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ABSTRACT

The research presented in this study focuses on the hypothesis that there are consistent patterns of school desegregation and racial attitudes in the South and urban North which can be empirically derived and mathematically described through the simultaneous use of ecological and opinion data. Findings relating to the public school desegregation process in Texas, attitudes of white and Negro Texas toward racial desegregation, racial voting and attitudes in the urban North, and attitudes toward parental control of public schools are considered as supporting the hypothesis. The findings led to the tentative formulation of two middle-range theories. The first, on the operation of attitude climates in the desegregation process, was explicitly sought; and the second, on the attitude effects of dramatic events, was held to be an unexpected dividend of the project's research approach. New research methods utilized in the study included: a method of simulating attitude climates for areas smaller than the original sampling frames of the surveys used; establishment of a 200-survey library of race survey data; adaptation of a number of aggregate analysis techniques to study racial voting across urban precincts; and, two new uses of established methods for contextual models of school desegregation. Policy implications for public education encompass racial desegregation in the South, basis of white resistance in the North, and parental control of public schools. (RJ)

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A STUDY OF SCHOOL INTEGRATION

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August 1970

The research reported herein was performed pursuant to a contract with the Office of Education, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Contractors undertaking such projects under Government sponsorship are encouraged to express freely their professional judgment in the conduct of the project. Points of view on opinions stated do not, therefore, necessarily represent official Office of Education position or policy.

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Acknowledgments

This Final Report presents the findings of a three-year research project which extended from 1966 to 1969. From the initial ideas which led to the research proposal to the writing of this last Report, the project has been a collective effort involving in varying degrees the ideas and services of twenty-seven individuals. Whatever merit the Report may have is due to this collective effort; and this page affords the opportunity to thank each person specifically.

J. Michael Ross was a graduate student in Harvard's Social Psychology Doctoral Program in 1965; he actively participated in the pilot work for the project and later served as its first Associate Director before becoming an Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of California at Santa Barbara. His work is directly represented in Chapter Eight and Appendices D and E of the Final Report; but his initial spadework is reflected throughout.

Robert T. Riley, also at the time a graduate student in Harvard's Social Psychology Doctoral Program, became the project's Associate Director in 1967 and served in this position through the duration of the project. His work is directly represented in Chapters Two, Four, Five, and Seven as well as in Appendix A. But actually his many ideas for original analyses and his day-and-night dedication to the project's research is reflected throughout the volume.

Four additional graduate members of the Department of Social Relations of Harvard University also contributed directly to these pages. Reeve Vanneman's analyses are found in sections of Chapters Three and Seven; and Andrew Walker's analyses are found in Chapter Six. Michael Schwartz, now on the staff of the State University of New York at Stoney Brook, and Dr. Donald Olivier, now an Assistant Professor of Psychology at Harvard University, developed the interesting unweighted means trend analysis technique employed in Chapter Three and described in Appendix B.

There would be no Report at all were it not for the efforts of the four secretaries who at various times served the project: Mrs. Ariel Dance, Mrs. Phyllis Brown, Dr. Laura Corwin, and Mrs. Shirley Roses. In addition, Mrs. Roses typed and oversaw the production of the Final

Report, and served part-time as a Research Assistant.

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I would like to express my sincere appreciation to all of these persons for their invaluable assistance.

Thomas F. Pettigrew
Professor of Social Psychology
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Chapter One

Introduction

Like the weather, American race relations is a much-discussed topic that has only recently begun to be systematically studied. Such investigation has not come any too soon, of course, with the nation in the grips of a severe racial crisis the depth and nature of which it at best dimly understands.

The area of race relations remained for many years an isolated ghetto of its own within social science. It attracted surprisingly few specialists and was relatively little influenced by the general progress and growing sophistication of the social sciences as a whole. For the first third of this century, the field kept largely to an armchair level of analysis, typically devoid of both empirical support and links to more general theory. By the late thirties and early forties, however, a number of empirical studies combined with incisive, data-based interpretations began to appear. These studies of the second third of the century are now the true classics of the field: Davis, Gardner, and Gardner's Deep South (1941), Dollard's Caste and Class in a Southern Town (1937), Drake and Cayton's Black Metropolis (1945), Frazier's The Negro Family in the United States (1939), Klineberg's Negro Intelligence and Selective Migration (1935), and Myrdal's An American Dilemma (1944). Save for Klineberg, these volumes stressed the social and institutional factors in race relations.

Special attention to individual factors awaited World War II and interest in the character structure which generated enthusiasm for Hitler's movement and comparable phenomena. The famous University of California study, The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford, 1950), together with such companion studies as Bettelheim and Janowitz's Dynamics of Prejudice (1950), employed a psychoanalytic framework and inspired a decade of intensive work on the relationships between personality and prejudice. By the early fifties, Allport (1954) could draw upon enough empirical work to write his famous, psychologically-oriented volume, The Nature of Prejudice, and Simpson and Yinger (1953) could write the initial edition of their highly-regarded, sociologically-oriented volume, Racial and Cultural Minorities.

Yet distinct traces of its ghetto past remain in evidence in the field of race relations. Even in the investigation of southern racial patterns since 1954, limited case studies are the rule. Low budget reports on only one community predominate; many of them are theses or seminar projects, some remain on the descriptive level, all but a few sample only one time period, and there is almost no comparability of instruments and approach. More comprehensive and focused work is obviously long overdue.

Efforts are only beginning now, as we enter the final third of the century, to bring to bear the full theoretical and empirical resources of social science to the study of intergroup processes. The Shibutani and Kwan (1965) attempt in Ethnic Stratification to apply systematically general social stratification theory to intergroup relations throughout the world is an interesting step in this direction. Especially important is the Blalock (1967) attempt in Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations to organize much of the field and present ninety-seven basic, testable, and interrelated propositions. Blalock's successful tour-de-force is reminiscent of the pioneer effort in this direction by Williams (1947), The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions. We shall have occasion to draw upon propositions from these sources later in this volume.

Empirical work has also lagged. While there has been an over-abundance of published research articles relevant to the field, the application of more sophisticated methods to the study of race relations has been rare. Here, too, the sixties have witnessed some promising beginnings. As one example, the Duncans (1969) offer initial empirical answers to two broad and practical questions: Does socialization in a matriarchal family reduce the chances for later occupational success for Negro and non-Negro males? And if so, does this factor account for a large part of the occupational differences between Negro and non-Negro males? Employing nationally-representative census data and an array of modern techniques to control for the many relevant variables, they tentatively conclude that being reared in families without a father does indeed lower the probability of later attaining relatively high-status employment for both Negroes and non-Negroes. But this factor accounts for only a relatively small amount of the racial discrepancies in male occupations.[1]

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[1] The Duncans' important research was carried out under Contract Number OE-5-85-072 of the United States Office of Education; and is an extension of the work reported in: P. M. Blau and O. D. Duncan, 1967.

Inspired by the significant work of Blalock, the Duncans, and others, the present study is a systematic attempt to apply more general theory and modern research methods to the study of racial change in public education.

A Contextual Approach

One of the primary barriers to the field's progress to date has been the relative separation within the study of American race relations between structural factors on the one side and psychological factors on the other. Thus, we have noted that the structural aspects of the problem were emphasized in the thirties, while the personality correlates of prejudice were emphasized in the forties and fifties. But seldom have these equally-critical sets of considerations been juxtaposed, been placed in contextual relationship to each other. This goal, too, awaits attention in the work of the last third of the century. Consequently, the research reported here has been designed within a contextual framework that treats the social and individual levels as equally important.

Not surprisingly, then, there are two, almost completely separate, literatures relevant to the process of racial change in public education. The first consists of the demographic and ecological studies of racial phenomena in the South; the second consists of opinion surveys on racial attitudes throughout the nation.

The first of these literatures is reviewed in detail in Chapter Two. Suffice it here to mention that ecological studies of southern race relations began in 1930 with research on where southern lynchings tended to occur (Southern Commission on the Study of Lynching, 1931; Raper, 1933). This approach has since been extended to the study of segregationist voting in the South and the North, and directly to the prediction of school desegregation patterns since the 1954 ruling of the United States Supreme Court against *de jure* public school segregation (Pettigrew, 1957; Pettigrew and Cramer, 1960; Pettigrew, 1965; Vanfossen, 1968; Winer, 1964). Repeatedly, this research has isolated consistent patterns of racial change. For the South, these patterns are comprised of variables related to: (1) urbanism, (2) the Negro, (3) economic prosperity, and (4) traditionalism. Chapter Two extends this work for the process of school desegregation in Texas; and Chapter Six extends it for racial voting in the urban North.

The public opinion literature on race relations traces its origins back to the thirties and the first surveys to employ systematic sampling procedures. And most of the major survey agencies, such as the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago (NORC), the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan (SRC), the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup's AIPO), and the Roper polls, have been asking questions relevant to American race relations over the last three decades (see Appendix C). And we shall review the trends detected by these agencies in later chapters.

Our own data collected by this project further substantiate the trends detected in these earlier studies. Surveys conducted in Texas, Gary, Indiana, and Cleveland, Ohio are thoroughly consistent with earlier opinion findings and allow us to make these results specifically relevant to public school desegregation in both the South and North. These discussions will be made in Chapters Three, Seven and Eight.

A truly social psychological analysis of racial desegregation requires equal attention to both social structural and individual data and their subtle interplay. From this social psychological perspective, then, each of these two research literatures has what the other lacks. On the one hand, ecological studies are subject to the often-committed "ecological fallacy"; that is, such studies do not allow statements about individuals save in extremely limiting cases (Duncan and Davis, 1953; Menzel, 1950; Robinson, 1950; Selvin, 1958). A classic instance of the fallacy was committed by Emile Durkheim (1897), for instance, when he assumed that individual Protestants must have been committing suicide far more than individual Roman Catholics because predominantly Protestant areas had consistently higher suicide rates than predominantly Roman Catholic areas. As it turned out, Durkheim was correct. But it was at least possible, given only the ecological data by areas, that individual Roman Catholics accounted for most of the suicide in predominantly Protestant areas because of oppression, religious isolation, or some other conditions found largely in Protestant areas. In short, ecological analyses typically require additional data on individuals directly, additional data uniquely well supplied by probability surveys.

On the other hand, survey data need to be placed in their proper structural context. Beyond mere background information on the respondent -- e.g., age, sex, occupation, education, region, size of community -- structural characteristics of the respondent's community are needed. And many of these characteristics are not mere totals of individual data -- "the cumulative fallacy," we might call it, as the converse of "the ecological fallacy." Nor can respondents typically supply in the interview situation the social data needed, such as the growth rate of the area's value added by manufacturing since

1900. The required structural perspective, then, is uniquely well supplied by ecological analyses. Indeed, the explanatory power of the two approaches together is only now becoming widely recognized in social science; typically, such investigations go under the titles of "contextual" or "climate" studies (e.g., Coleman, 1961; Davis, 1961; Levin, 1961; Michael, 1961; Sills, 1961).

The present research, then, aims to extend what is known on both the structural and individual levels. But it also ambitiously attempts to bring these two literatures together by combining our results from the two approaches into crude contextual models of racial change. Since this effort in part breaks new ground, these models are necessarily first approximations of what we believe can be derived eventually. But since a social psychological analysis of racial change requires attention to both sets of data, these crude beginnings are better than none at all. We shall also note in Chapter Five that the two levels, structural and individual, each has what the other lacks, so that even these rough contextual models have surprising explanatory power.

The central hypothesis of the study, then, is simply that: There are consistent patterns of school desegregation and related attitudes in the South and urban North which can be empirically-derived and mathematically-described through the simultaneous use of ecological and opinion data.

Outline of the Study

Race relations in the South and North are significantly different in many ways, though in a rather distressing manner they are growing to resemble each other. The South is slowly emerging from a pattern of racial separation embedded in three-and-a-half centuries of slavery and *de jure* segregation. Slow as this process has been, however, it has involved enough progress to be clearly evident to both white and Negro Southerners. But with its race relations restricted to urban areas, the North's embedded pattern of so-called *de facto* segregation allows change at an even slower and less evident pace. Consequently, contrasting regional models and approaches are required; and so we have divided our discussion by region.

Part I concentrates on the South in general and Texas in particular. We chose to focus our southern investigations upon Texas for three compelling reasons. First, Texas is a large state and thus affords a relatively large number of units for analysis. Of its 254 counties, 187 have one per cent or more Negroes in their population and constitute our test population. Second, it is the only southern state known to us to boast a competent, statewide survey agency -- Belden Associates of Dallas. This firm has cooperated closely with the project, and added project items to their regular state surveys on four occasions. Finally, Texas includes contrasting areas which resemble the variety of the southern region. East Texas is indistinguishable from the "Black Belt" of the deep South with which it joins at the Louisiana and Arkansas borders. Central Texas typifies in many ways the middle South -- the non-Black Belt portions of Arkansas, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Virginia. And West Texas approximates the border South, though it has a definite southwestern flavor unlike any border state save Oklahoma.

Chapter Two considers the ecology of southern desegregation. After reviewing previous research on the South at large, findings on the process of public school desegregation in Texas are presented in detail. Distinctive patterns are found for each of the three areas of the state; and these patterns are in line with the results of earlier studies, though they introduce greater complexity.

Chapter Three presents data on the opinions of white and Negro Texans toward racial change. Special attention is given to attitudes on pupil and teacher desegregation viewed separately, and to the sharp attitude shifts that occurred over the eventful spring of 1968. This brief season witnessed both the issuance of the much-publicized Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders ("the Kerner Commission") and the wanton slaying of Dr. Martin Luther King; and by happenstance it fell mid-way between the four Belden surveys conducted for the project in Texas. The attitude changes of both white and Negro Texans wrought by these events are not only significant in themselves, but point to a new and general hypothesis about the effects of dramatic events upon public opinion.

Chapter Four utilizes new methods in order to relate these attitudes to the state's process of public school desegregation. With simulated estimates of the white racial opinion climate of each county, consistent and meaningful relationships with school desegregation are found apart from directly ecological considerations.

The final southern discussion, Chapter Five, combines the ecological and attitude data into contextual models of desegregation in the public schools of Texas as a whole and each of its three major regions. Path analysis techniques reveal that racial opinion climate acts largely as a basic mediator of the ecological relationships with racial change, an interesting finding from which we derive particular types of contextual models. Moreover, this mediating role of attitude climate appears to be most critical in Black-Belt-like East Texas.

Part II turns attention to the urban North. Chapter Six analyzes in ecological terms racial voting patterns in Boston, Gary, and Cleveland. Boston is the scene of repeated campaigns for political office by Mrs. Louise Day Hicks, a leading symbol of white resistance to public school integration in the North. In 1961, 1963, and 1965, she successfully ran for the Boston School Committee, in 1967 she lost in a bid for mayor, and in 1969 she won election to the City Council. Gary and Cleveland are chosen because of the successful bids in 1967 for mayor by two Negro candidates, Richard Hatcher and Carl Stokes. In addition, the 1968 vote for Governor George Wallace of Alabama for President of the United States is analyzed in Gary. Consistent patterns of white voting are uncovered in these elections, though they are considerably more complex than the typically simple accounts of the mass media. These ecological analyses provide a valuable overview and perspective with which to evaluate more detailed opinion data.

Chapter Seven extends the northern discussion by analyzing in some detail project surveys of whites and Negroes in the racially-critical cities of Gary and Cleveland. A sample of 258 white adult males was drawn and interviewed in Gary during the fall of 1968; and samples of 480 white adults and 400 Negro adults were drawn and interviewed in Cleveland during the spring of 1969. In the context of more general positions on race, attitudes toward racial change in general and school change in particular are analyzed intensively. Attention is also given to the relationships between these attitudes and personal aspirations and political orientations.

A different approach to the analysis of opinion change is presented in Chapter Eight. Using a series of eighteen Gallup polls which asked the same racial question repeatedly, a cyclical model is put forward as the best fit for changes in both Negro and white responses over the period from 1962 through 1966. Once again the model is crude but suggestive. Apparently, national opinion shifts are meaningfully related to dramatic events in a manner similar to that noted in Chapter Three for Texas changes during the spring of 1968. This analysis, incidentally, also demonstrates the power and utility of combining surveys, a technique made possible by the project's time-consuming development of a two-hundred survey library of racial data (described in Appendix C).

Part III draws the threads of the study together. Chapter Nine briefly reviews the variety of interesting findings uncovered by the research, the middle-range theory of the attitude effects of dramatic events which emerges in Chapters Three and Eight, and the new research methods which are successfully developed and applied. The chapter and report then closes with a discussion of a number of policy implications for public education which are suggested by the results.

PART I

RACIAL SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE SOUTH

Chapter Two

The Ecology of Southern Desegregation

It is obvious even to the casual observer that racial change over the past generation has not developed uniformly over the South. Some areas readily complied, for example, with the 1954 Supreme Court ruling against *de jure* racial segregation in the public schools. Other areas resisted until direct pressure was brought upon them. Many others have resisted strenuously throughout the intervening years and still cannot boast significant educational desegregation. What underlies this pattern of acceptance and resistance? Is it predictable? This chapter will attempt to account for this pattern of change in ecological terms alone, in terms of census variables by counties. In the following chapters, we shall attempt to account for this pattern in terms of public opinion; and then we shall combine the ecological and public opinion data in order to derive a contextual explanation.

Previous Relevant Research

One of the first demographic and ecological analyses of southern racial phenomena was produced by the Southern Commission on the Study of Lynching (1931; Raper, 1933). The Commission's detailed and pioneer investigation of the twenty-one lynchings of 1930 disclosed that the areas with lynchings tended to differ sharply and systematically from those without lynchings. Later studies have successfully analyzed in ecological terms the consistent patterns of residential segregation in southern cities (Schnore and Evenson, 1966; Taeuber and Taeuber, 1965), of racial disparities in education, income, occupation, and housing quality (Bahr and Gibbs, 1967; Blalock, 1957, 1959; Glenn, 1964, 1966), of Negro voting registration (Daniel, 1969; Matthews and Prothro, 1966), of Negro homicide (Pettigrew and Spier, 1962), and even of the voting records on international issues of southern congressmen (Lerche, 1964).

Particularly important for our present focus are studies which have ecologically traced trends in desegregation attitudes (Lamanna, 1961; Pettigrew, 1957A; Pettigrew, 1958; Pettigrew, 1959), of desegregation voting (Grunbaum, 1964; Heer, 1959; Jennings and Ziegler, 1964; Key, 1949; Lustig, 1962; Ogburn and Grigg, 1956; Pettigrew and Campbell, 1960), and of school desegregation directly (Pettigrew, 1957B; Pettigrew and Cramer, 1959; Pettigrew, 1965; Vanfussen, 1968; and Winer, 1964). The factors which this research has consistently isolated as critical in southern race relations can be heuristically subsumed under four interrelated classifications: variables related to (1) urbanism, (2) the Negro, (3) economic prosperity, and (4) traditionalism.

(1) Urbanism. Southern racial phenomena are closely linked to measures of urbanism. Thus, lynching has been a predominantly rural technique. Many southern cities have never had a recorded lynching[1]-- e.g., Fayetteville in Arkansas; Durham, Wilmington, and Winston-Salem in North Carolina; Amarillo and Austin in Texas; and Norfolk, Portsmouth, and Richmond in Virginia. And only one city, New Orleans (29 lynch victims since 1882), ranks among the areas of very high incidence.[2] Moreover, for a 30-year period in 14 southern states, the number of deaths by lynching per 10,000 population was inversely proportional to the size of the county; for example, a resident of a county of less than 10,000 people was in 60 times as much danger of being lynched as a resident of an urban county of 300,000 or more people (Young, 1928).

More recently, residential segregation in southern cities has come in for ecological attention. The Taeubers (1965) have shown that southern cities as a group are today the most racially segregated by housing of any region. This was not the case in 1940. But from 1940 to 1950, cities throughout the nation became more segregated; and from 1950 to 1960, southern cities continued to grow more racially separate by residence while non-southern cities as a group became slightly less segregated residentially (Taeuber and Taeuber, 1965). While "racial choice" and economics are involved in this pattern, Taeuber and Taeuber (1965) demonstrate convincingly that the major factor behind residential segregation is blatant and direct racial discrimination. The average Taeuber segregation index score for southern cities in 1960 is 90.9, which means 91% of each city's Negroes would have to move to an all-white block before a racially-random pattern would be achieved (Taeuber and Taeuber, 1965, p. 37). Yet the index on social class segregation between white social classes is only about half this figure.

Schnore and Evenson (1966) have investigated housing segregation between southern cities, and they find that age of city correlates *negatively* with racial segregation in 1960. Thus, old cities, such as Charleston, South Carolina (79.5), Macon, Georgia (83.7), and New Orleans, Louisiana (86.3), tend to boast lower indices than modern cities, such as Atlanta, Georgia (93.6), Dallas, Texas (94.6), and Miami, Florida (97.9) (Taeuber and Taeuber, 1965, pp. 40-41). Schnore and Evenson believe that this is a twentieth-century carry-over of old urban slavery patterns, where lower-status Negroes live near upper-status whites in a type of "backyard desegregation." At any rate, this pattern, too, is breaking down; from 1940 to 1960, the Charleston, South Carolina index rose steeply from 60.1 to 79.5, the Macon, Georgia index from 74.9 to 83.7 and the New Orleans, Louisiana index from 81.0 to 86.3 (Taeuber and Taeuber, 1965, pp. 40-41).

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[1] This is according to the Tuskegee Institute record of lynching since 1882.

[2] Many of these victims in New Orleans, it should be noted, were white.

The Schnore and Evenson finding raises an interesting complication in understanding the urban factor and southern race relations. We shall see shortly that school desegregation tends to advance relatively rapidly in the region's more prosperous, *newer* cities, slowly in its less prosperous, older cities (Winer, 1964). This contradiction in findings, however, is more apparent than real. Bahr and Gibbs (1967) have shown that residential segregation is not an accurate indicator of other racial phenomena. Analyzing 1960 data from thirty-three randomly-selected Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA's) throughout the nation, they note no relationship between residential segregation and racial discrepancies in education, occupation, and income. This contrasts with the consistently positive associations between educational, occupational, and income differences between Negroes and whites. Indeed, for their sample of thirteen southern cities, Bahr and Gibbs discovered that residential segregation is actually *negatively* correlated with racial educational (-.32), occupational (-.12), and income differences (-.14). Thus, there is no conflict between the Schnore and Evenson results and those of Winer. Older southern cities tend to have both less residential segregation *and* greater racial discrimination in other realms.

Blalock (1959) has pursued these matters further. He analyzed 1950 racial discrepancies in home ownership, overcrowding, income, and education in 150 randomly-chosen southern counties. In contrast to the usual expectations, he did not find these discrepancies smaller in urban counties once Negro population percentages were held constant. In fact, he actually obtained *positive* correlations between income and educational differentials, on the one hand, and urban population percentages, on the other. This does *not* mean that Negro Southerners in urban areas do not enjoy higher living standards than those residing in rural areas. But it does show that white Southerners residing in cities enjoy relatively even higher standards when compared to those residing in rural areas.

Another reversal from common expectations about urbanism is provided by Matthews and Prothro (1966). They found per cent urban population did not relate to 1958 Negro voting registration in counties across the South; and it actually relates negatively to white voting registration. Likewise, in more recent analyses, Daniel (1969) found per cent of Negroes living in urban areas to relate negatively with Negro voting registration across Alabama counties in both 1960 (-.22) and 1966 (-.26).

Lerche (1964) provides an interesting indicator of the urban effect on southern liberalism. In studying the voting records of southern congressmen on international issues, he found them directly related to the degree of urbanization of the various congressional districts. Only a tenth of the most conservative representatives came from districts with at least two-thirds of their populations living in urban areas; this contrasts with 37% of the most liberal representatives (Lerche, 1964, p. 193).

Southern segregationist voting is generally related to urbanism, too. Ogburn and Grigg (1956) noted that only 61% of the white voters in Virginian communities larger than 5,000 people, as opposed to 72% of other white voters in Virginia, supported a pro-segregationist issue in 1956. And after the effects of the Negro ratio variable are partialled out, urbanism is found to be negatively related to a 1966 Arkansas vote on segregation, though the correlation is small and not statistically significant (Pettigrew and Campbell, 1960).

Moreover, segregationist politicians in the South usually run better in the rustic regions than in the cities. Heer (1959) has shown that Strom Thurmond's South Carolinian vote by counties for President on the pro-segregation "Dixiecrat" ticket was positively correlated to the percentages of rural-farm whites (+.37); and Pettigrew and Campbell (1960) have shown that Orval Faubus' vote by counties in the 1958 Arkansas gubernatorial primary was positively related to the percentages of rural-farm people in the county populations (+.40).[3] Key sums it up: "The growth of cities contains the seeds of political change for the South. In almost every type of analysis urban political behavior differs significantly from that of the rural areas. Apart from other political consequences of urbanism, cities seem to be less dominated in their political behavior than rural areas by consideration of the race question." (Key, 1949, p. 673)

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[3] The rural-farm correlation was only +.17 with the Faubus vote in the July 1954 gubernatorial primary when he made no anti-desegregation appeal.

Key's generalization usually holds true when large areas are considered, but detailed work on small areas present a more complex picture. Of special interest to our work is Grunbaum's (1964) ecological research on a Texas school desegregation referendum held in 1956. He matched three pairs of Texas subregions, with each pair containing contiguous districts only one of which had any schools desegregated in the late 1950's. Urbanism related in a variety of ways across counties within each of these subregions, with three positive and three negative correlations.

Nevertheless, cities are somewhat more prepared to desegregate their public schools than other southern areas. In a crude analysis across the seventeen southern and border states, Vanfossen (1968) found a small positive zero-order correlation (+.15) between the 1960 per cent of population residing in urban areas and the per cent of the Negro student population attending school with white students in 1965-66. A 1957 study (Pettigrew, 1957B) analyzed the county patterns of school desegregation within the states of Kentucky and Missouri; and this more detailed work found a stronger association with urbanism. Thus, all twenty-four counties in these states that were predominantly urban (50%+) had desegregated by May of 1957, compared to only three-fourths of the partially urban (1-49%) and slightly less than half of the totally rural counties.

Pettigrew and Cramer (1959) performed a more extensive ecological analysis of school desegregation by counties, and their findings help to clarify the role of urbanism in the process. These investigators used the date of the first desegregation within a county as their dependent variable, and related this to twenty-two census variables across counties within the five border states of Texas, Oklahoma, Missouri, Kentucky, and West Virginia. Three variables proved most predictive: per cent population in urban areas, per cent Negro, and per cent of adult white women in the labor force. Moderate positive zero-order relationships with urbanism were found, ranging from +.13 to +.39, but when the other two variables were partialled out, these relationships were reduced sharply in four of the five states. In the final three-variable predictive regressions, whose multiple correlations ranged from +.45 to +.72, urbanism proved far less critical than the Negro percentage variable.

We may sum up our consideration of the urban variable by commenting that it is, of course, important for southern racial phenomena; but, perhaps, not as critical as past observers have thought. To be sure, cities are more "liberal," more prepared for racial change. Yet many of the studies cited suggest that cities are different in this way less because of urbanism *per se* than other factors typically associated with urbanism.

A critic might reasonably argue that this is an artifact of measurement, that "per cent residing in urban areas" is a brittle indicator at best of true "urbanism," that the confounding factors are themselves often indicators of a broader and more adequate concept of "urbanism." We tend to agree in part with this point of view; but this raises problems of definition and multicollinearity to which we shall return at later points. For the present, however, note that studies which did not control on such relevant variables as Negro population percentage were more likely to find substantial relationships with urbanism as defined than other studies which did. Let us turn, then, to a discussion of these other variables.

(2) *The Negro*. The relative numbers and condition of the Negro population in various areas are consistently among the best predictors of southern racial phenomena. Again a critic can argue that this is hardly surprising since the numbers and condition of Negro Southerners are themselves racial phenomena. In a sense, then, Negro variables are dependent more than independent variables.

Yet in a time and cumulative process sense, directly racial factors make the most meaningful independent variables of all. For example, the principal dimension, per cent Negro population, has been relatively constant across southern counties since the slavery period.[4] Likewise, the percentage of a county's Negro labor force which is in white collar jobs actually taps employment practices of the area during the previous two decades or more. Thus, Negro variables introduce the time perspective into our ecological analysis, allowing us to grasp better the cumulative nature of the South's racial change. In addition, as we shall note in Winer's (1964) data, these variables allow us to tap the Negro community's present capacity to demand change as well as the white community's past capacity to resist it.

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[4] We have, for example, obtained correlations between per cent Negro in 1860 and 1960 from +.80 and +.95 across counties in a number of southern states!

Consider lynching once again. Though the state of Mississippi as a whole and many Black Belt counties throughout the South have been the scene of a vast number of lynchings in absolute terms, the ratio of Negroes in the total population is actually *inversely* related to lynchings when they are calculated per 10,000 Negroes in the population (Commission on the Study of Lynching, 1931; Raper, 1933). That is, controlling for the size of the Negro community, counties with relatively few Negroes have tended to have the *highest* lynching rates. Early investigators thus concluded that the more stable and rooted racial traditions of the Black Belt acted as a paternalistic protection for the mass of Negroes who furnished the cheap labor required by the area's economy.

But these same stable traditions make the Black Belt the bastion of segregationist sentiment. Again using the county as the unit of analysis, the Arkansas and Virginia segregationist votes correlated highly (+.64[5] and +.67) with the Negro population percentages (Ogburn and Grigg, 1956; Pettigrew and Campbell, 1960). And the 1948 Thurmond Presidential votes in Arkansas (Key, 1949, p. 343) and in South Carolina (+.67 in Heer, 1959) and the 1958 Faubus gubernatorial primary vote in Arkansas (+.19 in Pettigrew and Campbell, 1960) also related positively with the proportions of Negroes in the population. Indeed, Key (1949) noted a strong and similar relationship in the Tennessee secession vote of 1861.

The two segregationist votes of 1956 in Arkansas and in Virginia were also significantly associated with the county levels of Negro education. Even after the Negro percentage factor is partialled out, median years of Negro education correlates -.45 in Arkansas (Pettigrew and Campbell, 1960) and -.60 in Virginia (Ogburn and Grigg, 1956) with pro-segregationist voting. Thus, it is those counties with large percentages of relatively uneducated Negroes that form the core of segregationist political power in the South.

Grunbaum (1964) took a closer look by analyzing specific subregions of Texas. In six of these areas, he obtained the expected negative associations, ranging from -.10 to -.65, between per cent Negro population and voting for desegregation. But in a seventh subregion, East Texas, he obtained a moderately positive correlation (+.28). East Texas, as we shall discuss in detail later, is the Black Belt area of the state. Most white voters in this subregion, precinct data suggest, did vote against desegregation; and if we had a pure measure of white voting it, too, would almost surely provide a reasonably large negative relationship with per cent Negro population. But the Negro vote in East Texas, larger than in most Black Belt areas of the South, has apparently made the difference and caused the exceptional positive correlation. This should remind us that in voting studies using the Negro population proportion variable, either a relatively pure white vote must be isolated or it must be assumed that few Negroes voted if the negative relationship is to be found as in past studies.

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[5] As opposed to the Pearsonian product-moment coefficients routinely reported, this is a Kendall rank correlation coefficient.

In this connection, two studies have ecologically investigated the variance in Negro voting registration over the South (Daniel, 1969; Matthews and Prothro, 1966). The voting registration of Negroes across southern counties in 1958 proved most highly related to per cent Negro population (-.46). And the greater presence of Negro middle-class citizens further aided the registration percentage, for per cent of Negroes in the labor force with white-collar jobs related positively with Negro registration (+.23) even after per cent Negro population is partialled out (+.15).

Daniel (1969) updates this work by showing the genuine impact upon Negro registration in Alabama of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. He proves that the presence in a county of local Negro candidates and of Federal electoral examiners under the Act each contributed about equally in raising voting registration of Negro citizens by 1966. And since these two factors have been more likely in the previously most resistant counties covered by the Act, this swift change has the interesting property of reversing the sign on the correlations with Negro voting registration on six of the seven ecological variables employed by Daniel. For example, per cent Negro population related -.66 with Negro registration in 1960 and +.43 in 1966! This provides a dramatic illustration of how ecological analysis can pinpoint basic structural change in southern race relations.

Glenn (1964, 1966) has explored the relationships among SMSA's between the Negro population proportion variable and various status measures of both races. First, he demonstrated that, for the 151 largest SMSA's throughout the United States in 1950, Negro male occupational status is relatively constant across metropolitan areas of varying Negro population percentages (Glenn, 1964). This failure to relate occupational status to Negro percentages, however, masks the fact that metropolitan areas with relatively small Negro communities do tend to have somewhat greater percentages of lower-level Negro white-collar workers, while areas with large Negro communities tend to have somewhat greater percentages of upper-level Negro blue-collar workers.

Later, Glenn (1966) related 1960 racial discrepancies to Negro population percentages in SMSA's throughout the country. He revealed positive associations among southern cities between Negro percentages and white status variables. Glenn concluded that racial discrimination in this sense primarily "benefited" middle-class white Southerners, especially housewives and workers in managerial, sales, and upper-level manual occupations.

It is not surprising, then, that Negro variables comprise the most critical predictors of school desegregation. Vanfossen (1968), in accounting for the 1965 range of Negro pupil percentages in school with whites across seventeen southern and border states, discovered per cent Negro population the most important of fourteen independent variables (-.78). Indeed, her three next most critical predictors were also Negro measures: 1959 median income of Negro males (+.72); Negro-white ratio of 1959 male income (+.75); and median school years completed for Negroes over 24 years old (+.68). No other variables employed by Vanfossen approached the predictive power of these Negro measures, not even comparable white measures such as 1959 white male income (+.44) or white median school years completed (-.10).

Winer (1964) obtained similar results. He studied the South's thirty-six SMSA's and defined desegregation both in terms of the relative number of biracial public facilities and the relative number of Negro school children involved. And he found both of these indicators of desegregation were far more related to census measures of the Negro population than of the white population. In particular, those southern urban areas with considerable desegregation in schools and other facilities tended to be those with relatively high percentages of prosperous, well-educated, and white-collar-employed Negro citizens. Even in rural Kentucky, an area sparsely populated by Negroes, the Negro ratio factor is associated with educational desegregation. Only half of the rural counties of Kentucky with 6% or more Negroes had started desegregating their public schools by May of 1957, but over two-thirds of those with less than 6% had started (Pettigrew, 1957B). A similar trend is not discernible, however, in rural Missouri, a border-state with even fewer rural Negroes than Kentucky.

In their research on the date of initial school desegregation by counties, Pettigrew and Cramer (1959) also found the Negro variable the most important in their three-factor prediction regression for all five border states tested. With per cent urban population and per cent adult white women in the labor force controlled, per cent Negro population correlations with desegregation ranged from -.34 to -.55.

The crucial importance of these Negro variables is amplified by a number of additional studies. Pettigrew and Spier (1962) have shown how state rates of Negro homicide are correlated with the per cent increase of the non-white population as well as "the homicidal culture" in which a state's Negroes have been reared; and Blalock (1957) has demonstrated that severe racial discrimination in many forms is centered in the Black Belt. Negro-white disparities in housing, education, and income are all correlated highly and positively with the non-white percentages of counties. That this blanket suppression is due in large degree to the steep traditionalism of the Black Belt is suggested by a variety of investigations. Dornbusch and Irle (1959) found that the 1955 vote by southern presbyteries against union with the northern Presbyterians was correlated +.57 with the non-white percentages of the general population. Key (1949) and Price (1957) have both noted southern counties with relatively few Negroes that politically behave quite similarly to the Black Belt; upon closer scrutiny, both observers discovered that these counties usually had quite large numbers of Negroes before out-migration radically changed the scene. In short, the traditional, anti-Negro norms of the Black Belt are the important factor; these norms can even cling on in an area long after the county's racial structure has changed.

Another study revealed how these Black Belt norms have sharp effects upon individual attitudes (Pettigrew, 1957A; Pettigrew, 1959). White adults in four small southern towns were randomly sampled, with two of the towns in the Black Belt (38% and 45% Negroes) and two outside of it (10% and 18% Negroes). Respondents in the Black Belt were significantly more anti-desegregation and anti-Negro than the other Southerners. But these two groups of Southerners were not significantly different in their authoritarian, F-scale responses. Note that this study was a preliminary step toward the contextual approach followed in the present research, where individual data are analyzed in their different social contexts.

The consistency in results of these varied studies lends considerable weight to the view that Negro variables are critical because they indicate not only the Negro community's ability to achieve change but even more fundamentally the traditional anti-Negro norms of an area. We shall soon review more evidence for this interpretation of traditionalism; but an alternative explanation provided by Ogburn and Grigg (1966) should also be mentioned. These writers argue for a type of "reality" principle. Whites in counties with a large Negro percentage and a low level of Negro education, they point out, are understandably more threatened by racial change. They face a bigger problem in effecting school desegregation, for example, and therefore oppose it more. This reasonable cause-and-effect interpretation may hold true for some white parents in the present. But it is a relatively small factor in explaining the persistence of such resistance over centuries in these same counties. More to the point is that pro-segregation attitudes and voting, long-term denial of the franchise to Negro citizens, and defiant resistance to school desegregation in these counties are manifestations of the same thing: historically-rooted cultural norms of racial discrimination.

(3) Economic Prosperity. Poverty has long been a southern fact of life. But when an area in the South does become more prosperous, it begins to enter the mainstream of American culture and all indices of race relations tend to improve. Such prosperity, of course, is closely related to the other classifications -- urbanism, the Negro, and traditionalism -- but it is helpful to review the effects of economic variables directly.

The counties in which the 1930 lynchings occurred were generally very poor. Relative to their states' averages, these counties tended to be deprived in terms of per capita tax valuation, per capita bank deposits, per capita farm and factory income, and farm and automobile ownership (Southern Commission of the Study of Lynching, 1931; Raper, 1933).

Similarly, the economically backward areas tend to vote heavily for segregation and segregationist candidates. In Virginia, the 1956 segregationist voting (Ogburn and Grigg, 1956) was correlated negatively with white family income (-.45) and positively with the percentage of families making less than $2,000 in 1949 (+.32). In South Carolina, Thurmond's 1948 Dixiecrat support came largely from counties with relatively small percentages of non-farming whites in manufacturing (-.53) (Heer, 1959). These variables are not as clearly associated, however, with the 1956 and 1958 votes for Governor Faubus, for rural prosperity is associated with high percentages of Negroes in Arkansas (Pettigrew and Campbell, 1960).

In his subregional study of the 1956 Texas desegregation referendum, Grunbaum (1964) found substantial positive correlations across counties between family income and pro-desegregation voting in four of seven areas. In the remaining three, the coefficients were all negative but small, and one of these areas had a considerable number of poor Mexican-Americans who voted for desegregation.

Voting analyses within metropolitan areas give a still more detailed view. Vander Zanden (1961) investigated the relationship of social class with white voting on segregationist referenda in fifteen cities in six southern states. In general, he found no consistent correlation, but one, Birmingham, Alabama, evidenced a distinctly direct correlation. However, Vander Zanden's methodology in many ways mixed oranges with apples and not surprisingly obtained mixed results. The referenda in various states varied widely, from closing schools to ending compulsory attendance laws, and hence should have had different social class appeals. Moreover, Vander Zanden employed largely impressionistic measures for social class in cities with sharply disparate social structures.

Better-controlled urban voting research clarifies the picture. Lustig (1962) looked at the Miami, Florida white southern vote by precinct in a 1958 Democratic party primary election for the state legislature between an incumbent integrationist and an outspoken segregationist. While other than racial considerations could have been involved, the vote for the integrationist candidate was significantly and positively correlated with both education (+.58) and income (+.48). Jennings and Ziegler (1964) investigated the 1962 election votes for a liberal, Charles Weltner, to the U.S. House of Representatives from Fulton and DeKalb Counties in Georgia (metropolitan Atlanta). Using precincts as the units of analysis, they also found education and income to relate positively three out of four times with Weltner's vote in the Democratic party primary once other variables were controlled. But once conservative, upper-status Republicans entered the general election, these partial correlations all turned moderately negative (-.26 to -.39) with the Weltner vote. In other words, in both the Lustig (1962) and Jennings and Ziegler (1964) investigations, voting for integrationist, Democratic politicians was positively related to social status variables within the dominant Democratic party; but in the general election, the relationships turn understandably negative since upper-status Republicans are likely to support the opponent for partisan reasons.

Lamanna (1961) employed a different methodology to study white attitudes toward school desegregation in Norfolk, Virginia. He drew a random sample of 626 white adults soon after the city had reopened its schools following a semester without public education in resistance to desegregation. Roughly 15% of the respondents favored desegregation, 59% opposed both the closing of schools and desegregation, and 26% favored closing schools to maintain segregation. Lamanna was surprised to find that these attitudes did not relate to either the respondent's school district or his proximity to Negro residential areas; but they did have a curvilinear association with the social class rank of their areas of residence. Low-social-rank areas tended to be the most liberal, middle-ranked areas the least. Lamanna suggests that the low-rank areas were most in favor of desegregation because they contained the most young people with school-aged children who could not afford private education.

In his attempt to relate integrationist voting of southern representatives to the House with characteristics of their districts, Lerche (1964, p. 202) noted that economic prosperity made a difference. The majority of the most liberal members (54%) came from the region's most affluent districts (with per capita income averages of $1,377 in 1949); in stark contrast, only a fifth of the most conservative members came from these districts.

Economic prosperity also relates strongly to the percentage of Negro voting registration in the South, but the direction of the relationship depends on whether one considers data from before or after the critical Voting Rights Act of 1965. For the whole South in 1958, the correlation across counties between Negro registration and the percentage of farms operated by tenants was -.32 and when per cent Negro population is partialled out was -.13 (Matthews and Prothro, 1966). And for Alabama in 1960, the correlation between the Negro registration and tenant variables was -.50; but this changed dramatically by 1966 to +.29 (Daniel, 1969). This suggests that the 1965 Act's focus upon poor southern counties with relatively large Negro percentages actually made Negro voting a more prevalent reality in these resistant areas.

Prosperity is also directly associated with school desegregation. In her study using the seventeen border and southern states as units, Vanfossen (1968) discovered social class variables to be her best predictors of statewide school desegregation save for per cent Negro population. As noted previously, Negro social variables were most vital: 1959 median income of Negro males (+.72); 1959 Negro income as a percentage of white income (+.75); and median school years completed by adult Negroes (+.68). But white social variables also yielded modest coefficients: 1959 median income of white males (+.44); and per cent of the total labor force in white-collar occupations (+.45).

And in both Kentucky and Missouri, the economically secure areas tended to desegregate their public schools first. Among totally rural counties, those which had started their educational desegregation programs by May of 1957 had significantly larger family incomes, more manufacturing, more valuable farms, and greater proportions of homes with central heating and mechanical refrigerators than those which remained segregated (Pettigrew, 1957B). Poverty breeds resistance.

In general, then, indicators of economic and social well-being for the general population are second only to directly Negro variables as predictors of southern racial phenomena.

(4) Traditionalism. Sections of the South that are rural, heavily Negro, and poor tend also to be the most traditional, particularly in regard to race. So this classification, too, is by no means independent of the others.

Contrary to common expectations, the less traditional areas tended to have the highest lynching rates, once the size of the Negro population is controlled. Lynching was typically a substitute for rooted racial norms; relative rates were highest in the "fringe" states, Florida, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Texas, and lowest in the long-established "Old South" states, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia.

In an effort to measure traditionalism statistically, investigators have employed two variables -- population change and the percentage of white women in the labor force. A stagnant area, losing population over the years, is assumed to be undergoing fewer pressures for social change than a rapidly expanding area. Likewise, an area that has relatively few of its white women employed is assumed to be more traditional because of the historically-rooted sanctions in the South against white women formally entering the labor force. County population increases from 1940 to 1950, for instance, have been noted to be moderately and negatively related to both the 1956 Virginia segregationist vote (Ogburn and Grigg, 1956), and the 1958 Arkansas primary vote for Faubus (Pettigrew and Campbell, 1960). The proportion of white women in the labor force was also negatively related to the 1958 Faubus primary returns (Pettigrew and Campbell, 1960).

Lerche (1964, p. 190) found, too, that internationalist voting among southern representatives could be related to population growth of their districts between 1950 and 1960. While 37% of the liberals won election in rapidly expanding areas (16.5%+), only 20% of the conservatives did so.

Grunbaum's (1964) research on subregions of Texas employs a special measure of traditionalism -- the percentage of Mexican-Americans residing in each county. On the assumption that the presence of Spanish-speakers breaks up racial traditions of the English-speakers, his findings in the two border regions which allow the use of this variable are of relevance. In both cases, as the traditionalism hypothesis would predict, the percentage of Mexican-Americans in the population was positively related with a desegregation vote. Grunbaum further observes that the relationship holds firmest in counties where Mexican-Americans do not constitute a majority -- presumably because of greater variance.

A number of these findings, such as Lerche's on internationalism, could possibly be accounted for in terms of a confounding of these traditionalism variables with urbanism. But these variables also predict school desegregation patterns directly even when urbanism is held constant. Thus, totally rural counties in Kentucky and Missouri that had begun their school desegregation programs by May of 1957 had tended to lose significantly fewer people from 1940 to 1950 than those counties that were still tightly segregated (Pettigrew, 1957B). Inasmuch as these variables tap traditionalism, it appears that the more traditional sections of the South vote more solidly for segregation and a candidate such as Faubus and resist school desegregation more effectively.

Perhaps, the strongest evidence of all comes from the use by Pettigrew and Cramer (1959) of the white-women-in-the-labor-force variable in their prediction of the timing of school desegregation in five border states. Zero-order correlations between the date of desegregation and the labor force variable varied between +.11 and +.43 as the traditionalism hypothesis would predict. When urbanism and per cent Negro population were partialled out, the coefficients varied between +.08 and +.29 for four states. For one state, West Virginia, the coefficient became -.22; and it seems significant that this is the one border state tested that had no pro-southern traditions dating from the Civil War and Reconstruction.[6]

Of twenty-two variables tested, the percentage-of-white-women-in-the-labor-force factor proved the second most important predictor together with urbanism. Only per cent Negro population was a better correlate. The three variables were combined in the final prediction equation and yielded multiple coefficients ranging from +.45 to +.63. A trial test of the equation on Maryland produced an even higher association of +.72. Six years later, the model was re-applied without alteration to three southern states -- Florida, North Carolina, and Tennessee (Pettigrew, 1965). Against the more rigorous test of predicting the complete county rank-order of public school desegregation, the old equation gave significant Kendall rank-order correlations of +.50, +.24, and +.18 respectively. Particularly close was the prediction for Florida: 16 of the 22 Floridian counties designated by the model as the easiest to desegregate had begun the process by the fall of 1963, compared with only 3 of the 23 designated as somewhat resistant and none of the 22 designated as most resistant.

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[6] Indeed, West Virginia was so pro-Union that it split from Virginia and became a separate state at the beginning of the Civil War. The other four states -- Missouri, Oklahoma, Kentucky, and Texas -- all had their "little Dixie" regions and strong pro-southern leanings, with Texas actually seceding from the Union.

It was the success of this preliminary ecological work that encouraged us to refine the prediction further for the state of Texas.

The Texas Ecological Model

For a more comprehensive attack upon this problem, we focused upon one key southern state and enlarged upon previous studies in three significant ways. We chose Texas because it has a large number of units for analysis (i.e., 187 counties with 1 per cent or more Negro population in 1960), sharp subregional variation within it, and the only established state-wide survey agency in the South. This final consideration is crucial for our attitude research reported in the later chapters. Our extensions beyond past work include: (1) a systematic expansion of the independent variables; (2) an expansion both in measurement and conception of the dependent variable; and (3) subregional as well as state-wide analyses. Each of these points deserves discussion as we review the results.

Expansion of Independent Variables. The past work just reviewed is characterized by an unsystematic approach to the selection of the independent variables. Usually only a few census indicators are tested; Pettigrew and Cramer (1959) with an original pool of twenty-two variables and Matthews and Prothro (1966) with twenty-one mark the most complete attempts to date. Yet the 1960 census directly provides approximately 150 variables at the county level, and many more could be constructed from these original 150.

Most of these 150 measures, of course, tap the same basic dimensions. Were we to regress the entire set upon school desegregation measures, a large number of the predictors would be strongly multicollinear -- that is, their high interrelationships guarantee that they will be accounting for much the same variance in desegregation. Hence, there is an initial need to reduce this sizable array down to a small number of orthogonal (i.e., independent) dimensions. Rather than attempt this crucial reduction on strictly *a priori* grounds, we employed a principal components factor analysis of the entire array and obtained through varimax rotation the eight orthogonal factors listed in Table 2-1.

Five of the factors are already familiar to us from our review of past studies. To cite rough labels, these five are: population size, urban-rural, manufacturing-farming, the Negro, and housing quality. One factor, Mexican-Americans, is among southern states special to Texas. Two others are partly discoveries of this factor analytic approach -- commercial farming and areas with prosperous, young white residents; and both of these new factors turn out to be significant predictors.

Expansion of Dependent Variables. Two different indices of school desegregation have been employed in past studies. The first to be used in the late fifties involved *the initiation* of desegregation (Pettigrew, 1957B; Pettigrew and Cramer, 1959). At the time these investigations were made, only the border states had begun the process. And even these states had typically involved only token numbers of students at best. So the only meaningful index then was to gage precisely when a county, city, or state first had one or more Negro pupils regularly attending school with white pupils.

Later research switched to a measure of *the extent* of the desegregation that had taken place at any point in time, for by the sixties enough change had occurred in many parts of the South to make possible this more comprehensive, if static, indicator. Both Winer (1964) and Vanfussen (1968) chose to use the percentage of all Negro public school children who were in school with whites in a specified area at one fixed time.

We decided on both theoretical and empirical grounds to employ both types of measures.[7] But we rejected the

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[7] The desegregation data used in this research were kindly provided by the U.S. Office of Education, and checked against data graciously supplied by the Southern Education Reporting Service of Nashville, Tennessee.

Table 2-1

Orthogonal Factors from 150-Census Variable Factor Analysis of Texas Counties, 1960[1]

Factor	Approximate Label	Latent Root	Rotated Sums of Squares
I	Population Size Factor	37.2	34.4
II	Urban-Rural Factor	11.8	5.1
III	Commercial Farming Factor	4.9	4.3
IV	Mexican-American Factor	4.4	2.4
V	Prosperous, Young White Residents Factor	3.7	10.9
VI	Farming-Manufacturing Factor	2.6	5.4
VII	Negro-American Factor	2.1	3.7
VIII	Housing Quality Factor	1.9	3.2

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[1] Principal components factor analysis was conducted followed by factor rotation subject to the varimax criteria.

percentage of Negro students in biracial schools as a measure of extent because it is subject to wide artifactual error. For instance, a school of five hundred Negro and ten white pupils would generally be allowed to add all five hundred Negroes to this total even though such handling of the data violates all meaningful conceptions of the process. Consequently, we chose a simpler, less-error-prone measure: namely, the percentage of public schools in biracial districts within a county which boasted biracial student bodies in 1965.

Complications were introduced by the fact that Texas has many more public school districts (2,024) than counties (254). But fortunately district lines do not cross county lines; so we faced only the task of aggregating the data from the biracial school districts within each of the 187 counties whose populations in 1960 were one per cent or more Negro. The date of desegregation *initiation* for any county, then, was the first year when even token desegregation began in one of its districts. Table 2-2 shows how values were assigned to comprise this variable and provides the number of Texas counties in each category. Observe that the highest assigned number, five, is given the counties which initiated the process earliest. This procedure later allows us to interpret a positive relationship as predicting desegregation progress, as is also true for our measure of extent. Note, too, that the frequency distribution reveals that the great majority of Texas counties did not start to dismantle their systems of school segregation until the middle sixties.

In aggregating over school districts within counties to derive the *extent* variable, we weighted each district's contribution by its number of students. Thus, large districts have proportionately special weight in a county's percentage; and the final index is consequently not a precise percentage of the biracial schools in a county. Furthermore, we eliminated all districts within which no Negroes reside. We deemed these procedures necessary because it is the entire county, not the effects of districts within the county, which is our focus.

The widespread notion that the *initiation* and *extent* of the school desegregation process are highly and positively associated proves not to be the case for Texas. It would seem reasonable that those counties which began their interracial schooling early would later be those with the most change. Yet our two measures are only weakly related (+.23) and have sharply different sets of ecological correlates. Table 2-3 shows the association between the two measures. In other words, some counties start early -- perhaps, under court order -- but do not proceed much beyond change in a few

Table 2-2

Initiation of Desegregation Variable[1]

Date of First School Desegregation		Assigned Score	Description	Frequency of Texas Counties
1954-1956	=	5	Early Compliance	36
1957-1959	=	4	Post-Little Rock Compliance	16
1960-1961	=	3	Early Kennedy Compliance	18
1962-1963	=	2	Late Kennedy Compliance	30
1964-1965	=	1	Forced Compliance[2]	87

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[1] Only 187 out of the 254 counties of Texas have one per cent or more Negroes in their populations in 1960.

[2] "Forced compliance" refers to the threat of withholding Federal school funds under Title IV of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

Table 2-3

Initiation vs. Extent of School Desegregation in Texas Counties[1]

		Percentage of Schools in County's Interracial School Districts with Students of Both Races, 1965				
		0-20	21-40	41-60	61-80	81+
Date of First Public School Desegregation in County	1954-56	5[2]	4	10	15	2
	1957-59	5	2	3	3	3
	1960-61	10	6	1	1	0
	1962-63	11	14	4	1	0
	1964-65	24	36	13	11	3

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[1] For the 187 Texas counties with one per cent or more of their 1960 populations Negro.

[2] Underlined cells represent extreme error cases. Note that there are 14 cases of each type of error -- the early initiators with relatively few schools desegregated by 1965 and the late initiators with relatively many schools desegregated by 1965.

schools; while some others start late but proceed with the process relatively rapidly. This phenomenon seriously challenges the widely-held notion that racial change in the South must be "gradual" if it is to be achieved at all. At any rate, our two indicators of school desegregation tap rather diverse aspects of the process and provide more perspective on its various aspects.

Factor Scores and Desegregation. Table 2-4 provides the associations between the eight ecological factors and both measures of school desegregation.[8] About two-fifths of the variance of both the initiation and extent indicators of desegregation is accounted for by these eight ecological factors. This figure compares quite favorably with similar efforts. Matthews and Prothro (1966), for example, explained 28 per cent of the variance in 1958 Negro voting registration across southern counties by twenty-one census variables. And Pettigrew and Cramer (1959) accounted for only 20 per cent of the variance in early Texas initiation of desegregation data with just three census variables.

More interesting, however, is the sharply contrasting pattern of correlates in Table 2-4 for the two indices of racial change. The *initiation* of desegregation is disproportionately related to Factors V, VI, and VII; while the *extent* of desegregation is disproportionately related to Factors II and III. Put more specifically, desegregation tended to be achieved earliest by Texas counties characterized by prosperous, young white residents, manufacturing, and relatively low percentages of Negroes.

By contrast, the *extent* of school desegregation is greatest in Texas counties with a large number of commercial farms and a large portion of its population living in *rural* areas. This surprising result may partly be a function of our particular measure of *extent*. Since rural counties have fewer schools to desegregate, it should be easier for them to attain a higher percentage of biracial schools. On the other hand, these findings also reflect the fact that so-called *de facto* segregation is less of a problem for rural than urban areas, and thus once begun the process can proceed more swiftly.

Specific Variables and Desegregation. The technique of regressing orthogonal factor scores, as shown in Table 2-4, is

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[8] Factor scoring assigns a score to each county as a function of its standardized measurement on a given variable and the variable loading on a given factor.

Table 2-4

Factor Score Associations with Initiation and Extent of Texas School Desegregation

Factor	Approximate Label	Initiation of School Desegregation		Extent of School Desegregation	
		Standardized Beta Weights	Unique Contributions	Standardized Beta Weights	Unique Contributions
I	Population Size Factor	+.11	1.2	+.17	2.9
II	Urban-Rural Factor	-.03	0.9	+.36	13.2
III	Commercial Farming Factor	+.17	2.9	+.43	18.3
IV	Mexican-American Factor	+.07	0.6	+.18	3.8
V	Prosperous, Young White Residents Factor	+.41	17.0	-.06	0.4
VI	Farming-Manufacturing Factor	+.27	7.5	-.04	0.2
VII	Negro-American Factor	+.29	8.5	+.13	1.7
VIII	Housing Quality Factor	+.07	0.4	-.07	0.3
R^2 (percentage of variance explained)			39.0%[1]		40.8%[1]
R (multiple correlation)			.62		.64

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[1] Since the eight factors are orthogonal, multicollinearity is no issue here and R^2 is a simple sum of the contributions of each factor in accounting for desegregation variance by counties.

analytically clean in that it avoids problems of multicollinearity and incompleteness. Yet it hinders precise theoretical interpretation, because a wide range of variables may load heavily on a given factor and a single variable may load heavily on more than one factur. Moreover, subregional variation cannot be accounted for with this technique. Factor structures are likely to shift from Black Belt-like East Texas to sparcely-populated West Texas, for example; and this undermines the basis of intersubregional comparisons.

To avoid these problems of interpretation inherent in the technique of regressing factor scores, another series of regressions were performed using census variables directly. But unlike previous efforts, these variables were carefully selected to meet three criteria: (1) each variable has a high loading on a critical factor; (2) each critical factor is represented by at least one key variable; and (3) each variable has a statistically significant correlation with at least one of the two desegregation measures. Since two of the factors, IV (the Mexican-American Factor) and VIII (the Housing Quality Factor), had neither significant relationships with desegregation nor had any highly-loaded variables which significantly related to desegregation, they are not represented in the list of variables.

Table 2-5 reveals the key variables chosen to meet these criteria together with their zero-order correlations with both initiation and extent of school desegregation across Texas counties. The seven variables chosen recall the earlier Pettigrew and Cramer (1959) four-factor paradigm: urbanism (per cent urban), Negro (Negro median education and per cent Negro population), economic prosperity (total commercial farms, median house value, and retail sales), and traditionalism (population change). And once again the diverse patterns of correlations emerge for the two dependent measures. While the signs are the same for all of the variables, different variables best predict initiation and extent. As with the factor scores, prosperity and Negro variables are the principal correlates of initiation, total commercial farms of extent.

Table 2-6 provides the results of the regressions employing these seven predictor variables on both indices of school desegregation. The prediction for initiation is almost as high as with the factor scores, with 37 per cent of the variance being accounted for by the seven variables. The beta weights show that three variables are equally critical: population change, Negro education, and per cent Negro. In

Table 2-5

Census Variable Correlations with Initiation and Extent of Texas School Desegregation by Counties[1]

	Zero-Order Correlations with	
	Initiation of Desegregation	Extent of Desegregation
1. Population Change, 1950-60	+.486**	+.144*
2. Per Cent Urban, 1960	+.336**	+.113
3. Total Commercial Farms, 1960	+.023	+.519**
4. Median House Value, 1960	+.448**	+.263**
5. Retail Sales, 1958	+.244**	+.240**
6. Negro Median Education, 1960	+.528**	+.162*
7. Per Cent Negro, 1960	-.423**	-.011

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[1] For the 187 counties in Texas with one per cent or more of their populations Negro in 1960; except for variable 6 (Negro Median Education), which is available in Census Data for only 107 counties with five per cent or more of their populations Negro.

*Significant at better than the 5% level of confidence.

**Significant at better than the 1% level of confidence.

Table 2-6

Beta Weights for Seven-Variable Predictions of Initiation and Extent of Texas School Desegregation by Counties[1]

	Standardized Beta Weights for Predictions of			
Variable	Initiation of Desegregation	p[2]	Extent of Desegregation	p[2]
1. Population Change, 1950-60	+.231	<.01	+.072	N.S.
2. Per Cent Urban, 1960	+.011	N.S.	+.170	<.05
3. Total Commercial Farms, 1960	+.069	N.S.	+.509	<.001
4. Median House Value, 1960	+.078	N.S.	+.031	N.S.
5. Retail Sales, 1958	+.042	N.S.	+.017	N.S.
6. Negro Median Education, 1960	+.246	<.01	+.046	N.S.
7. Per Cent Negro, 1960	-.268	<.01	+.046	N.S.
R^2 (percentage variance explained)	.374		.342	
R (multiple correlation)	.61	<.001	.58	<.001

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[1] For the same county samples as described in Table 2-5.

[2] Probabilities are derived from two-tailed t-tests.

other words, rapidly growing counties with low percentages of Negroes who are relatively well-educated initiated the school desegregation process in Texas; and slowest were the stagnant counties with high percentages of poorly-educated Negroes -- the typical East Texas situation. These findings, of course, are consistent with earlier research (Pettigrew, 1957B; 1965; Pettigrew and Cramer, 1959), though the relatively high level of prediction is well above that previously attained.

The prediction for extent is not as strong, with 34 per cent of the county variance explained by the seven variables, though its composition is more interesting. This prediction still compares favorably with previous efforts. But the beta weights listed in Table 2-6 make clear that five of the predictor variables make virtually no contribution to the basic variable of total commercial farms combined with per cent urban. Indeed, further calculations uncover the fact that the commercial farms variable alone accounts for 76 per cent of the variance explained by the entire seven-variable array. As mentioned earlier, this finding may in part reflect the manner in which we measured the extent of desegregation.[9] More fundamentally, though, it appears to tap a social structure especially conducive to relatively rapid implementation of desegregation once begun. Checking the correlates of total commercial farms, we find counties characterized as high on the variable are concentrated in Central Texas and are moderately urban and prosperous with intermediate percentages of Negroes. Such counties appear to lie near major cities and serve them agriculturally. Their secret of extensive desegregation may be that they combine the less traditional norms of urban, prosperous communities without the city's problem of so-called "*de facto*" segregation brought about by sharp residential separation of the races. Such an interpretation is supported by the small but significant beta weight for per cent urban.

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[9] The factor mentioned previously, the reader may recall, was simply that smaller counties with fewer schools could obtain higher extent percentages with the desegregation of comparatively few public schools. One can speculate, too, on the role of the large number of military installations in Texas. A district within a county with many school children of military personnel is "federally impacted" and receives special federal educational funds to operate its schools. But racial segregation can jeopardize these funds; hence, military installations in a county are likely to lead to rather extensive desegregation. Yet one could argue that for our present purposes this factor is of minimal importance. Military installations are likely to be established in areas with characteristics similar to those we have already found to be associated with desegregation. Furthermore, once they have been established, these installations are likely to create urban concentrations, prosperity, and possibly lower Negro population percentages -- all of which relate to early desegregation of public schools.

Data on one of the seven predictors in Table 2-6, Negro median education, is not available for the total population of interracial counties. Consequently, it could be rightfully argued that a more realistic prediction would involve only the six variables for which data are available for all 187 Texas counties which had Negroes comprising one per cent of their 1960 populations. Such analyses are shown in Table 2-7. The prediction for desegregation initiation is lowered slightly (37.4 to 33.9 per cent of variance accounted for), but the prediction for desegregation extent is virtually unchanged (34.2 to 35.5 per cent). The major change in beta weights, not surprisingly, is a modest increase for the per cent Negro variable in predicting initiation (-.268 to -.311); otherwise the key variables in accounting for initiation and extent remain the same.

Table 2-7

Beta Weights for Six-Variable Predictions of Initiation and Extent of Texas School Desegregation by Counties[1]

Variable	Standardized Beta Weights for Predictions of: Initiation of Desegregation	p^2	Extent of Desegregation	p^2
1. Population Change, 1950-60	+.296	$<.001$	+.089	N.S.
2. Per Cent Urban, 1960	+.051	N.S.	+.200	$<.001$
3. Total Commercial Farms, 1960	+.047	N.S.	+.519	$<.001$
4. Median House Value, 1960	+.089	N.S.	+.059	N.S.
5. Retail Sales, 1958	+.035	N.S.	+.004	N.S.
6. Per Cent Negro, 1960	-.311	$<.001$	+.098	N.S.
R^2 (percentage variance explained)	.339		.355	
R (multiple correlation)	.58	$<.001$	.60	$<.001$

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[1] Includes all Texas counties which had Negroes comprising one per cent or more of their 1960 populations.

[2] As in Table 2-6, probabilities are derived from two-tailed t-tests.

Subregional Differences.[10] The results already strongly suggest sharp subregional differences in the Texas pattern of public school desegregation. East Texas, the Texas equivalent to the deep South's

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[10] Texas counties with Negroes comprising one per cent or more of their 1960 populations were divided geographically into the three subregions as follows:

East Texas = Anderson, Angelina, Bowie, Camp, Cass, Chambers, Cherokee, Delta, Ellis, Franklin, Freestone, Gregg, Grimes, Hardin, Harrison, Henderson, Hopkins, Houston, Jasper, Jefferson, Kaufman, Lamar, Leon, Liberty, Madison, Marion, Montgomery, Morris, Nacogdoches, Navarro, Newton, Orange, Panola, Polk, Rains, Red River, Rusk, Sabine, San Augustine, San Jacinto, Shelby, Smith, Titus, Trinity, Tyler, Upshur, Van Zandt, Walker, Wood.

Central Texas = Aransas, Archer, Austin, Bastrop, Baylor, Bell, Blanco, Bosque, Brazonia, Brazos, Burleson, Burnet, Caldwell, Calhoun, Clay, Collin, Colorado, Comal, Comanche, Cooke, Coryell, Dallas, Denton, DeWitt, Erath, Falls, Fannin, Fayette, Fort Bend, Galveston, Goliad, Gonzales, Grayson, Hamilton, Harris, Hays, Hill, Hood, Hunt, Jack, Jackson, Johnson, Lampasas, Lavaca, Lee, McLennan, Matagorda, Milam, Palo Pinto, Parker, Refugio, Robertson, Rockwall, Stephens, Tarrant, Travis, Victoria, Waller, Washington, Wharton, Wichita, Wilbarger, Williamson, Wise, Young.

West Texas = Andrews, Bailey, Bee, Bexar, Briscoe, Brown, Castro, Childress, Cochran, Coleman, Collingsworth, Crave, Crockett, Crosby, Dawson, Deaf Smith, Dickens, Donley, Eastland, Ector, Edwards, El Paso, Fisher, Floyd, Foard, Gaines, Garza, Gray, Guadalupe, Hale, Hall, Hardeman, Haskell, Hockley, Howard, Hutchinson, Jones, Karnes, Kent, King, Kinnery, Kleberg, Knox, Lamb, Lubbock, Lynn, McCulloch, Martin, Midland, Mitchell, Motley, Nolan, Nueces, Parmer, Potter, Reagan, Reeves, Runnels, Schleicher, Scurry, Shackelford, Stonewall, Swisher, Taylor, Terry,Tom Green, Upton, Valverde, Ward, Wheeler, Winkler, Zavala.

"Black Belt," appears most resistant to the initiation of the process; West Texas, the Texas equivalent to the Southwestern states of New Mexico and Arizona, appears least resistant to initiation. And we have just observed the relatively rapid spread of the process in the counties of Central Texas with large numbers of commercial farms. Now we shall explore these leads further.

"Dummy" variables for each subregion are employed for this purpose. This merely means that they were formed by assigning one point to each county within a given subregion and zero to all other counties. Formed in this manner, we obviously cannot simultaneously submit all three of the dummy subregional variables into regression equations. Thus, we have entered only the two most interesting subregions -- East Texas and Central Texas. Table 2-8 shows the basic correlations between these dummy variables and the two dependent variables. These coefficients support our earlier leads: school desegregation tended to come first in the West and last in the East, and to spread fastest in Central Texas and slowest in the West.

Table 2-9 adds these subregional considerations to the six-variable predictions. The explained variance shifts from Table 2-7 for initiation from .339 up to .381 and for extent from .355 down to .346. In general, the introduction of subregional dummy variables does not significantly alter the beta weights. For example, total commercial farms remains the dominant predictor of desegregation extent, which indicates that it is more important than any ecological pattern unique to Central Texas.

On the other hand, the subregional variables significantly reduce the predictive power of per cent Negro for desegregation initiation. This indicates that this racial variable is less important than other factors also closely associated with East Texas in particular. This finding coincides with results from previous research cited earlier. Recall that considerable evidence pointed to the crucial significance of the racist norms of Black Belt areas. Indeed, some southern counties which had once had large percentages of Negro residents but no longer do still act in anti-Negro ways similar to present Black Belt counties. East Texas has such norms still operating, and its dummy variable consequently overwhelms per cent Negro as a predictor of initiation in Table 2-9.

The significant betas of Table 2-9 for subregional dummy variables indicates only that the dependent variables vary

Table 2-8

Correlations Between Texas School Desegregation and Subregional Dummy Variables[1]

	Initiation of Desegregation	p	Extent of Desegregation	p
East Texas	-.422	<.01	+.047	N.S.
Central Texas	-.016	N.S.	+.240	<.05
West Texas	+.392	<.01	-.191	<.10

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[1] The subregional "dummy" variables were formed by assigning one point to each county within a given subregion and zero to all other counties.

Table 2-9

Beta Weights for Six-Variable Predictions of Texas School Desegregation Using Subregions as Dummy Variables[1]

	Standardized Beta Weights for Predictions of			
Variable	Initiation of Desegregation	p[2]	Extent of Desegregation	p[2]
1. Population Change, 1950-60	+.278	$<.01$	+.084	N.S.
2. Per Cent Urban, 1960	+.051	N.S.	+.178	$<.05$
3. Total Commercial Farms, 1960	+.028	N.S.	+.503	$<.001$
4. Median House Value, 1960	+.107	N.S.	+.048	N.S.
5. Retail Sales, 1958	+.034	N.S.	+.021	N.S.
6. Per Cent Negro, 1960	+.116	N.S.	-.120	$<.15$
7. East Texas (dummy variable)	-.295	$<.01$	+.230	$<.01$
8. Central Texas (dummy variable)	-.195	$<.01$	+.121	$<.15$
R^2 (percentage variance explained)	.381		.346	
R (multiple correlation)	.62	$<.001$	.59	$<.001$

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[1] Includes all Texas counties which had Negroes comprising one per cent or more of their 1960 populations. The subregional "dummy" variables are established as described in Table 2-8. Scored in this manner, obviously, only two of the three subregions can be entered into a regression analysis at a time. West Texas, as the least critical subregion, is therefore omitted.

[2] As in Tables 2-6 and 2-7, the probabilities are derived from two-tailed t-tests.

significantly across the three subregions of Texas. But they do not specify how the six census predictor variables change across subregions. Direct controls for subregions with separate analyses can, however, assess this point. But notice that we are now asking a more specific and difficult question: Can the same six variables predict the school desegregation process not only over the whole state of Texas but within sharply different subregions of the state as well?

Table 2-10 presents the relevant data. All six of the predictions are successful, with the six key census variables accounting for between one-fifth to four-ninths of the desegregation variance. The multiple correlation coefficients tend to be highest in West Texas, lowest in East Texas which as the most resistant subregion provides the least variance for both initiation and extent of the school desegregation process. To anticipate the findings of the following chapters, however, we shall soon learn that attitude climates are of special importance in East Texas counties and allow us later to make a highly refined prediction of the extent of the process in this critical area.

The most interesting feature of Table 2-10 is the contrasting relationships between the independent and dependent variables across the three subregions. Though the levels of prediction are in each case satisfactory, these levels are obtained in divergent ways.[11] Indeed, only one of the six

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[11] The reader will observe in Table 2-10 that almost as satisfactory predictions would be obtained in each of the six problems by employing only two or three key variables (e.g., use only per cent urban and total commercial farms to predict the extent of desegregation in Central Texas). If prediction were the primary goal, such trim models would indeed be preferable. But we are endeavoring more to understand than predict the processes of racial change; and from this perspective, these more parsimonious models are unduly limiting on at least two counts. First, different sets of variables selected after the fact would be used for the various regressions, which renders impossible beta weight comparisons across subregions and between the initiation and extent indicators. Second, the extended ecological models of Table 2-10 provide far more information about the ecological structure of desegregation. Given the multicollinearity of most of these census variables, the two-or-three-variable prediction regressions work in part because each variable stands as the surrogate of a range of other variables. Yet it is these other variables which we need to know about if we are to gain an understanding of the findings.

Table 2-10

Beta Weights for Six-Variable Predictions of Texas School Desegregation Within Subregions[1]

	East Texas				Central Texas				West Texas			
	Init. Deseg.	p[2]	Ext. Deseg.	p[2]	Init. Deseg.	p[2]	Ext. Deseg.	p[2]	Init. Deseg.	p[2]	Ext. Deseg.	p[2]
1. Population Change, 1950-60	-.018	N.S.	+.213	N.S.	+.188	N.S.	+.238	<.12	+.451	<.01	+.042	N.S.
2. Per C[illegible] Urban, 19[illegible]	+.422	<.02	+.225	N.S.	+.137	N.S.	+.446	<.02	+.034	N.S.	+.107	N.S.
3. Total Commercial Farms, 1960	+.279	<.20	+.389	<.05	-.133	N.S.	+.656	<.001	+.284	<.02	+.387	<.01
4. Median House Value, 1960	+.183	N.S.	-.192	N.S.	+.239	<.12	+.002	N.S.	-.072	N.S.	+.101	N.S.
5. Retail Sales, 1958	+.054	N.S.	+.158	N.S.	-.190	N.S.	-.209	N.S.	+.193	<.10	+.156	N.S.
6. Per Cent Negro, 1960	-.207	N.S.	-.221	N.S.	-.111	N.S.	+.095	N.S.	-.138	N.S.	+.084	N.S.
R^2 (percentage variance explained)	.190		.355		.258		.467		.424		.346	
R (multiple correlation)	.42	<.10	.60	<.01	.51	<.01	.68	<.005	.65	<.005	.59	<.005

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[1] Includes all Texas counties which had Negroes comprising one per cent or more of their populations in 1960.

[2] As in Tables 2-6, 2-7, and 2-9, the probabilities are derived from two-tailed t-tests.

predictors, per cent urban, retains the same sign across the six predictions. For example, per cent Negro relates negatively as expected in four of the regressions, but its beta weight is positive in accounting for the extent of school desegregation in Central and West Texas.[12]

What do contrasting patterns signify? First, it means that subregions within Texas constitute a vital factor in shaping the desegregation process, a factor obscured in statewide analyses and generalizations. The three areas are ecologically diverse, and this diversity conditions the ecological structure of desegregation in a pointed demonstration of a "contextual effect."

Second, the findings of Table 2-10 provide us with detailed pictures of the range of desegregation patterns. Combined with the Bogue and Beale (1962) economic descriptions of these areas, we can see how racial change in the public schools began and spread in a far more refined manner than is possible at the state level. Consider, for instance, East Texas. Educational desegregation started in the prosperous urban counties of the subregion characterized by large oil refineries and new industries, not in the more traditional counties characterized by the "pinny woods." Initiation and extent of desegregation are actually _negatively_ related in East Texas. But the chief ecological difference in the patterns of the two indicators seems to involve the greater opposition to the spread of the process in the counties of shrinking population from 1950 to 1960. These results reflect the powerful influence of historically-rooted norms of racial segregation in the unchanging parts of East Texas that operate much as our review of previous research indicated: traditional areas are the most resistant to desegregation.

Central and West Texas do not as subregions share with East Texas the deep involvement in segregation and the confederacy. With Fort Worth, Dallas, Houston, Austin, and San Antonio within its area, Central Texas has the greatest variance in per cent urban, so that this variable does not signify largely small towns as in East Texas. Yet these cities often waited for court orders to initiate the process, and now face so-called "_de facto_" residential segregation as a major barrier to the spread of school desegregation. Hence, partly urban counties with commercial farming have carried the process furthest. In West Texas, the Negro population is sparce and concentrated in or near urban areas. Hence, growing urban areas initiated the process in this area; but it has spread fastest in prosperous counties with reasonable numbers of Negroes and commercial farming.

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[12] This is largely an artifactual result of the relatively small Negro percentages in these regions, for a "heavily" Negro county in West Texas, for example, still had only a few per cent. Consequently, only these counties have enough Negro students to desegregate most of their public schools and score high on the extent measure.

In short, when seen in the context of the contrasting subregional ecological structures, Table 2-10's diverse patterns underlying the initiation and extent of desegregation across East, Central, and West Texas become more meaningful.

Recapitulation. Building on previous work, we have uncovered the ecological patterns of public school desegregation for Texas and its three subregions. Two only moderately-associated indicators of the process -- initiation and extent -- were employed. And the key census variables were selected only after a factor analysis of the 150 variables available on the county level. The six ultimately used are: population change, 1950-1960; per cent urban, 1960; total commercial farms, 1960; median house value, 1960; retail sales, 1958; and per cent Negro, 1960. The levels of prediction obtained for the state and its subregions for both indicators were all satisfactory, in fact, generally higher than ecological predictions of southern racial phenomena previously reported in the social science literature.

But ecological relationships seldom satisfy by themselves, for they seem cold statistical indicators distant from the practical process they attempt to predict. Yet they provide the social context for our analyses of public opinion data. And it is to these less distant analyses we now turn.

Chapter Three

Southern Attitudes Toward Racial Change

Popular conceptions concerning racial change typically revolve around attitudes. In its most simple-minded form, the theory seems to be that change occurs when attitudes favor it and does not occur when attitudes oppose it. On reflection, of course, this lean model overlooks much of what we do know about social change in general and racial change in particular. The relation between public opinion and societal alterations is not well understood in social science, but enough is known to be sure that it is most complicated at best. Nor does the popular model allow for one of the major forces behind attitude change -- the *fait accompli* effect of social change itself. That is, *attitude change* and social change constitute a two-way causal link (Allport, 1954; Hyman and Sheatsley, 1964; Pettigrew, 1961,1966, 1969).

Nonetheless, attitudes *are* important in racial change. If the popular conception is *not* refined enough to meet the facts, neither is it entirely wrong in emphasizing the role of attitudes. In this chapter, we will consider attitudes in the South toward racial change, and view them both as causes and consequences of fundamental shifts in the racial scene. These analyses will set the scene, then, for the attitude prediction of the school desegregation process in Texas which follows in Chapter Four.

Previous Relevant Research

Almost totally separated from the racial ecological literature discussed in the previous chapter, the racial opinion literature is built on two methdologies -- group-administered questionnaires to non-random cluster samples of homogeneous populations (e.g., college classes) and individual survey interviews to probability samples of heterogeneous populations. We shall not refer to the first of these methodologies except as a particular questionnaire study touches on a point relevant to our discussion. The second of these methodologies has led to a massive amount of data, for most of the major survey agencies -- such as the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago (NORC), the Survey Research Center (SRC) of the University of Michigan, the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup's AIPO), and the Roper polls -- have been asking questions relevant to American race relations for over three decades.

Cantril (1951) made an early attempt to bring together racially-related survey data, as well as data in other realms. Fenton (1960) and Schwartz (1967) made later and similar efforts. But the most extensive collection has appeared in Erskine's (1962, 1967, 1968A, 1968B, 1968C, 1968D, 1969A, 1969B) repeated and valuable summaries in Public Opinion Quarterly. In addition, Hyman and Sheatsley (1956, 1964), Sheatsley (1966), and Brink and Harris (1963, 1966) present extended reports on specific surveys. These presentations are of special interest, for the Hyman and Sheatsley and the Sheatsley papers provide significant longitudinal data and the Brink and Harris volumes give data from relatively large nation-wide probability samplings of Negro Americans. These broader polls are supplemented by a number of research surveys that have drawn probability samples in specific communities (e.g., Pettigrew, 1959; Ross, Crawford and Pettigrew, 1966; and Williams, 1964).

In broad outline, the findings of this literature are surprisingly consistent. There are, for example, relatively consistent differences in opinion between respondents of various regional, educational, and occupational characteristics across many types of racial questions asked by rival polling agencies (Erskine, 1962). Furthermore, there have been consistently dramatic shifts toward greater tolerance in racial opinion registered over the past generation by most polls (Erskine, 1962; Hyman and Sheatsley, 1956, 1964; Pettigrew, 1966; Sheatsley, 1966). Table 3-1 furnishes the flavor of these shifts on contrasting questions directly relevant to school desegregation. Note especially the conflicting evidence against any supposed "white backlash" in white racial attitudes during the 1963-1968 years -- a popular mass media interpretation that received virtually no support in the survey literature (Pettigrew, 1964B). And also observe how the southern percentages, starting from a lower base, have made relatively greater strides than the comparable northern percentages.

We shall discuss such trends as they pertain to the North in Chapter Eight. For the present, we shall pursue these intriguing southern data further by analyzing our Texas data thoroughly. First, we shall check on broad trends in the racial attitudes of white Texans. Second, a detailed look will be taken at the changes in white racial opinion which appear to be a direct result of such dramatic events as the Little Rock school conflict of 1957 and the assassinations of President Kennedy and Dr. King. Next, a brief inspection will be made of how white Texan views about pupil desegregation of schools relate to other racial views, in particular attitudes concerning Negro teachers for white

Table 3-1

Changing White Attitudes Toward School Desegregation

"Do you think white students and Negro students should go to the same schools or to separate schools?" (Hyman and Sheatsley, 1964; Sheatsley, 1966).

Percentage answering "same schools"

	1942	April, June, Sept. Average, 1956	June, Nov., Dec. Average, 1963	1965
White Northerners	40	61	74	78
White Southerners	2	14	32	36
Total Whites	30	49	63	67

"Would you, yourself, have any objection to sending your children to a school where a few of the children are colored?" (AIPO release, May 22, 1965; Roper Public Opinion Research Center, Williamstown, Massachusetts supplied the 1966 data; Integrated Education, Nov.-Dec. 1969, 7 (6), 51-52.

Percentage answering "No, would not object"

	1963	1965	1966	1969
White Northern Parents	87	91	93	93
White Southern Parents	38	62	74	78
". . .where half of the children are colored?"				
White Northern Parents	56	65	64	69
White Southern Parents	17	27	44	47
". . .where more than half of the children are colored?"				
White Northern Parents	31	37	32	39
White Southern Parents	6	16	27	26

students. Finally, we will analyze the racial attitudes of Negro Texans and how they shifted after the murder of Dr. King in April of 1968.

Broad Trends in White Texan Attitudes Toward Public School Desegregation

White Texan attitudes toward public school desegregation have become consistently more positive since the historic ruling of the United States Supreme Court on May 17, 1954. But this trend is not evenly distributed either across time or among the various segments of the state's white population. Particular dramatic events furthered the trend. And while most white Texans grew more accepting of the process, some remained hostile or even grew more resistant. We shall consider the effects of dramatic events in later sections of this chapter. This section, employing a new technique designed for the purpose by this project,[1] will briefly sketch this trend and indicate how it varied by a number of relevant ecological variables.

The data for our analysis derives from eight regular surveys of Texas conducted by Belden Associates of Dallas between November of 1954 and August of 1961. Each of these surveys interviewed a fresh sample and each asked the following pertinent question: "Suppose you were on the school board here, and they asked you to give your frank opinion. Which one of [these] four statements. . .comes closest to the way you feel about it? (A) Keep races separate even if. . .disobey law; (B) . . .keep races separate by getting around law; (C) . . .mix races gradually; (D) or obey law even if. . . all races go to the same schools immediately." (See Appendix B for the full item.)

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[1] This new technique, an unweighted means analysis, was devised for the project by Drs. Donald Olivier and Michael Schwartz and is described in some detail in Appendix B. For present purposes, the technique is valuable as a means of correcting for minor sample biases across Belden opinion surveys conducted at various points of time. Since different respondents were questioned in each Belden survey and drawn on a stratified quota basis, minor sampling fluctuations necessarily occurred from one survey to another and contribute error to our trend analysis unless corrected. For example, the Belden organization took considerable care to obtain almost precisely the same percentages in each sample of females, of urban residents, of West Texas residents, etc. But this quota sampling assured stability across time only for the total marginals of each variable stratified on. It did not hold constant across surveys more refined types involving two or more background variables considered at once, such as urban females in West Texas. It is these errors which have been corrected for in the figures of this section by our new analysis technique in a manner described in Appendix B.

Figures 3-1 through 3-5 provide the relevant data over time of the percentages of white Texans who chose either of the two resistant alternatives (responses A and B, "disobey law" or "get. . .around law"). And each of these figures is a product of our new unweighted means analysis technique which smoothes out sampling errors as described briefly in footnote one and in detail in Appendix B.

Figure 3-1 shows the basic over time trend. All told, the nearly seven-year period covered by the eight surveys witnessed a reduction in resistant responses of a third. Observe, too, the constancy in resistant white opinion between 1954 and early 1957, followed by a steady decline. Note, too, that the steepest decline occurred during the Little Rock school crisis when President Dwight Eisenhower surprised the nation and especially the South by sending in paratroopers to enforce the Federal Courts' desegregation rulings. We shall investigate this phenomenon thoroughly in the next section. But it does suggest that the initial constancy in defiant attitudes among white Texans in the two years following the High Court's ruling was due in large part to a failure of the Federal Government to enforce school desegregation vigorously.[2]

The trend of Figure 3-1 is essentially identical for each sex. Figure 3-2 reveals the near-parallel trends for males and females among white Texans, with the males consistently more willing at each point in time to break or evade the law in order to prevent school desegregation. Figure 3-3 illustrates the same for each of the four socio-economic-status (SES) groupings rated by the interviewer. Though not as striking parallels are achieved as for sex, the data in Figure 3-3 show that the four classes moved roughly in line with each other. Exceptions to this generalization occurred for the better-off whites who give up their ideas of resistance

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[2] There is reason to believe in this regard that the Supreme Court's own relatively weak enforcement order of May 1955 requiring only a vague formula of "all deliberate speed" was a vital part of this perception by the white South at this point that resistance could be effective.

Figure 3-1

White Texan Willingness to Defy Law to Resist School Desegregation[1]



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[1] These data are derived from the approximately 750 white "Anglo" Texans in each of eight representative surveys conducted by Belden Associates of Dallas, Texas. They have been corrected for minor sampling fluctuations by the unweighted means analysis technique described in Appendix B.

Figure 3-2

White Texan Willingness to Defy Law to Resist School Desegregation By Sex[1]



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[1] These data are derived from the approximately 750 white "Anglo" Texans in each of eight representative surveys conducted by Belden Associates of Dallas, Texas. They have been corrected for minor sampling fluctuations by the unweighted means analysis technique described in Appendix B.

Figure 3-3

White Texan Willingness to Defy Law
to Resist School Desegregation By Socio-Economic-Status[1]



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[1] These data are derived from the approximately 750 white "Anglo" Texans in each of eight representative surveys conducted by Belden Associates of Dallas, Texas. They have been corrected for minor sampling fluctuations by the unweighted means analysis technique described in Appendix B.

Figure 3-4

White Texan Willingness to Defy Law to Resist School Desegregation By Community Size[1]



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[1] These data are derived from the approximately 750 white "Anglo" Texans in each of eight representative surveys conducted by Belden Associates of Dallas, Texas. They have been corrected for minor sampling fluctuations by the unweighted means analysis technique described in Appendix B.

Figure 3-5

White Texan Willingness to Defy Law to Resist School Desegregation by Political Party Identification[1]



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[1] These data are derived from the approximately 750 white "Anglo" Texans in each of eight representative surveys conducted by Belden Associates of Dallas, Texas. They have been corrected for minor sampling fluctuations by the unweighted means analysis technique described in Appendix B.

earlier. Notice also that the lowest ranked group actually grew more resistant after the Little Rock events.

Figure 3-4 presents the same trend over time by the size of the community. While the larger areas were consistently less defiant in their opposition to school desegregation, an interesting departure from linearity emerges between the basically rural areas of less than 2,500 population and small towns of between 2,500 and 10,000 population. Witness the greater readiness of the townsfolk to defy the law in all five surveys from 1957 through 1961.

Finally, Figure 3-5 illustrates the trend by political party identification. White Texans who regarded themselves as members of the Democratic Party remained throughout more willing to resist racial change. To a large degree, this reflects the social class difference of Figure 3-3 since white Democrats in Texas as a group are of considerably lower social status than either white Independents or white Republicans. But observe the diverse responses of these political groupings at different points in time. One is tempted to speculate that the Republicans lowered their resistance more following the Little Rock crisis because the national leadership for racial change at that point was provided by their own political party under President Eisenhower. And, similarly, the Democrats lowered their resistance most sharply -- while the Republicans belatedly increased in resistance -- when the national leadership for racial change was assumed by the Democratic Party in 1961 under President John Kennedy. At any rate, such speculations raise interesting questions concerning the influence of dramatic events upon the racial attitudes of white Texans. And it is to these questions we now turn.

Dramatic Events and Attitude Change

Considerable speculation but surprisingly little research has been expended over the years on the influence of highly-publicized public events on attitude change. The question achieves obvious importance for our efforts to understand the process of racial change in Texas, for the past two decades have afforded a blinding series of dramatic racial events in the United States in general and over school desegregation in the South in particular.

The Little Rock School Desegregation Confrontation. Our first approach to this problem centered on two of the eight representative surveys conducted throughout Texas by Belden Associates that were just discussed. One of the surveys was completed just prior to the beginning of Arkansas Governor

Faubus's attempt in September of 1957 to prevent public school desegregation in Little Rock by closing down the schools. And the other was conducted after the first and most dramatic month of the world-publicized conflict, though the confrontation actually continued on for several years afterwards in Little Rock.

Each of these Belden surveys asked roughly 750 white "Anglo" respondents the standard school desegregation question of the Belden organization described in the previous section. But the same people were not reinterviewed in the second survey, though the same sampling points and general sampling procedures were employed. This, then, is not an ideal panel design, though testing effects of the first administration are not a problem here. Instead, we must check on the same social categories and "demographic types" across the two surveys on the apparently justifiable assumption that these categories and types are also drawn in exceedingly similar ways across the two surveys. We shall discuss this point in greater detail later in this chapter and in Chapter Eight.

Table 3-2 provides the relevant data after the item's two responses of gradualism and immediacy are combined into a single percentage "favoring acceptance of school desegregation." First, there are no surprises in the manner in which the social categories relate to the item. Thus, male, East Texan, rural, low socio-economic status (SES), and elderly respondents are the most resistant.

More interesting are the changes, two forms of which are provided in Table 3-2. The raw change percentage, of course, is just the difference in favorable percentages between the pre- and post-event surveys. But the standardized change percentage recalculates the raw percentage as a function of how much change, either positive or negative, was possible given the pre-event percentage. In short, the standardized change percentage controls for "the ceiling effect," since a five per cent shift for a sub-group which already favored school desegregation at a 90 per cent level clearly is more important than a five per cent shift for a sub-group which had an initial favorable percentage of 50 per cent.

The shift for the entire sample was +4.8 per cent, standardized to +8.5 per cent. For such a short period of elapsed time between surveys, this difference is large enough to be of interest and approaches statistical significance ($p < .09$). But note how uneven this overall change is among the sub-groups. And note, too, that the groups which changed

Table 3-2

White Texans Accepting School Desegregation
Before and After Little Rock Confrontation in 1957[1]

Social Category	Initial % Accepting	Post % Accepting	Raw Change %	Standardized Change %[2]	Probability[3]
Males	39.3	44.1	+4.8	+7.9	<.25
Females	47.8	53.3	+5.5	+10.5	<.18
Rest of Texas	46.2	53.7	+7.5	+13.9	<.02
East Texas	28.1	15.5	-12.6	-44.8	--
Rural (10,000-)	38.8	42.7	+3.9	+6.4	N.S.
Urban (10,000+)	46.9	52.0	+5.1	+9.6	<.17
Low SES	36.6	34.9	-1.6	-4.4	--
Low-Middle SES	40.7	44.4	+3.7	+6.2	N.S.
Middle SES	48.9	57.2	+8.3	+16.2	<.05
Young (21-35)	50.0	58.2	+8.2	+16.4	<.12
Middle-Aged (36-50)	49.4	49.7	+0.3	+0.6	N.S.
Old (51+)	30.9	36.4	+5.5	+8.0	<.30
Total	43.7	48.5	+4.8	+8.5	<.09

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[1] The data derive from two representative surveys of Texas conducted by Belden Associates of Dallas, Texas and kindly furnished the project by the Roper Public Opinion Research Center of Williamstown, Mass. The surveys were conducted during ideal pre- and post-dates surrounding the much-publicized school desegregation events in the bordering state of Arkansas. The question asked is provided in full in Appendix C and briefly stated in the text. Per cent "favoring acceptance of school desegregation" combines response categories C and D -- that is, it includes all white Texas respondents who either accepted it as coming "gradually" or "immediately."

[2] "Standardized change" refers to the percentage change as a function of the change possible in a given direction; in other words, it rules out "the ceiling effect" by controlling for the initial opinion percentage. The formula is simply $\frac{P_T - P_{T+1}}{100 - P_T}$, where P_T is the original acceptance percentage and P_{T+1} is the post-event percentage.

[3] These are the chi-square probabilities between pre- and post-event percentages for each listed social category. In cases of 2x2 chi-squares, all probabilities are calculated after Yates correction for continuity. "N.S." in all tables refers to "not significant."

most positively tend to be the same ones that were initially most favorable. With one minor reversal between the middle-aged and old, this trend holds up even for the raw change percentages despite the ceiling effect. Once the ceiling effect is taken into account in the standardized change percentage, the trend becomes still stronger.[3]

These results led us to formulate a new hypothesis concerning the effects of dramatic events upon an individual's emotionally-based, salient network of racial attitudes. Clearly the publicized events of the 1957 school desegregation crisis in Little Rock, Arkansas had a measurable and positive effect upon the attitudes toward the desegregation issue of whites in neighboring Texas. But directly contrary to the predictions of cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), these positive changes are to be found largely among the already convinced who held reasonably positive views prior to the event. Such an exciting finding harks back more to old-fashioned set and adaptation theories and its current heirs than it does to dissonance ideas. In any event, we sought another opportunity to test the hypothesis; and regretfully the tragic and wanton slaying of Dr. Martin Luther King in Memphis, Tennessee in early April of 1968 combined with the late March issuance by the equally-well publicized Report of the Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders ("The Kerner Report") to furnish us with unusually potent examples of racially-relevant dramatic events.

The King Assassination and its Attitude Effects on White Texans. In order to collect data directly pertinent to the development of our census-attitude model of racial change in Texas, we commissioned Belden Associates to ask a standard set of questions concerning twelve areas of desegregation to representative samples of Texans in November of 1967 and in February, May, and August of 1968.[4] As it happened, the assassination of Dr. King and the issuance of the Kerner Commission Report intervened precisely midway between the four surveys. This fortuitously afforded us a rare opportunity to retest our "dramatic event hypothesis."

As with the Little Rock data from 1957, different individuals served as respondents for each survey though the same sampling points and procedures were utilized each time. However, we have this time two pre- and post-event surveys each; and this doubling of the data allows us to make greater use of "demographic type" analysis. In essence, this analysis allows us to treat each "demographic type" (e.g., elderly white residents of rural East Texas of lower-middle class status) as the unit and check changes over time for each of these distinct units as if they were individuals. In addition, instead of just one item to analyze as in the Little Rock results, we have twelve items which tap white opinions about a wide variety of situations, ranging from riding buses to attending parties.[5]

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[3] Since each of the five subgroupings in Table 3-2 exhaust the tested population, the trends in each are naturally not independent.

[4] See Appendix C for a complete copy of the racial questions asked in these surveys.

Tables 3-3 and 3-4 present the basic findings for the total sample of white Texans.[6] The first of these, Table 3-3, reveals that the degree of racial attitude change during the critical spring months of 1968 was sharply positive for most items (column 9); indeed, it demonstrates that the overall change was considerably greater than that recorded by Belden for comparable or even much longer periods of time. Observe the levels of favorable opinion on these same questions asked by Belden in similar polls in 1963, 1964, and 1966. And note for the formal and informal items that the standardized changes for the three months from February to May 1968 ranged from one-and-a-half times to four-and-a-half times the standardized changes over the fateful year from August 1963 to August 1964 (columns 3 and 9 in Table 3-3), and from four

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[5] Since they comprise only about a seventh of the samples, Negro Texans are not numerous enough to have their attitudes analyzed in precisely the same manner. They were, however, asked a different set of questions (see Appendix C); and these data are analyzed later in this chapter.

[6] Both Tables 3-4 and 3-5 combine the two pre-event and the two post-event surveys, in order to obtain more stable estimates (pre-event combined sample = 1,464; post-event combined sample = 1,544). The joining of the November 1967 and February 1968 Belden polls is supported by the fact that no significant differences occurred between them for any "demographic type" or for any type of social contact (formal, informal, or intimate). (See, too, columns 5 and 6 in Table 3-3). The joining of the May 1968 and August 1968 polls raises minor problems. Though there was no regression to the mean phenomenon evident in the August data, some small but consistently positive differences suddenly emerge for intimate contact items. This interesting phenomenon is shown later in Table 3-7.

Table 3-3

White Texans Accepting Racial Desegregation at Six Points in Time from 1963 to 1968

Desegregation Situation	(1) Aug. 1963	(2) Aug. 1964	(3) 8/63-8/64 Standardized Changes/3 mos.[1]	(4) Aug. 1966	(5) Nov. 1967	(6) Feb. 1968	(7) 8/63-2/68 Standardized Changes/3 mos.[1]	(8) May 1968	(9) 2-5/68 Standardized Changes
Formal Contact									
Jobs	48.9	59.1	5.0	57.6	66.8	69.1	2.2	76.1	+22.7
Buses	44.3	57.2	5.8	54.2	62.9	64.5	2.0	74.3	+27.6
Restaurants	37.1	49.8	5.0	49.2	57.9	59.9	2.0	66.8	+17.2
Hotels	34.1	45.1	4.2	42.4	53.0	53.8	1.7	60.2	+13.9
Informal Contact									
Schools	39.0	49.2	4.2	45.6	53.7	57.6	1.7	61.4	+9.0
Churches	44.5	55.2	4.8	47.8	57.4	60.0	1.6	62.5	+6.3
Teachers	---[2]	---[2]	---	---[2]	49.4	51.2	---	54.3	+6.4
Intimate Contact									
Social Gatherings	24.5	30.1	1.9	30.9	39.3	38.9	1.1	41.8	+4.7
Neighborhood	22.3	24.8	0.8	26.3	29.5	32.1	0.7	32.0	-0.1
Swimming Pools	20.1	26.7	2.1	25.3	30.9	27.1	0.5	29.5	+3.3
House Parties	14.8	18.6	1.1	19.7	26.2	26.2	0.7	26.5	+0.4
College Roommate	11.3	12.7	0.4	16.9	17.4	17.8	0.4	18.0	+0.2

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[1] In order to make it comparable to column 9 of this Table, the raw change is first divided into three-month segments (4 quarters for column 3 and 18 quarters for column 7) and then standardized in the defined and described manner in Table 3-2.

[2] Not asked until November 1967.

Table 3-4

White Texans Accepting Racial Desegregation Before and After King Murder and Kerner Report[1]

Desegregation Situation	Initial % Accepting, 11/67 + 2/68	Post % Accepting, 5/68 + 8/68	Raw Change Percentage	Standardized Change %[2]	2 x 3 Chi-Square Probability[3]
Formal Contact					
Jobs	68.0	76.2	+8.2	+25.6	<.001
Buses	63.7	72.0	+8.3	+22.9	<.001
Restaurants	58.9	66.6	+7.7	+18.7	<.001
Hotels	53.4	59.9	+6.5	+13.9	<.001
Informal Contact					
Schools	55.7	61.5	+5.8	+13.1	<.001
Churches	58.7	63.9	+5.2	+12.6	<.01
Teachers	50.3	55.0	+4.7	+9.5	<.01
Intimate Contact					
Social Gatherings	39.1	43.0	+3.9	+6.4	<.07
Neighborhood	30.8	34.3	+3.5	+5.1	<.11
Swimming Pools	29.0	32.1	+3.1	+4.4	<.20
House Parties	26.2	27.7	+1.5	+2.0	N.S.
College Roommate	17.6	17.6	0.0	0.0	N.S.

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[1] The data derive from four representative surveys of Texas conducted by Belden Associates of Dallas, Texas and commissioned by this project. The questions asked are provided in full in Appendix C. Per cent "accepting desegregation" in any given area refers to those persons who selected response categories +5, +4, +3, or +2 out of the eleven point scale offered them.

[2] As in the description given in Table 3-2, "standardized change" refers to the percentage change as a function of the change possible in a given direction.

[3] The probabilities are derived from 2 x 3 chi-squares where the school desegregation opinion response is divided among those accepting (+5,+4,+3,+2), neutral to (+1,0,-1) and rejecting (-2,-3,-4,-5) the process.

to eleven times the standardized gains over the four-and-a-half years from August 1963 to February 1968 (columns 7 and 9 in Table 3-3). Clearly the gains in desegregation acceptance during spring 1968 are striking indeed when compared to earlier gains.

Table 3-3 also affords us a rough replication of our Little Rock findings. The sharpest gains prior to the spring of 1968 occurred from August 1963 to August 1964. Recall that this twelve-month period was when President John Kennedy, a civil rights champion, was brutally murdered in Dallas in November 1963 and the sweeping Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, events comparable in race relations terms to King's murder and the Kerner Commission Report. Moreover, these gains by type of desegregation are highly related to the initial percentages of favorability -- just as the Little Rock data would have us predict. The Spearman rank-order correlation between August 1963 percentages and the raw percentage gains for the eleven items is +.73 ($p < .01$) and with the standardized gains (columns 1 and 3 in Table 3-3) is +.85 ($p < .01$). For that matter, the same trend holds for gains over the more than four years from August 1963 to February 1968; the Spearman rank-order correlation between 1963's initial scores and raw change percentages is +.79 ($p < .01$) and with standardized change percentages (columns 1 and 7 in Table 3-3) is +.85 ($p < .01$).

However, Table 3-4 shows how varied the degree of change was for this three-month period across the twelve types of desegregation. And a closer look at these data suggests that these differences are remarkably ordered, too, in line with the "dramatic event hypothesis" that emerged from the Little Rock analysis. Thus, the four areas of relatively formal contact -- jobs, buses, restaurants, and hotels -- shifted by far the most. In fact, the standardized change percentages for three of these areas show that from roughly one-fifth to one-fourth of all of the white Texans who could have changed positively did so! With no overlap whatsoever, the next three areas of relatively informal contact -- schools, churches, and teachers in public schools -- changed next most sharply. Here roughly one-tenth to one-eighth of all of the white Texans who could have changed positively did so. Finally, again with no overlap, the five remaining areas of intimate contact -- social gatherings, neighborhoods, swimming pools, house parties, and college roommate (a special and controversial issue in Texas institutions of higher learning) -- were altered the least.

The findings in Table 3-4 are consistent with our "dramatic event hypothesis." Witness the close parallel between the initial acceptance percentage for each area and its degree of change. This parallel even holds for the raw change percentages despite the ceiling effect; and when this effect is controlled in the standardized change scores, the parallel becomes more pronounced. The Spearman rank-order correlations for the twelve desegregation situations between initial acceptance and raw change is +.965 ($p < .001$) and between initial favorability and standardized change is +.972 ($p < .001$). This striking pattern suggests that those attitude positions which already have won wide acceptance are the most susceptible to change by dramatic events.

The striking differences between formal, informal, and intimate racial contact are pursued further in Table 3-5. Here standardized change percentages are provided for the various social categories on contact scales comprised of the individual items as listed in the previous table. Each of these short scales had adequate internal reliabilities both before and after the event for our analysis purposes;[7] but the three scales themselves were intercorrelated enough to warrant using all twelve items together in a generalized desegregation scale if that were also useful in analysis.

The total sample data highlight the trend we just discussed. Change was strongest for formal contact, moderate for informal contact, and virtually non-existent for intimate contact. But these trends vary considerably

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[7] The formal contact scale consists of items 1 through 4 of Table 3-4 (jobs, buses, restaurants, and hotels); it has a Kuder-Richardson 20 internal reliability of .86 for the pre-event sample and .87 for the post-event sample. The informal contact scale consists of items 5 through 7 of Table 3-4 (schools, churches, and teachers); it has a Kuder-Richardson 20 internal reliability of .74 for the pre-event sample and .81 for the post-event sample. Finally, the intimate contact scale consists of items 8 through 12 of Table 3-4 (social gatherings, neighborhood, swimming pools, house parties, and college roommate); it has a Kuder-Richardson 20 internal reliability of .71 for the pre-event sample and .67 for the post-event sample.

Table 3-5

Standardized Change Percentages For Desegregation Scales by Social Characteristics[1]

Social Category	Desegregation Scale					
	Formal Contact	*p*[2]	Informal Contact	*p*[2]	Intimate Contact	*p*[2]
West Texas	+10.4	N.S.	+ 6.8	.10	+ 0.9	N.S.
Central Texas	+28.8	.001	+15.9	.02	+ 2.1	N.S.
East Texas	- 3.2	N.S.	+ 4.8	N.S.	-40.9	.01
Rural (10,000-)	+24.8	.001	+17.2	.01	+ 2.9	.02
Urban (10,000-100,000)	- 2.4	N.S.	+ 3.7	N.S.	- 4.2	N.S.
Metropolitan (100,000+)	+40.6	.001	+13.6	.15	- 2.3	N.S.
Low SES	+ 3.7	N.S.	- 4.5	N.S.	- 6.2	N.S.
Low-Middle SES	+15.1	.12	+13.2	.02	+ 1.7	.25
Middle SES	+28.1	.02	+13.1	.01	+ 3.2	.20
Young (21-35)	+33.6	.001	+21.4	.02	+11.1	.005
Middle-Aged (36-50)	+ 6.6	N.S.	+ 3.7	N.S.	-11.8	.10
Old (51+)	+16.0	.05	+10.6	.20	-14.9	N.S.

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[1] Standardized change percentages are calculated as described in Table 3-2. Here they refer to the change recorded by surveys May 1968 + August 1968/2 - November 1967 + February 1968/2. The table's percentages can be interpreted as follows: the +10.4% for West Texas under formal contact means that about one in ten white residents of West Texas who were not already generally accepting of desegregation in formal situations (items 1-4 of Table 3-4) in the winter of 1967-68 had become so by the late spring of 1968.

[2] The probabilities are calculated from 3 x 2 chi-squares in the manner described in Table 3-4.

across social categories.[8] For instance, Table 3-5 reveals that alterations in formal and informal contact attitudes were concentrated in Central Texas, rural and metropolitan areas, and among the middle class and the young and old. Half of the standardized change percentages for intimate contact actually reflect negative shift; especially is this true in East Texas. Save for the remarkable changes among rural respondents, the results of Table 3-5 closely correspond to those for the 1957 Little Rock controversy previously provided in Table 3-2. Thus, negative shifts again characterize Black Belt-like East Texas; socio-economic status is again almost linearly associated with change with the middle class the most susceptible; and age is once more curvilinearly related to change with the young and the old recording sizable shifts but not the middle-aged.[9]

These differences by social characteristics provide us with another opportunity to test our "dramatic event hypothesis." Since we cannot check on the same individuals changing over time, we must check on how homogeneous groups with similar social characteristics changed over time. Consequently, we formed seventy-two different "demographic types" out of the four social categories split three ways as listed in Table 3-5.[10] Hence, one group would be rural residents of West Texas who are both young and of low socioeconomic status.

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[8] These four variables -- subregion, rural-urban, SES, and age -- were also used for the Little Rock analysis in Table 3-2 and are the most consistent social correlates of racial attitudes of white Texans that we have available to us from Belden surveys. The twice-larger samples allow us, however, to extend subregion and rural-urban from the previous two to three categories. Central Texas and West Texas, as defined previously in Chapter Two, are now both differentiated from East Texas. And the urban category is now differentiated into urban (10,000 to 100,000 in population) and metropolitan (100,000+ population).

[9] Using analysis of variance techniques (as mentioned in the previous section and described in Appendix B), a number of the item and scale associations with these four social variables and time (before and after) considered simultaneously are of interest. Region remains the most critical variable for all items and scales. Save for one item, schools, size of community is always the second most important on the formal and informal contact items, but age is understandably more important for the more traditionally taboo areas which comprise the intimate scale. Interesting, too, is that age is also a significant predictor of opinions toward church desegregation -- yet another traditional domain. Of special importance for the present study are the predictors of opinions toward school desegregation: after region, SES is an unusually critical variable followed by community size and time, while age is not at all related.

A linear effects model was then applied to the pre-event attitude percentages of these seventy-two groups. Fortunately, an analysis of the pre-event data revealed that the effects of these four social variables on the three different types of social contact are consistent; and when controlled for jointly, no significant interactions occur between any of these independent variables and the types of social contact. Consequently, the pre-event percentage with pro-desegregation attitudes was estimated for each demographic type following the assumptions of a linear effects model. According to this model, the cell mean can be estimated by simply adding the grand mean to the sum of the main effects for each factor.[11]

Once we have pre-event attitude estimates for each demographic type on all three contact measures, we are ready to correlate these estimates with the extent of standardized attitude change across demographic types rather than individuals. Our crude hypothesis derived from the Little Rock data

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[10] The alert reader will see at once that we ideally should have formed eighty-one demographic types ($3^4 = 81$); but there are no metropolitan (100,000+ population) areas in East Texas, which eliminates nine theoretically possible groups and leaves only seventy-two types.

[11] Thus, for rural residents of East Texas who are young and lower class, the estimated equation reads:

Rural effect	+	East Texas effect	+	Young effect	+	Lower class effect	+	Grand mean	=	Estimated cell percentage
(+10.6)	+	(-14.3)	+	(+1.1)	+	(-5.3)	+	68.0	=	60.1

Estimates derived in this manner implicitly make the assumption of an unweighted means analysis of variance with one observation per cell. Pool, *et al*. (1965), for example, made comparable assumptions in their similar formation of "voter types." The major advantage of this model lies in its ability to provide estimates for our "demographic types" with small cell frequencies which may be unstable if they were based upon contingency tables.

calls for significantly positive correlations for all three types of contact. But this is not completely the case. The coefficient for formal contact is +.30 ($p < .01$), for informal contact -.04 (N.S.), and for intimate contact +.69 ($p < .001$). These results suggest that change in racial attitudes as a function of initial racial attitudes depends in part on the intimacy of the domain tapped. In particular, initial attitudes on intimate contact predict well a demographic type's degree of change.

Further perspective on these desegregation attitude data is provided by an additional question commissioned by the study and asked of whites in all four 1967-1968 Belden surveys: "Is the Johnson Administration pushing integration too fast, too slow, or about right?" Table 3-6 shows its changing response patterns over the four polls. Over the quiet winter months, the percentage of respondents reporting "too fast" declined slightly, as was also true for the not-as-hot-as-usual summer months from May to August (2 x 3 chi-square; $p < .40$). But the "too fast" category rose sharply from February to May (9.1 percentage points of raw change and 22.4 points of standardized change). Perhaps, this rise was a consequence of the post-King murder rioting throughout urban America, for this item has proven over the years to be highly sensitive to racial conflict.[12] The item also introduces political considerations beyond race, such as general support or antagonism toward the Administration. Nevertheless, the pattern is strikingly in conflict with those of the formal and informal contact scales (Tables 3-3, 3-4, 3-5). Yet it appears that greater acceptance of interracial contact can occur at precisely the same time as a growing sentiment that there is too much national pressure for racial change.

A final question can be asked about the stability of these event-induced shifts in racial opinion. Given the sizable shifts in attitude recorded in the May 1968 poll soon after the King assassination and the Kerner Report publicity, was there a significant regression back to the mean? And were there differential changes from the May to the August 1968 surveys for the three types of contact? Put differently, did white Texans settle back comfortably to their pre-event racial opinions once the shocks of early spring had begun to fade by late summer?

Table 3-7 supplies the answers. Clearly there was no

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[12] See the intensive national analysis of a similar Gallup item in Chapter Eight.

Table 3-6

White Texan Opinions on Whether Johnson Administration is "Pushing Integration Too Fast," 1967-68

Response Category	Date of Survey			
	Nov. 1967	Feb. 1968	May 1968	August 1968
"Too Fast"	63.7%	59.4%	68.5%	65.6%
"About Right"	33.3	37.8	28.0	29.8
"Too Slow"	3.0	2.8	3.5	4.7
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%

Table 3-7

Did the Spring Changes In Racial Opinion Last Through the Summer?

Desegregation Situation	% Accepting Desegregation May 1968	% Accepting Desegregation August 1968	Raw Change % (Aug.-May)	Standardized Change %[1] (Aug.-May)	Probabilities[2]
Formal Contact	74.7[3]	73.2	-1.5	-2.0	N.S.
1. Jobs	76.1	76.4	+0.3	+1.3	N.S.
2. Buses	74.3	69.7	-4.6	-6.2	<.05
3. Restaurants	66.8	66.4	-0.4	-0.6	N.S.
4. Hotels	60.2	59.6	-0.6	-1.0	N.S.
Informal Contact	59.8	61.4	+1.6	+4.0	N.S.
5. Schools	61.4	61.7	+0.3	+0.8	N.S.
6. Churches	62.5	65.4	+2.9	+7.7	N.S.
7. Teachers for Child	54.3	55.6	+1.3	+2.8	N.S.
Intimate Contact	25.2	28.2	+3.0	+4.0	<.03
8. Social Gatherings	41.8	44.2	+2.4	+4.1	N.S.
9. Neighborhood	32.0	36.6	+4.6	+6.8	<.01
10. Swimming Pools	29.5	34.6	+5.1	+7.2	<.07
11. House Parties	26.5	29.0	+2.5	+3.4	<.10
12. College Roommate for Child	17.1	18.0	+0.9	+1.1	N.S.

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[1] As described and defined in Table 3-2.

[2] The probabilities are based on 2 x 3 chi-squares as described in Table 3-4.

[3] Because of the method of scale construction employed, the scale scores are not an arithmetic mean of the scale's individual items.

general regression to the mean effect. Formal contact, which had gained the most previously, slipped slightly; but this constituted only insignificant decrements save in the instance of bus desegregation. From a November - February average favorability percentage of 63.7 (Table 3-7), the bus percentage lifted 10.6 points by May -- by far the sharpest increment of any of the twelve items. Not surprisingly, then, it is the only item to evince a significant decrease in August, though its August figure of 69.7 still represents a 6 point raw change and a 17 point standardized change from its pre-event figure. All three informal contact items gained slightly in favorability, rather than regressed. The most interesting aspect of Table 3-7 concerns the intimate contact items. All five of these items increased in acceptance from May to August. In fact, two of them, neighborhood and swimming pools, achieved significant gains substantially larger than they had achieved over the critical months from the winter to May (Table 3-3). Overall the change on the intimate contact scale is striking: between February and May the scale shifted slightly less favorable (-0.1%), whereas from May to August the scale shifted moderately in the favorable direction (+3.0%). We shall term this intriguing phenomenon a "latency effect," for it appears that the influence of the dramatic events of March and April on the more emotionally-charged intimate domains was at first latent and did not manifest itself for four months.

Toward a Theory of the Influence of Dramatic Events upon Racial Opinions. In Chapter Eight, we shall briefly review the general literature of the effects on public opinion of such dramatic events as the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary, the 1957 Soviet Union space success with Sputnik, and the 1963 assassination of President Kennedy. And we shall also present extensive data on changes in racial attitudes of whites in the urban North following significant racial events in the 1960's. At this point, we shall focus exclusively upon the Texas data just presented. When placed in the broader context of social psychology's intensive research and theory on attitude change, our findings on the shifting racial opinions of white and black Texans suggest the broad outlines of a theory of dramatic events.

The basic Texas results that any theory must account for are: (1) despite ceiling effects, those situations where interracial contact was already most accepted changed the most for white Texans over the eventful spring of 1968; (2) despite ceiling effects, demographic types of white Texans already most accepting of interracial contact tended to change the most -- especially for intimate situations; and (3) more positive white Texan attitudes for the most rejected intimate realms did not manifest themselves until four months after the King murder and the issuance of the Kerner Commission Report.

To account for these intriguing findings, we must select among the various bodies of attitude change theory within social psychology. Following McGuire (1969), four theoretical approaches have been made to attitude change: learning, perceptual, consistency, and functional. These different orientations stem from diverse theoretical roots in general psychology and overlap considerably. And, as McGuire (1969) correctly points out, they are largely "complementary rather than contentious." Indeed, the complementarity of two specific theories of attitude change helps to organize and explain the Texas results: Sherif and Hovland's (1961) social judgment theory and Festinger's (1957) cognitive dissonance theory.

Social judgment theory usefully combines the learning and perceptual perspectives and emphasizes the assimilation-and-contrast process of handling new information. Its roots lie in the conceptions of traditional psychophysics. Cognitive dissonance is the most provocative of an array of consistency theories in modern social psychology. Its roots lie in the rationalistic orientations of Gestalt theory; and it emphasizes the relationship between discrepant cognitions -- especially those resulting from conflicting behavior and beliefs. Brief descriptions of these two theories are necessary to appreciate their useful application to the present data.

Insight into the basis of social judgment theory can be gained from recalling the standard weight judgment experiments of classical psychophysics (Bressler, 1933; Fernberger, 1920, 1931; Needham, 1935; Pfaffman, 1935; Wever and Zener, 1928; Woodrow, 1933; and Volkmann, 1951). Consider the basic task of judging two separate series of weights as either "heavy" or "light." Suppose the first series consists of weights ranging from five to 25 grams and the second from 20 to 40 grams. A weight of 22 grams, then, would seem "heavy" in the first series but "light" in the second. "It all depends on the circumstances," goes the popular expression, for all perception of objects is influenced by the surrounding context.

In their brilliant monograph, Sherif and Hovland (1961) have demonstrated that this and other judgmental phenomena apply to attitudes as well as objects. They studied the effects of extreme attitudes which define the limits or anchor a series of related attitudes. The weight analogy again illustrates the phenomena. Suppose the series of weights varying from five to 25 grams was suddenly anchored by another weight of 75 grams. Being such an extreme addition, a contrast effect is likely to occur; that is, all of the weights in the original five to 25 gram series may now seem ligher than they did before being contrasted with the heavy, "alien" anchor which is judged heavier than it actually is. The opposite effect is demonstrated when an anchor is applied that is close enough to be perceived as an integral part of the original series -- for instance, by replacing the 75 gram weight with a 35 gram one. This not-so-extreme anchor will create an assimilation effect by establishing what appears as a new series from five to 35 grams. This addition now may cause the original five to 25 gram weights to appear heavier than they did before being assimilated to the "belonging" anchor which is judged lighter than it is.

One important variation on the contrast effect would occur if the 75 gram weight were judged from the perspective of both the five to 25 gram series and a 150 to 200 gram series. In the former series, as noted, the 75 gram anchor would be judged as not belonging to the series, because it is too heavy; but in the latter series, the same anchor would also be judged as not belonging, this time because it is too light. Attitude examples of this phenomenon are commonplace. Like many others in public life, Felix Frankfurter, former associate justice of the United States Supreme Court, often found himself in the position of the 75 gram weight. Through the eyes of extremely conservative judicial observers, Justice Frankfurter was widely regarded as a wild liberal. On the other hand, extremely liberal judicial observers, reading the same Frankfurter opinions as their conservative counterparts, generally perceived the Justice as a staunch conservative. Contrast effects operated in both cases; the committed, extreme positions of the observers caused the same man to be judged as further from each of the two positions than he actually was.

These phenomena are best revealed during times of crisis. One investigation conducted in Little Rock, Arkansas at the height of that city's racial tensions found that even total silence at such a time could be interpreted as a contrasting anchor (Campbell and Pettigrew, 1959). Thus, the extreme segregationists of the White Citizens' Council came to view any silent white minister as a "race mixer," whether he favored school desegregation or not. Failure to declare himself as a firm white supremacist became regarded as final evidence that the clergyman did not belong. In the midst of any crisis, it becomes increasingly difficult to hold a middle position; "if you are not with us," goes the slogan, "you must be against us." Such community polarization maximizes the likelihood of contrast effects, minimizes assimilation effects.

Both contrast and assimilation effects are involved in the shifting mass media assessment of Negro-American protest organizations. Throughout the 1950's, the N.A.A.C.P. was generally pictured as an extremely militant group, contrasting sharply with dominant white opinion. Though it employed the traditional and peaceful instruments of court orders and ballots, the N.A.A.C.P. bore the brunt of the struggle for change and consequently was viewed as the chief source of agitation. By the 1960's, however, the entire scale for judging Negro protest had abruptly shifted. The approach through the court room and the voting booth appeared quite tame when compared with mass direct action and threats of violence. As a result, white Americans have increasingly come to regard the N.A.A.C.P. as the conservative protest group, though its activities have actually become more, not less, militant. The Black Muslims, Black Panthers and other militants, asserting thinly-veiled threats of racial violence, now furnish the extreme, contrasting anchor. And the N.A.A.C.P. has gained in white opinion as it becomes an assimilated anchor. Ironically, appeals are made for white Americans to help achieve racial progress in order to keep Negro leadership in the hands of "such responsible organizations as the N.A.A.C.P."

Sherif and Hovland (1961) introduce a number of useful concepts to describe and understand this process. Thus, they speak of the "latitude of acceptance" and the "latitude of rejection" as the domains where either assimilation or contrast effects will occur. And note these latitudes can refer to the subject's perception of the communicator, the message, or both in relation to his own attitude on the subject. Any neutral area between the latitudes of acceptance and rejection is termed the "zone of indifference." Latitudes of acceptance and rejection vary depending upon whether the communicator of the message is a familiar or unfamiliar one, whether the issue is one in which the subjects are involved, and whether the communicator has high or low credibility.

The ranges of acceptance are narrowed and those of rejection are broadened by high involvement and familiarity. This important fact is neatly illustrated in an experimental study by Hovland and Sherif (1952). Extremely pro- and anti-Negro subjects in Oklahoma colleges, both Negro and white, were asked to sort various statements about Negroes into a series of piles ranging from sharply favorable to sharply unfavorable. A number of the racial statements were rated by unbiased judges as blandly neutral, but these were the statements which biased subjects differed most in rating. They tended to perceive relatively greater psychological distance between their own position and the neutral assertions. Neutral statements, together with even a few mildly favorable ones, were typically sorted into the "unfavorable" piles by pro-Negro judges, into "favorable" piles by the anti-Negro judges. High involvement and familiarity in both cases led to displacement of the neutral items in a contrasting direction, for these conditions minimize the probability of assimilation effects and maximize that of contrast effects.

Similar in basic assumptions to other consistency theories, cognitive dissonance theory specifies a strain toward consistency in behavior and attitudes (Festinger, 1957; Brehm and Cohen, 1962). If a person behaves differently from the way he thinks he should, the knowledge of having acted in this conflicting fashion is said to be dissonant with his beliefs. The theory posits that individuals will strive to decrease dissonance with a variety of mechanisms, one of which is to modify the old attitude to fit the new action.

The reasoning behind cognitive dissonance is straightforward. Behavior serves to commit an individual to a certain course of action; and when he senses that his behavioral commitment conflicts with his attitudes, tension develops and he seeks to reduce the conflict. Behavioral commitment, perceived conflict, and personal tension, then, are the underlying ingredients in the dissonance process. The theory also asserts that the greater the conflict, the greater the tension and subsequent striving to mollify the dissonance.

A typical dissonance experiment illustrates how many of the theory's predictions violate conventional wisdom. College students wrote essays advocating an opinion sharply contrary to what they actually believed (Brehm and Cohen, 1962, pp. 73-78). For performing this dissonant chore, the subjects were paid either 50 cents, one dollar, five dollars, or ten dollars. Behaving in a fashion discrepant with their attitudes, all of the college students would be expected to modify their thinking in the direction of their essay. But the critical question is: which payment condition produces the greatest change? Though common sense would suggest that the ten-dollar subjects should reveal the sharpest effects, cognitive dissonance theory predicts precisely the opposite. The poorest paid subjects are assumed to have incurred the greatest tension and dissonance, since they had the least external reason for performing the uncomfortable task. Thus, the 50-cent students were more committed to their essays, goes the argument, while the ten-dollar students could always rationalize they performed the task strictly for the remuneration. The results handsomely support the theoretical expectation; attitude change among the student subjects was directly inverse to the amount of money received.

Social judgment and cognitive dissonance notions, as with most attitude change theories, typically do not lead to conflicting predictions. An apparent exception occurs, however, in predicting which types of subjects will change their attitudes the most. Social judgment theory holds that those subjects and messages which allow the new information to fall within the latitudes of acceptance will produce the sharpest positive change. Indeed, it further holds that when the new information falls into the latitudes of rejection, negative change may well occur. Cognitive dissonance, by contrast, predicts that the greatest positive change will occur when dissonance is maximized, as in the case of subjects who are initially quite hostile to divergent new information.

The reader will readily observe that the social judgment predictions are handsomely met by the Texas data, so much so in fact that this Sherif and Hovland paradigm furnishes a basic framework upon which to construct a theory of the attitude effects of dramatic events. Types of white Texans whose racial opinions were already favorable, especially in the controversial domain of intimate contact, found it easiest to assimilate within their latitudes of acceptance the societal implications of the Kerner Commission's harsh indictment of the nation's race relations and the killing of a Negro leader for change. Consequently, these Texans evinced the greatest positive change. For types of white Texans initially hostile to interracial contact, the traumatic events of March and April of 1968 fell within their zones of indifference or latitudes of rejection. Consequently, these Texans evinced the least positive, or even negative, change. Recall that young and middle-class respondents as groups shifted positively the most, while lower-class respondents and those in East Texas shifted negatively (Table 3-5). The same phenomena occurred in Texas as a result of the Little Rock confrontation in 1957 (Table 3-2). Similar assimilation and contrast considerations account for the even stronger finding that attitude changes were greatest among white Texans for formal areas of interracial contact that had already achieved considerable acceptance prior to 1968, least for areas of intimate contact that had achieved minimal acceptance (Tables 3-3, 3-4, 3-5).

Yet the conflict in predictions between social judgment and cognitive dissonance ideas is actually more apparent than real. The two theories predict different results for contrasting situations. Some of the conditions for change according to the social judgment model are met in the Texas data: the new facts are clear and unambiguous, and the communicator --

the mass media -- has high credibility.[13]

But the leading dissonance condition, behavioral commitment, is missing. White Texans are generally highly involved in the race issue; but they did not experience direct behavioral commitment from either the Kerner Report or the King assassination. If, for example, some of the sample had been placed in a position of publicly defending the Report's controversial conclusions regardless of what they thought of them, the basic cognitive dissonance condition would have been met. The theory's prediction of maximum positive change for the most initially bigoted does have empirical support in race relations research when behavioral commitment is present. Two extensive investigations of racial attitudes among white residents of desegregated public housing projects both found that the greatest net gain in favorable change occurred among those tenants most initially prejudiced (Brehm and Cohen, 1962, pp. 274-276; Deutsch and Collins, 1951; and Wilner, Walkley, and Cook, 1955).

Consistency theory, however, helps to explain the delayed influence of the dramatic events upon the white Texan attitudes toward intimate interracial contact (Table 3-7). Superficially, this effect resembles the well-studied social psychological phenomenon known as "the sleeper effect." Two studies by Hovland and his colleagues (Hovland and Weiss, 1951; Kelman and Hovland, 1953) found that over time subjects tended to recall a message but forget its source. Consequently, messages from prestigious, high credibility sources lost much of their attitude-changing potential three to four weeks later; while messages from low-status, low credibility sources gained in change potential over the period. This increase in attitude change for communications emanating from low-credibility sources was labeled a sleeper effect.

The delayed favorable change for attitudes toward intimate contact obviously stems from a different process. All three types of attitude realms -- formal, informal, and intimate -- were influenced by the same events reported on by the same sources. A comparison of the changes shown in Tables 3-4 and 3-7, however, provides a clue. In the May 1968 data, collected only one month after the critical events, white Texan attitudes toward formal contact had altered sharply positive, toward informal contact moderately positive, and toward intimate contact insignificantly positive. Between May and August 1968, now four months past the eventful period, attitudes toward formal contact regressed insignificantly, toward informal contact shifted insignificantly positive, and toward intimate contact changed moderately positive.

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[13] Some of the conditions, though, restrict attitude change rather than further it: the issue was a familiar and salient one and the respondents were highly involved in the issue.

The regularity of the changes across the three types of contact suggests "a ripple hypothesis" in line with consistency theories. Hence, initial changes in racial attitude came in those domains where interracial contact had already won widespread acceptance in Texas and fell within the latitudes of acceptance of many respondents. But these changes themselves set up strains by conflicting with traditionally-held beliefs concerning other areas of racial segregation. In the fashionable parlance of consistency theories, the new attitudes concerning formal realms of contact are dissonant, imbalanced, incongruent, and inconsistent with the remaining segregationist attitudes. Cognitive consistency was an important reason why segregationist beliefs were held for all tested areas by a majority of white Texans back in August 1963 (see column 1 of Table 3-1). Once this resistance declined during the 1960's for formal contact, the chink in the consistency armor was established. Then the dramatic events of spring 1968 considerably increased the strain in segregationist opinions. This inconsistency could have been eased by reverting over time to the older views on formal contact; but we noted in Table 3-7 that this did not happen. Rather the inconsistency tended to work itself out in positive change toward interracial contact in informal and especially in intimate situations.

In short, the initial impact of the spring's dramatic events on formal contact percolated down to more controversial realms by August. From the social judgment point of view, this "ripple effect" could be described as a shifting scale that once it absorbed formal contact extended its latitudes of acceptance to include additional domains. More directly, the phenomenon is in line with consistency theories, though not restricted to behavioral commitment. Indeed, some may have committed themselves publicly to the initial changes in formal domains in discussions about the events with friends or even a survey interviewer.[14] In any event, however, a significant number of white Texans who changed their views on biracial formal contact seemingly began to ask themselves in effect: "If it's alright for Negroes and whites to be together as equals on the job and in restaurants and hotels, what's wrong with it, then, in churches, neighborhoods, and swimming pools?"

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[14] Commitment to an interviewer is not a factor in the present data, however. Recall that different samples were drawn for the four surveys, though the same sampling points and procedures were employed each time.

Finally, the breakdown into three scales tapping formal, informal, and intimate interracial contact together with their amazingly consistent and meaningful results deserve brief discussion. Both the three-way split and the findings resemble a resolution offered by Triandis and Davis (1965) to a social psychological controversy over the basic nature of "prejudice." Rokeach (1961) maintains that white American rejection of Negro Americans is motivated less by racism than by assumed belief and value differences. In other words, whites generally perceive Negroes as holding contrasting beliefs, and it is this perception and not race *per se* that leads to rejection. Indeed, a variety of subjects have supported Rokeach's ideas by typically accepting in a social situation a Negro with similar beliefs to their own over a white with different beliefs (Rokeach *et al.*, 1960; Rokeach and Mezei, 1966; Smith *et al.*, 1967; Stein, 1966; and Stein *et al.*, 1965).

Triandis (1961) challenged the Rokeach position; and a resolution to this practical as well as theoretical controversy did not come forward until the Triandis and Davis paper in 1965. These authors showed that the relative importance of belief and race factors in cross-racial attraction is a joint function of the interpersonal realm in question and the personality of the particular person. Belief similarity is most crucial in more formal matters of general personal evaluation and social acceptance, where racial norms are more positive as well as more ambiguously defined. Race is most crucial in intimate matters of marriage and neighborhood, where racial norms are more negative as well as more salient and explicitly defined. For interpersonal realms of intermediate intimacy, both belief and race considerations appear important. Moreover, the widest individual differences in the application of belief similarity and race occurs for these situations of intermediate intimacy.

This resolution assumes added weight when the data from studies favorable to the original Rokeach position are examined carefully. That different interpersonal realms lead to varying belief-race weightings is borne out in Table 4 of an article reporting data on California school children (Stein *et al.*, 1965); that intensely-prejudiced subjects, especially *in* environments where explicitly negative racial norms even extend into less intimate realms, will act primarily on racial considerations instead of belief similarity is shown by a sample of whites in the deep South (Smith et al., 1967).

The present scales of formal, informal, and intimate inter-racial contact appear to tap the precise dimension put forward by Triandis and Davis (1965) as critical. The greater changes in attitudes toward formal contact rendered by dramatic events, then, are more flexible in part because they are more related to belief similarity than directly racial factors. Indeed, these dramatic events, particularly as reported by the mass media, may act largely to portray Negroes and their white allies in human terms, suggesting the existence of belief and value similarities with the respondent that he had not previously considered. As mentioned earlier, too, attitudes toward formal interracial contact enjoy more flexibility from relating to social norms both more supportive of contact and less definitely defined.

An additional factor may involve the public behavioral commitment that is central to cognitive dissonance and other balance theories of attitude change. By its very nature, formal contact is more frequent and more public and hence more likely to be socially committing than other types of contact. Should this behavior result from either reacting to the event directly or on the basis of the event-changed atitudes, this public commitment would make more permanent the event-induced attitude shift. This may help to explain the resistance to a regression to the previous mean in the August 1968 formal contact attitude data (Table 3-7).

Four possibilities exist, then, to explain the greater vulnerability of the formal contact attitudes to dramatic event-induced change: they are (1) more reliant upon belief similarity than directly racial factors; (2) governed by more positive social norms; (3) governed by less salient and explicit social norms; and (4) more likely to be supported by public behavioral commitment. Our present data do not allow us to evaluate the relative importance of these factors; but they pose interesting, if difficult, possibilities for later research of event-induced opinion change.

Summing up, in generic terms, then, our tentative theory of the influence of dramatic events upon salient opinions predicts:

(A) The most significant initial opinion changes positively toward the object in question will occur for those related attitudes with the most normative acceptance. These are the attitudes whose "latitudes of acceptance" most completely include the dramatic event. Likewise, the most significant initial opinion changes negatively away from the object in question will occur for those related attitudes with the least normative acceptance. These are the attitudes whose "latitudes of rejection" most completely include the dramatic event.

(B) The most significant positive opinion changes toward the object will occur among those individuals whose opinions were most favorable prior to the dramatic event. Likewise, the most significant negative opinion changes away from the object will occur for those individuals whose opinions were most unfavorable prior to the dramatic event. This effect will be seen clearest for those attitudes which have the least normative acceptance.

(C) Significant changes in attitudes which have the least normative acceptance will not typically manifest themselves, if at all, until some time following the dramatic event. This passage of time allows the initial effects to percolate down in a "ripple process" toward greater cognitive consistency across related attitudes.

In a later section of this chapter, we shall note that Negro Texan shifts in racial attitudes over the fateful spring of 1968 adhere closely to these predictions. And in Chapter Eight, we shall return to consideration of the influence of dramatic events with more complex data from the urban North.

Interracial Schools and Teachers

Two of the Belden items reported on above are of special interest to this report -- interracial schools and teachers. The white opinion data presented thus far indicate clearly that these two realms are of intermediate intimacy; that is, both fall consistently in the informal contact category, which is not as susceptible to alteration as such formal contact realms as hotels and restaurants nor as resistant as such intimate contact realms as swimming pools and social gatherings.

If we combine these results with the Triandis and Davis (1965) formulation, we may tentatively conclude that white Texan attitudes toward both interracial student bodies and teachers: (1) are governed by moderately positive and explicit social norms; (2) involve both belief similarity and racial factors as determinants; (3) vary more sharply than many other realms as a function of personality factors; and (4) are subject to moderate shifts induced by dramatic events.

We can press this analysis a bit further by investigating the relationship between the two attitudes. When racially desegregated faculties in southern public schools became a focus of the United States Office of Education in the late sixties, there was considerable speculation as to the possible white southern reaction. Many observers seemed to think that the white South would resist interracial teaching staffs far more sternly than interracial student bodies, even when the latter had already been widely achieved. These Texas data of 1967-68 cast doubt on these fears, as subsequent events in much of the South bore out.[15]

Figure 3-6 shows the near-linear relationship between the two attitudes which prevails when all four Belden surveys are combined. In short, acceptance by white Texans of pupil desegregation proves an excellent indicator of acceptance of teacher desegregation. Table 3-8 presents the same data in another manner. Note in the marginals that a majority of white Texans favor each of the processes, with only six per cent more supporting interracial schools than interracial teaching. Observe also that nearly half the sample (46.4 per cent) favor both conditions, while a fifth (20.9 per cent) reject both. Clear "error" cases consisting of accepting desegregation in one realm while rejecting it in the other comprise less than a tenth (9.7 per cent) of the three thousand cases.

Finally, we may ask if the two realms relate to key background variables in essentially the same fashion. Table 3-9 shows that they do. Treating all of the correlates but age as dummy variables for more rigorous tests, we see that attitudes toward interracial schools and interracial faculties relate almost identically to type and region of residence, education and age. Thus, the larger and more urban the locality lived in by the respondent, the more likely he will favor both processes. West Texans are far more likely to accept both, East Texans least likely. And the better educated and younger respondents are more likely to accept both.

In sum, the initial fears that interracial teaching in the South's public schools raised new elements of resistance appear unfounded. Attitudes of white Texans toward the two realms are in effect two indicators of the same attitude

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[15] At his request, the former Commissioner of Education, Harold Howe III, was supplied by the project with much of the analysis below in 1968.

Figure 3-6

White Texan Attitudes Toward Interracial Schools and Teaching



Table 3-8

White Texan Attitudes Toward Interracial Schools and Teaching[1]

		Attitudes Toward Interracial Schools			
		Favorable	Neutral	Unfavorable	Total
Attitudes Toward Interracial Teaching	Favorable	46.4%	3.6%	2.7%	52.7%
	Neutral	5.4	7.1	2.1	14.6%
	Unfavorable	7.0	4.8	20.9	32.7%
	Total	58.8%	15.5%	25.7%	100.0%

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[1] These percentages are based on the full 3,008 white (Anglo-) Texans interviewed in the four Belden surveys conducted for the project from November 1967 through August 1968. "Favorable" (+5 to +2), "neutral" (+1 to -1), and "unfavorable" (-2 to -5) are defined from the original eleven point scales in the same manner as used in previous tables.

Table 3-9

Correlates of White Texan Attitudes Toward Interracial Schools and Teaching[1]

	Attitudes Toward Interracial...	
	Schools	Teaching
Rural Residence	-.09**	-.11***
Urban Residence	+.04	+.04
Metropolitan Residence	+.06*	+.09**
East Texas Residence	-.18***	-.18***
Central Texas Residence	-.04	-.01
West Texas Residence	+.18***	+.15***
Grade School Education	-.13***	-.11***
High School Education	-.03	-.02
College Education	+.12***	+.11***
Age	-.06*	-.08**

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[1] These coefficients are based on all 3,008 white Anglo-Texans interviewed in the four Belden surveys conducted for the project from November 1967 through August 1968. All of the correlates save age have been treated as dummy variables for more rigorous tests.

***$p < .001$

**$p < .01$

*$p < .05$

toward racial change in public education. They are both moderately susceptible to change and share other common characteristics.

Negro Texan Attitudes[16]

To this point, we have concerned ourselves solely with the racial attitudes of white Anglo-Texans. But as noted already in Chapter Two, Negro insistence for racial change is just as vital as white resistance. Consequently, we shall review the responses of our Negro interviewees to the racial questions especially asked them by the project in the two Belden surveys of November 1967 and February 1968. Then we shall check with the surveys of May and August 1968 to see the changes wrought in these attitudes by the assassination of Dr. King and the publicity given the Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders.

An Overview of Negro Texan Racial Attitudes. Since only about 125 Negro respondents participated in each of our four Belden surveys compared to about 750 white Anglo-respondents,[17] we must combine the two pre-King-assassination surveys and the two post-King-assassination surveys in order to obtain stable estimates of Negro opinion. For the two pre-assassination surveys, Table 3-10 provides the combined results together with a complete listing of the ten attitude questions asked all Negro respondents. A quick reading of this table first reveals that a major consensus existed before Dr. King's assassination on protest methods. Thus, the most agreement occurred in support of non-violent demonstrations (item a), the least for violence and rioting (item j). And this occurred despite the fact that half of the Negro Texans believed that riots had "helped more than hurt" (item f). The generally conservative tone of Negro opinion in Texas at this time is attested to best by the 56 per cent who agreed that Negroes should "work hard and stay out of Civil Rights trouble" (item d).

Other trends in Table 3-10 are also of interest. Notice, for example, the general resentment against white employers (item b) and the difficulty nearly half the sample expressed in trusting whites (item e). Observe, too, the widespread sense of little personal control in the face of a

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[16] The basic analysis for this section was prepared by Mr. Reeve Vanneman of Harvard University.

[17] The remaining 125 respondents in each sample were Mexican-Americans.

Table 3-10

Negro Texan Attitudes Prior to King Assassination and Kerner Report, 1967-8[1]

Question	Percentage Who			
	Agree (+5 to +2)	Are Uncertain (+1 to -1)	Disagree (-2 to -5)	Mean Response[2]
a. The best way for Negroes in America to get power is with peaceful non-violent demonstrations.	73	18	8	+3.0
b. White employers underpay and overwork their Negro employees.	61	22	18	+2.0
c. Very often when you try to get ahead, something or somebody gets in your way.	57	22	21	+1.7
d. The best way for Negroes to gain their rights is to work hard and stay out of "Civil Rights" trouble.	56	20	24	+1.4
e. If a Negro is wise, he will think twice before he trusts a white man as much as he trusts another Negro.	44	29	27	+0.7
f. Riots have helped more than hurt the Negro in his struggle for equal rights.	49	16	35	+0.6

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Table 3-10 continued

Question	Percentage Who Agree (+5 to +2)	 Are Uncertain (+1 to -1)	 Disagree (-2 to -5)	Mean Response[2]
g. You would prefer to send your child to a mostly white school instead of an all Negro school.	43	29	29	+0.6
h. People like you don't have a very good chance to be really successful in life.	38	21	41	+0.2
i. You would prefer to send your child to a mostly white school instead of a Negro one even if there might be racial trouble.	29	25	46	-0.9
j. Negroes should use all possible means to gain power in America, including violence and rioting if necessary.	17	16	66	-2.5

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[1] Based on the combined 256 respondents of the Belden Texas surveys of November 1967 and February 1968.

[2] For ease of interpretation, this scoring is changed from previous tables to read "0" for neutral, +5 for very favorable, and -5 for very unfavorable. Means are for the full uncollapsed eleven-point scale.

hostile environment (items c and h).[18] Finally, the sentiment for interracial public education is tapped by items g and i. When no mention is made of conflict, three out of every seven Negro respondents expressed an interest in having their child attend a predominantly-white school and another two out of seven were uncertain (item g). But when possible "racial trouble" is mentioned explicitly, the percentages drop dramatically with only two in seven still interested and almost half rejecting the idea (item i).

The items of Table 3-10 are best described by the two-dimensional, orthogonal factorial structure shown in Figure 3-7.[19] Note first the stability of this structure over time from before and after the murder of Dr. King in April of 1968. These two factors account for 39 per cent of the total variance between the nine items before the assassination and 42 per cent after.[20] The vertical dimension appears to represent a respondent's negative view of his environment. Failure to include items to which agreement would signify environmental satisfaction is why this dimension does not extend downward in Figure 3-7 to include a positive view of the environment. The horizontal dimension seems to tap racial militancy, with items measuring both ends of this continuum included in the survey. Note how items f and j concerned with violence load fairly heavily on both environmental frustration and militancy in the upper-left quadrant. But the five items which received the most agreement in Table 3-10 (items a, b, c, d, and e) all tend to fall in or near the upper-right quadrant. The dominant opinion climate of adult Negro Texans prior to the killing of Dr. King can therefore be summarized as conservative but environmentally frustrated. Only the three-fifths of the sample who

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[18] These items were included so as to measure "fate control" as developed by Rotter (1966) and found to be important for Negroes by Gore and Rotter (1963), Ransford (1968), and Coleman et al. (1966).

[19] Based on a principal components solution with an orthogonal varimax rotation.

[20] The one item omitted from our factor analyses -- support for school integration (item g) -- had to be left out because its very high correlation with the similar item i would have created a third factor. Had it been used instead of i, it would have occupied a similar place on the plot, slightly nearer the origin, that is, neither so militant nor so frustrated.

Figure 3-7

Factorial Structure of Racial Attitudes of Negro Texans

BEFORE THE KING ASSASSINATION



AFTER THE KING ASSASSINATION



expressed hostility at white employers and the half who thought riots helped the Negro struggle gave hints as to the potential for racial militancy among Negro Texans prior to April 1968.

The most remarkable feature of these results, however, is the stability over time of the factorial structure in Figure 3-7. It is remarkable first because replications of factorial structures are surprisingly uncommon in the research literature of the social sciences. Second, it is remarkable because we shall shortly see that the events of spring 1968 apparently led to significant shifts in the absolute levels of responses to some of these ten items; yet these shifts occurred without disturbing the basic opinion structure -- an important fact that will make easier our later job of interpretation. Next, however, we shall investigate the correlates of these pre-assassination attitudes.

The Correlates of the Pre-assassination Attitudes. Table 3-11 summarizes the relationships between each of the ten pre-assassination attitudes and the background variables of type and section of residence, education,[21] socio-economic-status,[22] age, and sex. In general, the relationships are not as strong and consistent as previous survey data would suggest (Brink and Harris, 1964, 1966; Pettigrew, 1964). Sex, for instance, is unrelated to any of the ten items in Table 3-11; and each of the other background variables is only modestly related.

The rural-urban-metropolitan place of residence variable related significantly to only three of the items. Not surprisingly, rural residents were far more interested in staying "out of trouble" (item d; $p < .01$) and more reticent about sending their children into potentially troubled interracial schools (item i; $p < .01$); and metropolitan residents were more willing to express discontent with white employers

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[21] Education was mistakenly not asked in the November 1967 survey, so the data for it are based on the February 1968 survey only with roughly 135 instead of 256 respondents.

[22] As rated on a four-point scale by Belden interviewers using largely such material cues as type of house, house furnishings, and type of personal clothing. The top two categories are combined in all of our use of the variable so as to achieve more stable estimates.

Table 3-11

Correlates of Pre-Assassination Racial Attitudes of Negro Texans[1]

Item	Type of Residence			Region			Education			
	Rural	Urban	Metro	West	Central	East	Grade School	Some H.S.	H.S. Grad	Above H.S.
a. "...best way...is with peaceful non-violent demonstrations."	+2.6	+3.2	+3.0	+3.5	+2.9	+3.0	+3.4	+2.0	+2.7	+2.4
b. "White employers underpay and overwork... Negro[es]..."	+1.4	+1.5	+2.6	+0.9	+2.3	+1.7	+2.5	+2.5	+1.5	+2.3
c. "...try to get ahead, something...gets in your way."	+1.8	+1.4	+1.9	+1.4	+1.9	+1.4	+1.4	+1.6	+1.6	+1.5
d. "...best way...is to work hard and stay out of...trouble."	+2.5	+1.6	+0.8	+0.5	+1.0	+2.6	+1.3	+1.9	+1.8	-0.9
e. "...a Negro will think twice before he trusts a white man as much as ...another Negro."	+1.1	-0.6	+1.7	-0.6	+1.0	+0.7	+2.2	+0.3	+0.7	0.0
f. "Riots have helped more than hurt the Negro..."	+0.6	+0.9	+0.4	+1.4	+0.5	+0.6	+1.5	+0.8	+0.2	+1.2
g. "...prefer to send your child to a mostly white school..."	-0.8	+1.2	+0.7	+1.8	+1.0	-0.8	+0.2	-0.6	+1.6	+1.5

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Table 3-11 continued

Item	Type of Residence			Region			Education			
	Rural	Urban	Metro	West	Central	East	Grade School	Some H.S.	H.S. Grad	Above H.S.
h. "...don't have a very good chance to be really successful in life."	-0.5	-0.2	-0.1	-0.6	-0.3	+0.1	+1.7	-1.1	-0.3	-1.1
i. "...prefer to send your child to a mostly white school...even if there might be racial trouble."	-2.5	-0.7	-0.4	+0.5	-0.6	-2.4	-1.0	-1.1	-0.7	-0.2
j. "Negroes should use all possible means... including violence and rioting if necessary."	-1.9	-2.8	-2.5	-3.0	-2.5	-2.4	-1.5	-2.4	-2.7	-2.7

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Table 3-11 continued

Item	Socio-Economic-Status			Age			Sex	
	Lower	Lower-Middle	Middle	Younger (21-35)	Middle-Aged (36-50)	Older (51+)	Male	Female
a. "...best way...is with peaceful non-violent demonstrations."	+2.9	+3.2	+2.9	+2.6	+3.5	+3.0	+2.9	+3.1
b. "White employers underpay and overwork... Negro[es]..."	+1.5	+2.2	+2.8	+2.1	+2.0	+1.9	+1.9	+2.0
c. "...try to get ahead, something...gets in your way."	+1.1	+2.1	+2.7	+2.5	+1.2	+1.5	+1.5	+1.9
d. "...best way...is to work hard and stay out of...trouble."	+1.8	+1.3	+0.3	+1.4	+0.9	+2.6	+1.0	+1.8
e. "...a Negro will think twice before he trusts a white man as much as ...another Negro."	+0.7	+0.6	+1.1	+0.9	+0.3	+0.9	+0.8	+0.7
f. "Riots have helped more than hurt the Negro..."	+0.8	+0.2	+0.7	+1.3	+0.8	-0.2	+0.6	+0.6
g. "...prefer to send your child to a mostly white school..."	+0.4	+1.2	-0.1	+0.8	+1.1	-0.1	+0.7	+0.5

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Table 3-11 continued

Item	Socio-Economic-Status			Age			Sex	
	Lower	Lower-Middle	Middle	Younger (21-35)	Middle-Aged (36-50)	Older (51+)	Male	Female
h. "...don't have a very good chance to be really successful in life."	+0.1	-0.7	-0.5	-0.7	-0.6	+0.6	0.0	-0.4
i. "...prefer to send your child to a mostly white school...even if there might be racial trouble."	-1.1	-0.5	-1.3	-0.7	-0.7	-1.4	-0.6	-1.3
j. "Negroes should use all possible means... including violence and rioting if necessary."	-2.0	-2.7	-3.5	-2.9	-2.1	-2.4	-2.6	-2.4

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[1] These data are presented in the form of means; as in the previous table, +5.0 is the most favorable category, 0.0 is neutral, and -5.0 is the most unfavorable category. All relationships attaining at least a two-tailed significance level of five per cent are underlined. As in the previous table, these data are based on the combined 256 Negro respondents of the Belden Texas surveys of November 1967 and February 1968, save for the education results which are based only on the latter survey.

(item b; $p<.05$). Similarly, Negro citizens of East Texas were also more interested in avoiding "trouble" (item d; $p<.01$) and less interested in sending their children to predominantly-white schools whether there might be "racial trouble" (item i; $p<.001$) or not (item g; $p<.001$).[23]

Better-educated Negro Texans were considerably more enthusiastic about interracial schools (item g; $p<.05$). And poorly-educated Negro Texans, especially those with just grade-school training, expressed considerably more environmental frustration. In particular, they distrusted whites more (item e; $p<.05$) and realistically believed that people like themselves had little "...chance to be really successful in life" (item h; $p<.01$). All three of these relationships, however, are non-monotonic.

Rated social class, which would generally be expected to relate in a manner similar to that of education, actually provides a sharply different pattern. Thus, its association with school desegregation is curvilinear, with the lower-middle class and not the middle class most favorable to desegregated public education for their children (items g and i).[24] The middle class respondent expressed his pre-assassination ambivalence by more sternly rejecting both violence (item j; $p<.05$) and staying "out of 'Civil Rights' trouble" (item d; $p<.05$). And contrary to the education effects, it is the middle class which registered the greatest degree of environmental frustration. Thus, upper-status Negro respondents were more likely in late 1967 and early 1968 to accuse white employers of poor treatment of Negro workers (item b; $p < .05$) and to feel that "something or somebody gets in [their] way" when they "try to get ahead" (item c; $p < .05$). All told, socio-economic-status related to more items, four, than any other variable tested in Table 3-11 and provides the most complex pattern -- especially the squeezed and ambivalent self-perceptions of the Negro middle-class in Texas prior to the momentous events of spring 1968.

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[23] These regional differences in attitudes toward desegregated schooling are consistent with the respondents' actual practice. As one might expect from the ecological data of Chapter Two, only 25 per cent of the East Texas respondents reported in the survey that they sent children to desegregated schools, compared to 40 per cent in Central Texas and 71 per cent in West Texas. Yet these two sets of data are not mere reflections of each other. The more favorable attitudes toward interracial education in both West Texas and in urban and metropolitan areas remains even when participation in actual public school desegregation is controlled.

[24] These relationships, however, do not reach statistical significance.

Finally, age proved to be a weak correlate of only two items, despite the fact that the much-discussed "generation gap" is presumed by many observers to be greater among Negroes than whites. The young were more likely to believe that riots had done more good than harm for racial change (item f; $p < .05$); and the old were more likely to regard poorly their chances to be "really successful in life" (item h; $p < .05$). These significant trends, however, are mitigated by the less-significant opposite results of other items, for the young were somewhat *more* hostile to violent methods (item j; n.s.) and more likely to regard their attempts at upward mobility to be blocked (item c; n.s.).

Now we turn to see what had happened to these attitudes by May and April of 1968.

Reactions of Negro Texans to the King Assassination and the Kerner Commission Report. We have investigated in some detail the sharp effects of King's death and the Kerner Commission Report on white Texans. Yet there are good reasons to expect that the influence of these events should have been even more striking on Negro Texans. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was, afterall, their hero, a southern leader who preached a position quite close to their dominant opinions as just outlined. And the National Advisory Commission Report's indictment of "white racism" represented for many Negroes the first official recognition of their perspective on American race relations. "Did they have to spend all that money," mused a number of our respondents, "just to find *that* out! I could have told them about white racism for nothing!" But underlying such joking was a widespread hope that just maybe "the Man" was slowly beginning "to catch on."

What, then, were the effects on our ten items of these two critical events? Table 3-12 provides the results. Before investigating these trends in detail, we should check on the "dramatic event hypothesis" of attitude change derived from the white Texan data. If the original agreement percentages are ordered according to the direction of the

Table 3-12

Negro Texans' Racial Attitudes Before and After King Murder and Kerner Report[1]

Item	Percentage Agreement		Raw Change Percentage (Post-Pre)	Standardized Change Percentage	p
	Nov.'67 +Feb.'68	May'68 +Aug.'68			
a. "...best way...is with peaceful non-violent demonstrations."	73.4	82.7	+9.3	+35.0	<.01
b. "White employers underpay and overwork... Negro[es]..."	60.5	58.3	-2.2	-3.6	N.S.
c. "...try to get ahead, something...gets in your way."	57.4	48.1	-9.3	-16.2	<.01
d. "...best way...is to work hard ahd stay out of...trouble."	56.2	50.4	-5.8	-10.3	<.05
e. "...a Negro...will think twice before he trusts a white man as much as... another Negro."	44.1	33.8	-10.3	-23.4	<.01
f. "Riots have helped more than hurt the Negro..."	49.2	44.7	-4.5	-9.1	N.S.

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Table 3-12 continued

Item	Percentage Agreement		Raw Change Percentage (Post-Pre)	Standardized Change Percentage	p
	Nov.'67 +Feb.'68	May'68 +Aug.'68			
g. "...prefer to send your child to a mostly white school..."	42.6	39.5	-3.1	-7.3	N.S.
h. "...don't have a very good chance to be really successful in life."	37.9	34.2	-3.7	-9.8	N.S.
i. "...prefer to send your child to a mostly white school...even if there might be racial trouble."	28.9	24.1	-4.8	-16.6	N.S.
j. "Negroes should use all possible means... including violence and rioting if necessary.	17.2	12.4	-4.8	-27.9	N.S.

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[1] The data derive from four representative surveys of Texas conducted by Belden Associates of Dallas, Texas and commissioned by this project. Per cent agreement refers to those who answered +5, +4, +3, or +2 on an eleven point scale. As in previous tables, "standardized change" refers to the percentage change as a function of the change possible in a given direction.

changes,[25] then the trends do support our hypothesis. Thus, raw changes relate slightly positively (Spearman Rho = +.14, n.s.) and the standardized changes relate sharply positively (Spearman Rho = +.65, $p < .05$) with the percentage of sampled Negro Texans who before the King assassination held the view which gained further support after the assassination. Put more simply, these Negro data, like the white data, indicate that once ceiling effects are controlled attitude changes moved toward the positions already widely held. Once again we are led to the conclusion that dramatic events tend to bolster the views which are already normative and within the latitudes of acceptance of a significant portion of the population.

One immediate substantive effect was not easily foreseen, another answer to those critics who assert that social science research finds only "the obvious." Negro Texans reacted to the King assassination and Kerner Commission Report with guarded hope and a sense of less environmental frustration. Note especially items c, e, and h -- three key items of the environmental frustration factor of Figure 3-7. On all three items, agreement decreased and disagreement increased with strong statistical significance being attained in two instances. The fourth item previously identified with this factor -- the underpayment and overwork of white employers (item b) -- showed almost no change over time. Perhaps, it taps into too specific an attitude, conditioned by one's own work experience, to be greatly affected by unconnected national events.

Looking at Table 3-12 once more, how many observers would have guessed that Negro Texans actually became more trusting of whites and more optimistic about getting ahead immediately after the murder by a white assassin of their principal and most popular protest leader? Yet the findings for each of the three items are quite consistent with one another.

Next we must ask how long-lasting were these surprising shifts in attitude and mood? We can check on this by looking in Table 3-13 at the less stable results for each of the four polls separately, rather than combining the two pre- and the

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[25] Thus, in Table 3-12, the standardized base for item a is 26.6 (100-73.4) since its change was positive; while for the other nine items, the standardized base is the original agreement percentage since their changes were all negative.

Table 3-13

Environmental Frustration Results over 1967-68 Year

	Percentage Agreement			
	Nov.'67	Feb.'68	May'68	Aug.'68
c. "...something or somebody gets in your way."	59.3	55.6	47.4	48.9
e. "...Negro...will think twice before he trusts a white man..."	43.9	44.4	29.3	38.3
h. "...don't have a very good chance to be really successful in life."	36.6	39.1	27.8	40.6

two post-assassination polls. And we find that enormous changes are registered in items e and h ("trusting white men" and "a good chance to be successful") between February and May 1968, but that these changes recede back toward pre-assassination levels by August 1968. The third item of Table 3-13, item c ("something gets in the way"), does not change between May and August; but it must be noted that it had already shown a decline between the November 1967 and February 1968 surveys, hence its post-murder effect was apparently at least to some extent a part of a more general pattern. In short, while there is considerable evidence that the spring 1968 events were greeted at first with greater optimism by Negro Texans generally, there is every reason to suspect that this alteration in mood and aspiration was not long-lasting.

What could have caused even this temporary rise in confidence? The outpouring of public sympathy following the assassination combined with the surprisingly forthright conclusions of the Kerner Commission apparently provide an answer. Many Negro Texans had probably never before seen white men grieve over a slain Negro. Nor had many of them ever heard a white-dominated governmental view so fully substantiate their perspective on American race relations. For a fleeting few months, it must have seemed to those most aware of these national happenings that fundamental racial change was about to occur. We can speculate that many Negro Texans at this point must have mused hopefully, if guardedly, that Dr. King had not died in vain. But, as it had happened so often before, no basic and dramatic improvement occurred in the following months, and by August 1968 the old pessimism and environmental frustration was starting to reassert itself.

This interpretation is supported by the results shown in Table 3-14. Observe that it is the very Negroes who would have had the greatest awareness of the dominant white American reaction to King's death and the conclusions of the Kerner Report who evince the most significant shifts in responses to items c, e, and h: the middle-class, younger adults, and those residing in metropolitan areas.

The effects of the spring 1968 events on the militancy factor are somewhat more complex. One might reasonably have anticipated a general rise in militancy throughout the Negro Texan community. But this did not occur for the sample as a whole. Instead, there were quite different reactions among subgroups that go unnoticed if the data are simply aggregated. Briefly, it appears that militancy did increase among the young and the middle class; but these trends were balanced by

Table 3-14

Raw Change Percentages for Three Environmental Frustration Items by Social Characteristics[1]

Item	Response	Social Characteristic									
		Type of Residence			Region			Education			
		Rural	Urban	Metro	West	Central	East	Grade School	Some H.S.	H.S. Grad.	H.S.+
c. "...try to get ahead, something... gets in your way."	Agree	+0.1	-7.0	-19.7	-16.1	-7.5	-10.3	-1.6	-6.4	-11.3	-14.9
	Uncertain	+3.8	-3.7	-13.0	-12.9	-11.0	+6.5	-2.1	-6.3	-14.0	-3.7
	Disagree	-3.9	+10.7	+32.8	+29.0	+18.5	+3.9	+3.7	+12.7	+25.3	+18.5
e. "...a Negro will think twice before he trusts a white man as much as another Negro."	Agree	-5.5	+1.1	-24.1	-6.5	-6.1	-20.8	-25.8	+9.8	-8.4	-9.2
	Uncertain	-5.5	-10.8	-1.6	-3.2	-12.0	+7.8	-4.2	-31.9	-15.1	+9.3
	Disagree	+10.9	+9.8	+25.8	+9.7	+18.1	+13.0	+30.0	+22.1	+23.5	0.0
h. "...don't have a very good chance to be really successful in life."	Agree	+13.1	-8.5	-13.5	-12.9	-1.8	-3.9	-13.1	+6.9	-1.4	-7.4
	Uncertain	-2.0	-2.6	-7.2	-6.5	-7.0	0.0	+7.1	-14.9	-18.7	-9.2
	Disagree	-11.1	+11.1	+20.8	+19.3	+8.7	+3.9	+6.0	+8.0	+20.1	+16.7

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Table 3-14 continued

Item	Response	Social Characteristic							
		Socio-Economic-Status			Age			Sex	
		Lower	Lower-Middle	Middle	Younger (21-35)	Middle-Aged (36-50)	Older (51+)	Male	Female
c. "...try to get ahead, something ...gets in your way."	Agree	-2.3	-14.1	-22.7	-19.3	-7.6	0.0	-6.6	-12.0
	Uncertain	-6.7	-5.8	-3.0	+0.7	-8.2	-11.3	-4.3	-7.8
	Disagree	+9.1	+20.0	+25.6	+18.7	+15.9	+11.2	+11.0	+19.8
e. "...a Negro will think twice before he trusts a white man as much as another Negro."	Agree	-12.8	+0.9	-23.9	-11.1	-3.5	-13.5	-14.8	-5.7
	Uncertain	-7.1	-3.2	-1.1	-9.2	-4.1	-4.5	+2.6	-13.0
	Disagree	+19.9	+2.3	+25.0	+20.4	+7.7	+18.0	+12.3	+18.7
h. "...don't have a very good chance to be really successful in life."	Agree	+2.0	-3.7	-12.5	-2.6	-8.7	+2.3	-8.6	+1.2
	Uncertain	-9.2	-0.6	-3.0	-2.9	-1.5	-10.2	-1.9	-7.9
	Disagree	+7.3	+4.3	+15.4	+5.6	+10.2	+7.9	+10.5	+6.7

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[1] Raw change percentages for Negro Texans calculated as in Table 3-12. Those figures in a column which are underlined (e.g., metropolitan residents on item c) indicate that the particular 3 x 2 chi-square (e.g., agree, uncertain, and disagree vs. before-after spring 1968) is statistically significant at better than the five per cent level of confidence.

a markedly less militant stance among the elderly and the lower class. It appears that those elements of the Negro community which were more accustomed to a traditional and subordinate role were largely intimidated by the assassination, while the young and the middle class reacted more aggressively. Once again we see our "dramatic events hypothesis" operating.

The most militant question asked in the survey was item j, which advocates that Negroes should use "all possible means to gain power...including violence and rioting if necessary." We already noted in Table 3-10 that this statement was by far the most rejected item just prior to the eventful April of 1968. For the entire sample, agreement with item j actually decreased five per cent after the murder of Dr. King and the issuance of the Kerner Commission Report. Nevertheless, among the young and the middle class, agreement with the statement increased in the post-murder results ten per cent and seventeen per cent respectively. Table 3-15 records these raw percentage changes together with the results for other sub-samples.

At the opposite end of the militancy continuum is item d which advocates that Negroes should "...work hard and stay out of Civil Rights trouble." Again it is the middle class and especially the young who shift most sharply toward rejecting this statement. As Table 3-15 indicates, disapproval among the middle class rose from 20 per cent compared to smaller increases among the lower-middle class (twelve per cent) and lower class (three per cent). Similarly, disagreement increased among the younger respondents 22 per cent compared to essentially no change among the middle-aged respondents and a more modest increase among the older respondents. And since we sampled only adults, it seems safe to imagine that this increased militancy was still greater among adolescent Negroes than for the young adults interviewed. Thus, we find a consistent pattern at both ends of the militancy factor. The middle class and the young endorsed violence more and approved of staying out of trouble less following the wanton slaying of Dr. King.

Note, too, that these shifts created sharp cleavages of Negro opinion along class and age lines that did not exist prior to the events of spring 1968. Thus, in response to item j concerning the possible use of violence and rioting, agreement declined twelve per cent among the lower-class but rose 17 per cent among the middle class; likewise, agreement of the younger respondents lifted ten per cent while it sank fourteen per cent for the older respondents. We may conclude at this point, then, that if these dramatic events

Table 3-15

Raw Change Percentages for Three Militancy and Two School Integration Items by Social Characteristics[1]

Item	Response	Social Characteristic									
		Type of Residence			Region			Education			
		Rural	Urban	Metro	West	Central	East	Grade School	Some H.S.	H.S. Grad.	H.S.+
a. "...best way ...is with peaceful non-violent demonstrations."	Agree	+12.6	+8.1	+8.4	+3.3	+12.0	+6.5	+7.8	+29.9	+12.8	-5.6
	Uncertain	-3.6	-13.0	-13.8	-6.4	-14.6	-6.5	-10.2	-31.4	-18.1	-7.4
	Disagree	-8.9	+4.9	+5.4	+3.2	+2.7	0.0	+2.4	+1.6	+5.5	+13.0
d. "...best way ...is to work hard and stay out of... trouble."	Agree	-12.1	-3.4	-8.9	+6.4	-6.4	-9.1	+4.1	-13.6	-7.7	+9.3
	Uncertain	+0.9	+1.8	-8.1	-6.4	-5.0	-1.3	-7.9	+12.5	-12.2	-22.2
	Disagree	+11.2	+1.6	+17.0	0.0	+11.5	+10.4	+3.7	+1.1	+19.9	+13.0
j. "Negroes should use all possible means ...including violence and rioting if necessary."	Agree	-10.1	-4.5	-2.6	-9.6	-1.0	-10.4	-24.7	-2.0	+6.1	+5.6
	Uncertain	-1.1	-1.1	-1.5	+6.4	-3.7	+1.3	+8.0	-19.9	-4.5	-1.8
	Disagree	+11.2	+5.6	+4.0	+3.2	+4.7	+9.1	+16.8	+21.9	-1.5	-3.7

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Table 3-15 continued

Item	Response	Social Characteristic									
		Type of Residence			Region			Education			
		Rural	Urban	Metro	West	Central	East	Grade School	Some H.S.	H.S. Grad.	H.S.+
g. "...prefer to send your child to a mostly white school..."	Agree	+8.0	-13.3	+0.6	-3.2	-6.0	+2.6	-8.7	+11.2	-1.8	-5.6
	Uncertain	-1.9	-5.2	-6.1	-12.9	-8.9	+3.9	-4.3	-11.	-15.7	-11.1
	Disagree	-6.2	+18.6	+5.4	+16.2	+15.0	-6.5	+13.0	-0.2	+17.4	+16.7
i. "...prefer to send your child to a mostly white school...even if there might be racial trouble."	Agree	+12.5	-9.2	-11.1	-19.4	-10.9	+13.0	-7.7	-2.6	+1.5	-7.4
	Uncertain	+8.8	+0.4	-4.4	-9.7	-1.7	+5.2	+4.8	-5.3	-18.6	+3.7
	Disagree	-21.3	+8.9	+15.5	+29.0	+12.6	-18.1	+2.9	+7.8	+17.2	+3.7

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Table 3-15 continued

Item	Response	Socio-Economic-Status			Age			Sex	
		Lower	Lower-Middle	Middle	Younger (21-35)	Middle-Aged (36-50)	Older (51+)	Male	Female
a. "...best way ...is with peaceful non-violent demonstrations."	Agree	+8.9	+8.9	+12.1	+2.7	+9.1	+15.8	+8.3	+10.2
	Uncertain	-11.0	-9.1	-16.3	-10.9	-9.9	-13.5	-8.8	-13.5
	Disagree	+2.0	+0.2	+4.2	+8.3	+0.9	-2.2	+0.5	+3.4
d. "...best way ...is to work hard and stay out of... trouble."	Agree	-3.2	-4.7	-10.7	-18.5	+0.9	+1.1	-2.7	-9.1
	Uncertain	-0.1	-7.6	-9.7	-3.2	+1.1	-13.5	-4.2	-3.9
	Disagree	+3.4	+12.2	+20.4	+21.8	-2.0	+12.4	+7.0	+13.0
j. "Negroes should use all possible means ...including violence and rioting if necessary."	Agree	-12.2	-4.2	+17.2	+9.6	-9.0	-13.5	-6.5	-3.0
	Uncertain	-0.8	+5.1	-9.6	+4.6	0.0	-7.8	+3.6	-5.5
	Disagree	+13.1	-1.0	-7.6	-14.1	+9.0	+20.3	+3.0	+8.6

Social Characteristic

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Table 3-15 continued

Item	Response	Social Characteristic							
		Socio-Economic-Status			Age			Sex	
		Lower	Lower-Middle	Middle	Younger (21-35)	Middle-Aged (36-50)	Older (51+)	Male	Female
g. "...prefer to send your child to a mostly white school..."	Agree	-3.5	-7.9	+11.4	+1.8	-12.1	+4.5	-10.9	+4.6
	Uncertain	-8.9	-5.0	-1.2	-11.8	+4.0	-12.4	+4.8	-15.8
	Disagree	+12.4	+13.0	-10.3	+10.1	+8.1	+7.8	+6.1	+11.2
i. "...prefer to send your child to a mostly white school...even if there might be racial trouble."	Agree	-5.0	-13.1	+14.0	-6.5	-5.4	-1.1	-9.2	-0.5
	Uncertain	-1.9	+0.4	+1.1	-2.8	+8.5	-10.1	+5.6	-6.6
	Disagree	+7.0	+12.7	-15.1	+9.4	-3.1	+11.3	+3.6	+7.0

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[1] Raw change percentages for Negro Texans calculated as in Table 3-12. Those figures in a column which are underlined (e.g., metropolitan residents on item a) indicate that the particular 3 x 2 chi-square (e.g., agree, uncertain, and disagree vs. before-after spring 1968) is statistically significant at better than the five per cent level of confidence.

further polarized dominant white and Negro thinking in Texas at large, they also served to polarize thinking within the Negro community itself.

For the total sample, the results for an additional militancy item further underlines this polarization of opinion. Approval of non-violent protest demonstrations (item a) rose substantially (ten per cent) while disapproval also rose slightly (two per cent). The principal effect of the assassination here was to decrease sharply the uncertain, low-saliency response (eleven per cent) -- an effect which emerges for all eighteen of the non-independent ecological sub-samples employed in this analysis. Indeed, uncertain, neutral response percentages fell for nine out of the ten questions asked Negro Texans (sign test $p < .05$). In short, the King assassination and the Kerner Commission Report made militancy a more salient issue among Negro Texans; but among those most accustomed to traditional modes of race relations this heightened saliency reflected intimidation and reduced militant attitudes, while for such other elements as the middle class and the young this new saliency reflected enhanced militancy.[26] And unlike the temporary nature of the rising optimism, these militancy effects remained at least through our August 1968 survey four months after the King murder.

Similarly, alterations in attitudes toward integration shown in Table 3-15 sharply differed across ecological groupings. Understandably, the most striking shifts occurred in responses to item i which explicitly mentions the possibility of "racial trouble." For the total Texas sample, there was a slight but statistically insignificant decline in preference for sending children to a "mostly white school... even if there might be racial trouble" (from 29 to 24 per cent). But Table 3-15 reveals that substantial decreases occurred in West Texas (19 per cent), Central Texas (eleven per cent), and in both the metropolitan (eleven per cent) and urban (nine per cent) areas. These were the areas, as we have previously noted, where public school desegregation had already been widely achieved by 1968. But in those areas where little educational mixing had been accomplished, an interesting and significant increment in preference for interracial schooling despite possible "trouble" took place. Thus, a gain of thirteen per cent occurred in both East Texas and in rural counties. Indeed, these shifts serve to eradicate the regional differences which existed in responses to this item prior to the fateful April of 1968.

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[26] Note the similarity here with the previously-presented white data. Going once again in the face of ceiling effects, those Negro Texans who were already the most militant -- the young and the middle class -- are the ones who tend to become more militant following the events of spring 1968. This finding is further evidence, then, for the general principles put forward earlier to explain the attitude effects of dramatic events.

Further specification of these regional results is provided by looking separately at those who had and those who had not actually sent their children to desegregated schools prior to Dr. King's assassination. In West and Central Texas, support for desegregated education under conditions of potential trouble eroded for both groups. Yet in East Texas a sharp differentiation occurred. The gain in preference for interracial schooling in this region is restricted to those who had already sent their children to mostly white public schools. Before the sobering events of spring 1968, only ten per cent of these parents in East Texas who had been personally involved in the process preferred biracial education if they thought "racial trouble" might burst forth; but after the events this percentage climbs up to 52 per cent. It is as if the courage and public commitment involved for a Negro family to utilize desegregated school opportunities in East Texas is so great that national adversity largely made these parents more determined than ever to continue to challenge the status quo. Such a social psychological explanation is consistent with the finding above that for East Texas Negroes in general militancy declined, for the majority of the East Texas sample had not committed themselves publicly in such a norm-breaking manner as these parents.

Finally, Table 3-15 reveals a status difference with this school desegregation item similar to that noted previously for militancy items in general. Middle class Negroes increased their preference for school desegregation following the assassination, while lower and lower-middle status Negroes decreased their preference. The middle class responded to the killing and Kerner Commission Report as they did, we can infer, in part because they were the least intimidated prior to spring 1968 and the most publicly committed to interracial life in general.

In summary, Negro Texans responded differentially to the dramatic events of April 1968. Those most aware of the predominant white response to Dr. King's murder and the Kerner Commission indictment of white America as basically racist, metropolitan residents and the middle class, reacted with a temporary racial optimism. Militancy changes were more mixed but longer lasting. Those Negro Texans least racially intimidated before the events, the young and the middle class, became more militant; and likewise, those most intimidated, the old and the lower class, became less militant. And a similar phenomenon appears for preferences for interracial schools when there might be "racial trouble." Middle class Negro Texans became more determined to have integrated education for their children, while lower-status Negro Texans became less determined. Interestingly, too, in those areas where "racial trouble" is not rare, rural and East Texas counties, preference for desegregation among those parents who had already sent their children to such schools sharply increased -- presumably because of the considerable risk and commitment involved in their earlier decision. Preference for desegregation, however, generally declined in urban and metropolitan areas as well as in West and Central Texas. In short, a polarization of racial opinion occurred in the Negro community following the King assassination not unlike the polarization within the white community.

Chapter Summary

This chapter has presented an overview of racial opinion in Texas, both white and Negro. We have traced its changes over time and concentrated attention upon the alterations in attitudes wrought by the dramatic events of the spring of 1968. White Texan opinions toward desegregation became markedly more favorable following the death of Dr. Martin Luther King and the issuance of the Kerner Commission Report, especially for such formal contact areas as hotels and restaurants. Negro Texan opinions became temporarily more optimistic; and they became more militant among the already-moderately militant, the young and the middle class, and less militant among the old and the lower class.

Attitudes toward interracial public schools evinced a number of interesting properties. Among white Texans, they have become irregularly more favorable among most groups. In the wake of the dramatic events of 1968, they proved to be of intermediate intimacy and like attitudes toward church desegregation became moderately more positive. Furthermore, attitudes toward pupil desegregation were found to relate closely with those toward teacher desegregation and consequently had similar social correlates and responses to dramatic racial happenings. Among Negro Texans, the determination to have their children attend biracial schools despite possible "racial trouble" declined somewhat among most types with one glaring exception. Those parents in rural and East Texas who had already braved the risks involved in sending their children to predominantly-white schools became sharply more supportive of interracial public education.

In general, the findings are consistent with the several social psychological theories of attitude change. They point to a more generalized theory of opinion change rendered by dramatic events, a subject to which we shall return in Chapter Eight. In the following chapter, we shall employ these attitude data in an attempt to predict and understand the extent of public school integration across the biracial counties of Texas.

Chapter Four

Attitudes and School Desegregation

Attitudes have rarely been employed to predict broad social processes. As an individual concept, attitudes have generally been exploited to predict only individual behavior. And these attitude-behavior studies have often failed to consider the social context in which both are shaped (Rokeach, 1967). Yet the need is great to place attitudes in social perspective and to use them in the aggregate to predict broader processes. We noted in Chapter One when discussing the "ecological fallacy" the dangers involved in inferring individual behavior from aggregate data; and we also noted in Chapter Two how the ecological predictions of the school desegregation process in Texas left much unanswered. Hence, in this chapter we shall attempt to predict the same unfolding process with the use of attitude data.

Social science has seldom attempted to use attitudes in this fashion for the practical reason of cost. Without a new aggregating technique, it was necessary to sample individually each ecological unit involved in the process under study. Such a procedure was prohibitively expensive. For example, working with the more than 180 Texas counties under scrutiny in this study, it would have required a separate probability sample in each of the counties -- a task approximately as expensive as 30 or more national surveys.

The methodological breakthrough which overcame this difficulty is comparatively new, having been first reported by Pool, Abelson, and Popkin in 1964. It allows a simulation of an opinion climate for each smaller unit (e.g., county) from survey data drawn only from a larger unit (e.g., state). The present study is apparently the first application of the technique at the county level, and presents in Appendix A the first direct validation of the technique's central assumption. A brief discussion of this new method of aggregating survey data is necessary before we apply it to our Texas sample.

The Pool-Abelson-Popkin Opinion Climate Simulation Technique

Ithiel Pool and his colleagues set out to simulate the 1960 and 1964 presidential election votes by state using only opinion data on relevant issues gathered well before the races (Pool, Abelson, and Popkin, 1965). Since they did not have probability samples of each of the states, they faced the same problem posed for the present project at the county level. Their solution was to simulate the opinion climate for critical issues for each state on the basis of national survey data. This simulation of state opinion climates was achieved in a series of straightforward steps.

First, the relevant survey data are cross-tabulated with basic "voter types," which we shall call by the more generic title of "demographic types." For example, Pool, et al., sorted each of 160,000 interview respondents into one of 480 different types defined by socio-economic-status (SES), sex, religion, race, city size, region, and political party identification. Thus, one demographic type consisted of high-status, Protestant, Republican, rural, white males in the East. Seven variables combined in this manner would lead logically to many more than 480 types; but fortunately many types do not exist for all practical purposes -- for instance, high-status, Jewish, Republican, rural, Negro females in the West! The first step was completed, then, when the investigators knew the typical response to a given survey question for each of their well-populated 480 demographic types.

Second, Pool and his associates estimated for each of the states the percentages of the various demographic types comprising its adult population.[1] Armed with these estimates, the final step to obtain the simulated opinion climates for each state involves simply combining the results of the first two operations. That is, a state's simulated climate for any given opinion is the sum of the products of the attitude position of each of the demographic types times the true proportions of the demographic types in that state. Put differently, the survey results for each type is merely weighted by its appropriate percentage in the state's adult population.

The acute reader will readily observe that this technique makes an important and fundamental assumption: namely, that the individuals comprising a given demographic type hold the same opinions in different states.[2] Hence, Pool, et al., had to assume that high-status, Protestant, rural, white males in Alabama were essentially the same as those in Louisiana; that is, within regions, types did not vary significantly in opinions across states. Clearly, this assumption is a large one and not likely to be precisely true. There are two ways to test it. A direct validity procedure would involve simulating estimates on specified units and then comparing these estimates to the results of direct probability samplings of the units. So critical is this basic assumption to the whole technique, we felt it necessary to conduct such a direct validity test as part of this project. The results of this validation are reported in detail in Appendix A, the first such direct test conducted on the technique. As can be judged from the data presented in Appendix A, the assumption is upheld in the Texas data at quite acceptable levels.

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[1] Such estimates were not possible for political party identification. And note that only the types associated with a particular region are relevant for any one state. Thus, the estimates necessary for a single state are considerably less than the total 480.

An indirect validity test of the technique is strictly pragmatic: do the simulated opinion climates actually predict the social process under investigation? Pool, Abelson, and Popkin (1965) report considerable success. Using only data collected prior to 1959 on the religious issue, their rank-order of the 32 non-southern states correlated +.82 with the actual Kennedy vote for President in 1960. Actually, these investigators tapped the religious issue with a single blatant item which had been repeatedly asked during the fifties: "Would you be willing to vote for a qualified Catholic of your party for President?" This constitutes an interesting demonstration of the ability of surveys to measure intergroup prejudice accurately, a power often called into serious question by critics.

The same authors had even more success in 1964 in predicting the actual vote rather than merely the rank order. Again the simulation had trouble with the idiosyncratic South; but a final seven-factor simulation of Johnson's percentage in each state correlated +.90 with the actual returns with a median error of 3.4 per cent.

Yet the simple prediction of an outcome is a relatively trivial goal of an elaborate simulation. Far more important is what the simulation can tell us about the process itself. For example, what effect did President John Kennedy being a Roman Catholic have on the popular vote and the electoral college totals? The best fit estimates of the three authors was that roughly one in five Protestant Democrats and Independents who would have voted for the Democratic candidate for President in 1960 cast his ballot for Nixon largely for anti-Catholic reasons. Likewise, over a third of the Roman Catholics who otherwise would have voted Republican apparently switched to Kennedy. The model suggests, therefore, that religion cost Kennedy 4,300,000 Protestant votes and won him 2,800,000 Roman Catholic votes for a total loss of 1,500,000 ballots. Note, too, that roughly seven million out of 68 million voters defected because of religion, according to these calculations. But did this loss of popular votes hurt Kennedy in the electoral college count? The best fit answer seems to be just the reverse. The religious issue won for Kennedy 22 electoral votes, according to the model, because the lost Protestant voters tended to reside in states already lost to the Kennedy column while the won Roman Catholic voters tended to reside in large, industrial states which the Democratic candidate took by exceedingly small margins.

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[2] A second basic assumption, it should be noted, is that the variables employed to make up the demographic types are indeed significantly related to the opinions and the social process involved.

Now we turn to applying this interesting new technique to the school desegregation process in Texas. And this application serves as another pragmatic, indirect test of the technique's central assumption.

Application of Opinion Climate Simulation to the School Desegregation Process in Texas.

The application of the opinion climate simulation technique to school desegregation in Texas is similarly straightforward. Instead of states, our unit of analysis is the county. Instead of predicting the presidential vote, we shall attempt to predict the extent of school desegregation, as defined in Chapter Two, throughout Texas and each of its regions. Instead of using seven variables to define the demographic types, we use three highly relevant variables -- education, age, and city size. Save for these changes, the present simulation is almost identical in method to that of Pool, *et al*. (1965).

We initially had more ambitious plans. We had hoped to conduct separate white and Negro simulations and fuse them in a later step. And we had hoped to employ the date of initiation of school desegregation as well as the extent of school desegregation for dependent variables -- as was possible in Chapter Two. Survey data restrictions prevented both of these ideas from being carried through. Even with combining polls, enough relevant Negro data could not be amassed to allow an adequate simulation of Negro opinion climates. Nor could we amass enough relevant data to allow an over-time simulation of the initiation of Texas school desegregation, a process that would have involved in effect a series of simulations at different dates. Note, in this regard, that even Pool, et al., with their far larger data base, did not attempt any longitudinal simulations with their method. This chapter, then, focuses upon the prediction of the extent of public school desegregation in Texas using simulated estimates of the white opinion climates by county.

Attitude Data. In August of 1963 and again in August of 1964, Joe Belden Associates of Dallas, Texas asked as a part of its regular quarterly state survey the series of questions cited in the previous chapter concerning attitudes toward the desegregation of a variety of public facilities including schools. Responses to these questions were recorded on an eleven-category scale, ranging from one (most favorable) through six (neutral or no opinion) to eleven (most unfavorable). For present purposes, it was sufficient to collapse this response scale down to three categories such that a one to four response was registered as favorable to racial desegregation, five to seven as neutral, and eight to eleven as unfavorable.

Each of the Belden surveys included over 850 white interviews. Pooling the two surveys to obtain a more adequate 1,700 respondents requires at least that the distribution across demographic types are similarly rank-ordered in 1963 and 1964 according to their "per cent favorable" toward school desegregation. Fortunately, this is the case; the Spearman rank-order rho correlation across the two years is a high +.81 ($p < .001$). This allows the combining of the two surveys, which in turn achieves a greater stability in the estimates of the per cent favorable for each demographic type. Since we shall employ 27 types (three educational categories X three age categories X three city size categories), the roughly 1,700 cases yields an expected cell size of approximately 62 each.

Another decision involves the particular attitude domain to employ in the simulation. Should we employ a scale of eight of the questions?[3] Or should we simply use the one item on school desegregation alone? A Likert-type scale was formed of the eight items with high internal reliability (Kuder-Richardson 20 reliability coefficient = .94), and item to scale correlations ranging from .79 to .92 with a mean of .87. Not only do these coefficients indicate an adequate scale, but they point to the salience and consistency of white Texans' attitudes toward racial desegregation in a variety of realms. But the school desegregation item alone correlated with the entire scale .90, which for present purposes means that it is virtually interchangable with the scale scores. On the basis of this high correlation as well as its direct relationship with and salience for the dependent variable, the single item on school desegregation was adopted as the principal measure to be simulated rather than the entire eight-item scale. However, we shall also employ the full scale in an additional simulation to see if it results in any discernible difference in prediction.

A final decision to be made at this point involved what index of the attitudinal response to utilize. Should we simply use per cent favorable? Or should we take into account the neutral response by using an index of per cent favorable minus per cent unfavorable? Thus, if 60 per cent of one demographic type had favorable opinions toward the racial desegregation of public schools and 20 per cent each had neutral and unfavorable opinions, then the per cent difference would be 40. Contrast this case with that of another demographic type where 60 per cent had favorable, 30 per cent neutral, and 10 per cent unfavorable opinions yielding a per cent difference of 50. Notice, then, the responsiveness of the difference index to the neutral category.

The per cent favorable index has the advantages of simplicity and requires less manipulation of the data. The per cent difference index is more complex, but has the distinct advantage of reflecting the positions of the highly committed in both directions -- the very persons balance theory maintains are critical. Consequently, we decided to run the simulations using both indices; though for ease of reading, all data which follow represent per cent favorable unless specifically labeled otherwise.

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[3] The eight items of the scale included the questions on desegregation in public buses, restaurants, hotels, employment, churches, schools, swimming pools, and social gatherings. (See Table 3-3 in the previous chapter for data on each of these items over time.)

The 27 Demographic Types. On the basis of results reported in Chapters Two and Three, three relevant background variables were selected with which to form the demographic types for the attitude simulation: *education*, *age*, and *city size*. Each of these dimensions was split into three meaningful categories, forming a total of (3^3) 27 demographic types.

Tables 4-1 through 4-3 provide the basic relationships between each of these variables and white Texan attitudes toward school desegregation in 1963 and 1964. Thus, in Table 4-1, college-educated whites in Texas reveal considerably greater acceptance of school desegregation than others; but no significant differences appear between those with high school training and those with just grade school training. Similarly, in Table 4-2, older white Texans (51+) are significantly more resistant to racial desegregation of the public schools than others; but no significant differences emerge between the younger (21-35) and the middle-aged (36-50) white segments of the sample. Finally, in Table 4-3, a genuine surprise occurs. Rural (less than 10,000) white Texans are the least favorable, as one might expect. Yet urban white residents (10,000-100,000) are significantly and surprisingly *more* favorable to educational desegregation than metropolitan white residents (100,000+).[4]

These primary relationships tend to remain true when all three variables are combined into one table. Providing the per cent favorable to public school desegregation for all 27 demographic types, Table 4-4 shows college respondents to be the most favorable in seven out of nine comparisons, the older respondents to be the least favorable in seven out of nine comparisons, and the urban residents to be the most favorable in eight out of nine comparisons. Not surprisingly, then, the most favorable type (67.7 per cent) of all is comprised of younger, college-educated white residents of urban areas. But more surprising is the next most favorable type (61.3 per cent), middle-aged, grade-school-educated white residents of urban areas, and the least favorable type (19.0 per cent), younger, grade-school-educated white residents of metropolitan areas. Clearly, the three background variables are

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[4] Notice that this distinctly curvilinear relationship between city size and attitudes toward school desegregation would sharply violate any linearity assumptions of regression analyses, assumptions which in fact we made in Chapter Two before considering the attitude component.

Table 4-1

White Texan Attitudes Toward School Desegregation and Education, 1963-64[1]

		Education		
		College	High School	Grade School
Attitudes Toward Public School Desegregation	Favorable	53.6 (293)	39.0 (326)	41.1 (122)
	Neutral	16.6 (91)	15.9 (133)	13.1 (39)
	Unfavorable	29.8 (163)	45.1 (377)	45.8 (136)
		100.0% (547)	100.0% (836)	100.0% (297)

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[1] Taken from the combined Belden surveys of August 1963 and August 1964. The number in parentheses refer to the number of respondents in each cell.

Table 4-2

White Texan Attitudes Toward School Desegregation and Age, 1963-64[1]

		Age		
		Younger (21-35)	Middle-Aged (36-50)	Older (50+)
Attitudes Toward Public School Desegregation	Favorable	46.4 (292)	47.6 (275)	38.0 (196)
	Neutral	15.4 (97)	14.5 (84)	17.4 (90)
	Unfavorable	38.2 (240)	37.9 (219)	44.6 (230)
		100.0% (629)	100.0% (578)	100.0% (516)

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[1] Taken from the combined Belden surveys of August 1963 and August 1964. The numbers in parentheses refer to the number of respondents in each cell.

Table 4-3

White Texan Attitudes Toward School Desegregation and City Size, 1963-64[1]

		Metropolitan (100,000+)	Urban (10,000-1000,000)	Rural (-10,000)
Attitudes Toward Public School Desegregation	Favorable	44.0 (201)	52.7 (340)	35.7 (223)
	Neutral	17.3 (79)	16.4 (106)	13.8 (86)
	Unfavorable	38.7 (177)	30.9 (199)	50.6 (316)
		100.0% (457)	100.0% (645)	100.0% (625)

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[1] Taken from the combined Belden surveys of August 1963 and August 1964. The numbers in parentheses refer to the number of respondents in each cell.

Table 4-4

White Texan Per Cent Favorable to School Desegregation by Education, City Size, and Age, 1963-64[1]

		City Size								
		Metropolitan			Urban			Rural		
		Age			Age			Age		
		Younger	Middle-aged	Older	Younger	Middle-aged	Older	Younger	Middle-aged	Older
	College	54.5 (68)	54.9 (51)	44.8 (29)	67.7 (93)	59.3 (81)	60.9 (46)	41.1 (73)	48.3 (58)	38.3 (47)
Education	High School	48.3 (87)	45.6 (79)	29.1 (55)	39.7 (116)	52.5 (101)	39.0 (77)	36.9 (111)	30.6 (108)	28.7 (94)
	Grade School	19.0 (21)	50.0 (16)	31.7 (41)	55.6 (27)	61.3 (31)	44.4 (54)	41.2 (17)	43.2 (37)	30.8 (52)

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[1] Taken from the combined Belden surveys of August 1963 and August 1964. The numbers in parentheses refer to the number of respondents in each cell.

interacting in their joint relationship with opinions about educational desegregation by race.

Final Steps of the Simulation. Once the data of Table 4-4 are obtained, the simulated county opinion climates are readily obtainable. One merely sums up the products of the cell entries of Table 4-4 with the appropriate adult proportions of each demographic type for each of the 181 Texas counties with one per cent or more of its 1960 population non-white.[5]

The dependent variable, extent of public school desegregation, is the same as that described in some detail in Chapter Two. Its distribution was shown in Table 2-3. Recall that it basically measures the 1965 percentage of schools in a given county's interracial school districts that included students of both races. The test of the attitude simulation, then, is provided by the Pearson product-moment correlational coefficients across Texas counties between the estimated white opinion climates and the extent of the public school desegregation process.

Results

Table 4-5 presents the basic correlational findings. While all of them are significantly larger than zero at better than the .001 level of confidence, these nine coefficients are relatively modest compared to those we became accustomed to for ecological predictions in Chapter Two. They range between +.311 and +.352, thus accounting for roughly twelve per cent of the variance.

Perhaps, the most remarkable feature of Table 4-5 is the stability of the estimates. The methodological decisions discussed previously turn out to have virtually no effect. Observe the near-identical relationships achieved by the two indices of measurement for the school desegregation item alone -- though the per cent difference index is slightly more predictive than the per cent favorable index on all three comparisons as balance theory would cause you to expect. Nor does the full scale of eight desegregation questions do better than the single direct question on schools. Indeed, the scale does not perform quite as well in all three cases. As with Pool, Abelson, and Popkin's (1965) success with a single blatant item on anti-Catholicism, the single blatant item on

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[5] Six of the 187 counties used in the analyses of Chapter Two did not have complete enough data to allow inclusion in the attitude analyses.

Table 4-5

Correlations Between Simulated Attitude Climates and Extent of Texas School Desegregation[1]

	Belden Survey		
	1963 alone	1964 alone	1963-64 combined
Per cent favorable on school desegregation item alone	.312	.344	.332
Per cent difference index on school desegregation item alone	.318	.349	.352
Per cent favorable on complete 8-item desegregation scale	.311	.336	.328

---

[1] All of the coefficients shown are Pearson product-moment correlations for 181 interracial Texas counties. All coefficients are significantly larger than zero at better than the .001 level of confidence.

public school desegregation provides satisfactory estimates of relevant intergroup opinion. Finally, it is important to note that each of the surveys considered separately as well as the combination of the two produced extremely similar results. Once again the tiny differences are in the expected direction; that is, the survey nearer to the 1965 data on the dependent variable yields consistently higher coefficients than the earlier survey.

The scarcity of relevant Texas survey data near 1965 restrained us from using a larger number than 27 demographic types. Had we been able to have had a larger number, we would certainly have used region as an additional control variable. Recall the importance of region in the ecological analyses of Chapter Two and the attitude trend data of Chapter Three. For that matter, it would have made our application of the opinion climate simulation technique more directly comparable to the original election simulation work of Pool, Abelson, and Popkin (1965). But at this point we can now at least check to see how well the simulation predicts the school desegregation process within sub-sets of Texas counties, especially within the three diverse regions of the large state.

The relevant correlations are given in Table 4-6. The major feature of these results is their diversity across region. The simulated attitude climate accounts for only six per cent of the school desegregation extent variance in West Texas, but sixteen per cent of it in Central Texas. And in East Texas, the Black Belt area where racial norms and attitudes are widely known to be the most salient in the entire state, the percentage of the extent of desegregation variance accounted for by the simulated white attitude climate rises dramatically to 36. The last figure attains the order of magnitude of the ecological predictions in Chapter Two.[6]

The interesting results of Table 4-6 raises two issues. First, it appears significant that the white attitude climate simulation works best in the region where ecological predictions worked poorest for both the initiation and extent indicators of the school desegregation process.[7] This fact will be pursued further in Chapter Five. Second, the far higher predictions in East Texas suggests that further controls, especially for per cent non-white, should be applied to these relationships.

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[6] See especially Tables 2-7 and 2-10.

[7] See Table 2-10.

Table 4-6

Correlations Between Simulated Attitude Climate and Extent of Texas School Desegregation by Region[1]

Region of Texas		
East	Central	West
+.599 (49)	+.411 (65)	+.243 (73)

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[1] The two Belden surveys for 1963 and 1964 are combined for these correlations; and only per cent favorable to the single item on school desegregation is used as the indicator of attitude climate. The coefficient for East Texas is significantly different from zero at the .001 level of confidence, for Central Texas at the .01 level, and for West Texas at the .05 level.

Table 4-7 follows up this lead by attempting to ascertain under what conditions the predictions of the simulated white attitude climate vary. The findings are quite striking. With or without regional controls, simulated attitude climates associate far more closely with the extent of public school desegregation in rural counties and in counties with moderate (11 to 30 per cent) numbers of non-whites. Table 4-8 specifies this trend further by indicating that the white opinion climate predictions are highest in rural counties with moderate non-white population percentages. Hence, the largest correlation of all, +.66, occurs for rural counties in East Texas with moderate non-white proportions, followed by similar counties in Central Texas.

Toward a Model of Climates

Why should white opinion climates significantly predict the extent of public school desegregation in Texas? And why should they be particularly impressive in East Texas, rural counties, and counties with moderate non-white percentages? We should pause here to consider these questions before we combine this attitude analysis with ecological variables in the next chapter.

We begin by assuming that the simulated white opinion climates of Texas counties reflect reasonably accurately the actual white opinion climates. This assumption is directly tested in Appendix A. We further assume that white opinion climates largely reflect the positions of a county's predominant white demographic types.[8] And we note that variations in white opinion climates across counties also reflect variations in such structural characteristics as age and education distributions as demonstrated in Table 4-4.

The next step must involve the county's "decision-makers," for they are the obvious mediators between the opinion climate and the extent of public school desegregation. We hold that these critical "decision-makers" will reflect to some degree their county's white opinion climate in their own attitudes. Stouffer (1954) provides data that support this view for such community leaders throughout the nation as mayors, school board chairmen, political party committee chairmen, and presidents of Chambers of Commerce, labor unions, and Bar

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[8] In a similar though not identical context, Blumer (1947) has criticized this assumption. He stresses the importance of "key individuals" as opposed to probability-determined respondents. We attempt to handle this issue in the following discussion concerning county "decision-makers."

Table 4-7

Correlations Between Simulated Attitude Climate and Extent of Texas School Desegregation by Region, City Size, and Per Cent Non-White[1]

	City Size[2]		Per Cent Non-White		
	Rural	Urban	1-10	11-30	31+
No Regional Controls	.491***	.039	.292**	.577***	.345
East Texas	.591***	.238	---	.633***	.191
Central Texas	.457*	-.146	.420*	.515*	---
West Texas	.406**	.095	.245*	---	---

---

[1] The two Belden surveys for 1963 and 1964 are combined for these correlations; and only per cent favorable to the single item on school desegregation is used as the indicator of attitude climate. All correlations are based on a minimum of ten cases; blank cells had too few cases for stable results.

[2] With only seven cases, the metropolitan category is omitted for lack of data.

***The correlation is significantly different from zero at better than the .001 level of confidence.

**The correlation is significantly different from zero at better than the .01 level of confidence.

*The correlation is significantly different from zero at better than the .05 level of confidence.

Table 4-8

Correlations Between Simulated Attitude Climate and Extent of Texas School Desegregation by Region, City Size, and Per Cent Non-White Controlled Simultaneously[1]

	City Size				
	Rural			Urban	
	Per Cent Non-White			Per Cent Non-White	
	1-10	11-30	31+	1-10	11-30
No Regional Controls	.374*	.622**	.295	.084	-.064
East Texas	---	.622**	.167	---	.220
Central Texas	.190	.557*	---	.301	---
West Texas	.370*	---	---	.111	---

---

[1] The two Belden surveys for 1963 and 1964 are combined for these correlations; and only per cent favorable to the single item on school desegregation is used as the indicator of attitude climate. As in Table 4-7, the metropolitan category is omitted because of insufficient data; in addition, the 31 per cent plus category of per cent non-white for urban counties is omitted for the same reason. All correlations are based on a minimum of ten cases; blank cells had too few cases for stable results.

**The correlation is significantly different from zero at better than the .001 level of confidence.

*The correlation is significantly different from zero at better than the .02 level of confidence.

associations. He found these leaders reflected their constituents' views in attitudes toward civil rights, though he did discover in addition that they were consistently somewhat more tolerant of non-conformists than their median constituent.

Further, we hold that county "decision-makers" will make school desegregation decisions (in varying degrees) consistent, on the one hand, with their own views, and, on the other hand, with their perception of the opinion climate of their county. Clearly, this contention will vary considerably, though this variance should relate systematically to such variables as the homogeneity of the white population and the salience of racial attitudes in the area. Before we explore this, however, we should point out that this contention directly derives from social psychology's balance theory (Abelson and Rosenberg, 1958; Rosenberg, et al., 1960; Cartwright and Harary, 1956; McGuire, 1969).

Put in simplest form, balance theory supports the old adage that "birds of a feather flock together." As a central theorem, balance theory holds that a person (P), another individual (O), and some third element in the situation, such as a value, social object, or even a third person (X), will strive toward "balance." What is meant by "balance" is illustrated in Figure 4-1. Suppose two people are attracted to the same movies, the same cuisine, the same political party, in other words, tend to have the same tastes and interests, then the theory simply predicts that they will like each other (Diagram A). Or suppose they dislike the same things, then the theory again predicts they will like each other (Diagram B). But consider two individuals who differ markedly in their preferences; the theory predicts they will not like each other (Diagrams C and D).

Balance theory has some severe limitations. Fear, for instance, can totally upset the predictions. Witness the child who so dreads the alleged bad taste of spinach that he despises the food intensely despite the fact he is fond of Popeye, the cartoon character famous as a devotee of spinach. Competition raises an additional limitation to balance theory. In 1968, presidential-aspirants Hubert Humphrey and Richard Nixon both coveted and sought the same office, but they did not grow to like each other better, as balance theory would predict. The reason is obvious. The Presidency of the United States is in short supply; only one man could win the high office; and the consequent competition prevented the usual favorable outcome between two men who share similar interests and aspirations.

Figure 4-1

Basic Balance Theory Predictions


Diagram A Diagram B

Diagram C Diagram D

Key

Person..............P

Other Person........O

Third Element.......X
(a value, social
object, or
third person)

+................Liking or
positive valance

-..............Disliking or
negative valance

Applied to our model, balance theory would hold that any sharp inconsistency between the decision-makers' actions and beliefs leads to intense strains either to change their actions or their beliefs.[9] One possibility would be "to leave the field," to resign from the board charged with responsibility for public education. Indeed, in many parts of the South the desegregation process has caused service on school boards to become unpopular. Yet balance theory predictions break down, as we just noted, when fear enters the scene; and this can be readily imagined in this situation, too. Thus, the relatively liberal school board member may defy court desegregation orders for fear of antagonizing conservative local white opinion. "Look," goes the refrain, "I have to live and get along in this county!" Or imagine the relatively conservative school board member who readily surrenders to pressure to desegregate for fear of Federal power. In such instances, the conservative leader usually takes considerable pains to cover himself from local hostility by emphasizing publicly the negative consequences for the whole county if compliance were not the policy.

Note that our model does not require that a county's decision-makers mirror in attitudes and action exactly the county's white opinion climate. Like Stouffer's (1954) community leaders, they may consistently be a bit more aware of the national scene and consequently more open to change than their typical white constituent. The model requires only that the decision-makers relate to the white opinion climates in some systematic fashion across counties. For example, sharply conservative areas might tend to have fairly conservative decision-makers, typically conservative areas moderate decision-makers, moderate areas fairly liberal decision-makers, and fairly liberal areas liberal decision-makers. To the degree that such a situation exists in Texas, the correlation between simulated white opinion climates and the extent of school desegregation across counties will be high.

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[9] Dissonance theory, a form of balance theory, has an interesting hypothesis concerning those instances where a conservative school board member who is party to a decision to desegregate his county's public schools might later change his attitudes in support of his action (Aronson and Carlsmith, 1963). It holds that the member's attitudes toward racial desegregation of the public schools would become more positive in inverse proportion to the degree of pressure applied to induce the desegregation decision. In other words, the less the outside pressure or rationalized "justification" for the dissonant decision, the greater the likelihood of perceived cognitive dissonance between the initial attitudes and the decision and thus the greater the strain toward adjusting racial attitudes to believe that the action was really "the right thing to do afterall." We shall make use of this interesting and relevant prediction in the following chapter.

Obviously, the tenets of our model are not absolutes. They will hold, as mentioned earlier, in varying degrees; and the model not only holds that this variance should relate systematically to structural variables, but attempts to specify what some of these variables are. Our findings provide strong clues: the predictions are strongest in East Texas, rural, and moderately Negro-populated counties. These clues suggest that across counties three related variables are important: closeness to traditional racial norms of the deep South, the salience of racial attitudes, and the homogeneity of the white population. Thus, in counties characterized by these features the consistency between the decision-makers' actions on educational desegregation and the white racial opinion climate should be closest. Let us consider each of these variables in more detail.

The most striking finding in the analysis of sub-sets of Texas counties was the clear and pronounced improvement in prediction as one proceeds from West Texas, economically and culturally linked to the Southwest, to Central Texas, partially southern in orientation, to East Texas, a clear extension of the Black Belt South spilling over from Louisiana and Arkansas. Race, and its accompanying institution of segregation and legacies of a harsh regional past, are the touchstones of the southern sub-culture. It is little wonder that the relationships between white racial opinion climate and school desegregation should be a direct function of how "southern" the area is.

Yet this is not the whole story. If "southernness" provided a complete explanation, then Texas counties with more than 30 per cent Negroes should have shown higher climate-desegregation correlations than other counties. Yet this was not the case. Recall that 10 per cent to 30 per cent Negro counties provided the most impressive correlations by far. This strongly suggests that the salience of the attitude climate, both white and Negro, is also important.

We know from earlier work (Pettigrew, 1957A, 1958, 1959) that whites in 10 to 30 per cent Negro counties in the South tend to be considerably less in favor of racially discriminatory practices than comparable whites in southern counties with more than 30 per cent Negro, even though they are not less authoritarian or anti-Semitic. Matthews and Prothro (1966) report similar findings with 30 per cent as a critical dividing line. And Blalock (1957) has shown how southern counties with moderate Negro population percentages do in fact have less racial discrimination than southern counties with larger Negro ratios. These findings suggest that white racial opinion and practices are more variable in the 10 to 30 per cent Negro counties of Texas than they are in more densely-populated Negro counties; and this variability makes racial attitudes and practices more salient as well as more open to alteration.

Put differently, racial norms of solid segregation are so fixed, powerful, and pervasive in the heavily Negro areas that racial opinions count for less in determining county school policy. Remember a similar point made in Chapter Two in connection with the ecological correlates of southern lynching. Controlling for the size of the Negro community, southern counties with large Negro percentages tended to have far smaller lynching rates. The monolithic norms of racial discrimination formerly acted, ironically, as a type of paternalistic protection from lynching for the mass of Negroes in much the same way they presently reduce the salience of racial attitudes in both their white and Negro communities. In short, racial discrimination in Black Belt counties becomes such a culturally-sanctioned "given" that it neither needs lynching nor saliently expressed racial attitudes to support it.[10]

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[10] This is not to imply, of course, that the racial attitudes of both white and Negro residents in Black Belt areas cannot become intensely salient during periods of threat to the norms of racial discrimination. Even during periods of calm, it can be assumed that these attitudes are more salient than those of Texas counties where the Negro population number less than ten per cent of the population. The point at issue is only that racial attitudes would generally be less salient than in moderately-Negro counties because the norms are typically seen as fixed by both white and Negro citizens. Put differently, Negro insistence is less likely in such counties, and consequently white resistance -- though potentially massive -- is less likely to be invoked. As suggested by the lynching data, the price of "racial peace" in such counties is an effective system of racial oppression and denial of basic rights.

The principal weakness of this model is its omission of Negro opinion, made necessary as explained previously by the shortage of appropriate Negro data. This weakness is most apparent when discussing the greater salience of racial attitudes in moderately Negro-populated counties, for the point appears even more true for Negro than white opinion. Negro insistence for school desegregation is at least as crucial as white resistance to it. Our model focuses upon the white pull factor, but we should consider at this point the Negro push factor. Put simply, considerable research indicates that Negro insistence for change tends to be maximized in the 10 to 30 per cent non-white counties. It appears that small southern counties with Negro percentages less than ten per cent often do not have enough Negroes to constitute the critical mass necessary to organize and campaign for racial reform. And in counties with more than 30 per cent Negro, the same discriminatory norms which mold and mute white racial views act to make organized Negro protest difficult and unlikely. Thus, until the effective 1964 Civil Rights Voting Act aimed special Federal attention at many Black Belt counties (Daniel, 1969), Negro voting registration was noticeably lower in counties with more than 30 per cent of their populations Negro than in counties with less than 30 per cent (Matthews and Prothro, 1966).

Blalock (1967, p. 188) cogently sums up the point in two related propositions. "Minority mobilization should be low if either. . .(a) there is a low perceived probability of success in reducing discrimination through such mobilization; or (b) there is a high probability of extreme negative sanctions being applied by the dominant group." Thus, "[M]inority mobilization is likely to be greatest whenever the minority is intermediate in size, being neither too small to exert any influence at all nor so large as to constitute a major power threat." Blalock points out that exceptions to the latter proposition might occur when either the subordinate group came to believe that their large numbers gave them some chance of gaining the dominant power position, or if oppression came to be perceived as so intolerable that increased negative sanctions are no longer a deterrent. He might have added a third condition for an exception: namely, when the subordinate group gains powerful outside allies -- such as the Federal Government. All three of these conditions for an exception appear to have been triggered in part by the well-designed Voting Rights Act of 1965, as Daniel (1969) documents for Black Belt counties in Alabama.

Considerations of "minority mobilization" further explain the added importance of white opinion in moderately Negro-populated counties. Blalock (1967, p. 189) adds the further proposition that minority mobilization will lead to group gains, higher minority expectations of future gains, and even further minority mobilization only if dominant-group mobilization does not also significantly increase. Here we see the critical importance of the white community's racial opinion climate, in addition to such factors as political and economic stability and general prosperity which Blalock lists as factors making counter-mobilization by the dominant group less likely. Hence, in 10 to 30 per cent counties, one can expect greater Negro mobilization for insistence on change and subsequently either racial change or conflict depending upon the white racial opinion climate and the degree of counter-mobilization it fuels.

Texas counties with from 10 to 30 per cent of their populations Negro, then, have enough Negroes to ensure the existence of an organized insistence for racial change, have more variance in their white racial attitudes than in Black Belt counties, and escape the smothering effects of monolithic norms of racial discrimination that trace back to the days of slavery. For all of these reasons, racial opinions tend to be more salient and influential for policy, holds the model; and this ensures a higher correlation between the simulated white opinion climate and the extent of educational desegregation in these counties than in other counties.

A final variable appears to be the homogeneity of the white community. Rural counties as a group yield higher correlations between simulated climate and desegregation. And this seems to be traceable to the lack of diversity in reference groups in the white community. Perhaps, rural counties best meet our model's assumption that the numerically dominant demographic types do in fact contribute heavily to the attitude climate. Perhaps, too, decision-makers are necessarily "closer to the people" in homogeneous areas, know more accurately the prevailing white racial sentiments, and feel a greater need to relate their actions to these sentiments. And these possibilities all act to increase our simulated climate with desegregation correlations for rural areas.

Summing up, our model of attitude climates consists of the following assumptions and assertions:

(1) Our simulated opinion climates of Texas counties reflect reasonably accurately the actual white opinion climates.

(2) White opinion climates largely reflect the positions of a county's predominant white demographic types.

(3) Variations in opinion climates across counties also reflect variations in such structural characteristics as age and education.

(4) Decision-makers will reflect to some degree their county's white opinion climate in their own attitudes.

(5) Decision-makers will make school desegregation decisions in varying degrees consistent with (a) their own views and (b) their perception of the opinion climate of their county.

(6) Following balance theory, sharp inconsistency between the decision-makers' actions and beliefs leads to intense strains to change their actions, or their beliefs, or simply "to leave the field" by resigning from the school board.

(7) Fear can upset balance theory predictions, leading, for example, to a relatively liberal decision-maker in a Black Belt county resisting racial change for fear of local pressure or a relatively conservative decision-maker assenting to racial change for fear of Federal power.

(8) The relationship between decision-makers' actions on educational desegregation and the white opinion climate will be highest for counties (a) close to the traditional racial norms of the deep South, (b) with a relatively homogeneous white population, and (c) where racial attitudes are particularly salient for both white and Negro residents.

We turn now in Chapter Five to the task of combining into a contextual analysis both the ecological approach of Chapter Two with the opinion climate approach of this chapter.

Chapter Five

Ecology, Attitudes, and Southern Desegregation

Contextual analysis, the central idea of this research and the particular focus of this chapter, attempts to place independent variables of diverse levels into a single meaningful model. As with figure-ground relationships in perceptual psychology, such intermediate factors as attitudes must be placed in the wider perspective furnished by such distal factors as ecological variables. And the model must then follow logically on to the shaping of the dependent variable, the extent of public school desegregation in Texas counties.

To achieve such a contextual model, we need both new conceptual and methodological tools. Adding to the attitude climate model just presented in the previous chapter, we conceptually distinguish between a number of logically-possible forms of mediation with which climates might serve as the intermediate links between distal ecological variables and the actual desegregation process. Furthermore, we must operationalize these types of mediation partly in terms of a relatively new methodological tool well suited for approaching such contextual problems -- path analysis (Boudon, 1965; Duncan, 1966; Land, 1969; Wright, 1960).

This chapter, then, will present a brief discussion of path analysis and how we propose to utilize it for distinguishing between various types of mediation. Next we shall review the results. And, to anticipate these results, we shall find that each of our logical types of mediation are illustrated in the analysis and models for the entire state of Texas and its regions.

Path Analysis

Without considering its more technical aspects, it is appropriate that we review briefly the nature of the technique used in the analyses which follow. Path analysis is intimately related with the regression analyses which characterize the work in Chapters Two and Four on ecological and attitude climate predictions of school desegregation. Indeed, it can be viewed as merely a new manner of interpreting the results of regression analyses. Like regression analysis, it assumes interval measures and linear effects and cannot easily handle interactions between variables. But path analysis differs from routine regression analysis interpretations in a number of significant ways. And it has the great advantage of ordering a complex array of variables and teasing out the effects of inter-correlated independent variables.

The principal distinction between the two methods involves how the effects of the independent variables upon the dependent variable are conceived to operate. In standard regression analysis, all of the indepedent variables are assumed to act simultaneously and relatively independently of each other on the dependent variable. By contrast, path analysis assumes asynchronous relationships with the effects of antecedent or distal variables operating through intermediate variables. Figure 5-1 illustrates the two models in simplest form. Note how regression analysis disregards all possible time sequences and forms of mediation. And observe how the path analysis model considers both. Thus, independent (or "distal") variable A has its only effect on dependent variable Z through the intermediate variable M. Independent (distal) variable B has both an unmediated effect upon dependent variable Z and one through the intermediate variable M, with its total effect constituting the sum of these two paths. Finally, distal independent variable C has only an unmediated direct effect upon dependent variable Z. The alert reader can already see why the path analysis model is so well adapted to help us fashion a contextual model.

The principal criticisms of path analysis have centered upon its claims for indicating causal sequences. Indeed, these criticisms raise more philosophical issues of the concept of "cause" than they challenge the method itself. Such considerations are beyond the scope of this effort. Suffice it to say that we are sympathetic in part with these criticisms and do not intend to use path analysis in this chapter primarily to infer causal flows.

There are, however, several assumptions underlying our models of school desegregation: (1) ecological factors represent a set of exogenous variables; (2) an attitude climate represents an endogenous variable. Both classes of variables affect the dependent variable, school desegregation, but ecological factors can exert their effects on desegregation either directly or indirectly through a county's attitude climate; (3) attitude climates influence the dependent variable in a direct manner, i.e., they cannot act in the reverse direction influencing ecological factors; and (4) attitude climates serve only

Figure 5-1

Contrasting Analysis Models

Regression Analysis Model



Path Analysis Model



as mediators: they mediate the effects of ecological factors specified in the model, or factors external to the model. Assumptions (3) and (4) may seem extreme, but they are necessary simplifications to avoid feedback loops in the model and to account for the effects of unmeasured ecological factors or external factors such as court decisions that vary among counties and relate to a county's attitude climate and the extent of its school desegregation.

In general terms, such a view seems quite justified for this preliminary effort at contextual models. Yet one can certainly imagine possible situations where attitude climates might in fact act back upon the ecological structure of an area, at least in the long run.[1]

This set of assumptions defines the limit of our inferences about the flow of causality and the specification of temporal sequences. Path analysis provides a useful tool for ordering variables and suggesting the relative importance of contextual factors in relation to school desegregation, so that we can define our interpretation and heighten our understanding of the desegregation process beyond that possible with the one level analyses of Chapters Two and Four. To quote Duncan (1966, p. 1): "Path analysis focuses on the problem of interpretation and does not purport to be a method for discovering causes. It may, nevertheless, be invaluable in rendering interpretations explicit, self-consistent, and susceptible to rejection by subsequent research." In contrast to Duncan, another advocate of techniques similar to path analysis (Blalock, 1969) deemphasizes the need for refined interpretations and increased understanding of the interrelationships among a model's components within a specific population in favor of the specification of "causal laws" that permit predictions for many populations. Precise predictions and "causal laws" of school desegregation for many states at different points in time exceeds the capacity of these desegregation models. The caution urged by Duncan sets a limit on the utility that can be assigned to our path analytic models of the desegregation process.

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[1] For example, an especially anti-Negro, traditional opinion climate in a given county could conceivably act in the long run to encourage Negroes to migrate out and industry to stay out. Thus, the attitude climate might be said to be driving the Negro percentage of the area down and perpetuating poverty and rural living. Available data on reasons for migration cast serious doubt on this process (Hamilton, Collignon, and Carlson, 1970), though other similar processes may operate.

Contrasting Types of Mediation

Three logically distinct types of mediation can be specified in advance as possible ways for attitude climates to mediate ecological factors in shaping the extent of school desegregation in Texas. First, attitude climates may act as full mediators by translating virtually all of the ecological effect upon the process. We know this is the case when the ecological variables predict more accurately the county's opinion climates than they do the extent of school desegregation; and when a significant beta weight exists between climate and desegregation even after the effects of the ecological variables have been removed.[2]

Second, selective mediation occurs when the opinion climate mediates the effects of some of the ecological variables but not others. In this case, the total battery of ecological variables will explain more of the variance of the extent of school desegregation than it does of the variance of opinion climates. But the standardized beta weights of particular census variables are nevertheless larger in predicting opinion climates than they are in predicting racial change; and this directly indicates the operation by the opinion climate of "selective mediation." Finally, a significant beta weight must exist between the opinion climate and the extent of school desegregation.

Third, residual mediation occurs when opinion climate provides an especially strong prediction of educational desegregation, but the ecological factors yield weaker predictions of both the opinion climate and desegregation. In other words, opinion climate is adding a relatively large unique contribution to the variance explained of the extent of interracial schools. This implies in the terms of our general contextual model that opinion climate is mediating a variety of residual factors important to the desegregation process but unmeasured by our array of census

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[2] Path coefficients are standardized beta weights. In the case when all paths present in a model receive specification, we have a closed system.

variables. In diagrammatic fashion, Figure 5-2 illustrates each of these three contrasting types of mediation.

In the previous chapter, we correlated white opinion climate with the extent of school desegregation across Texas counties. Recall that white opinion climate, without any controls for ecological factors, accounted for approximately twelve per cent of the desegregation variance for the entire state, with a regional range from only six per cent in West Texas to a sizable 36 per cent in East Texas (Tables 4-5 and 4-6).

Now we shall remove the effects of six of the seven standard ecological factors employed in Chapter Two (Tables 2-5 and 2-6) so as to specify more accurately the independent effect of opinion climate in predicting the extent of educational desegregation. In Chapter Two per cent urban entered the prediction equations of school desegregation, but the city size classification of a respondent also served in the estimation of the attitude climate measure. To reduce the direct overlap of these measures in the new regressions which included the attitude climate indicator, we eliminated the per cent urban variable in the analyses which follow. This appears justified since: (1) this variable lacked a consistently strong independent effect in the total and regional regressions in Chapter Two; (2) other aspects of a county's urbanism remain, such as retail sales and home value; and (3) an additional measure, median education of Negroes, which correlates highly with per cent urban is entered into these models. The inclusion of the per cent urban measure would have overstated the effect of urbanism as its variance would not be independent of the attitude climate indicator. From a statistical point of view, this deletion of a predictor variable represents a direct attempt to restrain the multicollinearity which if ignored often biases the estimates of regression coefficients.

Two indicators are available to assess the importance of opinion climate in these analyses: the opinion climate's unique contribution to the explained variance of desegregation and its beta weight. The first of these assesses the independent predictive value of opinion climate in terms of its increment to the total variance explained when it is entered last into the prediction equation. The second indicator, the beta weight, provides a joint estimate of the importance of opinion climate by including: (1) an effect attributable to its unique contribution to the variance explained as well as (2) an effect that results from an allocation of the variance

Figure 5-2

Contrasting Types of Opinion Climate Mediation

(1) Full Mediation



(2) Selective Mediation



(3) Residual Mediation



explained common to all variables in the model. Thus, the second component points to the importance of opinion climate as a mediator. The following relationship determines the overall importance of each component to the magnitude of the beta weight:

$$\begin{array}{ccccc} \text{independent contribution} & = & \text{unique contribution} & + & \text{proportional contribution} \\ B_i^2 & = & B_i^2(1-R_i^2) & + & R_i^2B_i^2 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{ccccc} \text{direct effect or beta weight} & = & \text{net effect} & + & \text{collinear effect} \\ B_i & = & \sqrt{B_i^2-B_i^2R_i^2} & + & B_i-\sqrt{B_i^2-B_i^2R_i^2} \end{array}$$

where R_i is the multiple correlation of variable I with all other predictor variables, and $R_i^2 = 1 - \frac{1}{R_{ii}^{-1}}$ and R_{ii}^{-1} is the diagonal element of the converted predictor correlation matrix.

Some explanation is necessary about the derivation and meaning of these relationships. Entangled in the many presentations of regression techniques, especially those of econometricians, lies valuable information about the quantities derived in the solution of normal equations for beta weights but then often forgotten. This information resides in the inverse of the correlation matrix, R^{-1}. First, it can be shown that a variable's unique contribution defined in terms of the increase in variance explained when it enters the regression equation last is equivalent to B_i^2/R_{ii}^{-1}; this adjusts B_i^2 with an estimate for its bias or lack of specificity. In a non-matrix presentation, the fact that this adjustment for bias is equivalent to the diagonal element of the inverted correlation matrix remains little known. At the same time, this element provides an estimate of a variable's total correlation with the other predictor variables: $1 - \frac{1}{R_{ii}^{-1}} = R_i^2$ (its multiple correlation with all other predictor variables).

This, then, constitutes a measure of multicollinearity.

Likewise, other treatments of regression employed by psychologists (McNemar, 1962; Guilford, 1968; Harmon, 1960) claim that B_I^2 constitutes a variable's independent contribution to R^2. Actually, B_I^2 and in turn B_i combine variation from two sources: the unique contribution to the explained variance (i.e., the increase in R^2 obtained when variable I is entered into the regression equation last) and the proportional contribution (i.e., an allocation of shared variance based on variable I's multicollinearity with the other independent variables). Similarly, the beta weight or direct effect of variable I has two components: its net effect, which corresponds to its unique contribution; and its collinear effect, which corresponds to its proportional contribution. Viewed from a psychometric perspective, the net effect of a variable refers to the specificity of an item in a test and the collinear effect refers to the commonality of the item in a test. These correspondences are not exact, as they lack the usual psychometric corrections for attenuation. Interpretations of path analysis often place greater emphasis on the collinear effect of a variable, especially when the mediation processes are the focal point of the analysis, while in standard regression analysis a variable's net effect (its unique contribution) and direct effect receive greater emphasis in interpretation. In terms of the role assigned to opinion climates in this model, their collinear effect may be more important than their net effects.

Results

Table 5-1 provides the results for the total state plus East and Central Texas. West Texas is omitted for reasons noted in Chapters Two and Four: too few counties in West Texas with sufficient Negro populations to warrant census data on the median non-white education variable, and the failure of opinion climate to add significantly to the prediction of the extent of interracial schooling in West Texas. Remember from Chapter Four that, even before ecological controls are applied, opinion climate accounted for but six per cent of the desegregation variance in this region. Now with the six ecological variables added to the analysis, we find that opinion climate uniquely contributes less than a tenth of one per cent to the prediction and yields an insignificant beta weight of only -.054. Accordingly, we have not analyzed these West Texas results further.

Table 5-1

Combined Ecological and Attitude Predictions of Public School Desegregation

	Total State		
	Ecological Prediction of Desegregation	Ecological Prediction of Attitude	Ecological and Attitude Prediction of Desegregation
Population Change	.096	.289	.042
Total Commercial Farms	.531	.159	.500
Median Home Value	.118	.177	.066
Retail Sales	.022	.077	.051
Per Cent Negro	.099	.048	.106
Negro Median Education	.097	.056	.092
Attitude Climate			.213
R	.585	.437	.613
R^2	34.2	19.1	37.6

Table 5-1 (continued)

East Texas

	Ecological Prediction of Desegregation	Ecological Prediction of Attitude	Ecological and Attitude Prediction of Desegregation
Population Change	.312	.296	.199
Total Commercial Farms	.458	.377	.315
Median Home Value	-.262	-.053	-.243
Retail Sales	.286	.258	.187
Per Cent Negro	-.183	-.014	-.189
Negro Median Education	.164	.186	.090
Attitude Climate			.382
R	.579	.604	.675
R^2	33.5	36.5	45.6

Table 5-1 (continued)

	Central Texas		
	Ecological Prediction of Desegregation	Ecological Prediction of Attitude	Ecological and Attitude Prediction of Desegregation
Population Change	.213	.291	.145
Total Commercial Farms	.608	.153	.580
Median Home Value	.239	.186	.185
Retail Sales	-.122	.123	-.085
Per Cent Negro	..007	.164	.057
Negro Median Education	-.031	.195	.019
Attitude Climate			.254
R	.625	.409	.659
R^2	38.5	16.7	43.4

The first column on the left of Table 5-1 is taken from Table 2-6 and shows the purely ecological prediction of the extent of educational desegregation for the full state of Texas. The second column reveals the ecological prediction of white opinion climates across the state's counties -- a necessary input for our later analyses. The third column provides the combined prediction employing both ecological and opinion climate variables. Note that the beta weights for all ecological variables except per cent Negro decline slightly in the third column when compared with the first. Observe, too, that opinion climate has the second largest beta weight (.213), following only the basic ecological predictor of total commercial farms. Yet the increase in the variance explained rises only 3.6 per cent (from 34.0 to 37.6).

The next three columns provide the standardized beta weights for the comparable three regressions for East Texas.[3] Here opinion climate makes a significant difference. Notice the increase in the explained desegregation variance once opinion climate is entered, a unique contribution increment of 10.2 per cent. Column six in Table 5-1 also shows that opinion climate achieves the highest standardized beta weight (.382), greater than that for total commercial farms, which drops from .458 to .315.

Columns seven through nine of Table 5-1 supply the less dramatic results for Central Texas. Here opinion climate plays a more moderate role, for it adds only 4.9 per cent to the total desegregation variance explained and its standardized beta weight, .254, is the second largest in column nine. Its effect on the ecological variables is essentially reductive: all the beta weights for the variables, except per cent Negro, decrease slightly.

Armed with the data of Table 5-1, we are now prepared to compose crude contextual models. Figure 5-3 gives a diagrammatic version of the model for the full state. For ease of interpretation and simplification, all possible paths are not drawn.[4] Rather, those ecological variables

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[3] The results in columns four and seven are not strictly comparable with those previously given in Table 2-10 because of the addition in Table 5-1 of the median education of non-whites variable.

[4] This is not a complete and explicit path analysis as such. Rather, it is a means of presenting an overall

Figure 5-3

Simplified Contextual Model for Full State of Texas



with larger beta weights when regressed upon opinion climate than upon desegregation directly (columns two and one of Table 5-1) are shown as mediated through the opinion climate; conversely, those with larger beta weights when regressed upon desegregation than upon opinion climate are shown as unmediated, direct effects upon desegregation.[5] The model that emerges in Figure 5-3 meets our earlier definition of selective mediation. Thus, opinion climate appears to mediate the population change, median house value, and retail sales variables, none of which are of any special importance in the prediction. But it fails to mediate the critical commercial farms factor as well as the two racial variables. Finally, in Table 5-1, the variance explained by the ecological factors of desegregation extent is considerably greater than that explained of opinion climate, and the beta weight (.213) for opinion climate in predicting desegregation is significant -- our final operational criteria for selective mediation.

By contrast, the East Texas model shown in Figure 5-4 illustrates both full and residual mediation. The set of predictors divides evenly in terms of the manner with which they exert their effect on school desegregation. Median home value and per cent Negro have only direct effects on the extent of school desegregation. And population change and Negro median education exert their effect only through their relationship with the opinion climate measure. But total commercial farms and retail sales have both direct and indirect effects, though the equality of coefficients is greater for total commercial farms. Yet full mediation of the entire ecological battery is suggested by the slightly larger percentage of the opinion climate variance (36.5) than of the desegregation variance (35.7) accounted for by the battery. The other operational criterion of full mediation, a

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evaluation of the models, since all possible paths lack specification and the extent to which this produces a difference between the observed and predicted correlation needs assessment. This will be done later in the evaluation of the models. Moreover, the pattern of indirect effects will then be presented and analyzed.

[5] A number of exceptions are made for variables with nearly-equal standardized beta weights for predicting both desegregation and opinion climate. In these cases, noted below, both direct and mediated indirect paths are shown.

Figure 5-4

Simplified Contextual Model for East Texas



significant opinion climate beta weight in predicting desegregation with the ecological variables included, appears as expected, its beta = .382.

But the results of Table 5-1 also indicate that residual mediation is operating in East Texas; that is, opinion climate is apparently mediating a number of regional factors which are important to the school desegregation process but which are "residual" in the sense that they are not directly measured in our study. Residual mediation is indicated by the unusually big opinion climate beta weight in the desegregation regression (column six), and the significantly large unique contribution opinion climate adds to the results of column six compared to those of column four. Another estimate of the residual mediation in terms of its net effect, and not an increment in the variance explained, relies upon the decomposition of the opinion climate beta weight as outlined previously. The square root of the unique contribution, .315, would transform the variance measure into a net effect estimate. We would stress that this transformation places the opinion climate in the role of a mediator of either measured or unmeasured factors. An estimate of its mediation with respect to measured factors alone is given by its collinear effect, while our estimate of mediation of residual factors is given by its net effect.[6]

These results for East Texas are of practical as well as theoretical interest, for this region closely resembles the Deep South pockets of greatest resistance to racial change. And they tempt speculations as to just what these unmeasured "residual" factors might be. The most obvious possibilities involve external pressures that would influence both racial opinion and policies -- such as court orders and federal cut-offs of educational funds under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Indeed, such outside pressures were brought to bear more sharply on East Texas than on any other part of the state. And recall from Chapter Two that East Texas did initiate the process relatively early because of external pressures, but then has been comparatively slow about extending the process throughout its public schools.

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[6] But this is not a residual path, R_u, as defined in the explicit path analysis model. Rather it is an estimate of the residual factors unmeasured by this particular set of ecological variables.

A related, less obvious "residual" factor involves the white opinion change that results from actually initiating the process of racial change (Pettigrew, 1966, 1968, 1969). Contrary to conventional wisdom, social psychological research in race relations has repeatedly shown that the racial attitudes of white Americans are far more likely to follow rather than precede actual institutional and situational alterations. Laws can and do change "the hearts and minds of men," despite popular misconceptions on the subject; they do so by first changing behavior which for reasons of consistency and public commitment leads in time to changed attitudes. This factor relates to the discussions in Chapters Three and Four on social judgment, balance, and dissonance theories as exemplified in the post-King-assassination opinion results and the hypothesized role of county decision-makers. Applied to East Texas, we can speculate that the early initiation of school desegregation in the region triggered intra-county and intra-individual processes that led to altered racial attitudes and practices which were functionally relatively autonomous from the external pressures that forced the beginning of the process.

These reasonable possibilities suggest an hypothesis counter to much popular thinking: namely, that *external pressures for racial change are likely to be most important and influential in areas most resistant initially to the change*. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this hypothesis should hold best when, as cognitive dissonance theory specifies (Aronson and Carlsmith, 1963), the external pressure applied is the *minimal* needed to induce the new policies and behavior. The reciprocal hypothesis also seems tenable: *any significant and perceived lessening of external pressures for racial change is likely to lead to the most retrogression in racial attitudes and practices in areas most resistant initially to the change*. Events of 1969 and 1970, when the Deep South responded with renewed resistance to apparent slackening of federal pressure for school desegregation, seem to bear out this reciprocal hypothesis.

Central Texas presents in Figure 5-5 a different picture. Opinion climate is less significant than in East Texas (beta = .254); and there is evidence for *selective mediation* as with the entire state as well as *residual mediation* as with East Texas. Opinion climate *selectively mediates* the full effects of four variables: retail sales, median Negro education, per cent Negro, and population change.

Figure 5-5

Simplified Contextual Model for Central Texas



There is in addition mild evidence for some degree of residual mediation operating in the Central Texas results. While opinion climate moderately lifts the percentage of desegregation variance explained for the region (4.9 per cent), it tends to relate only weakly to the census variables ($R^2 = 16.7$). The contention that opinion climate serves an important role in the mediation of residual factors is supported by the estimate of the net effect for residual mediation based upon a beta weight decomposition. The estimated effect of the residual factors, .241, exceeds all but that of population change in magnitude. Furthermore, the net effect accounts for a majority of the beta weight estimated for opinion climate, .254. This is consistent with the lack of predictive power displayed by the ecological variables in relation to opinion climate. And while opinion climate has a significant beta weight (.254) when regressed with the ecological variables upon extent of desegregation, per cent Negro even achieves opposite signs for its beta weights with desegregation and opinion climate. Note, too, in columns seven and nine of Table 5-1, that the ecological beta weights for predicting desegregation, save population change, undergo little change with the addition of opinion climate to the equation. All of this suggests that opinion climate is evincing some modest degree of residual mediation, a process comparable, if not nearly as strong, as that already found for East Texas. One can infer, then, that such extra-county factors as court rulings and Title VI financial pressure from the U.S. Office of Education have also been important in public school desegregation in Central Texas, though not nearly as crucial as in East Texas.

Internal Evaluation of the Models

The evaluation of the desegregation models presented earlier did not explicitly take into account the explained variance which is shared by the set of independent variables as opposed to being uniquely allocated to a single independent variable. Thus, the effects indicated in the previous diagrams may overestimate the explanatory role of variables entered early in the regression and understate that of variables entered late.

The fundamental theorum of path analysis provides a means to allocate shared variance among the predictor variables.[7] This theorum implies that each correlation can be decomposed into several effects: direct, mediated and associative. A variable's direct effect estimates the relationship of the independent variable with the dependent variable which can be uniquely attributed to the predictor. As described previously, a mediated effect results from the shared explanatory variance of two independent variables, but appears in the model in temporal sequence (e.g., first population change, followed by attitude climate). An associative effect results from the shared explanatory variance of two variables measured at the same point in time (see Figure 5-6).

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[7] This theorum states that any correlation (r_{ik}) can

For the sum of all three of these effects to equal the correlation, all relationships in the model must be specified; however, for theoretical purposes as well as for simplicity it is sometimes convenient to eliminate some relationships (paths) among the independent variables. The effect of this elimination process can be evaluated by the discrepancy of the sum of the effects obtained from this reduced model and the actual correlation. A small discrepancy indicates that the deleted relationships or paths are of little significance in this model. But a large discrepancy indicates that much of the original correlation can be traced to the shared variance of the eliminated paths.

The key question becomes: What is the effect of the relationships we omitted in Diagrams 5-3, 5-4, and 5-5? To simplify the presentation of the data each relationship is separated into its direct, mediated, and associative effects. The only mediated effect possible in these models is through the county's attitude climate and in some cases this effect is eliminated. To estimate associative effects, only variables that are contained within the same subset of variables are considered to have an associative effect. For instance, if the population change and retail sales variables were postulated to have

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be decomposed into a series of products between path coefficients and independent variables. In the case where the subscripts k and j are equal, it is an estimate of the variable's direct effect. Likewise, if variable k precedes variable j in time, it provides an estimate of the mediated effect of k through j; where if both are synchronous it estimates an associative effect. If all equations were obtained in a recursive solution, it is possible to express a correlation in terms of successive products of path coefficients.

Figure 5-6

Types of Effects in Path Analysis



their effect only through the attitude climate variable and the per cent Negro and total commercial farms variables are assumed to have only direct effects with school desegregation, then only the shared variance within each group of synchronous independent variables is considered part of the associative effect (Figure 5-6). The shared variance between, say, total commercial farms and population change is considered error variance as it contributes to the magnitude of the discrepancy between the observed and predicted correlations.

For purposes of comparison, the various types of effects have been calculated on a percentage basis. For example, what percentage of the correlation between the dependent variable and each of the independent variables can be termed a direct, mediated, or associative effect? And what percentage of the original correlation is lost in the simplified model? On the one hand, using this percentage technique simplifies the presentation and provides a meaningful base for the comparison of models. On the other hand, it neither takes into account the magnitude of the original correlation, the path coefficient, or the intricate pattern of shared variance that may occur in multivariate models (especially "error suppressor" effects). Nonetheless, it clearly tests the validity of our previous assumptions with regard to the eliminations of paths from the models.

The Entire State. For the total state, the simplified model's validity is not as high as expected (Table 5-2). Deleting the mediating paths for total commercial farms, per cent Negro and Negro median education produces a tolerable error percentage, the largest being 16.7 per cent for per cent Negro. Much of this error results from its relationship with the population change variable which we have defined as error rather than as an associative effect. However, the assumptions that the first three variables exert all their influence on school desegregation through the attitude climate measure or associatively among themselves seems less founded. This is especially true in the case of retail sales, where an error percentage of 79.8 per cent occurs. This large proportion of error and the small mediated percentage of 2.8 per cent result from a complex error suppressor effect with Negro median education and median home value. Much of its original mediated effect through the attitude climate derives from its relationship with the Negro median education variable and the per cent Negro variable, but now these relationships no longer remain as a valid part of the simplified

Table 5-2

Decomposition of Extent of School Desegregation Correlations

	Total State				East Texas			
	Direct Effect	Mediated Effect	Associative Effect	Error	Direct Effect	Mediated Effect	Associative Effect	Error
Population Change	----	40.6[1]	29.2	30.2	----	78.5	----	21.5
Median Home Value	----	37.8	27.4	34.8	41.0	----	48.9	10.1
Retail Sales	----	2.8	18.8	79.4	5.1	34.8	45.3	14.8
Total Commercial Farms	96.9	----	3.1	0.6	63.2	33.4	2.4	1.0
Per Cent Negro	45.1	----	38.2	16.7	60.4	----	36.4	3.2
Negro Median Education	94.1	----	4.8	1.1	17.9	31.8	43.1	8.2

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[1] All entries are the percentage of the correlation between each of the independent variables and the dependent variable attributable to each type of effect.

Table 5-2 (continued)

Central Texas

	Direct Effect	Mediated Effect	Associative Effect	Error
Population Change	----	56.7	10.1	31.9
Median Home Value	67.1	22.9	9.0	1.0
Retail Sales	----	26.1	26.7	47.2
Total Commercial Farms	98.5	----	1.4	0.1
Per Cent Negro	50.4	----	46.1	3.5
Negro Median Education	15.5	40.8	31.3	12.4

model and are counted as error. The error percentages of median home value and population change result from similar relationships (compare Figure 5-3 with Table 5-2).

Comparing the path coefficients from the solution without all possible paths to the regression solution leads to similar findings, especially since the path coefficient for retail sales falls from .041 to .006. The failure of attitude climate to mediate a large percentage of each of these relationships suggests its importance as a mediator of factors external to the model. Moreover, this analysis reveals the importance of shared associative variance in the production of the larger mediated effects in the previous models.

East Texas. Here eliminating paths has the least effect. The error percentages for the most part are less than 11 per cent; only population change has an error percentage larger than this (21.5 per cent). But this can be explained in terms of its role in the model. Population change is the only variable that has just a mediated effect; and as a consequence of this role it has no legitimate associative effect. Even so its percentage of 21.5 per cent error indicates that almost four-fifths of its effect is in fact mediated through the attitude climate measure as specified in the simplified model. And without this estimate of a county's opinion climate, its effect on school desegregation might have been lost for none of the other independent variables in the model bring out its full effect. The mediated effects of Negro median education and retail sales are substantially larger than their direct effects; especially in the case of the latter, its contribution would be eliminated were it not for its large associative effect. In short, retail sales has little direct influence on the extent of school desegregation in East Texas, but through its relationships with variables other than population change it exerts most of its predictive influence. To eliminate its direct path would eliminate this large associative effect. A similar set of relationships underscores the effect on Negro median education.

Even in East Texas, where full mediation existed in the original model, we see that the mediating effect of the attitude climate is less than expected when tested in this manner. Nonetheless, the overall effect of the attitude climate remains strong (+.251). Once again the role the attitude climate as a mediator of factors external to the model is emphasized. The climate indicator reflects variation independent of these demographic factors which is still extremely important to the explanation of the extent of school desegregation in East Texas.

Central Texas. The simplified model for Central Texas fares well when secondary paths are deleted. Only the retail sales and the population change variables have large error percentages; and again these can be attributed to their shared variance with a variable that serves both as a direct and mediated factor in the explanation of school desegregation. Both population change and retail sales are part of a complex error suppressor relationship with median home value. Because of our conservative assumptions, the variance that each of these variables shares with median home value cannot be counted as associatively shared variance; rather, it is counted as error variance since median home value has both direct and mediated sources of influence in the model.

In Central Texas, it is also apparent that the deletion of paths has less effect on the direct relationships than it does on the mediated relationships. Less error occurs in the variables that affect school desegregation directly than in those whose effects are postulated as mediated. It is important, however, to note that the mediated effects are smaller than the direct effects, and this points once more to the attitude climate's role as a mediator of factors external to the model. The direct effect of median home value becomes more dramatic in this form of the model. Its direct effect is now almost three times as important as its mediated influence, while in the previous simpler presentations of the model this was not the case.[8]

Conclusions of the Evaluation. Both ecological and opinion variables contribute to the understanding of the extent of school desegregation in Texas in 1965. The importance of the county's opinion climate stems in large part from its ability to mediate the effects of variables not included in our ecological measures -- such as court cases or Title VI pressure from H.E.W. Residual mediation is strongest in East Texas but critical, too, in Central Texas. This is not to say that the county's attitude climate fails to mediate any of the ecological variables; rather it suggests that it functions to a greater extent to bring into the model sources of variation untapped by the traditional census indicators.

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[8] Deleting certain paths rellocated variance of median home value originally considered as mediated to a position of direct effect. This occurred because of the variable's relationship to retail sales, population change, and median Negro education. Such a four-variable interaction illustrates the extreme complexity underlying these models.

Several interesting methodological concepts proved to be fruitful. The concepts of net and collinear effects provide a way to separate the different mediating functions of the attitude climate -- external and ecological. Likewise, the differentiation of mediated from associative effects in the set of synchronous independent variables contrasts the different ways in which shared variance among independent variables may affect school desegregation. At the same time, it can be seen that the effect of deleting a path in the model not only removes its direct effect, but it may drastically alter the role of other variables through its associative effects with them.

Three conclusions, then, emerge from our evaluation of the simplified models. First, the effect of deleting a path is more complex than we had anticipated. Consequently, second, the model for the entire state of Texas (Figure 5-3) is too lean, with direct paths needed for such variables as retail sales. Finally, third, the significance of the attitude climate as a mediator of factors external to the model is even greater than revealed in previous analyses.

Summary

Using the techniques of path analysis, three simplified contextual models of the extent of public school desegregation across Texas counties are presented for Texas as a whole, East Texas, and Central Texas. The models all point to a process similar to that outlined in the previous chapter. And the evaluation of the models revealed the underlying complexity as well as the especially important role of external factors in influencing both a county's attitude climate and its desegregation process. The significance of external pressures, particularly in East Texas, led to the formulation of two hypotheses of practical value (p. 157) to which we shall return in Chapter Nine when we consider the policy implications of the Project's results.

This completes our study of school desegregation in the South, for now we turn to Part II on race relations in the North.

PART II

RACIAL ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR IN THE NORTH

Chapter Six

The Ecology of Northern Racial Voting

Voting in elections of racial significance offers an effective place of entry for empirically exploring racial attitudes and behavior in the North. The act of casting a ballot in a political contest charged with racial implications, like a Texas county's decision to desegregate its public schools, brings the whole issue to a sharp focus. Unlike attitudes, it involves a binding decision of future importance; and seen collectively it lays bare the basic lines of fracture. Consequently, the next two chapters will center attention upon racial voting in key urban areas throughout the North.

We shall first attempt to provide the broad outlines of the phenomenon. As in the contextual approach to southern school desegregation, we shall begin with an ecological analysis of northern racial voting in this chapter. In the following chapter, the perspective gained from this ecological treatment will form the context within which northern survey data on individual racial attitudes will be embedded.

The Research Approach

Two types of elections of racial importance present themselves. One type involves a Negro candidate who runs for high office with a biracial constituency. This form usually occurs at the local level, where the election is city-wide. The other type involves a white candidate for high office who intentionally injects race into the campaign and is an openly avowed racial segregationist. This form can occur at the local level or, as in 1968, can also occur at the national level in the campaign for the presidency.

Three northern cities and a variety of political races constitute our target cases. Elections in Boston, Cleveland, and Gary are studied which involved three Negro and two white candidates. In Boston, we shall investigate the white votes for Thomas Atkins, a Negro, for councilman-at-large and, more briefly, for Mrs. Louise Day Hicks, a white, for mayor. In Cleveland and Gary, we shall look at the 1967 ecological voting patterns for Carl Stokes and Richard Hatcher, successful Negro candidates for mayor in these cities. Finally, the returns favoring Wallace for President in 1968 will be analyzed in these three central cities in order to determine to what extent white electoral patterns for Negro candidates constitute mirror images of those for Wallace.

The basic data set for each city consists of a variety of variables for each precinct within the municipal limits whose Negro population did not exceed ten per cent in 1960. The arbitrary cut-off point of ten per cent was chosen to ensure that our universe was populated almost entirely by whites.[1] Two types of variables describe each precinct. One type derives completely from the United States Bureau of Census, and consists of the social class, ethnicity, and neighborhood characteristics which form the independent variables for the analyses of this chapter. The other type consists of the actual voting data which form the dependent variables for the analyses.

The voting data present no problems, for their units are, of course, precincts to start with. The census data, however, come only in units of blocks and tracts. They have to be converted to precinct units, a conversion that requires elaborate aggregation procedures. Housing characteristics are available for each block; and it is a relatively easy task to identify the component blocks of each precinct and then to aggregate the census data from the blocks so as to fit the precinct contours precisely. But the remaining census data are available only in tract form, a larger unit; and rarely are precincts and census tracts coterminus. This necessitates determining the value of variable Y for precinct X by aggregating the value of each relevant tract weighted by the ratio of the population in that part of the tract that falls within the precinct to the total population of the precinct.[2]

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[1] One might think that this ten per cent figure is too low, and would result in a disproportionately large percentage of whites being excluded from the analyses. But it must be remembered that these percentages must be calculated from 1960 census data, while our elections of interest took place in the latter half of the decade. We have evidence for believing that many areas of our three target cities shifted from only ten to twenty per cent Negro in 1960 to over thirty and forty per cent by the late 1960's. The inclusion of this many Negroes in the universe would seriously distort our results, since Negroes voted almost unanimously against Governor Wallace and for black candidates. Indeed, to the extent that Negroes remain in our studied precincts, significant relationships are rendered more difficult to obtain. Consequently, the ten per cent cut-off is actually more realistic than it might first appear. And given the relatively few interracial precincts in these three cities, only an insignificant number of whites are excluded by this procedure.

Once the data are aggregated into precinct units, the raw figures are transformed to proportions based on the total population of the precinct. This simple standardization technique is necessary since the population sizes of the precincts within a city often vary considerably. Moreover, all correlations based on raw numbers would be confounded by the covariance between precinct size and voting patterns, a covariation that proved not insignificant. Standardization into proportions, then, is necessary.

The final result is a data set which consists of an array of census characteristics and racially-relevant voting data for each precinct with ten per cent or less Negroes in 1960. It is important to remember that the unit here is the precinct, not the individual. Just as we analyzed counties as units in Chapter Two, the analyses of this chapter refer only to aggregates; thus, direct inferences about individuals are not generally justified. Recall in Chapter One the discussion of "the ecological fallacy," the mistake of making direct statements about individuals solely from aggregate results. Consider, for example, a zero-order correlation of -.40 between mean education and the 1968 presidential vote for George

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[2] Put in equation form, the value of variable Y for precinct X is found by:

$$Y_X = \sum_{1}^{N} Y_i W_i \ ,$$

where N = the number of tracts forming the precinct

$W_i = P_i/P_X$

P_i = the population of tract i falling within precinct X

P_X = the total population of precinct X.

Wallace across Boston's white precincts. If one inferred from this finding alone that the poorly-educated voters were more likely to support Wallace, a pure example of the ecological fallacy would have been committed. The correct generalization is that precincts with considerable numbers of poorly-educated residents tend to favor Wallace more than other precincts. Note that the problem here is created by the obvious possibility that the better-educated voters in poorly-educated areas could be the backbone of the Wallace support -- a neat illustration of the type of contextual finding to which this research is especially alerted.

It is true that the smaller the aggregate unit, the less dangerous is the ecological fallacy. This fact makes the problem less severe in a city with thinly populated precincts, such as Cleveland, than in a city with densely populated precincts, such as Boston. And the fallacy is also less likely for a characteristic that is found among many of the individuals in the aggregate than for a rare characteristic. This fact makes the problem less severe for a precinct that gives Wallace ninety per cent of its ballots compared to one that gives him only five per cent. But we shall not risk the ecological fallacy in this chapter at all, for we are genuinely interested in the precincts themselves. Thus, this chapter's generalizations will be restricted to precincts only as we develop the context within which directly individual data on northern racial attitudes can be embedded in Chapters Seven and Eight.

Pilot Voting Analyses in Boston

We began our ecological analyses of racial voting in the North by perfecting the methods and approach on a series of significant elections in Boston, Massachusetts. For 209 white precincts, we first compared the patterns of support in 1967 for Thomas Atkins, a successful Negro candidate for the City Council, and Mrs. Louise Day Hicks, an unsuccessful white candidate for mayor.[3] Atkins' victory was notable, because it was a city-wide, at-large post and constituted the first such electoral win for a Negro in Boston for a generation. He had been a leader of the local branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Mrs. Hicks' candidacy was equally interesting. Three times previously, in 1961, 1963, and 1965, she had run successfully for the city's School Committee; in the last two of these elections, she garnered roughly two-thirds of the votes cast running as the chief local defender of "neighborhood schools," no "busing," and racial segregation of schools (Ross, Crawford, and Pettigrew, 1966). Soon she became a symbol of resistance to racial change in the public schools in the North, even appearing on the cover of Newsweek just before the 1967 mayoralty race.

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[3] In 1969, Atkins came in second and Mrs. Hicks first in city-wide elections for the nine-person City Council. Atkins improved somewhat on his 1967 feat of receiving approximately a third of the white ballots cast. It is important to note that he was not running against any one particular opponent, but trying to rank in the top nine. The situation is analogous to the 1969 Los Angeles first mayoralty race in which Thomas Bradley, a Negro, did so well, only to be decisively beaten by incumbent Mayor Samuel Yorty in the run-off.

Table 6-1 presents the regression results for five key census variables for both the Atkins and Hicks votes. Relatively high percentages of the precinct variance for each of the candidates are accounted for in this crude initial attempt. Two variables are especially significant, median house value and the stability of residence. Indeed, these two variables are so important that they alone do almost as well as the five variable regressions.[4]

In general the weights for the Negro and segregationist candidates are counter to each other in sign as expected. Both regressions reflect the operation of the powerful effect of white "ethnic enclaves." These enclaves are characterized by lowly-valued real estate, stability of residence, home ownership, and high parochial school attendance together with modest educational attainment; and they tend to vote against a Negro candidate and for a white segregationist. Yet the Atkins and Hicks regressions are not mirror images of each other. Observe, for example, the greater importance of education in the Atkins vote and of house value in the Hicks vote. Table 6-2 further clarifies these differences. While 134 (65 per cent) of the white precincts in Boston fall in the expected diagonal (lower-left to upper-right), a number have interesting deviations from the main trend and

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[4] For the Atkins voting pattern across Boston's white precincts, the multiple R equals .80 (R^2 = 64.4 per cent) for the two variables alone; and for the Hicks pattern, R equals .70 (R^2 = 49.8 per cent).

Table 6-1

Regression Results for 1967 Boston Elections for 209 White Precincts

	Standardized Beta Weights	
Ecological Variable	Atkins Vote	Hicks Vote
Median house value	+.384	-.664
Percentage living in same house before 1955	-.342	+.172
Percentage of owner-occupied dwellings	-.160	+.218
Percentage of school-aged children in public schools	+.167	-.261
Median years of education	+.225	+.090
Multiple Correlation (R) =	.82	.76
Percentage of Voting Variance by Precinct Predicted (R^2) =	67.4%	58.4%

Table 6-2

Relationship of Atkins and Hicks 1967 Votes in the 209 White Precincts of Boston

Hicks Nov. 1967 Vote

		Low (41.5%-)	Medium (41.6%-54.0%)	High (54.1%)
Atkins Nov. 1967 Vote	Low (27.0%-)	0	18	54
	Medium (27.1%-35.0%)	3	37	22
	High (35.1%+)	43	25	5

five even deliver relatively large votes for both candidates. In these five precincts at least, a number of white voters must have supported both candidates![5] It is such deviant precincts that merit special attention with survey methods.

Encouraged by this initial success to delineate clear and meaningful ecological patterns for racial voting in Boston, we next expanded the number of variables sharply and for these same white precincts compared the Atkins voting pattern in 1967 with that of Governor Wallace in 1968. The two elections correlate -.70, indicating that each accounts for about half of the precinct variance of the other. This leaves considerable room for diverse ecological patterns of the two votes.[6]

Table 6-3 provides the zero-order correlations for these two races for sixteen census variables ranging from socio-economic indicators and ethnic compositions to neighborhood characteristics.[7] Save for one instance, the

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[5] This modest statement can be made without committing the ecological fallacy because of the large votes polled by both candidates in these five precincts. Thus, if in precinct X Atkins received 40 per cent and Mrs. Hicks 80 per cent (each voter could choose nine candidates), then at least 20 per cent of the precinct's voters had to have cast ballots for both Atkins and Hicks. Other evidence suggests that this small but fascinating segment of the Boston electorate were often cultural pluralists who believed in all segments of the community sharing in Council seats. "We want ours," succinctly summed up an Irish-American construction worker, "they want theirs."

[6] The Wallace vote in the 209 white precincts of Boston was only 6.3 per cent with virtually all precincts ranging between just three and nine per cent. The previously mentioned dangers of committing the ecological fallacy are especially great when the dependent variable's mean is so low and its range so narrow.

[7] The reader is reminded of the chief weakness of Pearsonian correlations for this purpose: namely, that they assume simple linear relationships. We shall try to handle this problem in two ways. First, we have broken up such variables as family income into three variables (less than $4,000, $4,000 to $9,000, and over $15,000) in order to detect curvilinear trends where we have good reason to suspect them. Second, we shall shortly do more elaborate analyses to show more clearly the curvilinear relationship between Mayor Hatcher's 1967 vote in Gary and family income.

Table 6-3

Zero-Order Pearsonian Correlations of Sixteen Census Variables with Racially Related Votes in Boston Across White Precincts

Census Variable, 1960	Voting Patterns Across White Precincts for:	
	Thomas Atkins for City Council, 1967	George Wallace for President, 1968
Socio-Economic Variables		
Median Housing Value	+.643	-.513
Median Gross Rent	+.529	-.480
Per cent Paying $100-$150 Rent	+.402	-.438
Per cent Family Income $4,000 or Less	-.048	+.031
Per cent Family Income $4,000-$9,000	-.441	+.345
Per cent Family Income $15,000 or More	+.493	-.354
Median Years of Education	+.579	-.397
Per cent of Adults with 8 Years Education or Less	-.601	+.656
Ethnic Variables		
Per cent British-Americans[1]	+.521	-.275
Per cent Irish-Americans	-.254	+.383
Per cent Italian-Americans	-.419	+.165
Per cent Jewish-Americans	+.346	-.547
Per cent Other Ethnicities	-.123	-.164

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[1] British-American is defined as of English, Welsh, or Scots origin. And like the other ethnic variables, it relates to those who were either born in or whose parents were born in the countries. Third-generation Americans and others of earlier American origin are not recorded as such by the census.

Table 6-3 (continued)

Census Variable, 1960	Voting Patterns Across White Precincts for:	
	Thomas Atkins for City Council, 1967	George Wallace for President, 1968
Neighborhood Variables		
Per cent in Same Residence Since 1955	-.637	+.390
Per cent of Dwellings Owner Occupied	-.302	+.267
Per cent of Children in Public Schools	+.270	-.245

signs for the coefficients are different for the two patterns. Yet notice once again that the two votes are not simple mirror opposites. As in the Atkins and Hicks comparison, stability of residence is more important for the militant Negro candidate than the segregationist white candidate. And on one dimension the two voting patterns are remarkable similar: neither candidates did well in white Boston precincts with relatively high percentages of families with annual incomes under $4,000 in 1959. But regression analyses investigating many of these variables at once are necessary to tease out these more subtle ecological trends.

Socio-Economic Variables. Table 6-4 shows the regression results of seven socio-economic variables considered simultaneously. Broadly speaking, Atkins did best in white areas with good housing and relatively well-educated residents; Wallace did best in white areas with poor housing and relatively poorly educated residents. The small betas for the percentages who paid in 1960 between $100 and $150 rent indicate that the median rent relationships with the two voting patterns was largely linear. This description is consistent with the zero-order correlations presented in Table 6-3. But the regression analyses do make a sharp difference in the income effects, and this requires further discussion.

Recall that Table 6-3 showed that Atkins did best in high-income precincts, Wallace best in medium-income precincts, and neither did well in low-income precincts. But now Table 6-4's standardized beta weights suggest sharply different trends. To understand this revealing shift, remember that the regression analyses are considering income in the context of housing expenditures and education. This means that Table 6-4 demonstrates that Atkins did considerably better and Wallace considerably worse in low-income precincts than would be expected given their patterns in housing and education. In other words, the greatest relative source of white resistance to Atkins' candidacy and of white support for Wallace's candidacy resided in the middle-income precincts (Table 6-3). Since Atkins in general ran strongest in high-income, well-educated areas, he did surprisingly well in low-income white precincts and this causes the strong, positive beta weight in Table 6-4 for the $4,000 or less income variable. Thus, this beta weight should not be interpreted to mean that Atkins ran best in low-income areas as such. This curvilinear relationship between income and white voting for Negro candidates for high office is a general one; we shall find it reoccurring in

Table 6-4

Socio-Economic Variables and Racially Related Votes Across White Precincts in Boston

Socio-Economic Census Variables	Standardized Beta Weights for:	
	Atkins, 1967	Wallace, 1968
Median Housing Value	+.38	-.22
Median Gross Rent	+.39	-.32
Per cent Paying \$100-\$150 Rent	-.08	-.18
Per cent Family Income \$4,000 or Less	+.57	-.51
Per cent Family Income \$15,000 or More	-.11	+.14
Median Years of Education	+.27	+.06
Per cent Adults with 8 Years of Education or Less	-.21	+.47
Multiple Correlation (R) =	.70	.65
Percentage of Voting Variance Across Precincts Predicted (R^2) =	49%	42%

the Stokes and Hatcher voting patterns in Cleveland and Gary; and we shall consider it in detail with the Gary findings.

The income beta weights for Wallace in Table 6-4 should be similarly interpreted, and also alert us to another important cuvilinear trend. For a candidate who tended to run best in areas with low-cost housing and grammar-school-educated residents, Wallace did surprisingly poorly in areas with relatively large percentages of low-income whites. The prototype of his best precincts contained residents who despite scant years of formal schooling were nevertheless receiving medium family incomes. This is an interesting clue which suggests, on the individual level, a status discrepancy hypothesis (Benoit-Smullyan, 1944; Lenski, 1954, 1956b). We shall look closely for this effect in Cleveland and Gary; and test directly the social psychological hypothesis that it suggests with survey data in Chapter Seven.

Ethnicity Variables. Table 6-5 pushes the analysis further by examining five ethnicity variables. Not surprisingly, the two sets of beta weights reveal contrasting patterns. Atkins did best in British-American and Jewish precincts (Table 6-3), though only the British-American effect holds up in the regression analysis. He did worst in areas with large percentages of Irish- and Italian-Americans. On the other hand, Wallace did relatively best in Irish-American districts, worst in Jewish and British-American districts. Other ethnicities showed across precincts no clear trend for either candidate. The two deviations from mirror-image results are provided by the Italian- and Jewish-American areas. Italian-American precincts resisted Atkins' candidacy, but tended not to back Wallace's. And Jewish-American precincts resisted Wallace relatively more than they supported Atkins.

But these findings may only reflect what we have already learned in Table 6-4. Since British and Jewish areas tend to be among the more prosperous neighborhoods, the ethnicity results of Table 6-5 may simply show that Atkins' vote related to high-cost housing and extensive education while Wallace's related to low-cost housing and limited education. Table 6-6 checks on this possibility by showing the results of placing four of the more significant socio-economic variables from Table 6-4 together with the five ethnicity variables. The British effects for both votes are substantially reduced, as is

Table 6-5

Ethnicity Variables and Racially Related Votes Across White Precincts in Boston

Ethnicity Census Variables	Standardized Beta Weights	
	Atkins, 1967	Wallace, 1968
Per cent British-American[1]	+.30	-.24
Per cent Irish American	-.61	+.30
Per cent Italian-American	-.60	+.06
Per cent Jewish American	-.09	-.41
Per cent Other Ethnicities	+.06	+.04
Multiple Correlation (R) =	.64	.56
Percentage of Voting Variance Across Precincts Predicted (R^2) =	41%	31%

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[1] Defined as in Table 6-3.

Table 6-6

Socio-Economic Together With Ethnicity Variables and Racially Related Votes Across White Precincts in Boston

Census Variables	Standardized Beta Weights for:	
	Atkins, 1967	Wallace, 1968
Median Housing Value	+.38	-.16
Median Gross Rent	+.16	-.20
Per cent Family Income $4,000 or Less	+.36	-.33
Median Years of Education	+.19	-.44
Per cent British-American	+.14	-.03
Per cent Irish-American	-.37	+.14
Per cent Italian-American	-.42	-.10
Per cent Jewish-American	-.14	-.31
Per cent Other Ethnicities	+.19	-.17
Multiple Correlation (R) =	.73	.67
Percentage of Voting Variance Across Precincts Predicted (R^2) =	53%	45%

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[1] Defined in Table 6-3.

the Irish effect for Wallace, indicating that they were basically socio-economic in character. But three major ethnic effects remain: the relative rejection of Atkins by Irish and Italian precincts and the relative rejection of Wallace by Jewish precincts.

A comparison of the explained variances of Tables 6-4, 6-5, and 6-6 furnishes a rough comparison of the relative predictive importance of the socio-economic as opposed to the ethnicity variables. For both the Atkins and Wallace votes, the socio-economic variables are more critical. There is, of course, considerable multicollinearity between the two sets of variables. But the addition of the five ethnic variables lifted the explained variance for Atkins only four per cent (from 49 to 53) and for Wallace only three per cent (from 42 to 45); while the addition of four socio-economic indicators lifted the ethnic predictions for Atkins twelve per cent (41 to 53) and for Wallace fourteen per cent (31 to 45).[8]

Neighborhood Variables. Table 6-7 provides the results for five variables which all relate to the neighborhood, two of which are repeated from the socio-economic analyses. For Atkins, though not for Wallace, this regression yields the highest percentage of variance explained of any so far -- well over half of the precinct variance. This is achieved largely by the first three variables, indicating that white areas with costly housing and relatively high turnover gave Atkins his largest white returns. By contrast, Wallace ran strongest in low-rent white areas with relatively large percentages of owner-occupied homes, a pattern reminiscent of Mrs. Hicks' vote in her 1967 run for mayor of Boston (Table 6-1).

Fifteen Variable Regression. Omitting only the grammar school education variable, all of the census variables discussed in this section are applied simultaneously to the two Boston votes in Table 6-8. Note that almost three-fifths of the Atkins precinct variance and half of the Wallace precinct variance are accounted for in these fifteen variable regression analyses.

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[8] And if the full seven variable set of socio-economic factors had been utilized instead of just four in Table 6-6, these differences in favor of the greater importance of socio-economic factors would have been slightly enhanced.

Table 6-7

Neighborhood Variables and Racially Related Votes Across White Precincts in Boston

Neighborhood Variables	Standardized Beta Weights for:	
	Atkins, 1967	Wallace, 1968
Median Housing Value	+.28	-.15
Median Gross Rent	+.30	-.57
Per cent in Same Residence Since 1955	-.48	-.13
Per cent of Dwellings Owner Occupied	-.09	+.57
Per cent of Children in Public Schools	+.11	-.18
Multiple Correlation (R) =	.74	.62
Percentage of Voting Variance Across Precincts Predicted (R2) =	55%	38%

Table 6-8

Fifteen Variable Regression Results on Racially Related Votes Across White Precincts in Boston

Census Variables	Standardized Beta Weights for:	
	Atkins, 1967	Wallace, 1968
Socio-Economic Variables		
Median Housing Value	+.12	-.02
Median Gross Rent	+.10	-.22
Per cent Paying $100-$150 Rent	+.10	-.09
Per cent Family Income $4,000 or Less	-.02	+.06
Per cent Family Income $4,000-$9,000	-.16	+.28
Per cent Family Income $15,000 or More	+.04	+.15
Median Years of Education	+.13	-.35
Ethnic Variables		
Per cent British-Americans	+.09	-.03
Per cent Irish-Americans	-.22	+.19
Per cent Italian-Americans	-.30	-.07
Per cent Jewish-Americans	-.28	-.16
Per cent other Ethnicities	+.30	-.13
Neighborhood Variables		
Per cent in Same Residence Since 1955	-.44	-.07
Per cent of Dwelling Owner Occupied	-.03	+.32
Per cent of Children in Public Schools	+.02	+.02
Multiple Correlation (R) =	.76	.70
Percentage of Voting Variance Across Precincts Predicted (R^2)=	58%	49%

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[1] Defined as in Table 6-3.

But more important than the level of prediction for our purposes is the perspective this larger regression analysis provides on the relative power of the various independent variables. While the Atkins pattern retains its upper-status character, the largest beta weights appear for ethnic and housing stability variables. Strong Atkins precincts among white Bostonians tended, within the context of high socio-economic status, to be characterized by considerable turnover in residents and relatively few Irish-, Italian-, and Jewish-Americans.[9]

By comparison, the Wallace pattern is less related to ethnicity than it is to the low education and medium income combination previously noted. In addition, areas with relatively high proportions of owner-occupied homes were more likely to favor the Alabamian. Since the percentages of owner-occupied dwellings and families in the same residence since 1955 are highly and positively correlated, this last result is actually the reciprocal of the Atkins strength in unstable areas. This strongly suggests that residents of stable ethnic neighborhoods comprised largely of medium-income home owners are especially fearful of Negro intrusion and express this fear by voting against Negro candidates and for Wallace. This possibility deduced from aggregate data is borne out in survey data from these very precincts (Ross, Crawford, and Pettigrew, 1966).

How specific are these interesting findings to Boston? Are there generalities across cities that can be made about white northern electoral support for competent Negro and white segregationist candidates? To seek answers to these questions, we turn to further analyses of such political races in Cleveland, Ohio and Gary, Indiana.

Voting Analyses in Cleveland

Carl Stokes, a well-known Negro state legislator, ran first for mayor of Cleveland in 1965 as an independent. He garnered only about eleven per cent of the white vote and lost, but his race was impressive enough to set him up for a full-scale effort in 1967. He began by winning the Democratic Party nomination in a stunning upset over the incumbent. Then he narrowly squeeked past his formidable Republican opponent, Seth Taft, in November of 1967, receiving roughly nineteen per cent of the white vote. It is this partisan election in 1967 which we will analyze here. Since then, in 1969, Stokes has won re-election in another close race in which his white vote increased to approximately twenty-two per cent.

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[9] The large and positive beta for "other ethnicities" (+.30) is due largely to a few predominately Puerto Rican precincts which, while relatively poor areas, tended to support Atkins and other Negro candidates heavily.

There are, then, a number of significant differences between the Stokes election in Cleveland and the Atkins election in Boston. First, Stokes ran in a highly partisan contest as a Democrat, while Atkins ran in a truly non-partisan contest. This distinction makes a definite difference in the ecological results, as we shall shortly observe. Second, Stokes ran for the highest local office, while Atkins ran as the only Negro aspirant for a nine-member City Council. White voters prove far more elusive for Negro candidates when the candidates attempt to be "the captain of the ship" rather than merely one among representatives. Third, the Negro population percentage of Cleveland is considerably larger than that of Boston; precise data are not available, but by 1967 the Cleveland percentage probably approached forty per cent compared to less than twenty per cent in Boston. Assuming a large and solid Negro vote, then, Stokes needed white votes less than Atkins. Finally, Stokes had a specific opponent, while Atkins was one of eighteen aspirants for nine posts. This difference is double-edged. Stokes could count on anti-Taft votes and use any of his opponent's flaws as issues, though Taft could do the same in reverse. Also cutting down Stokes' white following was the fact that his opponent was competent, popular, and liberal -- the hardest type of white adversary for a Negro candidate because the white appeals to the type of white voter otherwise most disposed to voting for a Negro on the ballot.

For our present purposes, however, these contrasts between the two races are quite useful. If we should obtain similar results for the Stokes and Atkins voting patterns, we can be more confident that racial attitudes and behavior are the critical factors overcoming structural differences.

On the basis of the successful pilot work on Boston elections, we selected six additional census variables to add to the original sixteen of Table 6-3. They are: the percentages of adult females in the labor force, families residing in the same dwelling since 1939, households with one car, households with two cars, craftsmen and foremen in the labor force, and homes built before 1940. In addition, the two leading ethnicities of Boston, the Irish and Italians, are replaced by Poles and Czechs. The zero-order correlations for these twenty-two predictor variables are given in Table 6-9. Finally, the two votes serving as the dependent variables correlate only -.36, rather than -.70 as in Boston, and this leaves considerably more room for the two patterns to be other than mirror-opposites.

The first striking aspect of Table 6-9 is its typically lower coefficients than those found in Boston. For both the Stokes and Wallace votes, the correlations are generally small. This trend is traceable to two differences between Cleveland and the two other cities under scrutiny. Cleveland has many small precincts, 507 white ones for this analysis. And at the same time the city has sharply attenuated variances in many of the key predictor variables; in particular, the better-educated, higher-income residents of the Cleveland metropolitan area have left the central city in vast numbers for homes in such outlying suburbs as Shaker Heights and Cleveland Heights. Thus, when the variances of the predictor variables are restricted, the result of lower correlations is not surprising.

Yet clear trends for both the Stokes and Wallace votes still emerge in the data of Table 6-9, trends similar to those already uncovered in Boston. For example, the income relationship is again curvilinear for both candidates; those areas with large numbers of families earning $4,000 to $9,000 are likely to vote against Stokes and for Wallace. This trend is further reflected by the additional variable of craftsmen and foremen in the labor force. This indicator of high-level working class concentrations relates negatively to Stokes voting and positively to Wallace voting. And, as before, precincts characterized by old, stable neighborhoods with poorly-educated residents tend to reject the Negro aspirant for mayor and favor the white aspirant for president.

Socio-Economic Variables. A more accurate indication of these trends is provided by multiple regression equations. Table 6-10 provides the standardized beta weights for eight socio-economic variables. Note that the prediction of the Stokes vote is very poor and that of the Wallace vote considerably better. Several factors underlie this result. One is the attenuated variance of the

Table 6-9

Zero-Order Pearsonian Correlations of Twenty-two Census Variables with Racially Related Votes Across White Precincts in Cleveland

Census Variables, 1960	Voting Patterns Across White Precincts for:	
	Carl Stokes for Mayor, 1967	George Wallace for President, 1968
Socio-Economic Variables		
Median House Value	-.06	-.39
Median Gross Rent	-.05	-.15
Per cent Paying $100-$150 Rent	+.14	-.44
Per cent Family Income $4,000 or Less	+.09	-.20
Per cent Family Income $4,000-$9,000	-.22	+.30
Per cent Family Income $15,000 or More	+.20	-.49
Median Years of Education	+.16	-.48
Per cent Adults with 8 Years Education or Less	-.08	+.31
Per cent Females in the Labor Force	-.06	-.01
Per cent Households with One Car	-.07	-.10
Per cent Households with Two Cars	-.02	+.29
Per cent Craftsmen and Foremen in Labor Force	-.21	+.13
Ethnicity Variables		
Per cent British-American[1]	+.12	-.29
Per cent Polish-American	-.25	+.13
Per cent Czech-American	-.01	+.05
Per cent Jewish-American	+.11	-.18
Per cent Other Ethnicities	-.28	+.10

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[1] Defined as in Table 6-3.

Table 6-9 (continued)

Census Variables, 1960	Voting Patterns Across White Precincts for:	
	Carl Stokes for Mayor, 1967	George Wallace for President, 1968
Neighborhood Variables		
Per cent Same Residence Since 1939	-.29	+.24
Per cent Same Residence Since 1955	-.21	-.13
Per cent of Dwellings Owner Occupied	-.12	-.08
Per cent of Children in Public Schools	+.06	-.06
Per cent of Buildings Built Before 1940	-.18	+.36

Table 6-10

Socio-Economic Variables and Racially Related Votes Across White Precincts in Cleveland

Socio-Economic Variables	Standardized Beta Weights for:	
	Stokes, 1969	Wallace, 1968
Median Gross Rent	-.11	-.02
Per cent Paying $100-$150 Rent	+.15	-.16
Per cent Family Income $4,000 or Less	+.20	+.01
Per cent Family Income $4,000-$9,000	-.11	+.22
Per cent Family Income $15,000 or More	+.06	-.07
Median Years of Education	+.13	-.36
Per cent Households with One Car	+.03	+.05
Per cent Craftsmen and Foremen in Labor Force	-.14	+.03
Multiple Correlation (R) =	.33	.50
Percentage of Voting Variance Across Precincts Predicted (R^2) =	11%	25%

socio-economic variables already discussed. Moreover, Stokes was engaged in a partisan election as a Democrat, rather than in a non-partisan election like Atkins in Boston. His opponent was a wealthy and popular Republican, a man sure to appeal in many of the types of high status precincts which backed Atkins. Consequently, the expected high status effect for Stokes is muted, and the socio-economic prediction of his vote is slight.[10]

No such factors operate in the Wallace regression, however, and a pattern similar to his in Boston presents itself in Table 6-10. Areas with poorly-educated residents of medium income emerge once again as his electoral strongholds in the urban North.

Ethnicity Variables. Table 6-11 provides the Cleveland regression findings on ethnicity. As in Boston, the ethnic variables prove to be somewhat more critical for the Negro candidate. Again the Irish and Italian areas, now comprising a large share of "other ethnicities" together with Hungarian and some other Eastern European areas, resist the Negro. Polish precincts respond similarly. Indeed, among the ten Cleveland precincts returning the smallest vote percentages for Stokes in 1967, seven had over thirteen per cent first- or second-generation Polish-Americans -- well over twice the city's Polish population ratio. By comparison, the Czech- and Jewish-American precincts tended to favor Stokes and oppose Wallace.[11]

The Czech finding deserves special discussion, for the temptation to conclude that Czech-Americans as individuals are more likely to support Stokes provides a particularly interesting instance of the ecological

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[10] This interpretation receives further support by a close examination of the high-education precincts. These areas either went strongly for or strongly against Stokes, a trend that suggests the high-status areas either remained intensely loyal to the Republican Party or revealed the type of robust support for a Negro candidate already noted in the Atkins results in Boston.

[11] Unlike in Boston, British-Americans constitute such small portions of the populations in Cleveland and Gary that the betas based on this variable are not reliable.

Table 6-11

Ethnicity Variables and Racially Related Votes Across White Precincts in Cleveland

Ethnicity Variables	Standardized Beta Weights for:	
	Stokes, 1967	Wallace, 1968
Per cent British-American[1]	+.04	-.29
Per cent Polish-American	-.20	+.01
Per cent Czech-American	+.11	-.05
Per cent Jewish-American	+.18	-.20
Per cent Other Ethnicities	-.30	+.13
Multiple Correlation (R)	= .40	.37
Percentage of Voting Variance Across Precincts Predicted (R^2)	= 16%	13%

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[1] Defined as in Table 6-3.

fallacy. Closer examination of the Cleveland data reveals that the "Czech effect" is conditioned by the presence or absence of Polish-Americans in the same precinct. Thus, the overall zero-order association between the Czech percentage and the Stokes vote in 1967 is only -.01 (Table 6-9); and there is no discernible trend for Stokes in Czech areas where few Poles reside. But in joint Czech-Polish precincts, there is a decided trend toward somewhat greater support of the Negro candidate than in comparable Polish precincts without Czechs. Consequently, when the Polish-American percentage is controlled, the Czech-American beta becomes positive (+.11, Table 6-11) and even more so with further controls (+.13, Table 6-12; +.18, Table 6-14). Such aggregate data do not allow you to probe deeper. Is it the Czechs, the Poles, or both of them jointly who are more willing to cast their ballots for Stokes in ethnically mixed precincts? Only survey data can answer such problems.

Table 6-12 checks to see to what extent these ethnicity findings are merely masking socio-economic factors. Using slightly different sets of socio-economic variables for each election in order to maximize control of status, these regressions suggest that the ethnicity effect for the Stokes voting pattern across white precincts is not a function of socio-economic factors. And the Wallace vote's positive association with "other ethnicities" is greatly enhanced by applying socio-economic controls.

Neighborhood Variables. Four neighborhood variables, combined with two related socio-economic variables, form the regression equations whose results are provided in Table 6-13. Similar to Boston, the Negro candidate does best in newer white districts with high turnover and relatively low home ownership. By contrast, Wallace thrives in older white districts with home ownership of relatively low-cost housing.

Nineteen Variable Regression Results. Table 6-14 presents the results of two regressions utilizing nineteen of the census variables. In contrast to the Boston findings, these larger analyses account for only a fourth of the Stokes variance and two-fifths of the Wallace variance across white precincts.

Yet the two votes present clearly diverse patterns, though not mirror-opposites of each other. Both ran weakest in areas with expensive homes and neighborhood stability. But Stokes received his strongest backing from

Table 6-12

Socio-Economic and Ethnicity Variables and Racially Related Votes Across White Precincts in Cleveland

Census Variables, 1960	Standardized Beta Weights for:	
	Stokes, 1967	Wallace, 1968
Median House Value	-.19	-.34
Median Gross Rent	+.01	-.09
Per cent Paying \$100-\$150 Rent	---	-.19
Per cent Family Income \$4,000 or Less	+.06	-.15
Median Years of Education	+.39	-.31
Per cent Females in the Labor Force	-.18	---
Per cent Households with One Car	---	+.25
Per cent Craftsmen and Foremen in the Labor Force	-.11	+.02
Per cent British-American[1]	-.02	.00
Per cent Polish-American	-.19	-.03
Per cent Czech-American	+.13	-.13
Per cent Jewish-American	+.15	-.15
Per cent Other Ethnicities	-.26	+.28
Multiple Correlation (R)	= .50	.62
Percentage of Voting Variance Across Precincts Predicted (R^2)	= 25%	39%

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[1] Defined as in Table 6-3.

Table 6-13

Neighborhood Variables and Racially Related Votes Across White Precincts in Cleveland

Neighborhood Variables	Standardized Beta Weights for: Stokes, 1967	Wallace, 1968
Median House Value	-.09	-.33
Per cent Females in Labor Force	-.02	+.03
Per cent Same Residence Since 1955	-.18	+.02
Per cent Dwellings Owner Occupied	-.18	+.24
Per cent of Children in Public Schools	-.08	+.14
Per cent of Buildings Built Before 1940	+.37	-.35
Multiple Correlation (R)	= .35	.49
Percentage of Voting Variance Across Precincts Predicted (R^2)	= 13%	24%

Table 6-14

Nineteen Variable Regression Results on Racially Related Votes Across White Precincts in Cleveland

Census Variables, 1960	Standardized Beta Weights for: Stokes, 1967	Standardized Beta Weights for: Wallace, 1968
Socio-Economic Variables		
Median Housing Value	-.24	-.35
Median Gross Rent	+.01	-.06
Per cent Paying \$100-\$150 Rent	+.09	-.11
Per cent Family Income \$4,000 or Less	+.12	-.11
Per cent Family Income \$4,000-\$9,000	+.11	+.20
Per cent Family Income \$15,000 or More	+.16	+.01
Median Years of Education	+.29	-.27
Per cent Females in the Labor Force	-.14	+.02
Per cent Households with One Car	.00	+.20
Per cent Craftsmen and Foremen in the Labor Force	-.05	-.06
Ethnicity Variables		
Per cent British-Americans[1]	+.02	.00
Per cent Polish-Americans	-.14	-.02
Per cent Czech-Americans	+.18	-.12
Per cent Jewish-Americans	+.08	-.16
Per cent Other Ethnicities	-.20	+.35
Neighborhood Variables		
Per cent Same Residence Since 1955	-.16	-.17
Per cent of Dwellings Owner Occupied	-.10	+.11

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[1] Defined as in Table 6-3.

Table 6-14 (continued)

Census Variables, 1960		Standardized Beta Weights for:	
		Stokes, 1967	Wallace, 1968
Neighborhood Variables			
Per cent of Children in Public Schools		-.08	+.06
Per cent of Buildings Built Before 1940		+.13	-.06
Multiple Correlation (R)	=	.52	.64
Percentage of Voting Variance Across Precincts Predicted (R^2)	=	27%	41%

precincts boasting well-educated residents and reasonably new buildings; while Wallace received his from precincts boasting middle-income families with one car, poorly-educated residents, and ethnic concentrations other than Czech- and Jewish-Americans. The negative beta weight for the housing value variable in the Stokes regression is the only major deviation from the Boston results; and even this difference is the direct result of a structural difference between the two elections -- non-partisan in Boston, intensely partisan in Cleveland. Such remarkable consistency encourages us to analyze a third city, Gary, where comparable election data are available.

Voting Analyses in Gary

Richard Hatcher had become a publicized member of the City Council before he entered the race for mayor of Gary, Indiana in 1967. He initially defeated the incumbent mayor to gain the Democratic Party nomination. And he narrowly won over his white Republican opponent in November of 1967 in a bitter and tense election. The Democratic Committee of Lake County openly opposed Hatcher and the United States Department of Justice had to intervene in the closing days of the contest in order to ensure a reasonably fair election. Thus, it is difficult to determine how well he did among white voters; it appears, however, that he obtained between fifteen and seventeen per cent.

The Gary election differs, too, from the other races studied. Like Stokes, Hatcher ran for "captain of the ship" in a partisan campaign against a single opponent. But unlike Stokes, he had an electorate in which Negroes approached half and an opponent who had not previously run for political office and was little-known. Unlike Boston and Cleveland, Gary is almost entirely a heavy industry city and had 29 per cent of its labor force in 1960 in skilled blue collar occupations. In addition, Gary is a much smaller city than either Boston or Cleveland, with only 55 white precincts for our analysis.

The small number of white precincts limits our analysis in a number of ways. We cannot, as with the Cleveland data, produce 19-variable regressions for there would be but three units for each variable. Indeed, even in the smaller regressions, the beta weights will be considerably more unstable with larger "standard errors"-- though the concept of "standard error" becomes difficult to interpret when we are dealing with the entire universe of white precincts in Gary rather than a sample. We shall return to this issue as we discuss the Gary results.

Table 6-15 gives the zero-order correlations between the census variables and the Hatcher and Wallace votes in Gary's white precincts. Note the generally higher coefficients, especially the extremely close relationships between both votes and the lower-middle-class indicator of percentage of craftsmen and foremen in the labor force. Note, too, the difference in the signs of the coefficients for the two votes in all save a few of the variables, suggesting a more nearly mirror-image relationship between them than found in either Boston or Cleveland. In general, these zero-order correlations bear out the patterns with which we have become familiar in the previously considered cities: the Negro candidate does best among white precincts in the more prosperous, well-educated, mobile and Jewish areas; Wallace does best in the middle-income and poorly educated areas.

Socio-Economic Variables. Table 6-16 provides more detail by supplying the regression results on nine socio-economic variables for the two contests. The most striking features are the close predictions achieved for both races in marked contrast with the Cleveland results. Several of the components already mentioned underlie this phenomenon. One,, of course, involves the different number of white precincts in the two cities. On purely mathematical grounds, the probability is that a nine-way regression equation will explain the variance in a 55 point set better than in a 508 point set.[12] Secondly, the

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[12] There are statistical techniques which would allow inter-city comparisons independent of set size. But we are primarily interested in intra-city comparisons between the precinct bases of support for Negro candidates and Wallace, a purpose for which our form of analysis is ideally suited, as well as the patterns across cities.

Another method of determining the relative power of multiple regression equations across cities which yields different results should be cited here. We can inspect the standardized mean square deviations from the predictions in the two cities. In Cleveland for the Stokes vote, the mean square deviation from the socio-economic effects (Table 6-10) is only .0016, while it reaches .0076 in Gary for the Hatcher vote. This would make it appear that the prediction in Cleveland, rather than Gary, is actually

Table 6-15

Zero-Order Pearsonian Correlations of Twenty-two Census Variables with Racially Related Votes Across White Precincts in Gary

Census Variables, 1960	Voting Patterns Across White Precincts for: Richard Hatcher for Mayor, 1967	George Wallace for President, 1968
Socio-Economic Variables		
Median House Value	+.45	-.54
Median Gross Rent	-.40	+.20
Per cent Paying $100-$150 Rent	-.46	+.45
Per cent Family Income $4,000 or Less	+.27	-.21
Per cent Family Income $4,000-$9,000	-.53	+.72
Per cent Family Income $15,000 or More	+.46	-.66
Median Years of Education	+.35	-.58
Per cent Adults with 8 Years Education or Less	-.13	+.17
Per cent Females in the Labor Force	+.50	-.57
Per cent Households with One Car	-.41	+.24
Per cent Households with Two Cars	-.14	+.22
Per cent Craftsmen and Foremen in the Labor Force	-.72	+.75
Ethnicity Variables		
Per cent British-American[1]	+.71	-.64
Per cent Polish-American	-.50	+.41
Per cent Czech-American	-.37	+.08
Per cent Jewish-American	+.51	-.50
Per cent Other Ethnicities	-.04	-.14

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[1] Defined as in Table 6-3.

Table 6-15 (continued)

Census Variables, 1960	Voting Patterns Across White Precincts for: Richard Hatcher for Mayor, 1967	Voting Patterns Across White Precincts for: George Wallace for President, 1968
Neighborhood Variables		
Per cent Same Residence Since 1939	+.05	+.09
Per cent Same Residence Since 1955	-.22	-.13
Per cent of Dwellings Owner Occupied	-.10	+.08
Per cent of Children in Public Schools	-.53	+.67
Per cent of Buildings Built before 1940	+.34	+.33

Table 6-16

Socio-Economic Variables and Racially Related Votes Across White Precincts in Gary

Socio-Economic Variables	Standardized Beta Weights for:	
	Hatcher, 1967	Wallace, 1968
Median House Value	-.01	-.60
Median Gross Rent	-.39	-.21
Per cent Paying Rent $100-$150	-.39	+.41
Per cent Family Income $4,000 or Less	+.02	-.01
Per cent Family Income $15,000 or More	+.02	+.01
Median Years of Education	-.17	-.59
Per cent Females in the Labor Force	-.07	+.16
Per cent Households with One Car	.00	-.21
Per cent Craftsmen and Foremen in the Labor Force	-.59	+.32
Multiple Correlation (R)	=.82	.69
Percentage of Voting Variance Across Precincts Predicted (R^2)	= 66%	48%

relative absence of the top strata of whites from central city Cleveland is relatively less true of Gary, where a small, prosperous northeast section overlooking Lake Michigan remains. This means that the variances of the socio-economic variables are less attenuated in Gary, and this allows genuinely higher zero-order correlations to enter into the regression analyses (compare Table 6-15 with 6-9).

The Wallace pattern in Table 6-16 looks familiar. Relatively strong Wallace precincts are typified by low-cost housing and poorly educated residents in such lower-middle-class employment categories as craftsmen and foremen. Yet the high and negative beta weight for housing value requires comment, for this variable proved of little significance in Cleveland. The answers lie in the contrasting patterns of home ownership in the two Great Lakes cities. In Cleveland, home ownership is concentrated in the lower-middle class, whose disproportionate support of Wallace destroyed all chances for a strong linear effect for housing value. In Gary, home ownership is more evenly spread from the working class all the way through the upper-middle class, and this makes possible the strong beta weight for housing value in the Wallace regression of Table 6-16. We will shortly observe, however, a change of sign in this variable when ethnicity is controlled (Table 6-19).

The Hatcher results, however, contain some surprises. Though its zero-order correlation with the Hatcher vote was clearly positive (+.35, Table 6-15) as in Boston and Cleveland, education now has a negative beta weight. And both of the rent beta weights are also negative. A clue to the riddle is the powerfully negative beta weight for

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superior. But this is caused in large part by the difference in the number of precincts in the two cities which works against Gary, because it leads to far fewer degrees of freedom in the computation of that city's mean square deviation.

In the absence, then, of clear-cut rules for comparing variance explained, we can only note the problems involved and make clear the procedures we employed. The critical concern throughout this chapter and volume, however, is not the level of prediction so much as understanding the pattern and process underlying racial phenomena and their change.

the craftsman and foreman variable, a factor that did not prove of importance in either of the studied Cleveland elections (Table 6-14). And observe the trivial beta weights for low and high income areas. Considered together, these results suggest that once again we have a curvilinear effect for socio-economic variables: the greatest white opposition to Negro candidates for high office centers in the upper-status working class precincts where Wallace runs strongest; while greater white support derives from poorer precincts and particularly richer areas.

Table 6-17 highlights this curvilinear trend for income alone. While the zero-order correlation between mean income alone and the Hatcher vote across white precincts is only -.03, the regression analysis of Table 6-17 accounts for over a third of the variance by considering three groups of lowest, medium, and highest income. Note, too, that despite his running as a partisan Democrat, Hatcher did somewhat better in higher-income areas than lower-income ones -- though the open opposition of local white Democratic leaders may have made this effect possible. Figure 6-1 graphically illustrates the 1967 Hatcher vote with income relationship across white precincts.[13]

Once this unusually strong curvilinear effect is understood, the Hatcher results in Table 6-16 are more easily interpreted. It explains the highly negative beta weight for the percentage of craftsmen and foremen, whose areas fall in the middle of the income distribution. And it explains as well the reasonably high and negative beta weights for the renting variables, for home ownership is the rule among Hatcher's more prosperous areas of strength while his poorer areas of support tend to rent and pay less than the lower-middle-class. The negative education beta weight, like the trivial relationship of families receiving $15,000 or more, is traceable to the partisan nature of the election, the powerful effect of the craftsmen and

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[13] Figure 6-1 portrays a second degree equation fitted by the method of least squares. While the linear term of the polynomial regression accounts for virtually none of the variance of the Hatcher vote, the quadratic term accounts for 27 per cent. This provides convincing evidence of the sharply curvilinear relationship between the Hatcher vote and income.

Table 6-17

Income Effects on the Hatcher Vote Across White Precincts in Gary

Income Variables	Hatcher Vote by White Precincts	
	Correlations	Standardized Beta Weights
Per cent Family Income $4,000 or Less	+.27	+.37
Per cent Family Income $4,000-$9,000	-.53	-.12
Per cent Family Income $15,000 or More	+.46	+.44

Multiple Correlation (R)	=	.60
Percentage of Voting Variance Across Precincts Predicted (R^2)	=	36%

Figure 6-1

Fitted Second-Degree Curve Between Income and 1967 Hatcher Vote in Gary



foreman variable and its association with high school education, and a close relationship in Gary between education and income. Likewise, the tiny beta weight of house value is a function of being entered into the same regression analysis with the craftsmen and foremen variable with which it correlates -.76.

Ethnicity Variables. The standardized beta weights on both the Hatcher and Wallace elections for the same five ethnicity variables utilized in Cleveland are shown in Table 6-18. While the British-American variable includes too small a segment of Gary's population to yield trustworthy results, its result and that of Jewish-American areas is consistent with our previous ethnicity findings. The particular opposition of the latter precincts to Wallace is also in line with our earlier results. "Other ethnicities" operates differently in Gary than in Cleveland but it is comprised of a different mix of groups. As in Boston, it again refers in large part to pockets of heavy Puerto Rican concentration; and as with Atkins, Puerto Rican precincts backed Hatcher.

The major contrast with Cleveland involves the two Eastern European groups, the Polish-American and the Czech-American areas. Recall in Cleveland that the Polish precincts tended to vote against Stokes while indicating no trend in regards to Wallace; and the Czech precincts tended to support Stokes relatively well while going against Wallace, especially in precincts shared with Polish residents. Table 6-18, however, shows a sharply different pattern for Gary. Polish areas in Gary favored Wallace with no trend in the Hatcher election. And Czech areas appeared neutral to Wallace but highly anti-Hatcher. Before we discuss these trends, though, we should first check to see how much they are a function of social class.

Table 6-19 provides the beta weights on each of the Gary regressions for six socio-economic and five ethnicity variables -- about as large a regression analysis as 55 observations will allow. As in Boston and Cleveland, both the socio-economic and ethnic variables retain their independent importance even after being placed together in the same regression. Put differently, both social class and ethnicity remain important in racially relevant elections even when there are controls made for the rival set of variables.

Still, there are some shifts to be noted in Table 6-19. The most dramatic is the role of house value in the Wallace analysis, which has shifted from a beta weight of -.60 in Table 6-16 to +.52 in Table 6-19. This affords a

Table 6-18

Ethnicity Variables and Racially Related Votes Across White Precincts in Gary

Ethnicity Variables	Standardized Beta Weights for:	
	Hatcher, 1967	Wallace, 1968
Per cent British-American[1]	+.49	-.51
Per cent Polish-American	.00	+.32
Per cent Czech-American	-.73	+.03
Per cent Jewish-American	+.20	-.58
Per cent Other Ethnicites	+.62	-.21
Multiple Correlation (R) =	.74	.69
Percentage of Voting Variance Across Precincts Predicted (R^2) =	55%	48%

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[1] Defined as in Table 6-3.

Table 6-19

Socio-Economic and Ethnicity Variables and Racially Related Votes Across White Precincts in Gary

Census Variables, 1960	Standardized Beta Weights for:	
	Hatcher, 1967	Wallace, 1968
Median House Value	+.04	+.52
Median Gross Rent	+.12	-.10
Per cent Families Income $4,000 or Less	-.01	-.26
Median Years of Education	-.24	-.52
Per cent Females in the Labor Force	-.11	+.43
Per cent Craftsmen and Foremen in the Labor Force	-.43	+.36
Per cent British-American[1]	+.47	.00
Per cent Polish-American	+.13	+.38
Per cent Czech-American	-.39	-.18
Per cent Jewish-American	+.16	-.12
Per cent Other Ethnicities	-.02	-.17
Multiple Correlation (R) =	.75	.70
Percentage of Voting Variance Across Precincts Predicted (R^2) =	56%	49%

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[1] Defined as in Table 6-3.

vivid example of the instability of our beta weights given the small number of Gary's white precincts. It is the result of the clustering of British and Jewish precincts at the upper end of the housing value continuum and the Polish and Czech precincts at the lower end, so that ethnicity controls have a marked effect on the variable. Witness also that in the Hatcher analysis the median gross rent variable shifted from -.39 to +.12 with ethnicity controls. This trend suggests that Hatcher's white vote in 1967 goes up somewhat with increasing rents within the same ethnic area. Finally, the British and Jewish effects on the Wallace vote are drastically reduced for they were largely socio-economic in origin.

The Polish- and Czech-American factors have even more puzzling outcomes than before the class controls. Now the Polish areas appear disproportionately to favor both candidates while Czech areas appear disproportionately to oppose them both. And this despite the fact that the original zero-order correlation with the Hatcher vote for the Polish variable (-.50) was more negative than that for the Czech variable (-.37). The problem of understanding these results is aided by realizing that in Gary, and to a lesser extent in Cleveland, Polish and Czech areas overlap extensively (+.70). Indeed, so extensively that it is difficult to pull out one from the other and to discuss them separately. These crude aggregate data suggest that Polish-American voters in Gary of comparable social status are more likely to vote against Hatcher in areas which they share with Czech-Americans than Polish-Americans living in virtually all-Polish areas.[14]

Thus, while the ethnic enclave in Cleveland seemed to be casting its ballots more in terms of race than comparable mixed ethnic areas, just the opposite seems to be the case for Gary. Perhaps, ethnicity and its enclaves have contrasting meanings in the two cities. One possibility is that the persistent finding in all three cities that white opposition is centered in the lower-middle-class is more important than ethnic enclaves. If this were true, what is critical here may be whether or not lower-middle-class ethnics are found disproportionately inside or outside of the homogeneous ethnic neighborhoods. Indeed, as such a possibility would require, younger, high-level blue-collar ethnic workers in Gary do reside in large numbers in a post-World War II area of mixed-ethnic, middle-income housing in South Gary. This could explain the difference with the Cleveland findings. At any rate, these different trends do point to a fascinating contextual problem which can be untangled only at the survey and individual level.

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[14] This inference was later verified by the project's survey data in Gary. Likewise, the opposite inference for Cleveland was also verified by the project's survey data.

Neighborhood Variables. Another view of this issue is provided in Table 6-20. Two socio-economic variables, house value and median rent, are combined with the basic four neighborhood variables. Relevant to the possibility that the lower-middle-class factor is dominant in importance, note that Hatcher's white vote is strongest in old neighborhoods where more of the children attend private schools. This is precisely the opposite pattern from the Atkins and Stokes results in Boston and Cleveland. Again the suggestion from the data is that the importance and even the direction of the effects of these variables is determined in large part by what the characteristics of the white lower-middle-class precincts are in each particular city studied.

Summary of Findings

These ecological analyses of racially related voting in three northern cities have yielded findings which now allow us to establish a general perspective within which to place our northern survey findings of the next two chapters. Despite minor fluctuations in results due to differences in ecological patterns between the cities, the twenty tables of this chapter have shown the following consistencies:

(1) Lower-middle-class precincts, especially those where such upper-level working-class whites as craftsmen and foremen concentrate, are prone to support white opponents of Negro candidates and George Wallace for president.

(2) Areas with better-educated residents and relatively high turn-over tend to provide Negro candidates with better-than-average electoral backing and Wallace with less-than-average backing.

(3) Ethnicity and ethnic enclaves present a complex pattern. Jewish-American precincts consistently favor Negro candidates and reject Wallace more than other white precincts, while just the opposite effect appears among the

Table 6-20

Neighborhood Variables and Racially Related Votes Across White Precincts in Gary

Neighborhood Variables	Standardized Beta Weights for: Hatcher, 1967	Standardized Beta Weights for: Wallace, 1968
Median Housing Value	+.13	-.25
Median Gross Rent	-.27	+.24
Per cent Same Residence Since 1955	-.44	-.04
Per cent of Dwellings Owner Occupied	-.08	-.03
Per cent of Children in Public Schools	-.49	+.57
Per cent of Buildings Built before 1940	+.40	-.81
Multiple Correlation (R) =	.76	.67
Percentage of Voting Variance Across Precincts Predicted (R^2) =	58%	45%

precincts of the ethnic groups which are dominant in their cities (the Irish-American precincts in Boston and precincts with Eastern European-Americans in Cleveland and Gary). Eastern European enclaves are more likely than mixed ethnic areas to allow race to influence voting in Cleveland but less likely in Gary.

(4) The voting patterns of the three Negro candidates studied and those of Wallace, while direct contrasts in many ways, are not simple mirror reflections of each other. Generally speaking, socio-economic variables prove more important in predicting the Wallace votes, while ethnicity variables prove more important in predicting the votes of Negro candidates for high office.

Now we turn in Chapters Seven and Eight to a consideration of many of these aggregate trends at the individual level by utilizing survey data in Gary and Cleveland and across the urban North.

Chapter Seven

Northern Racial Attitudes

The most persistent and interesting ecological finding of the last chapter was the greater support for George Wallace and smaller support for Negro candidates in white areas of lower-middle-class status. But once again, in order to avoid the ecological fallacy, we need survey data on individuals to pinpoint the phenomenon precisely. This chapter will explore this aspect of northern racial attitudes by: (1) looking closely at the Wallace voters in Gary, Indiana; (2) broadening our analysis further with survey data from Cleveland, Ohio; and, finally, (3) checking to see who favors "local control" of public schools among both whites and Negroes in Cleveland and how this relates to racial attitudes.

The Wallace Phenomenon in Gary

During October of 1968, 257 male voters who were representative of nine of Gary, Indiana's white precincts were interviewed.[1] Our overall survey figures reveal that Gary is indeed the place to study the northern wing of the Wallace phenomenon. While 42 per cent of the white male respondents favored Nixon and 28 per cent Humphrey, another 30 per cent backed Wallace -- a figure twice that found for the Alabamian among northern white males by pre-election national surveys. The Gary figure among white voters of both sexes in the actual election the month after the survey was approximately 22 per cent, lowered undoubtedly by females in the electorate not interviewed in our all-male study and by strenuous union efforts for Humphrey in the campaign's final weeks.[2]

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[1] The project directly designed the schedule, drew the sample, and analyzed the data of this study. But all interviewing was performed by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago. We especially wish to thank Mrs. Eve Weinberg of N.O.R.C. for her extensive and competent help.

[2] After carefully inspecting a number of post-election polls, Lipset and Raab (1970) conclude that Wallace tended to lose during the closing weeks of the campaign both working-class, union-member following in the North and middle-class following in the South.

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[2] After carefully inspecting a number of post-election polls, Lipset and Raab (1970) conclude that Wallace tended to lose during the closing weeks of the campaign both working-class, union-member following in the North and middle-class following in the South.

Just as our ecological data suggested, those who favored the Southerner were not in any sense marginal members of the Gary community. Table 7-1 compares the backers of the three candidates. Note that Wallace did disproportionately well among the young and middle-aged, those with some high school training, blue-collar workers, labor union members, and those of moderate family incomes.[3] He did poorly among the old and those with either quite low or high family incomes. Indeed, those with annual family incomes between $7,500 and $10,000 were six times more likely to prefer Wallace than those with family incomes under $5,000 (48.5 to 8.1 per cent)! By contrast, the truly poor favored Humphrey and the well-off Nixon, though both the Democratic and Republican followings ranged far more widely over the social spectrum than that of the American Independent Party. Note, too, that the Wallace following was greatest among Protestants and self-designated political "independents."[4]

Of special interest are the findings on "subjective social class" consisting of the social class identifications which the survey respondents apply to themselves. The results summarized in Table 7-1 reveal that Wallace was not only stronger among the self-identified "working class" than the "middle class," but was especially popular among those who "felt close to the working class." At the extremes, a respondent in our sample who was strongly identified with the working class was three times more likely to prefer Wallace than a respondent who was strongly identified with the middle class (43.7 to 14.5 per cent). Clearly, then, the Wallace "true

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[3] The variables listed in Table 7-1 all proved more important than ethnicity, about which much was made by many popular writers at the time.

[4] Despite the greater favorability toward Wallace of Gary's white Protestants, southern-reared respondents comprise only a small fraction of the sample's support for the Alabamian. The Protestant Wallacite was typically from a small town or farm in the Mid-West, a fact consistent with the emphasis upon fundamentalism; but observe that the religion finding conflicts with the mass media view that it was primarily Roman Catholic ethnics who backed Wallace in the North.

Table 7-1

Personal Characteristics and Candidate Preference in Gary, Indiana, 1968

	Wallace Supporters	Nixon Supporters	Humphrey Supporters	Total
Total Sample (245)[1]	29.8%	42.0%	28.2%	100%
Age				
20-35 (young) (67)	38.8	38.8	22.4	100%
36-55 (middle-aged) (105)	37.1	42.9	20.0	100%
56+ (old) (73)	11.0	43.8	45.2	100%
Education				
Grade School (45)	18.2	36.4	45.5	100%
Some High School (41)	43.9	26.8	29.3	100%
High School Graduate (80)	36.2	40.0	23.7	100%
College (67)	23.9	58.2	17.9	100%

(continued)

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[1] The numbers in parentheses refer to the absolute number of respondents in each row. Though the total number interviewed was 257, 12 men expressed no candidate preference and are thus excluded from these analyses.

Table 7-1 (continued)

	Wallace Supporters	Nixon Supporters	Humphrey Supporters	Total
Occupation				
Blue Collar (155)	38.0	31.7	30.3	100%
White Collar (87)	12.6	62.2	25.2	100%
Union Membership				
Yes (142)	38.5	32.5	29.0	100%
No (101)	16.8	56.4	26.7	100%
Income				
Less than $5,000 (37)	8.1	35.1	56.8	100%
$5,000-$7,500 (54)	31.5	38.9	29.6	100%
$7,500-$10,000 (64)	48.5	32.8	18.7	100%
$10,000-$15,000 (56)	28.6	44.6	26.8	100%
$15,000 and over (22)	9.1	68.2	22.7	100%
Religion				
Protestant (111)	36.0	45.0	18.9	100%
Roman Catholic (104)	26.0	38.5	35.6	100%

(continued)

Table 7-1 (continued)

	Wallace Supporters	Nixon Supporters	Humphrey Supporters	Total
Party				
Democrats (113)	26.5	22.1	51.3	100%
Independents (81)	42.0	45.7	12.3	100%
Republicans (48)	12.5	85.4	2.1	100%
Subjective Social Class				
Working (133)	39.8	30.8	29.3	100%
Middle (111)	18.0	55.9	26.1	100%
Class Identification				
Strong Working (87)	43.7	31.0	25.3	100%
Weak Working (45)	33.3	28.9	37.8	100%
Strong Middle (69)	14.5	55.1	30.4	100%
Weak Middle (39)	23.1	59.9	17.9	100%

believers" in Gary are "solid citizens," reflecting an image similar to that we have already gleaned from precinct analyses.

Consistent with the "solid citizen" view is their political involvement. Among those who report having worn campaign buttons, cluttered their cars with a candidate's bumper stickers, donated money to a political campaign, or worked actively for a candidate, Wallacites are over-represented -- contrary to the popular alienation description. Moreover, they reported the most interest in local and national politics of the three groups of voters. Yet Table 7-2 reveals that on each of the four "political alienation" statements those who agreed were somewhat more likely to be Wallace supporters than those who disagreed. But the contradiction is more apparent than real. It may well be that Wallace's candidacy itself had stimulated by the time of our October survey political activity and interest among his supporters, while their detachment from "public officials" and "the government" as suggested by Table 7-2 remained high. In any event, we shall soon see that control of an additional social psychological variable largely eliminates the differences between American Independent Party backers and other voters on the items listed in Table 7-2.

Three other psychological variables prove more predictive of the Wallace following -- feelings of fear and distrust, anti-Negro prejudice, and relative deprivation. Table 7-3 summarizes the results on the first of these dimensions. Note that in each of the five statements, those with fearful suspicions were far more likely to favor the Alabamian than those without them.[5] Thus, disproportionate Wallace strength is found among those who believed that the assassinations of national leaders are planned by a group, that Communists and other outsiders are chiefly responsible for race riots, that race riots are likely to spread to their neighborhoods, that buses without a policeman are not safe, and that safety on the streets is the most important issue facing the nation.

Indeed, this pattern of perceiving conspiracies and hostility in the surrounding environment occurs frequently

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[5] When education is controlled, these differences in fear and distrust remain at each educational level.

Table 7-2

Political Alienation and Candidate Preference in Gary, 1968

Statement	Total Sample (245)	Wallace Supporters	Nixon Supporters	Humphrey Supporters	Total
		29.8%	42.0%	28.2%	100%
Public officials don't care what people like me think.					
Agree (123)		33.6	38.5	27.9	100%
Disagree (122)		26.1	44.5	29.4	100%
Politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.					
Agree (172)		32.9	35.9	31.2	100%
Disagree (73)		21.1	56.3	22.5	100%
People like me don't have anything to say about what the government does.					
Agree (100)		36.4	32.3	31.3	100%
Disagree (144)		25.7	48.6	25.7	100%
Voting is the only way that people like me can have a say about how the government runs things.					
Agree (183)		33.0	39.6	27.5	100%
Disagree (62)		21.3	49.2	29.5	100%

Table 7-3

Fear and Distrust

Statement Total Sample (245)	Wallace Supporters	Nixon Supporters	Humphrey Supporters	Total
Statement Total Sample (245)	29.8%	42.0%	28.2%	100%
Assassination of national leaders carefully planned by:				
A group (173)	36.8	33.5	29.7	100%
Individuals (72)	18.6	52.8	28.6	100%
The major cause of riots is:				
Social conditions (72)	11.1	46.3	42.6	100%
Local Negroes (23)	24.4	51.2	24.4	100%
Communists, outsiders (150)	38.7	37.2	24.1	100%
Violent riots spreading to their neighborhood are:				
Likely (135)	36.8	36.1	27.1	100%
Very unlikely (110)	21.6	49.6	28.8	100%
Buses are not safe these days without a policeman.				
Agree (173)	36.6	37.3	26.1	100%
Disagree (72)	17.7	46.8	35.5	100%

(continued)

Table 7-3 (continued)

	Wallace Supporters	Nixon Supporters	Humphrey Supporters	Total
Safety on the streets is the most important issue facing America now.				
Agree (193)	34.0	39.3	26.7	100%
Disagree (52)	15.4	50.0	34.6	100%

throughout the history of American politics. Richard Hofstadter, the noted social historian, describes the syndrome in his work, The Paranoid Style in American Politics:

> Paranoid spokesmen in politics see the hostile and conspirational world directed against a nation or culture. . . .His sense of political passions is unselfish and patriotic, in fact, goes far to intensify his feelings of righteousness and moral indignation.[6]

Viewing the world in this manner characterized the perspectives of many previous marginal groups in the American political past: the Free-Masons, the Know-Nothings, the Populists, the Coughlinites, and the Joseph McCarthyites.

Table 7-4 extends this analysis by providing a similar pattern of findings. The general fears and suspicions of Wallacites often seize specifically upon racial concerns. They are more numerous among those who did not believe that Negroes are as intelligent as whites -- the classical racist belief in Caucasian genetic superiority; and among those more willing to discriminate against their black fellow-citizens in housing, schools, and face-to-face contact. Furthermore, Wallace supporters are disproportionately included among those who report that they had not visited socially with Negroes recently; and they were two-and-a-half times more likely to agree that "police should shoot to kill" to prevent looting during a riot.

As in the South, there was in the North in addition to blatant anti-Negro attitudes a large degree of generalized protest in "the Wallace phenomenon." Only a minority of the Alabamian's adherents believed he could actually win the presidency. And many of these men had voted earlier in 1968 in Indiana's Democratic Party presidential primary for Eugene McCarthy. Though almost a complete reversal of Wallace in ideological position, McCarthy offered these threatened men what they wanted -- a critic of the establishment with a vague program and a refreshingly different style that broke the old political rules. And Wallace, coming from the other direction, offered them much the same.

This protest element in the Wallace movement led us to predict in print throughout the campaign that the

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[6] Richard Hofstadter (1965), p. 4.

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Table 7-4

Racial Concerns

Statement	Total Sample (245)	Wallace Supporters	Nixon Supporters	Humphrey Supporters	Total
		29.8%	42.0%	28.2%	100%
Negroes are as intelligent as white people.					
Agree (174)		26.8	42.2	31.0	100%
Disagree (71)		40.0	38.6	21.4	100%
Whites have a right to keep Negroes out of their neighborhood.					
Agree (145)		37.1	38.6	24.3	100%
Disagree (100)		18.5	45.6	35.9	100%
Best to keep Negroes in their own districts and schools.					
Agree (105)		35.2	32.4	32.4	100%
Disagree (140)		25.6	48.8	25.6	100%
Negroes shouldn't push themselves where they're not wanted.					
Agree (213)		33.8	37.3	28.9	100%
Disagree (32)		9.4	65.6	25.0	100%

(continued)

Table 7-4 (continued)

	Wallace Supporters	Nixon Supporters	Humphrey Supporters	Total
Would object to family member bringing Negro friend home to dinner:				
Very strongly (91)	41.3	33.7	25.0	100%
Maybe (45)	25.5	42.6	31.9	100%
Not at all (109)	20.8	49.5	29.7	100%
Would mind if Negro family with same income and education moved next door:				
A lot (67)	46.4	31.9	21.7	100%
Little (67)	26.5	44.1	29.4	100%
Not at all (111)	21.0	46.6	32.4	100%
When looting occurs during a riot, police should shoot to kill.				
Agree (145)	**40.4**	**39.7**	**19.9**	**100%**
Disagree (90)	**15.9**	**45.5**	**38.6**	**100%**

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ex-Governor would not do as well in the North at the ballot box as he was doing in the survey interview. This prediction proved accurate. Protest rendered in survey results is even safer than actually voting for a man who will probably not win. This is not a new phenomenon for third party candidates. In 1936, Father Coughlin's United Party presidential nominee, William Lemke, achieved as much as eight per cent in pre-election surveys, but only two per cent of the actual vote. Likewise, in 1948 Henry Wallace, running as a left-wing party candidate, gained nine per cent of survey respondents early in the campaign, but only two per cent of the November vote.

George Wallace did much better in 1968 than Lemke and Henry Wallace in large part because his ticket had a hard-core base in the deep South where its backing did not wither. But in the North, we anticipated shrinkage of his support. Though national polls registered as much as 22 per cent favoring him at his high point in the campaign, we correctly guessed his final total of 14 per cent on the basis of these considerations. To be sure, 14 per cent was no mean achievement for a southern politician running as a third-party candidate. But to understand its meaning and implications for the future of a democratic society, one must appreciate who these "true believers" are and what motivates them. And to achieve this appreciation, we need to search for yet another characteristic which predisposes them to favor the Alabama Governor.

Up to this point in our analysis, the social and psychological outlines of Wallace's followers in Gary appear in many ways to be in conflict. At the social level, the white males of Gary who favored the southern candidate were solidly and highly-identified working-class members with high school training and better-than-average incomes. Yet the psychological measures reveal them to be somewhat more politically alienated and considerably more fearful, distrustful, and anti-Negro -- all characteristics generally found most intense among the most ill-educated and poverty-stricken segments of the population, white and otherwise. Obviously, some additional social psychological component is missing from our analysis, a component which would clear up this apparent contradiction by linking the objectively fairly secure social position of the Wallace supporters with their subjectively insecure personality trends. We believe that this needed ingredient is a heightened sense of relative deprivation. For white working-class backers of Wallace in Gary, relative deprivation derives largely from perceiving other groups -- especially Negro Americans -- to be unfairly bettering their position relative to their's.

Table 7-5 presents relevant data. In sharp contrast with both the Nixon and Humphrey supporters, those who favored the Alabamian are far more likely to be among those who believed that the lot of "the average man is getting worse." And this psychological trend cannot be accounted for in terms of the social differences between the three types of voters that we have just been discussing. For each age, education, occupation, union membership, income, religion, political party, and social class identification category listed back in Table 7-1, Wallace's backers consistently tended to agree more frequently that "the average man's lot" is slipping. Table 7-5 provides these data for three of the variables -- union membership, religion, and class identification. And when social variables are combined with this powerful social psychological indicator, the Wallace phenomenon in Gary becomes brightly illuminated. Thus, 63 per cent of the respondents making between $7,500 and $10,000 annually who agreed with the relative deprivation statement favored the Alabamian; 57 per cent of the respondents who closely identified with the working class and agreed with the statement supported Wallace; and approximately half of the Protestants, the union members, and the men who had high school training who approved of the item sided with the Governor.

The strength of these relationships suggests we should re-analyze the other psychological variables while controlling for feelings of relative deprivation. When this is done, the small but consistent tendency back in Table 7-2 for Wallacites to appear more politically alienated virtually vanishes -- which indicates that relative deprivation is the more fundamental correlate. Similarly, control on relative deprivation for the fear and distrust findings of Table 7-3 narrows the differences though it does not eliminate them. And Table 7-6 reveals that prejudiced attitudes and the relative deprivation item both predict Wallace voting intentions, though the latter once again is the stronger. At the extremes of Table 7-6, observe that a highly-prejudiced respondent who believes that "the lot of the average man is getting worse" is four times as likely to be for the Southerner as a tolerant respondent who did not agree (48.3 to 12.0 per cent).

To sum up our psychological findings, then, the Wallace supporters among Gary's white males tend to be

Table 7-5

Relative Deprivation

	Wallace Supporters	Nixon Supporters	Humphrey Supporters	Total
Total Sample (245)	29.8%	42.0%	28.2%	100%
In spite of what some people say, the lot of the average man is getting worse, not better.				
Agree (118)	41.5	33.1	25.4	100%
Disagree (122)	18.9	49.2	32.0	100%
Union Members				
Agree (76)	47.3	30.2	22.5	100%
Disagree (63)	27.0	33.3	39.7	100%
Non-Members				
Agree (40)	27.5	40.0	32.5	100%
Disagree (59)	10.2	66.1	23.7	100%
Religion				
Protestants				
Agree (53)	50.9	34.0	15.1	100%
Disagree (45)	22.2	53.7	24.1	100%

(continued)

Table 7-5 (continued)

	Wallace Supporters	Nixon Supporters	Humphrey Supporters	Total
Roman Catholics				
Agree (53)	34.0	34.0	32.1	100%
Disagree (51)	17.6	43.1	39.2	100%
Social Class Identification				
Close to Working Class				
Agree (49)	57.1	18.4	24.5	100%
Disagree (36)	25.0	47.2	27.8	100%
Not Close to Working Class				
Agree (25)	36.0	36.0	28.0	100%
Disagree (20)	30.0	20.0	50.0	100%
Close to Middle Class				
Agree (27)	25.9	44.4	29.6	100%
Disagree (40)	7.5	60.0	32.5	100%
Not Close to Middle Class				
Agree (15)	26.7	60.9	13.3	100%
Disagree (23)	21.7	56.5	21.7	100%

Table 7-6

Anti-Negro Prejudice and Relative Deprivation

	Wallace Supporters	Nixon Supporters	Humphrey Supporters	Total
Total Sample (245)	29.8%	42.0%	28.2%	100%
High Anti-Negro Prejudice[1]:				
Agree that "lot of average man is getting worse" (62)	48.4	22.6	29.0	100%
Disagree (34)	23.0	42.3	34.7	100%
Moderate Anti-Negro Prejudice:				
Agree that "lot of average man is getting worse" (38)	36.8	44.7	18.5	100%
Disagree (38)	26.3	44.7	28.9	100%
Low Anti-Negro Prejudice:				
Agree that "lot of average man is getting worse" (18)	27.7	44.6	27.7	100%
Disagree (58)	12.0	55.1	32.7	100%

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[1] High, moderate, and low anti-Negro prejudice are measured by a multiple item scale formed by combining all of the statements save the last one of Table 7-4. For national results with a similar scale, the interested reader is referred to: T. Parsons and K. B. Clark (1966), pp. 303, 324.

more anti-Negro and distrustful than their peers. But primarily they reflect acute feelings of relative deprivation. They have typically done better than their fathers and are objectively fairly secure; but like Negro Americans, they have high aspirations without a sense of making progress toward their goals. Worse, they believe that Negroes and others are unjustly making rapid strides forward at their expense, helped out by a too-generous federal government that has forgotten them. Spontaneous comments make it clear that more than others in their position, the American Independent Party's faithful believed that they are victims of a national effort to aid through public welfare and Office of Economic Opportunity programs those who "refuse to work" while heavily taxing those who "have worked all their lives to get where they are now."

The bitter irony for our nation is that the same powerful social psychological mechanism -- relative deprivation -- is leading to racial strife on both sides of the color line. Negro Americans typically regard themselves as victims of injustice when they compare their still largely low status with that of other Americans (Pettigrew, 1964; 1967). Yet the white Wallace voters in Gary share much the same feeling. They understandably deduce from all the publicity about civil rights gains of the past decade that Negroes, in contrast with themselves, are in fact "making it big." Yet the hard truth is that most Negroes are not "making it" -- indeed, do not as a group approach the position of the threatened Wallace supporters in Gary.

This ironical situation, then, is a true measure of the extreme difficulty of our times. Thanks in part to an unwelcome and draining foreign war, thanks in part to the politician's natural bent to publicize and hail progress before it has been achieved, we find ourselves as a society in the 1970's in a "worst of both worlds" situation. On the one hand, many aspiring young members of the white working class are threatened and angry in the manner one might have expected had the nation actually delivered on its high promises to its Negro citizens. And on the other hand, many aspiring young Negroes are angry and frustrated because the nation did not in fact deliver to the Negro rank-and-file. The federal government, therefore, stands condemned as if it had actually made a lasting and significant difference for most Negro Americans; and equally condemned because it in fact did not make this difference. The United States finds itself thus caught in a vice of its own making, a vice which

Adlai Stevenson in the 1950's accurately labeled as "the age of rising expectations."

Relative Deprivation in Cleveland

If our emphasis upon relative deprivation is correct, its implications for future governmental policy are considerable. But this analysis from Gary survey data is based on only a one-item indicator of the critical phenomenon. Hence, we must press this analysis further by utilizing a wide variety of indicators of relative deprivation in surveys of both Negro and white residents of Cleveland.

In April and May of 1969, the project conducted two studies using somewhat different, hour-long schedules for the two racial samples. For the white study, representative samples were interviewed in 62 of Cleveland's precincts. All told, 488 whites were questioned in these precincts which were drawn randomly from among the 400 predominantly working-class white precincts of the city. Our white sample, then, is representative not of the total white population of the city but of whites who live in working-class white areas. This was done purposely in order to maximize the number of lower-middle-class respondents in the sample. But it is not as restrictive as it sounds. Cleveland is an overwhelmingly working-class city; thus 82 per cent (400 out of 485) of the white precincts are in fact predominantly working-class.

Similarly, the Negro sample numbers 400 respondents who are representative of 50 randomly-selected precincts out of the 325 Cleveland precincts with 75 per cent or more Negroes in their population. Our Negro sample, then, is representative not of the city's total Negro population but of Negroes who live in overwhelmingly Negro areas. This, too, is not as restrictive as it may sound, for the vast majority of Cleveland's Negroes reside in such neighborhoods. Taeuber and Taeuber (1965, p. 39) calculated for 1960 that 91 per cent of Cleveland's Negroes would have to move from an all-Negro block to a presently all-white one before the city would have a random racial distribution. And there is every reason to believe that this pattern of housing segregation has increased, not decreased, for central city Cleveland since 1960. We will employ only the white data in this section, but both samples will be utilized in the next section on attitudes toward parental control of schools.

The Relative Deprivation Concept. To expand on the "average man" item in the Gary study, the Cleveland study built on previous work on the critical concept of *relative deprivation*. The central notion is that individuals judge their own social standing and welfare in terms of comparing their lot with that of other individuals or groups. The job satisfaction of industrial workers, for example, can be explained in part in terms of a comparison process. Workers evaluate the following relationship:

$$\frac{\text{My Group Earnings}}{\text{Earnings of Other Occupational Groups}} \quad \text{compared to} \quad \frac{\text{Importance of My Group}}{\text{Importance of Other Groups}}$$

"Importance" is equivalent to the perceived investments of group members in such matters as type of work, skill, seniority, responsibility, and education. An inequality between the ratios to the disadvantage of the ingroup obviously breeds dissatisfaction and a sense of relative deprivation. Note that this formulation involves critical comparisons at the group level though the dissatisfaction is experienced at the individual level.

By contrast, Patchen (1961) explores social comparison processes at the individual level through the use of direct individual wage comparisons. He postulates comparisons of two dimensions: one a primary dimension with such attributes being compared as earnings, economic gains, and rates of improvement; the other a secondary dimension with such attributes as social status, education, seniority, and skill. Similar to the formulation above, Patchen offers the following equation as critical for the self-evaluation of workers:

$$\frac{\text{My Earnings}}{\text{Others' Earnings}} \quad \text{compared to} \quad \frac{\text{My Status}}{\text{Others' Status}}$$

When the comparer perceives the ratios of one side to be incongruent with the other, then a *perceived dissonant relationship* exists. This dissonance may generate either relative gratification or relative deprivation. Patchen specifies three types of relationships that will lead to dissatisfaction and relative deprivation:

(1) Comparisons with someone of the same or greater status earning disproportionately more.

(2) Comparisons with someone of inferior status earning more.

(3) Comparisons with someone of inferior status earning the same amount.

Adams (1965) treats similar relationships between individuals in terms of exchange theory. He maintains that the exchange between ego and alter will result in "equality" if the perceived ratio of ego's inputs (i.e., investments) to outcomes (i.e., pay, rewards) is incongruent with the perceived ratio of other's inputs to outcomes. Homans (1961) agrees by defining "injustice" as resulting in a dyad when the ratio of profits to investments are disproportional. And Adams (1965) notes that a state of relative deprivation prevails in this situation for the individual whose ratio of profits to investments is smaller.

Group comparisons, however, may be of greater significance than individual comparisons, for as Davis (1961) points out the latter include an individual's perception of the structure of society. When individuals compare their own economic gains with those of members of other groups, they are likely to sense equality or inequality relative to the status differences they perceive between their ingroup and the outgroup. To distinguish this type of comparison from that focused upon by Patchen and Adams, Runciman (1966) differentiates between fraternalistic and egoistic deprivation. Fraternalistic deprivation derives from a subjective feeling of a collective deprivation of a whole class or social stratum within the society; thus, it can be thought of as an individually experienced sense of group deprivation. Egoistic deprivation derives from the feeling of personal deprivation within one's own social group. Since these contrasting types of deprivation are theoretically independent, any combination of the two is possible.

Runciman's distinction is useful for the present analysis. Its importance rests on Runciman's contention that fraternalistic deprivation "plays the largest part in the transformation of an existing structure of social inequalities" (Runciman, 1966, p. 34). Reasonable as this argument sounds, it appears at first to be at variance with the extended formulations of Davis (1961). Relative gratification, Davis (1961) maintains, will be more frequent among the non-deprived within the deprived stratum. But Runciman's fraternalist is hardly gratified as a member of a deprived stratum, and is predicted to be the most dissatisfied with the existing social structure. The conflict between these formulations is at least in part resolved by the fact that Davis is defining the deprived stratum in *objective* terms, whereas Runciman and the present discussion begins with *subjective* comparisons. Another critical distinction involves the nature of the dependent variables. Davis was interested in accounting for such personal self-evaluations as occupational aspirations; Runciman was interested in perceived social justice across social classes in the United Kingdom. And similar to Runciman, we are focusing here on attitudes toward another group as well as voting behavior in elections involving racial considerations. In attempting to account for such distinctly collective behavior, it appears fruitful to follow Runciman and emphasize fraternalistic deprivation. We shall shortly see that this strategy is confirmed by the results.

Three conditions of relative deprivation at the group level can now be specified that are similar but not identical to those of Patchen's (1961) at the individual level:

(1) Comparisons with groups of the same status which are perceived to be earning more than the individual or his membership group. In the case where the group serving as a referent is also a membership group for the individual, then this condition is equivalent to Runciman's egoistic deprivation. In the terms of the present analysis, this case involves for white respondents the comparisons relative to whites as a group or his occupational group (e.g., blue-collar workers comparing their economic gains with those of blue-collar workers in general).

(2) Comparisons with non-membership groups of recognized higher status which are perceived to be earning disproportionately more than the individual or his membership group. This condition is one type of fraternalistic deprivation. In the present analysis, it arises when the white respondents rate their economic condition relative to occupational groups perceived to be of clearly higher social status (e.g., blue-collar workers comparing their economic gains with those of professionals in general).

(3) Comparisons with non-membership groups of recognized lower status which are perceived to be earning relatively more, the same, or absolutely more than the individual or his membership group. This condition constitutes the second type of fraternalistic deprivation. In the present analysis, it arises when the white respondents rate their economic condition relative to racial or occupational groups perceived to be of clearly lower social

status (e.g., skilled blue-collar white workers comparing their economic gains with those of Negroes in general or unskilled laborers in general).

These three conditions together outline a flexible general model of relative deprivation. The formulation is diagramed in Figure 7-1. For present purposes, the individual membership groups are the respondent's occupational group and his racial group (whites). Other groups provide sources for fraternalistic comparisons. Four occupational groups serve as sources of comparisons: professionals, white-collar workers, blue-collar workers, and unskilled laborers, along with two racial groups, whites and Negroes.

Two Types of Comparisons as Independent Variables. Two principal comparisons are relevant for our analysis. One involves the respondent's direct assessment of his *economic gains* versus those of a reference group. The other involves his degree of *satisfaction* with his economic gains relative to those he attributes to a reference group. Note that the satisfaction level is relative to a particular group rather than being an absolute judgment. And note that relative deprivation hypotheses can be tested equally well for both types of comparisons. Moreover, the differential salience of each type of comparison within each domain can be ascertained for different racial dependent variables as well as different occupational and sex subsets of the sample.[7]

The economic gains comparison is measured by the following item:

> Now I'd like to ask a few questions about your recent economic gains compared with those of several groups you know about.
>
> A. Would you say the economic gains of white-collar workers have been about the same, much greater than, greater than, or less than yours over the past five years?
> B. What about those of blue-collar workers?
> C. What about those of Negroes?
> D. What about professionals?
> E. Whites?
> F. Unskilled laborers?

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[7] In addition, relative deprivation was measured in the Cleveland study by ladder ratings of self and the six target groups, an item about whether each of the groups

Figure 7-1

Diagram of Relative Deprivation Model


Higher status group comparisons
upward fraternalistic comparisons
Membership group comparisons
Egoistic comparisons
Individual's membership group
Equal status fraternalistic comparisons
Non-membership group comparisons
downward fraternalistic comparisons
Lower status group comparisons

Satisfaction with comparative economic gains is measured by the following item:

> Tell me, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your economic gains compared to those of. . .
>
> A. White-collar workers?
> B. Blue-collar workers?
> C. Negroes?
> D. Professionals?
> E. Whites?
> F. Unskilled laborers?

We shall find that this straightforward question proves not only useful in the present analysis but critically important in the next section in accounting for strong support of a minority of whites for the parental control of schools.

The Condition of the Average Man Item. We also asked the Cleveland samples the simple Likert item which predicted Wallace support so well in Gary: "In spite of what some say, the condition of the average man is getting worse, not better." This item was originally introduced into the social science literature by Srole as a measure of "anomie"; yet we interpreted the Gary results with it in terms of relative deprivation. Was this interpretation justified? The Cleveland data allow a relevant test of this question by relating the "average man" measure to the two new items. The multiple correlation of all twelve comparisons with the "average man" item for the entire sample is +.509, with a range among five sub-samples from +.418 (blue-collar females) to +.628 (white-collar workers). In all cases, the satisfaction comparisons relate more to the average man question than the economic gains comparisons, with the highest relationships generally rendered by the fraternalistic satisfaction comparisons rather than the egoistic ones. The average man item, then, does tap feelings of relative deprivation, especially those aspects involved with anxiety generated by the dissatisfaction with economic gains in comparison with those of salient non-membership groups of reference.

But "the average man" question may well relate to

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was "entitled to" their economic gains, and past, present, and future ladder ratings of self as to personal standing. None of these measures proved nearly as effective in our analyses as the two items cited.

other feelings, perhaps those of global optimism or pessimism about the current state of the average man as well as a sense of absolute satisfaction. Its correlations with the Wallace vote for the white male sample in Gary was +.361 and for the white sample in Cleveland was +.219.[8] And even when entered in regressions to predict Wallace voting in Cleveland sub-samples after all of the social comparison items, status rankings, and an absolute satisfaction item had been entered, "the average man" item still generated a significant beta weight among white-collar workers (+.293), unskilled males (+.161), and unskilled females (+.254).[9] These beta weights indicate that this interesting single Likert-type statement is also tapping either feelings other than relative deprivation, aspects of relative deprivation not otherwise measured by the social comparison questions, or both.

Four Indicators of Racial Attitudes and Behavior as Dependent Variables. The two social comparison questions are new attempts to operationalize the relative deprivation models more effectively than the older ladder measures of Cantril (1965), for they allow explicit specification of the dimensions deemed relevant by Homans (1961), Patchen (1961), Adams, (1965), Runciman (1966), and Pettigrew (1967). And further specification of the model is achieved by separate analyses not only for the total sample but five sub-sets of the sample with enough respondents to warrant meaningful regressions: white-collar workers and their families, blue-collar males, blue-collar females or wives of blue-collar workers, unskilled males, and unskilled females or wives of unskilled workers.[10]

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[8] For five sub-sets of the Cleveland white sample, these correlations between the "average man" item and the Wallace vote were: white-collar workers, +.356; blue-collar males, +.141; blue-collar females, +.061; unskilled males, +.203; and unskilled females, +.192. The smaller relationships in Cleveland than in Gary are probably a function of less variance in Wallace voting in Cleveland (17 per cent favored Wallace compared to 30 per cent in Gary) as well as the fact that the Cleveland data were collected six months after the 1968 presidential election whereas the Gary data were collected the month before.

[9] The corresponding beta weights for the total sample was +.101, for blue-collar males +.109 and blue-collar females +.031.

[10] An initial analysis without these five sex-occupational controls proved unsatisfactory. To determine the

Four indicators of racial attitudes and behavior are employed as dependent variables: a six-item Sheatsley Scale of attitudes toward racial discrimination (Sheatsley, 1966), a two-item measure of attitudes toward School Busing, a three-item measure of Negro Threat, and Wallace voting. The six items forming the Sheatsley Scale were as follows:

A. Negroes shouldn't push themselves where they're not wanted. (dichotomized by disagree/agree + don't knows)

B. Do you think Negroes should have the right to use the same parks, restaurants, and hotels as white people? (dichotomized by yes/no)

C. And do you think Negroes should have as good a chance as white people to get any kind of job, or do you think white people should have the first chance at any job? (dichotomized by "as good"/"white(s) first chance")

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statistical need for separate regressions, we utilized an econometric procedure devised by Chou (1960) that partitions the explained variance of the regression within each group such that the effect of separate group regressions on the beta coefficients can be isolated from the between group differences in the dependent variable. For instance, if a relationship for an independent variable with a dependent variable is positive for males and negative for females the total sample's coefficient would be small if not zero. Separate analyses allow each sex-specific effect to emerge and, in the case of multiple variables, increases the R^2's of each of the separate regressions above that of the total. This increase in the explained variances is attributed to differences in the coefficients within each group. Conceptually, this interesting and useful procedure provides a means of testing the differential salience of various comparisons for diverse subgroups and indicates the need to perform separate analyses on the sub-groups. Chou's (1960) test for the present analyses demonstrates that the five sex-occupational group analyses are necessary for all four dependent variables. Another interpretation of these results is that the within cell regression coefficients of an analysis of covariance for a sex by occupations design cannot be pooled. Thus, the following analyses are presented for the complete set of the sex-occupational sub-groups.

D. If a Negro family with about the same income and education as you moved next door, would you mind it a lot, a little, or not at all? (trichotomized by "not at all"/"a little"/"a lot" + others)
E. How strongly would you object if a member of your family wanted to bring a Negro friend home to dinner -- very strongly, strongly, slightly, or not at all? (trichotomized by "not at all"/"slightly"/others)
F. Do you think white students and Negro students should go to the same schools or to separate schools? (dichotomized by "same"/"separate")

Note that the responses to each of the items are scored so that a high score will represent the rejection of racial discrimination. The Kuder-Richardson-20 reliability coefficient of the scale was an adequate +.762.

The two Likert-type items measuring attitudes toward school busing were as follows:

A. Busing elementary school children to schools in other parts of the city only harms their education.
B. In some cases, it's best for children to attend elementary schools outside their neighborhood.

Again the responses are scored so that a high score will represent the acceptance of busing as an educational measure. The two items have a high intercorrelation of +.654.

The three items comprising the Negro Threat Scale were as follows:

A. Over the past few years, Negroes have got more than they deserve.
B. Hard working people like me have not done as well as Negroes over the past few years.
C. Negroes have been favored too much for city jobs lately.

The responses are scored once more so that a high score signifies low perceived threat from Negroes. The Kuder-Richardson-20 reliability coefficient for this brief scale was an adequate +.743.

Finally, a simple dummy variable of Wallace voting was formed by assigning a point for each reported Wallace vote and zero for all other responses. These four indicators sample widely over the domain of racial attitudes and behavior, and consequently provide a more rounded assessment of how relative deprivation indicators act as predictors.

The Results. Table 7-7 shows the percentage of variance of each of the four dependent variables explained by, first, the economic gains comparisons, second, the satisfaction comparisons, and third, both of these types of comparisons together. Observe that in all cases the total variance accounted for by both types of comparisons is greater than the sum of the unique contributions of the two comparisons considered singly. This is caused by the addition of joint or shared variance that cannot be uniquely allocated. Thus, for the total white Cleveland sample the economic gains comparisons account uniquely for 1.2 per cent of the Sheatsley Scale's variance, the satisfaction comparisons for 2.6 per cent, and the two together for 6.6 per cent. The shared variance therefore accounts for 2.8 per cent (6.6 - 1.2 - 2.6 = 2.8 per cent).

In general, Table 7-7 reveals that the relative deprivation items account best for the Negro Threat Scale whose items involve a relative deprivation dimension themselves (see items above), next best for Wallace voting and the Sheatsley Scale of attitudes toward racial discrimination and worst for attitudes toward school busing where such factors as age and children in public schools are critical. And for all four dependent variables, the relative deprivation measures prove much better predictors for sub-sets of the sample than for the entire sample. Finally, sharp differences emerge among the five sub-groups on all four racial indicators. For the Sheatsley Scale, only a seventh of the variance is explained by the comparison variables among white-collar workers and unskilled females but over a fifth is explained for the two male sub-samples. For busing attitudes, the explained variances range from ten per cent for unskilled males to 20 per cent for blue-collar females. For the Negro Threat Scale, the explained variances range from 13 per cent for blue-collar males to 40 per cent for blue-collar females. And for Wallace voting, the explained variances range from eight per cent for blue-collar females to 26 per cent for white-collar workers. Finally, except for Wallace voting, Table 7-7 reveals that the direct economic gains comparisons were more predictive for white-collar workers and males; while satisfaction comparisons were more predictive for females and for all sub-groups on Wallace voting.

Within each type of comparison, fraternalistic deprivation relative to non-membership groups tended to

Table 7-7

Percentages of Explained Variance of Four Racial Variables by Economic Gains and Economic Satisfaction Measures of Relative Deprivation for Cleveland Whites, 1969[1]

Sample	Sheatsley Scale of Attitudes Toward Racial Discrimination		
	Economic Gains Comparisons	Satisfaction Comparisons	Combined
Total White Sample	1.2	2.6	6.6
White-Collar Workers	6.4	4.8	14.7
Blue-Collar Males	11.5	4.6	20.3
Blue-Collar Females	3.5	7.1	17.9
Unskilled Males	16.1	6.5	22.7
Unskilled Females	3.7	5.6	14.4

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[1] Each entry gives the percentage of the variance of a given racial variable explained (R^2's) by one or both of the comparison measures for a given sample of respondents. Thus, the 3.7 at the bottom of the row to the extreme left signifies that 3.7 per cent of the Sheatsley Scale's variance among unskilled females is accounted for by economic gains comparisons alone. Note, too, that the combined percentages are in all cases more than the sum of the two unique variance percentages. This indicates that in all 24 combined regressions there was useful shared variance that could not be uniquely allocated to a single comparison measure.

Table 7-7 (continued)

Sample	Attitudes Toward School Busing		
	Economic Gains Comparisons	Satisfaction Comparisons	Combined
Total White Sample	1.6	1.8	4.5
White-Collar Workers	8.6	8.1	16.8
Blue-Collar Males	6.4	5.8	12.5
Blue-Collar Females	5.4	11.1	19.7
Unskilled Males	4.5	2.8	10.0
Unskilled Females	10.5	3.6	15.4

Table 7-7 (continued)

Sample	Negro Threat Scale		
	Economic Gains Comparisons	Satisfaction Comparisons	Combined
Total White Sample	3.7	2.6	13.0
White-Collar Workers	18.4	13.3	32.5
Blue-Collar Males	6.8	5.5	13.1
Blue-Collar Females	18.7	3.2	39.5
Unskilled Males	9.9	8.7	22.8
Unskilled Females	2.8	4.5	16.3

Table 7-7 (continued)

Sample	Voting for Wallace for President in 1968		
	Economic Gains Comparisons	Satisfaction Comparisons	Combined
Total White Sample	1.7	3.2	5.7
White-Collar Workers	6.9	13.1	25.6
Blue-Collar Males	5.1	7.1	18.2
Blue-Collar Females	3.1	3.6	7.8
Unskilled Males	5.4	6.2	13.3
Unskilled Females	5.9	8.2	15.5

prove more predictive than egoistic deprivation relative to membership groups. But often an interesting and meaningful interaction occurred between the fraternalistic and egoistic deprivations. These trends are neatly illustrated in Tables 7-8, 7-9, and 7-10. First, Table 7-8 shows how it is those respondents who are satisfied with their economic gains relative to blue-collar workers and dissatisfied with them relative to white-collar workers who most often report that they voted for Governor Wallace for President in 1968.[11] Table 7-9 shows that precisely the same phenomenon operates for the direct economic gains comparison.[12] But if this is a trend combining egoistic contentment with fraternalistic deprivation, it should work only for those regarding themselves as blue-collar workers. And Table 7-10 demonstrates this to be precisely the case, with the trend emerging only for those who identify themselves as belonging to "the working class." Indeed, 41 per cent of the self-identified working-class members of the white sample in Cleveland who regard their gains below that of white-collar workers but not that of blue-collar workers report having voted for Wallace -- roughly two-and-a-half times the percentage of the total sample.

Blue-collar respondents, then, had white-collar workers as their chief economic reference group, and the relative deprivation generated by these comparisons related to all four dependent variables. This proved to be the case for the unskilled respondents as well. And for the white-collar respondents, the chief referents were the unskilled as well as to some degree Negroes. Class tensions and comparisons within the white community appear to be stronger predictors

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[11] These analyses involve only the self-reported voters in the 1968 presidential election, since the dependent variable was voting for Wallace. This cut the sample size from 488 to 301, a reduction of 38 per cent. But these analyses were repeated for the entire sample without a change in the results, except, understandably, the relationships were not quite as statistically significant.

[12] Much as in Gary, Wallace supporters in Cleveland were concentrated among the young, the medium educated, those receiving medium incomes, and union members. But controls for age, education, income, and union membership as well as occupation, owner-renter, region of origin, and type of industry worked in did not eliminate the trend shown in Table 7-9.

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

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

Table 7-8

Relative Economic Satisfaction and Wallace Voting[1]

Satisfaction with Economic Gains	Reported Wallace Voting		Total (N)
	Yes	No	
Those Satisfied Relative to Blue Collars			
Satisfied or Don't Know Relative to White Collars	16%	84%	100% (168)
Dissatisfied Relative to White Collars	34%	66%	100% (41)
Chi-Square = 5.73; $p < .02$ Tau b = -.18			
Those Dissatisfied Relative to Blue Collars			
Satisfied or Don't Know Relative to White Collars	11%	89%	100% (18)
Dissatisfied Relative to White Collars	13%	87%	100% (74)
Chi-Square = 0.01; n.s. Tau b = -.03			

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[1] The sample consists of 301 Cleveland whites who reported that they had voted in the 1968 presidential election from a pool of 488 respondents who constituted a representative sample of Cleveland's residents in predominantly white, working-class precincts.

Table 7-9

Relative Economic Gains and Wallace Voting[1]

Relative Economic Gains	Reported Wallace Voting		Total (N)
	Yes	No	
Those Feeling Economic Gains of Blue Collars Same or Less Than Their Gains			
White-Collar Gains Same or Less Than Their Gains	16%	84%	100% (109)
White-Collar Gains Greater or Much Greater Than Their Gains	31%	69%	100% (55)
Chi-Square = 4.33; p < .04 Tau b = -.18			
Those Feeling Economic Gains of Blue Collars Greater or Much Greater Than Their Gains			
White-Collar Gains Same or Less Than Their Gains	15%	85%	100% (47)
White-Collar Gains Greater or Much Greater Than Their Gains	13%	87%	100% (90)
Chi-Square = 0.001; n.s. Tau b = +.02			

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[1] The sample is the same as described in Table 7-8.

Table 7-10

Relative Economic Gains and Wallace Voting for Self-Identified Working and Middle-Class Respondents[1]

Relative Economic Gains	Reported Wallace Voting		Total
	Yes	No	(N)
Self-Identified Working Class Respondents Only			
Not Deprived Relative to Either Blue or White Collars	11%	89%	100% (54)
Deprived Relative to Blue Collars Only	23%	77%	100% (13)
Deprived Relative to White Collars Only	41%	59%	100% (32)
Deprived Relative to Both Blue and White Collars	15%	85%	100% (55)
Chi-Square = 12.5; p <.01			
Self-Identified Middle Class Respondents Only			
Not Deprived Relative to Either Blue or White Collars	21%	79%	100% (53)
Deprived Relative to Blue Collars Only	12%	88%	100% (34)
Deprived Relative to White Collars Only	17%	83%	100% (23)
Deprived Relative to Both Blue and White Collars	12%	88%	100% (34)
Chi-Square = 1.8; n.s.			

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[1] The sample is the same as described in Table 7-8 except that the total is reduced to 298 because three voters did not identify themselves by social class.

of at least some racial attitudes and behaviors than comparisons with Negroes. This important finding conflicts with much popular speculation that is seldom supported with relevant data.

Summary. The success of the single "average man" item in predicting Wallace presidential support in Gary led to the development of more extensive and refined measures of relative deprivation. Two of these new indicators proved particularly important and related closely to the original "average man" item: a direct assessment of economic gains relative to six particular groups, and a judgment of satisfaction with these economic gains relative to the same six groups. The six groups employed for referents were: white-collar workers, blue-collar workers, Negroes, professionals, whites, and unskilled laborers. These twelve (2 X 6) independent variables were then utilized to account for four diverse racial dependent variables for a sample of 485 white respondents who are representative of Cleveland's working-class white precincts. The dependent variables were: a six-item Sheatsley Scale of attitudes toward racial discrimination, two items regarding attitudes toward school busing, a three-item scale of Negro Threat, and reported voting for George Wallace for president in 1968.

The relative deprivation variables accounted for rather small amounts of the variances of the racial factors when the total sample is considered. The percentages of variances explained for the full sample ranged from only 4.5 per cent for the busing items to 13.0 per cent for the Negro Threat Scale. But when the sample is disaggregated into five sizeable sex and occupational groups (white-collar workers, blue-collar males, blue-collar females, unskilled males, and unskilled females), the results improved considerably. This indicates that relative deprivation measures are specific rather than global in their effects. For example, two-fifths of the Negro Threat variance for blue-collar females is accounted for by the twelve relative deprivation predictors, a third of the Negro Threat variance for white-collar workers, and a fourth of the Wallace voting variance for white-collar workers. Except for Wallace voting, the economic gains comparisons were more predictive for white-collar workers and males while the satisfaction comparisons tended to be more predictive for females. For Wallace voting, the relative satisfaction judgments were more predictive for all groups.

Fraternalistic comparisons, where deprivation is experienced relative to non-membership groups, proved consistently more important than egoistic comparisons, where deprivation is experienced relative to membership groups. Blue-collar and unskilled respondents typically employed white-collar workers as their critical referent; while white-collar respondents typically employed unskilled workers and Negroes as their critical referents. Yet meaningful interactions between fraternalistic and egoistic deprivations often emerged in the results. Thus, Wallace voters were especially concentrated among those respondents who identified with the working-class and believed their economic gains to be at least comparable to this membership class, but who also believed that their gains were below those of white-collar workers.

We turn now to an intensive analysis of a dependent variable closely related to the four dependent variables utilized here: attitudes towards parental control of public schools.

Attitudes Towards Parental Control of Public Schools[13]

In the urban North, one of the most pressing issues in public education concerns increased parental control of schools. It now looms large both for educational policy in general and for racial change in the schools in particular. Consequently, we asked both the white and Negro samples in Cleveland the following four questions tapping attitudes towards parental control:

> We are also interested in the ways you think parents should be involved in the public schools. For example:
>
> A. Do you think parents should be able to help decide which teachers are hired or kept on in their children's schools?
>
> B. Should parents be able to help decide whether a principal is hired or kept on?
>
> C. And should parents be able to help decide what should be taught in the courses?
>
> D. Should they be able to help decide how the school spends its money?

Racial Differences. Table 7-11 presents the responses to these questions for each racial sample. Two trends are conspicuous. First, Negroes in Cleveland are significantly more favorable to parental control ideas than the whites we interviewed in working-class areas of Cleveland. This sharp difference will require us to analyze the data from the two racial samples separately. Second, there is considerable opposition to parental control evinced on all four items, even among Negroes, despite the fact that the wordings are intentionally mild (e.g., "parents should be able to help decide...."). Only among Negroes on the one item involving the expenditure of money does a scant majority form in support of parental control notions.

The items are sufficiently interrelated among both racial samples to form a reliable index of attitudes toward parental control (Table 7-12). The indices were created by summing the number of parental control items favored by the respondent; notice that this procedure

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[13] The basic analysis for this section was prepared by Mr. Reeve Vanneman of Harvard University.

Table 7-11

Four Parental Control Items By Race, Cleveland, 1969

	Negroes				Whites			
Item	%Yes	%DK	%No	N=400	%Yes	%DK	%No	N=487
A. Hire teachers	44	11	45	100%	25	7	68	100%
B. Hire principals	46	9	45	100%	24	7	68	99%
C. Decide courses	46	6	48	100%	29	6	65	100%
D. Spend money	52	12	35	100%	43	7	50	100%

Table 7-12

Item-to-Item and Item-to-Scale Correlations For Parental Control Index By Race[1]

	Negroes				Whites			
	A.	B.	C.	D.	A.	B.	C.	D.
A. Hire teachers								
B. Hire principals	.70				.61			
C. Decide courses	.47	.45			.20	.24		
D. Spend money	.44	.44	.46		.31	.39	.33	
Overall scale	.83	.82	.75	.74	.73	.77	.62	.73

---

[1] Since the items are dichotomized (yes/no + DK), the item-to-item correlations are phi coefficients and the item-to-scale correlations are biserial coefficients.

equates "don't knows" (DK's) with "no" responses. Interestingly, the scale yields a higher Kuder-Richardson 20 reliability for the black sample (.79) than for the white (.49). This is the first indication, among others which we shall uncover, that parental control of public schools has a more direct significance and an ideological base for a segment of the Negro population in Cleveland than it enjoys in the city's white working-class white areas sampled in this study.

A second indication of this greater significance of the issue for Negroes is found in Table 7-13. Again we find the total Negro sample significantly more in favor of parental control. But note, too, the descending percentages agreeing with the parental control statements among both races save for one glaring break in the trend: a full fourth of the total Negro sample agrees with all four of the parental control statements. The sharp racial difference of Table 7-13 is maintained even after educational, income, and subjective social class controls are applied. Only among those Negroes who identify strongly with "the working class" is there any tendency to sharply reject the idea (38 per cent are against all four items); but even here a fifth agree with all of the items and there is significantly greater favorability than among comparable whites.

These racial differences are not primarily a function of hostile racial attitudes. The lower half of Table 7-13 shows the results from the most racially tolerant sub-sets of the two samples.[14] While the white findings are essentially unchanged from those of the total white sample, the Negro findings indicate some reduction in support for parental control in contrast to the total Negro sample. Hence, the racial differences among these two sub-samples are narrowed but still large; yet the differences lie in the degree of favorability, rather than among those who reject all four items. Again this suggests an ideological commitment to parental control among some Negroes who are the most rejecting of whites. Let's look in more detail at these Negro data before we explore those of Cleveland's whites.

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[14] The tolerant Negroes formed the lower two-thirds on the anti-white scale; the tolerant whites favored integrated schools. Arbitrary as these categories may seem, other ways of defining the two sub-sets lead to the same conclusions.

Table 7-13

Parental Control Index By Race

Description of Sample	Parental Control Index Number of Items Favored 0	1	2	3	4	Total (No.)	Mean Number Favored
Total Negro Sample	29%	18%	16%	13%	25%	100% (N=400)	1.89
Total White Sample	40%	25%	16%	11%	8%	100% (N=487)	1.25
Non-Anti-White Negroes[1]	37%	17%	14%	10%	22%	100% (N=298)	1.63
Non-Anti-Negro Whites[2]	39%	26%	16%	13%	7%	100% (N=337)	1.25

---

[1] "Non-Anti-White" Negroes are defined as the lower two-thirds of the Negro sample on an anti-white scale.

[2] "Non-Anti-Negro" whites are defined as those whites in the sample who favored integrated schools.

Negro Attitudes Toward Parental Control. Table 7-14 presents an overview of the scale relationships with attitudes toward parental control among Negro Clevelanders. Looking first at the zero-order product moment coefficients, favorability toward parental control relates positively with radical militancy, anti-white attitudes, acceptance of busing, a sense of personal fate control, and status anxiety; and it relates negatively with satisfaction over the schools, conventional militancy, and a sense of political efficacy.[15] Moreover, a step-wise multiple regression procedure reveals that the first three scales -- radical militancy, anti-white attitudes, and acceptance of busing -- together account for about one-sixth of the variance of the parental control index, with little benefit derived from adding further scales.[16] Indeed, as Table 7-14 shows, the remaining scales yield only insignificant associations with parental control once the effects of these three key variables are partialled out.

A better understanding of these relationships can be gleaned from the specific item analyses provided in Table 7-15. The significant correlations are attained for items falling roughly into five categories: radical militancy, attitudes towards whites, political attitudes, fate control, and other school attitudes.[17] Concerning

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[15] The Radical Militancy Scale includes items a through d of Table 7-15; the Anti-White Attitudes Scale includes items cc, dd, and ff of Table 7-15; the Acceptance of Busing Scale includes items v and bb of Table 7-15; the Satisfaction with Schools Scale includes items y, z, and aa of Table 7-15; the Conventional Militancy Scale includes such items as "The best way for black people in America to gain power is with peaceful, non-violent demonstrations"; the Political Efficacy Scale includes items such as j of Table 7-15; the Status Anxiety Scale includes such items as s of Table 7-15; the Ideology Scale includes items e, f, and g of Table 7-15; and the Relative Deprivation Scale includes such items as "In spite of what some people say, the condition of the average man is getting worse, not better."

[16] Radical militancy and anti-white attitudes also emerged close to the parental control index in a 17-variable factor analysis of these data.

[17] The 38 significant relationships reported in Table 7-15 are drawn from a pool of roughly 130 possible predictors. Since 20 of these associations attain

Table 7-14

Relationship of Parental Control Index With Ten Psychological Scales, Negroes in Cleveland, 1969

Predictor Scale	Zero-Order Pearson Product-Moment Correlations with Parental Control Index	Beta Weights in Multiple Regression[1]	Partial Correlations Holding Constant Scales 1, 2 & 3
1. Radical Militancy	+.31**	+.20	---
2. Anti-White Attitudes	+.31**	+.24	---
3. Acceptance of Busing	+.19**	+.16	---
4. Fate Control	+.18**	---	+.07
5. Satisfaction with Schools	-.17*	---	-.08
6. Conventional Militancy	-.17**	---	-.06
7. Political Efficacy	-.16**	---	-.07
8. Status Anxiety	+.15**	---	+.05
9. Ideology	+.13**	---	+.01
10. Relative Deprivation	+.10*	---	+.01

** = p .01

* = p .05

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[1] $R^2 = .167$; $R = .41$.

Table 7-15

Psychological Correlates of Parental Control Attitudes Among Negroes in Cleveland, 1969

Item	Gamma	Tau b	Chi-Square p[1]	Cramer's V[2]
Radical Militancy Items				
a. In black neighborhoods, businesses, banks and stores should be owned by blacks.	+.51	+.24	<.01	---
b. Blacks should use all possible means to get power in America, including violence and rioting if necessary.	+.40	+.18	<.01	---
c. Black leaders go too far when they praise and encourage violence.	-.31	-.14	<.05	---
d. ...the best way for black people to gain their rights...[is to] be ready to use violence.	+.23	+.14	<.05	---
e. ...mostly like Stokeley Carmichael.	+.20	+.12	<.05	
f. ...mostly like Black Muslims.	+.15	+.09	<.05	
g. ...mostly like Black Panthers.	+.14	+.08	<.05	
Political Attitude Items				
h. In your opinion, is the government in Washington pushing integration ...too fast?	-.42	-.20	<.01	---

---

[1] These probabilities were obtained by collapsing the parental control index into three categories: agreement with none of the items, one to three of the items, and all four of the items.

[2] Cramer's V statistic is provided for all relationships which are sharply curvilinear.

Table 7-15 (continued)

Item	Gamma	Tau b	Chi-Square p	Cramer's V
i. College professors and government experts have too much influence on too many things nowadays.	+.37	+.20	<.01	---
j. Public officials don't really care what people like me think.	+.30	+.17	<.01	---
k. ...Mayor Stokes [is] progressive.	-.23	-.13	<.05	---
l. ...Mayor Stokes [is] honest.	+.24	+.12	<.05	---
m. ...mostly like Richard Nixon.	-.20	-.12	<.01	---
n. ...Mayor Stokes has made [a great deal of progress] in solving Cleveland's problems.	-.21	-.10	<.10	---
o. ...Mayor Stokes [is] courageous.	-.18	-.10	<.10	---
p. ...Cleveland's city officials pay more, less, or the same attention to a request or complaint from a white person as from a black person.	+.10	+.07	<.01	.20
q. Elected officials in general can be trusted.	+.05	+.03	<.01	.21
Fate Control Items				
r. Very often, when I try to get ahead, something or somebody stops me.	+.34	+.19	<.01	---
s. Getting ahead depends more on who you know than how well you do something.	+.29	+.16	<.01	---
t. People like me don't have a good chance to be really successful in life.	+.18	+.10	<.01	---
u. Good luck is just as important as hard work for success.	+.18	+.10	<.05	---

Table 7-15 (continued)

Item	Gamma	Tau b	Chi-Square p	Cramer's V
Other School Attitude Items				
v. In some cases, it's best for children to attend elementary schools outside their neighborhood.	+.38	+.21	<.01	---
w. Black children should study an African language.	+.28	+.16	<.01	---
x. ...white students and black students should go to the same schools...	-.52	-.13	<.05	---
y. Public schools in Cleveland are not as good as public schools in other large cities in the North.	+.27	+.15	<.10	---
z. ...are you satisfied with public schools in this neighborhood...	-.13	-.08	<.10	---
aa. ...the education children get in public schools here in Cleveland is very good, good, fair, or poor?	-.11	-.09	<.10	---
bb. Busing elementary school children to schools in other parts of the city only harms their education.	-.09	-.05	<.10	---
Attitudes Toward Whites Items				
cc. If a black person is wise, he will think twice before he trusts a white man.	+.47	+.25	<.01	---
dd. Whites have been favored too much for city jobs lately.	+.40	+.23	<.01	---
ee. ...most whites in Cleveland favor... integrated public schools...	-.25	-.17	<.01	---
ff. Most whites want to keep blacks down as much as possible.	+.27	+.14	<.01	---

Table 7-15 (continued)

Item	Gamma	Tau b	Chi-Square p	Cramer's V
gg. Black people in general cannot feel comfortable around whites.	+.25	+.14	<.01	---
hh. Do you think you are...worse off... [than] the average white person with the same education and income?	+.18	+.1[illegible]	<.01	.19
ii. White people...have gained more than they are entitled to.	+.04	+.02	<.01	.16
jj. ...dissatisfied with your economic gains compared to those of white collar workers.	+.11	+.06	<.05	.14
kk. ...dissatisfied with your economic gains compared to those of whites.	+.01	-.01	<.05	.13
ll. Professionals...have gained more than they are entitled to.	-.01	-.01	<.05	.13

radical militancy, Negro sample members who favor parental control of schools tend toward black separatism, the utility of violence, and such symbols as Stokely Carmichael, the Black Muslims, and the Black Panthers. Yet it is wrong from these correlations simply to equate parental control demands with radical militancy. Only between ten and twenty per cent of the sample respond to each of the seven items listed in the radical militancy direction, far smaller percentages than favor some degree of parental control of the public schools. The relationships shown in Table 7-15 stem from the fact that the relatively few radical militants interviewed did overwhelmingly support parental control; yet a majority of the Negroes sampled who favored parental control were not radical militants.

Ten items that significantly relate to parental control attitudes all seem to suggest a certain degree of political alienation among those who score high on the index. Thus, sampled Negroes who favor parental control appear in Table 7-15 to regard public officials as not caring and professionals as having too much influence; they do not favor President Nixon nor do they believe that the federal government is pushing racial integration fast enough; and they tend to be sceptical about their city's black Mayor, Carl Stokes, whom they view as honest but not courageous, progressive, or effective. Two of these items provide interesting curvilinear relationships. Distrust of elected officials concentrates among those who mildly favor parental control, while greater trust is exhibited by those who are totally opposed or totally in support. The other such question involves whether the respondent believes that Cleveland city officials pay more, less, or the same attention to a complaint from a white than from a Negro. Those who believe that the white's complaint would receive greater attention naturally tend to be pro-parental control. But the 21 per cent of the Negro sample who feel that the white's complaint would receive less attention also tend to be pro-parental control. In short, assumed racial discrimination in either direction is associated with support of parental control.

The four fate control items shown in Table 7-15 all

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significance levels of less than one in a hundred and 12 more of less than five in a hundred, this pattern is far above the chance expectations of one to two relationships at the one per cent level and four to five additional ones at the five per cent level.

relate significantly in a linear fashion, indicating that low fate control is associated with the parental control index. But closer inspection in Table 7-16 reveals that this domain actually best separates the mildly favorables (one to three on the index) from the extremely favorables (four on the index), rather than separating those who are completely opposed (zero on the index) from others. Note also in Table 7-16 that while 36 per cent of those with low fate control are complete supporters of parental control, only 13 per cent of those with high fate control are complete supporters. Control on radical militancy pinpoints this relationship further. While there is no significant relationship in Table 7-16 between fate control and parental control among the highest third on radical militancy, the negative relationship is heightened for those low on radical militancy. In short, those Negroes who do not ascribe to the radical militant ideology but who strongly favor parental control are very likely to have a low sense of personal fate control.

Parental control opinions are embedded in a complex of other beliefs and opinions about the public schools (Table 7-15). Not surprisingly, all three questions indicating beliefs in the quality of the city's schools produce a negative relationship with the parental control index. Other such school reforms as busing and the teaching of an African language relate positively with the index. The negative relationship with support of integrated education, however, is deceptive; the result is produced solely by the tiny segment of the sample (five per cent) who are both ardent separatists as well as believers in the parental control of the public schools.

Finally, the parental control measure is related to attitudes toward whites, which fall naturally into two clusters: an anti-white dimension and a relative deprivation dimension. Table 7-15 shows that the five items tapping attitudes toward whites which yield the strongest linear relationships with the parental control index are all anti-white in character. Note the relatively large coefficients for the items indicating distrust of whites, cynicism about whites, and discomfort around whites. The relative deprivation measures involving comparisons with whites do not relate in a linear fashion, but their significant chi-squares alert us to the existence of curvilinear relationships. Closer examination reveals that those Negroes who feel dissatisfied with their economic gains relative to whites and white collar workers and feel that whites and professionals have "gained more than they are entitled to" tend to be moderate supporters of parental

Table 7-16

Fate Control and Attitudes Toward Parental Control

Parental Control Index (0-4 items agreed with)	Fate Control Scale Low (N)	 Medium (N)	 High (N)
Total Sample			
Completely Opposed (0)	26%	27%	39%
Moderate Support (1-3)	38%	48%	48%
Completely Favorable (4)	36%	25%	13%
$p < .01$	100% (104)	100% (210)	100% (86)
Non-Radical Militants Only[1]			
Completely Opposed (0)	29%	34%	45%
Moderate Support (1-3)	36%	46%	48%
Completely Favorable (4)	35%	20%	7%
$p < .01$	100% (72)	100% (137)	100% (71)
Radical Militants Only			
Completely Opposed (0)	19%	13%	7%
Moderate Support (1-3)	43%	53%	50%
Completely Favorable (4)	38%	34%	43%
p = n.s.	100% (32)	100% (73)	100% (14)

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[1] Defined as approximately the lowest scoring two-thirds of the distribution on the radical militancy scale.

control. It is those who are not so dissatisfied who are either extremely anti- or pro-parental control.

Tables 7-17 and 7-18 explore this interesting relationship in more detail. It is those sample members who perceive both the status of whites as low or moderate (ratings of zero through seven on the Cantril self-anchoring ladder) and the gains of whites to be greater than their own who favor parental control most strongly (Table 7-17). Likewise, in Runciman's terms, it is the fraternalistically deprived, rather than the egoistically deprived, who most favor parental control. Thus, in Table 7-18, the group scoring highest on the index perceives itself as doing as well or better than other Negroes but not as well as whites.

Just as revealing as these significant relationships are the relationships which are not significant. Strangely, the parental control index does not relate to education, income, sex, age, or subjective social class. Moreover, a variety of controls for these social variables do not diminish the psychological relationships revealed in Tables 7-15 through 7-18.

Summing up, then, attitudes toward parental control of the public schools among adult Negroes in Cleveland appear to be embedded in larger psychological and ideological belief systems. In general, support of parental control notions is associated with radical militancy, political cynicism and alienation, a low sense of fate control, a dissatisfaction with the schools, anti-white attitudes, and a fraternalistic sense of deprivation in comparison with whites. Closer analysis suggests two rather contrasting types of supporters, so contrasting in fact that this may cause the lack of association between the parental control index and a variety of social variables. Advocates of the first type are radically militant, often anti-integration and anti-white but not low in fate control; for them, parental control beliefs are only a part of a larger ideological framework of black power. Advocates of the second type are neither radically militant nor particularly anti-white and they favor school integration; yet they are unhappy with public education and have a low sense of fate control and political efficacy. It is tempting to speculate that the first group furnishes the leadership and rhetoric in the drive for parental control in urban ghettos of the North, while the second and larger group constitutes the followers.

Table 7-17

Racial Relative Deprivation and Parental Control Attitudes

Parental Control Index	Economic Gains of Whites Compared to Yours	
(0-4 items agreed with)	Same or Less (N)	Greater (N)
Those Who Perceive White Status as High[1]		
Completely Opposed (0)	31%	34%
Moderate Support (1-3)	51%	41%
Completely Favorable (4)	18%	25%
p = n.s.	100% (72)	100% (172)
Those Who Percieve White Status as Low or Medium		
Completely Opposed (0)	40%	17%
Moderate Support (1-3)	41%	52%
Completely Favorable (4)	19%	31%
p <.02	100% (43)	100% (90)

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[1] Defined as those who rate the present "rank in American society" of whites as 8, 9, or 10 on the 0-to-10-point self-anchoring scale of Cantril (1965).

Table 7-18

Fraternalistic and Egoistic Relative Deprivation and Parental Control Attitudes

Parental Control Index	Economic Gains of Whites Compared to Yours	
(0-4 items agreed with)	Same or Less (N)	Greater (N)
Those Who Regard Own Gains Less Than Other Negroes		
Completely Opposed (0)	30%	36%
Moderate Support (1-3)	44%	37%
Completely Favorable (4)	26%	27%
p = n.s.	100% (23)	100% (124)
Those Who Regard Own Gains Same or More Than Other Negroes		
Completely Opposed (0)	33%	21%
Moderate Support (1-3)	45%	53%
Completely Favorable (4)	22%	26%
$p < .10$	100% (106)	100% (147)

White Attitudes Toward Parental Control. Predicting parental control attitudes among whites in Cleveland is a more formidable task than predicting them among Negroes. Parental control advocacy does not have the ideological force and framework in the white community that it has in some quarters of the black community.

Support for parental control among our white respondents derives from two sharply different sources of motivation. First, there is a sizable number of whites who agree with one or two of the four parental control items and who appear to be motivated largely by expressive needs to be consistent within a larger perspective of political liberalism. These whites are primarily young, politically active, and ideologically liberal. For them, citizen participation is viewed as a good thing in principle; and their agreement with some parental control is not conditioned by their potentially benefiting from it personally. Second, there is a distinctly different source of support, one that is directly instrumental rather than expressive. These respondents want parental control for their own schools, for immediate benefits for themselves. They are motivated primarily out of a sense of relative economic deprivation and strong dissatisfaction with their neighborhood schools.

These conclusions are presented first so as to aid in the ordering and understanding of the complex results. The chief complication is that the white findings, unlike most of the Negro findings, are not linear. Consequently, one set of variables differentiates between those in complete opposition and those who are favorable, while another set differentiates between those who are strong supporters and other respondents. Table 7-19 illustrates this phenomenon. Witness the ability of age and the Sheatsley Desegregation Scale to distinguish those in complete opposition from those moderately in favor of parental control. Thus, older whites who favor some forms of segregation tend toward adamant opposition. Yet witness, too, the ability of a sense of economic deprivation relative to Negroes to distinguish those who are firm advocates of parental control.

We have, then, two analyses to perform. Initially, we shall compare those in total opposition to parental control with those who favor it in varying degrees. Next, we shall compare those in strong support who agree with either three or four items of the parental control index with those who agree with none or only one or two of the index's items. And just as indicated in Table 7-19, we

Table 7-19

Non-Linear Relationships with Parental Control Index Among Whites

Predictor Variable	Parental Control Index Totally Opposed (0)	 Moderate Support (1-2)	 Strong Support (3-4)	Total (N)
Age				
21-40 years	31%	48%	21%	100% (238)
41+	50%	34%	16%	100% (248)
Sheatsley Scale of Racial Desegregation				
Weak or Moderate Desegregation	45%	36%	18%	100% (347)
Strong Desegregation	28%	53%	19%	100% (139)
Economic Deprivation Relative to Negroes				
Satisfied	39%	46%	15%	100% (323)
Dissatisfied	41%	31%	28%	100% (128)

shall find a surprising lack of overlap of variables which serve as effective predictors in both analyses.

Table 7-20 lists the 24 variables which significantly differentiate those who are in complete disagreement with parental control from those who favor it.[18] In addition to the age and segregation factors, those respondents who most resist parental control notions are characterized by low political activity (items b, o, and r), generalized political conservatism (items d, m, n, s, and u), and a pervasive anti-Negro orientation (items e, f, g, l, t, v, and w). The array of predictors can be effectively reduced to three basic variables: (item b) political activity, (item a) age, and (item d) economic liberalism. These three indicators account for most of the explained variance of parental control dichotomized in this manner. Surprisingly, attitudes toward desegregation (items c, f, g, and t) have only minor effect when these three non-racial controls are applied. These findings suggest that total opposition to parental control among white Clevelanders is centered among the older residents with a generalized conservative approach to politics; while moderate support is centered among younger respondents with a liberal approach to politics that includes a belief in a participatory, socially active government.

To follow up in more detail on these possibilities, we must examine carefully each of these four key predictors. Consider first political activity. Table 7-21 illustrates the basically dichotomous association between the Political Activity Index and opposition vs. favorability to parental control. Note that the fundamental differentiation comes between those who have not engaged in any of the four types of political activity as opposed to those who have engaged in one or more. And note also that the opponents of all forms of parental control are less active in all four areas of political activity (only campaign work fails to attain statistical significance).

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[18] The 24 significant relationships reported in Table 7-20 are drawn from a pool of roughly 125 possible predictor variables. Since 11 of these associations attain significance levels of less than one in a hundred and seven more of less than five in a hundred, this pattern is far above the chance expectations of one to two relationships at the one per cent level and four to five additional ones at the five per cent level.

Table 7-20

Significant Relationships for Whites With Totally Opposed vs. Favorable Dichotomy of Parental Control Index

Item	Gamma	Tau b	Chi-Square p[1]	Cramer's V[2]
a. Age (21-40 vs. 41+)	-.39	-.20	<.001	---
b. Political Activity Index	+.39	+.19	<.001	---
c. Sheatsley Scale of Racial Desegregation	+.36	+.16	<.001	---
d. ...Some say the Federal Government should provide money to help improve...housing...others think ...not....What is your opinion?	+.32	+.16	<.001	---
e. In Cleveland, would you say many, some, or only a few Negroes miss out on jobs or promotions because of racial discrimination?	+.29	+.17	<.01	---
f. Negroes certainly have their rights, but it is best to keep them in their own districts and schools to prevent too much contact with whites.	-.29	-.15	<.01	---

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[1] Unless the number of ordinal levels are indicated in parenthesis, the variables have been dichotomized. For Likert items, "strongly agree" was merged with "agree," "strongly disagree" with "disagree," and Don't Know's omitted.

[2] Cramer's V statistic is provided for all relationships which are sharply curvilinear.

Table 7-20 (continued)

Item	Gamma	Tau b	Chi-Square p	Cramer's V
g. How strongly would you object if a member of your family wanted to bring a Negro friend home to dinner?	-.29	-.14	<.01	---
h. Succeeding in his job is the most important thing a man can do.	-.30	-.13	<.01	---
i. ...economic gains of Negroes...compared to your own (3)	----	----	<.01	.18
j. Gross Annual Family Income (3)	----	----	<.01	.17
k. How long have you lived in neighborhood? (3)	----	----	<.01	.14
l. Negroes have been favored too much for city jobs lately.	-.26	-.11	<.05	---
m. Poverty programs produce laziness and not hard work.	-.25	-.11	<.05	---
n. In some cases it's best for children to attend elementary schools outside their neighborhood.	+.26	+.10	<.05	---
o. 1967 mayoralty vote (Stokes, no vote, Taft) (3)	-.21	-.12	<.05	---
p. Status difference in Cantril ladder ratings for Self - Negroes (4)	+.19	+.11	<.05	---
q. Expected gain in status for self in Cantril ladder ratings for future - present (3)	+.16	+.09	<.05	---
r. How often do you read newspaper articles about politics? (3)	+.12	+.07	<.05	---
s. People can be divided into two classes, the weak and the strong.	-.20	-.09	<.10	---
t. Negroes shouldn't push themselves where they're not wanted.	-.24	-.08	<.10	---

Table 7-20 (continued)

Item	Gamma	Tau b	Chi-Square p	Cramer's V
u. Streets aren't safe these days without a policeman around.	-.27	-.09	<.10	---
v. ...Mayor Stokes [is] out for himself.	-.20	-.08	<.10	---
w. Negroes and whites can never be really comfortable with each other, even if they are close friends.	-.18	-.09	<.10	---
x. Perceived past gain in status for self in Cantril ladder ratings for present - past. (3)	+.14	+.08	<.10	---

Table 7-21

Political Activity and Totally Opposed vs. Favorable Dichotomy of Parental Control Index for Whites

		Parental Control Index		
		Totally Opposed (0)	Favorable (1-4)	Total (N)
Political Activity Index				
Low	0	48%	52%	100% (296)
	1	25%	75%	100% (92)
Medium	2	36%	64%	100% (53)
	3	25%	75%	100% (28)
High	4	31%	69%	100% (16)
Political Activity Items				
Wore Button	No	42%	58%	100% (397)
	Yes	32%	68%	100% (88)
Car Sticker	No	45%	55%	100% (362)
	Yes	29%	71%	100% (123)
Gave Money	No	44%	56%	100% (404)
	Yes	25%	75%	100% (81)
Campaign Work	No	41%	59%	100% (431)
	Yes	35%	65%	100% (54)

A similar dichotomization occurs for age (Table 7-22). While only 50 per cent of those over 40 years old favor some degree of parental control, 69 per cent do of those 40 years of age or younger. If these data are put in terms of birth dates, the critical split occurs about the time of the Great Depression. That is, those born during and after the Depression are more likely to lean toward parental control of schools. Put differently, those who politically came of age (e.g., turned 21 years of age) after World War II are far more likely to favor parental control. We do not have the necessary data to push this line of reasoning further; but suffice it to speculate that the Depression and World War II served as the psychological dividing line between those who remember a developing country and a dependence upon the federal government for economic recovery and those who have known only rising affluence and mounting protest for civil rights and liberties. It may well be that our data on parental control attitudes offer merely one example among many of the political differences among northern urban whites of different ages. At any rate, Table 7-23 specifies the age correlation further. Notice that the age relationship increases directly as gross annual family income and education increase. Such results tempt the further speculation that the political effects of the formative periods of each of the two age cohorts were greatest for those most politically aware, that is, the prosperous and relatively well educated.

The third key predictor, economic liberalism, is measured by the single item concerned with federal support of housing. Table 7-24 shows the positive relationship between the liberalism indicator and the opposed-favorable split of the parental control index. Table 7-25 pushes this analysis further by combining all three of the predictors to account for those who are favorable to any degree to parental control. The differences are striking. While 90 per cent of the young, politically active liberals agree with one or more of the four parental control items asked, only 31 per cent do so among the old, politically inactive conservatives. Indeed, the effects of the three independent variables are remarkably equal, with each adding roughly 20 per cent to the base rate of favorability. Table 7-26 presents another way of showing this; and Table 7-27 presents evidence that this youth-active-liberal index also significantly predicts each of the four parental control items employed in this study. The important point to emphasize about the close predictions shown in Tables 7-25, 7-26, and 7-27 is that they are achieved without the aid of directly racial variables.

Table 7-22

Age and Totally Opposed vs. Favorable Dichotomy of Parental Control Index for Whites

	Parental Control Index		
	Totally Opposed (0)	Favorable (1-4)	Total (N)
Age			
21-24 years	23%	77%	100% (52)
25-27 years	38%	62%	100% (47)
28-31 years	41%	59%	100% (51)
32-37 years	25%	75%	100% (53)
38-41 years	29%	71%	100% (41)
42-48 years	43%	57%	100% (49)
49-55 years	57%	43%	100% (51)
56-61 years	52%	48%	100% (46)
62-69 years	44%	56%	100% (45)
70+ years	52%	48%	100% (50)
Age Dichotomized			
21-40 years	31%	69%	100% (238)
41+ years	50%	50%	100% (248)

Chi-Square = 18.0; $p < .001$
Tau b = -.20
Gamma = -.39

Table 7-23

Whites Favorable to Some Parental Control By Age, Income, and Education

	Age			
	21-40 (N)	41+ (N)	Gamma	Tau b
Gross Annual Family Income				
Under $6,000	54% (37)	54% (116)	-.01	-.01
$6,000-$10,000	78% (111)	59% (73)	-.43	-.21
Over $10,000	67% (78)	35% (48)	-.57	-.31
Education				
Grade School	63% (30)	54% (105)	-.19	-.08
Some High School	63% (62)	49% (78)	-.28	-.14
High School Graduate or More	73% (146)	44% (63)	-.55	-.28

Table 7-24

Liberalism and Totally Opposed vs. Favorable Dichotomy of Parental Control Index for Whites

	Parental Control Index		
	Totally Opposed (0)	Favorable (1-4)	Total (N)
There are areas in cities like Cleveland where the housing is rundown and overcrowded. Some say the Federal Government should provide money to help improve the housing in such places. Others think the government should not provide money to improve housing. What is your opinion?			
Should Provide	33%	67%	100% (267)
Should Not Provide	49%	51%	100% (219)

Chi-Square = 12.1; $p < .001$
Tau b = +.16
Gamma = +.32

Table 7-25

Whites Favorable to Some Parental Control By Age, Political Activity, and Liberalism

	Age			
	21-40		41+	
	Politically Active	Politically Inactive	Politically Active	Politically Inactive
Political Liberal	90%	71%	70%	49%
Political Conservative	70%	49%	58%	31%

Table 7-26

The Youth-Active-Liberal Index and Parental Control Index for Whites

	Youth-Active-Liberal Index[1]			
	0	1	2	3
Parental Control Index				
Totally Opposed (0)	69%	49%	29%	10%
Favorable (1-4)	31%	51%	71%	90%
Total (N)	100% (65)	100% (187)	100% (194)	100% (40)

Chi-Square = 52.8; $p < .001$
Tau b = +.31
Gamma = +.52

---

[1] With each of the three variables dichotomized, the index is made up by assigning one point each for youth (21-40 years of age), political activity (one or more of the four activities listed in Table 7-21),and liberalism ("Federal Government should provide money to help improve ...housing" on item listed in Table 7-24).

Table 7-27

Youth-Active-Liberal Index and Agreement With Each Parental Control Item for Whites

Parental Control Item	Youth-Active-Liberal Index[1]				Gamma	Tau b	p
	0 (N=65)	1 (N=187)	2 (N=194)	3 (N=40)			
A. ...hire teachers	11%	21%	32%	30%	+.30	+.15	$<.01$
B. ...hire principal	9%	20%	29%	40%	+.36	+.18	$<.01$
C. ...decide courses	19%	24%	33%	48%	+.29	+.16	$<.01$
D. ...spend money	23%	38%	52%	60%	+.35	+.20	$<.01$

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[1] Constructed as described in Table 7-26.

The youth-active-liberal index, then, provides a strong prediction of total opposition to parental control ideas. When this predictor index is controlled, 18 of the remaining 21 significant relationships become trivial. The three which continue to explain some independent variance are: income (item j in Table 7-20), awareness of racial discrimination in employment (item e in Table 7-20), and acceptance of a Negro at dinner (item g in Table 7-20). As Table 7-28 indicates, income uniquely isolates the moderate white supporters of parental control. Note that a majority of those in the $6,000 to $10,000 gross annual family income category agree with one or two of the parental control propositions, while those either poorer or more prosperous are far more likely to reject all four. Controls for demographic, attitude, or relative deprivation measures do not dismiss this interesting pocket of moderate support, a pocket made more interesting because it will be recalled that this is precisely the income bracket in previous analyses that most often voted against Negro candidates and for Governor Wallace for President.

The remaining two racial predictors interact with the young-active-liberal index, but in different ways. Table 7-29 demonstrates that an awareness of racial discrimination is associated with support for parental control among those otherwise least likely to favor it. This suggests that as the support for it in principle decreases, the local need for parental control as one possible means of combatting racial injustice becomes a more important consideration.

However, acceptance of a Negro at your home for dinner operates in precisely the opposite fashion (Table 7-30). Recall the Triandis-Davis (1965) distinction which proved important in Chapter Three between race-laden intimate contact and belief-laden formal contact. Interestingly, here, the formal discrimination items concerned with jobs, restaurants, and even schools do not predict once age, political activity, and liberalism are controlled. But the intimate domain of dining in one's home appears to separate the truly tolerant from the pseudo-tolerant among those respondents scoring high in the young-active-liberal index and contributes among them to the prediction of opposition or favorability to parental control. And Table 7-31 shows that this item is one of the few with a linear association with the full parental control index, distinguishing the degree of favorability as well as the opponents. At any rate, Table 7-32 shows the beta weights for the three and five variable regressions. Note that the two racial

Table 7-28

Income and Parental Control Index for Whites

	Parental Control Index			
	Totally Opposed (0)	Moderately Favorable (1-2)	Highly Favorable (3-4)	Total (N)
Gross Annual Family Income				
Under $6,000	47%	31%	22%	100% (153)
$6,000-$10,000	29%	53%	17%	100% (184)
Over $10,000	45%	36%	19%	100% (126)

Table 7-29

Whites Favorable to Some Parental Control
By Youth-Active-Liberal Index and Awareness of Racial Job Discrimination

Youth-Active-Liberal Index Scores (0-3)	"In Cleveland, would you say many, some, or only a few Negroes miss out on jobs or promotions because of racial discrimination?"			
	None, Some, Few Negroes	Many Negroes	Tau b	p
0 (N=65)	23%	39%	+.16	<.01
1 (N=187)	42%	62%	+.20	<.01
2 (N=194)	65%	76%	+.12	<.05
3 (N=40)	92%	89%	-.05	n.s.

Table 7-30

Whites Favorable to Some Parental Control By Youth-Active-Liberal Index and Acceptance of Intimate Racial Contact

Youth-Active-Liberal Index Scores (0-3)	"How strongly would you object if a member of your family wanted to bring a Negro friend home to dinner -- very strongly, strongly, slightly, or not at all?"			
	Very Strongly, Strongly Object	Slightly Object, Or Not at All	Tau b	p
0 (N=65)	35%	32%	-.02	n.s.
1 (N=187)	47%	55%	+.08	<.10
2 (N=194)	58%	77%	+.19	<.01
3 (N=40)	78%	93%	+.22	<.01

Table 7-31

Acceptance of Intimate Racial Contact and Parental Control Index for Whites

	Parental Control Index			
	Totally Opposed (0)	Moderately Favorable (1-2)	Highly Favorable (3-4)	Total (N)
Object to Negro Home to Dinner				
Very Strongly, Strongly Object	49%	39%	12%	100% (163)
Slightly Object and Not At All	35%	42%	23%	100% (309)

Table 7-32

Three- and Five-Variable Regressions on Totally Opposed vs. Favorability Dichotomization of Parental Control Index for Whites

Predictor Variable	3-Variable Regression Beta Weights	5-Variable Regression Beta Weights
Age	-.19**	-.17**
Political Activity Index	+.22**	+.22**
Liberalism	+.19**	+.16**
Awareness of Racial Job Discrimination	----	+.15**
Acceptance of Intimate Racial Contact	----	+.11*
Multiple Correlation Coefficient (R) =	.33	.38
Percentage of Variance Explained (R^2) =	10.9%	14.2%

$^*p < .05$.

$^{**}p < .01$.

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variables add only about three per cent to the variance explained.

Useful as the three-variable index is for predicting total opposition, it is of no use whatsoever in predicting the extent of favorability. Eliminating the complete opponents, there is no relationship at all between the parental control index and political activity (tau b = +.03), age (tau b = +.01), liberalism (tau b = -.02), or the combined predictor index (tau b = +.01).

This pattern suggests that the decision to favor or to completely oppose parental control is determined largely by value-expressive criteria. It is an expressive choice shaped to be consistent with one's other political attitudes rather than an instrumental choice seeking personal gain. Consistent with this interpretation is how the youth-active-liberal index predicts the opposition-favorability dichotomy for various sub-groups. Hence, it does somewhat better for respondents without children (tau b = +.40) than for the more involved respondents with children (tau b = +.28). It works as well for those who think their neighborhood schools are satisfactory (tau b = +.25) as for those who think them unsatisfactory (tau b = +.21); for those who trust their elected officials (tau b = +.30) as for those who do not (tau b = +.29); and for those who know many people in their neighborhood (tau b = +.29) as for those who do not (tau b = +.31). In short, the predictor index works as well or better for those who could not easily personally benefit from parental control of their local schools as for those who might well benefit directly.

Instrumental motivation becomes important when we distinguish the highly favorable who agreed to three or four of the parental control items from those less favorable who agreed with none, one, or two items. This second analysis begins with Table 7-33, which shows the 19 significant predictors of this way of dichotomizing the parental control index.[19] Only four of the items are repeated from the previous analysis (Table 7-20); chief among them are the interracial dining item previously discussed (Table 7-31) and the political activity index.

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[19] Again, these 19 significant relationships, drawn from a pool of roughly 125 possible predictor variables, number far above those that would be expected by chance alone.

Table 7-33

Significant Relationships for Whites with Others vs. Highly Favorable Dichotomy of Parental Control Index

Item[1]	Gamma	Tau b	Chi-Square p	Cramer's V[2]
a. ...dissatisfied with your economic gains compared to those of professionals.	+.41	+.17	$<.01$	---
b. ...dissatisfied with your economic gains compared to those of Negroes.	+.37	+.14	$<.01$	---
c. ...dissatisfied with your economic gains compared to those of white collar workers.	+.35	+.14	$<.01$	---
d. How strongly would you object if a member of your family wanted to bring a Negro friend home to dinner?	-.38	-.13	$<.01$	---
e. White collar workers...have gained more than they are entitled to.	+.46	+.14	$<.01$	---
f. ...dissatisfied with your economic gains compared to those of blue collar workers.	+.31	+.12	$<.01$	---

---

[1] Unless the number of ordinal levels are indicated in parentheses, the variables have been dichotomized. For Likert items, "strongly agree" was merged with "agree," "strongly disagree" with "disagree," and "don't know's" omitted.

[2] Cramer's V statistic is provided for all relationships which are sharply curvilinear.

Table 7-33 (continued)

Item	Gamma	Tau b	Chi-Square p	Cramer's V
g. ...dissatisfied with your economic gains over the past five years.	+.30	+.12	.01	---
h. ...economic gains of white collar workers compared to your own (3)	-.30	-.12	.01	---
i. Political Activity Index (3)	+.23	+.10	.01	---
j. ...political parties help a great deal to make the government pay attention to what people think...	-.31	-.12	.05	---
k. Elected officials in general can be trusted.	-.30	-.12	.05	---
l. ...dissatisfied with the public schools in this neighborhood.	+.29	+.11	.05	---
m. Subjective social class (4)	----	----	.05	.14
n. ...economic gains of Negroes ...compared to your own (3)	-.27	-.11	.05	---
o. Some people say policemen use unnecessary force in making arrests. Do you think this happens to people in this area?	+.41	+.10	.10	---
p. In the next few years, things are not really going to improve for the average man.	+.26	+.09	.10	---
q. ...dissatisfied with your economic gains compared to those of whites.	+.24	+.09	.10	---

Table 7-33 (continued)

Item	Gamma	Tau b	Chi-Square p	Cramer's V
r. People like me don't have a good chance to be really successful in life.	+.23	+.08	<.10	---
s. How long have you lived in neighborhood? (3)	-.17	-.07	<.10	---

The striking new feature of Table 7-33 is the preponderance of relative deprivation measures -- ten in all, seven of the ten best predictors. Clearly, strong advocacy of parental control of schools is psychologically bound up with keenly felt relative deprivation; and parental control is perceived as one possible mechanism for alleviating this sense of deprivation. We face, then, two tasks of specification: (1) what are the most relevant reference groups in this process?; and (2) what mediates the process so that the relative deprivation needs are implemented through strong advocacy of the parental control of schools?

The leading three deprivation items listed in Table 7-33 turn out to be the most powerful predictors of highly favorable parental control attitudes when the many deprivation items are considered at once. Thus, items f and q indicating dissatisfaction relative to blue-collar workers and whites, for example, drop completely out as effective predictors once deprivation relative to professionals, item a, is controlled. Indeed, dissatisfaction compared with professionals is the leading item. And this is enhanced by adding the small group (seven per cent of the sample) who are dissatisfied compared with white-collar workers but not professionals, for they are also prone to adopting extremely pro-parental control positions. Thus, we form a new variable, deprivation relative to non-manuals, in which a respondent is scored as feeling deprived if he is dissatisfied relative to either professionals or white-collar workers. The significant results obtained with this new variable are provided in Table 7-34.

Rigorous testing of this relationship led to the finding that it could be enhanced further by considering item b of Table 7-33, dissatisfaction with economic gains compared with Negroes. This is especially true in interracial neighborhoods, where the Negro comparison yields a closer association with highly positive views of parental control than the non-manual comparison (Table 7-35).[20]

Now we are prepared to form a composite measure of relative deprivation: relative deprivation involves, for those in all-white areas, dissatisfaction with their

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[20] Interestingly, no subgroup of the respondents residing in the all-white neighborhoods provided a significant association between the measure of dissatisfaction relative to Negroes and extremely favorable parental control attitudes.

Table 7-34

Relative Deprivation Compared to Non-Manuals and Others vs. Highly Favorable Dichotomy of Parental Control Index for Whites

Relative Economic Deprivation Compared to Non-Manuals[1]	Parental Control Index		
	Opposed and Moderately Favorable (0-2)	Highly Favorable (3,4)	Total (N)
Satisfied	89%	11%	100% (224)
Dissatisfied	74%	26%	100% (263)

Chi-Square = 16.4; $p < .001$

Tau b = +.19

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[1] Respondents are scored as satisfied or dissatisfied with their economic gains compared to either or both "professionals" and "white-collar workers."

Table 7-35

Deprivation Relative to Negroes and Non-Manuals and Others vs. Highly Favorable Dichotomy of Parental Control Index for Whites in Interracial Neighborhoods

Economic Deprivation	Parental Control Index: Opposed and Moderately Favorable (0-2)	Parental Control Index: Highly Favorable (3,4)	Total (N)
Relative to Negroes			
Satisfied	94%	6%	100% (87)
Dissatisfied	62%	38%	100% (48)

Chi-Square = 19.9; $p < .001$

Tau b = +.40

Economic Deprivation	Parental Control Index: Opposed and Moderately Favorable (0-2)	Parental Control Index: Highly Favorable (3,4)	Total (N)
Relative to Non-Manuals			
Satisfied	91%	9%	100% (59)
Dissatisfied	76%	24%	100% (76)

Chi-Square = 4.4; $p < .05$

Tau b = +.20

economic gains relative to non-manuals (professionals plus white-collar variables), and, for those in interracial areas, dissatisfaction with their economic gains relative to Negroes. The results with this measure are shown in Table 7-36. Notice that respondents who are highly favorable to parental control are three times more likely among the relatively deprived than among the non-deprived. Table 7-37 demonstrates the persistence of the relationship across controls for income, education, subjective social class, age, and sex. Yet this relative deprivation measure predicts responses to only three of the original four parental control items (Table 7-38). "Deciding courses," the weakest of the scale's items (Table 7-12), is not a function of relative deprivation, though hiring teachers and principals and spending money are.

Turning to the second task, four mediating conditions appear logically necessary if strong advocacy of parental control of schools is to become an instrumental response to subjectively felt economic deprivation. These conditions are:

(1) The perception of education as a remedy for economic deprivation.
(2) The perception of the local public schools as inadequate.
(3) The perception of the existing political system as unable to deal effectively with the inadequate schools.
(4) The ability to benefit directly from parental control of schools (e.g., being a parent of school-aged children).

Our data do not allow us to test the first condition, but it would appear to be a widely held perception in American society. We shall test this directly in later research on this subject. The second condition is tested in Table 7-39 with a question about satisfaction with "public schools in this neighborhood." And just as the instrumental interpretation would require, this question acts as an important mediator in both all-white and interracial neighborhoods. In short, those who feel both relatively deprived and dissatisfied with their local schools are especially prone to becoming strong believers in parental control.

Two other questions about school quality, however, do not play this mediating function: "Public schools in Cleveland are not as good as public schools in other large

Table 7-36

Composite Relative Deprivation Measure and Others vs. Highly Favorable Dichotomy of Parental Control Index for Whites

Composite Relative Deprivation Measure[1]	Parental Control Index: Opposed and Moderately Favorable (0-2)	Parental Control Index: Highly Favorable (3,4)	Total (N)
Satisfied	90%	10%	100% (252)
Dissatisfied	71%	29%	100% (235)

Chi-Square = 27.6; $p < .001$

Tau b = +.24

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[1] Respondents are scored as satisfied or dissatisfied with their economic gains compared to Negroes if they reside in interracial neighborhoods or compared to non-manuals as defined in Table 7-34 if they reside in all-white neighborhoods.

Table 7-37

Relative Deprivation Measure and Highly Favorable Whites on Parental Control by Five Control Variables

Control Variable	Composite Relative Deprivation[1] Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Tau b	Chi-Square p	All-White Neighborhoods Only[2] Tau b	Interracial Neighborhoods Only[3] Tau b
Income						
Under $6,000	14%	28%	+.17	<.10	+.10	+.32
$6,000-$10,000	8%	25%	+.22	<.01	+.15	+.46
Over $10,000	9%	39%	+.35	<.01	+.33	+.29
Education						
Grade School	8%	24%	+.22	<.05	+.10	+.52
Some High School	9%	33%	+.29	<.01	+.24	+.40
High School Graduate or More	11%	29%	+.23	<.01	+.20	+.32
Social Class Identification						
Working-Distant	11%	46%	+.38	<.01	+.25	+.62

[1] Defined as in Table 7-36.

[2] Relative deprivation defined in comparison to non-manuals only.

[3] Relative deprivation defined in comparison to Negroes only.

Table 7-37 (continued)

Control Variable	Composite Relative Deprivation		Tau b	Chi-Square p	All-White Neighborhoods Only Tau b	Interracial Neighborhoods Only Tau b
	Satisfied	Dissatisfied				
Working-Close	11%	20%	+.13	n.s.	+.06	+.28
Middle-Distant	9%	26%	+.22	<.10	+.23	+.13
Middle-Close	4%	41%	+.47	<.01	+.25	+.33
Age						
21-40 years	13%	30%	+.22	<.01	+.17	+.29
41+ years	7%	27%	+.27	<.01	+.19	+.47
Sex						
Male	12%	26%	+.19	<.01	+.12	+.40
Female	8%	31%	+.30	<.01	+.25	+.42

Table 7-38

Relative Deprivation Measure and White Agreement to the Four Parental Control Items

Parental Control Index Item	Composite Relative Deprivation[1]		Tau b	Chi-Square p	All-White Neighborhoods Only[1] Tau b	Interracial Neighborhoods Only[1] Tau b
	Satisfied	Dissatisfied				
A. ...hire teachers	18%	32%	+.17	<.01	+.11	+.31
B. ...hire principals	16%	32%	+.19	<.01	+.17	+.27
C. ...decide courses	27%	31%	+.05	n.s.	+.04	+.08
D. ...spend money	36%	52%	+.16	<.01	+.17	+.15

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[1] Defined as in Table 7-37.

Table 7-39

Relative Deprivation and Highly Favorable Whites on Parental Control Index by Attitudes Toward Local Schools

...how satisfied are you with some of the public schools the city is supposed to provide for your neighborhood -- public schools in this neighborhood?	Relative Deprivation[1]		Tau b	Chi-Square p
	Satisfied	Dissatisfied		
Total Sample				
Satisfied	12%	22%	+.14	<.05
Dissatisfied	6%	46%	+.45	<.001
Interracial Neighborhoods Only				
Satisfied	9%	37%	+.34	<.02
Dissatisfied	4%	47%	+.51	<.005
All-White Neighborhoods Only				
Satisfied	13%	19%	+.09	n.s.
Dissatisfied	8%	45%	+.41	<.01

---

[1] Relative deprivation is defined differently in each sample as described in Table 7-37.

cities in the North" and "What do you think of the education children get in public schools here in Cleveland -- very good, good, fair, or poor?" These items differ in two critical ways from the one shown in Table 7-39. First, they do not refer to neighborhood schools, only schools in Cleveland at large. And second, they do not imply the third condition of an ineffectual political system as the key item does by stressing what "...the city is supposed to provide for your neighborhood." It is tempting to reason that the crucial perception is relative once more; in this case, how the local schools are seen relative to the city's school system as a whole. This possibility, too, requires later testing. In any event, when the local public schools are seen as inadequate, relative economic deprivation is more likely to be acted out in the form of extreme favorability for parental control of schools.

The third proposed mediating condition, the perception that the political system cannot deal with the problem of poor local schools, is tested in Table 7-40 with the simple Likert item, "Elected officials in general can be trusted." Once again, as expected, a process of mediation occurs. It is not as powerful an effect as shown in Table 7-39, particularly for all-white neighborhoods. Yet the trend is clear in the interracial neighborhoods: distrust of elected officials makes it more likely that relative economic deprivation will be associated with general acceptance of parental control ideas.[21]

Finally, Tables 7-41, 7-42, and 7-43 check on the fourth hypothesized condition -- the ability to benefit directly from parental control. First, we note the striking interaction rendered by comparing parents of school-aged children with non-parents (Table 7-41). Indeed, the relationship between relative economic deprivation and strongly favorable parental control attitudes is even reversed for non-parents in all-white neighborhoods. The parental variable, then, acts as a powerful mediator of the effect. Similarly, though to a lesser extent, neighborhood marginality mediates the relationship in

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[21] The same trend emerges for interracial neighborhoods for five other questions tapping dissatisfaction with the political system. However, no such trend is apparent for the all-white neighborhoods.

Table 7-40

Relative Deprivation and Highly Favorable Whites on Parental Control Index By Trust of Elected Officials

Elected officials in general can be trusted.	Relative Deprivation[1]		Tau b	Chi-Square p
	Satisfied	Dissatisfied		
Total Sample				
Agree, Trust	10%	22%	+.17	<.02
Disagree, Distrust	10%	34%	+.28	<.001
Interracial Neighborhoods Only				
Agree, Trust	6%	22%	+.24	<.15
Disagree, Distrust	6%	46%	+.47	<.001
All-White Neighborhoods Only				
Agree, Trust	11%	21%	+.14	<.10
Disagree, Distrust	12%	30%	+.21	<.03

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[1] Relative deprivation is defined differently in each sample as described in Table 7-37.

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Table 7-41

Relative Deprivation and Highly Favorable Whites on Parental Control Index By Parenthood

Parenthood of School-Aged Children	Relative Deprivation[1]		Tau b	Chi-Square p
	Satisfied	Dissatisfied		
Total Sample				
Parents	8%	33%	+.32	$<.001$
Non-Parents	18%	9%	-.12	n.s.
Interracial Neighborhoods Only				
Parents	4%	41%	+.47	$<.001$
Non-Parents	14%	22%	+.10	n.s.
All-White Neighborhoods Only				
Parents	9%	31%	+.26	$<.001$
Non-Parents	19%	6%	-.20	$<.20$

---

[1] Relative deprivation is defined differently in each sample as described in Table 7-37.

Table 7-42

Relative Deprivation and Highly Favorable Whites on Parental Control Index By Neighborhood Marginality

How many people in this neighborhood do you know on a first-name basis -- most, many, some, or just a few?	Relative Deprivation[1] Satisfied	 Dissatisfied	Tau b	Chi-Square p
Total Sample				
Involved (most, many)	8%	30%	+.28	<.001
Marginal (some, few, none)	11%	28%	+.22	<.001
Interracial Neighborhoods Only				
Involved (most, many)	7%	54%	+.53	<.002
Marginal (some, few, none)	5%	31%	+.35	<.002
All-White Neighborhoods Only				
Involved (most, many)	9%	26%	+.23	<.01
Marginal (some, few, none)	14%	26%	+.16	<.05

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[1] Relative deprivation is defined differently in each sample as described in Table 7-37.

Table 7-43

Relative Deprivation and Highly Favorable Whites on Parental Control Index By Political Activity Index

Political Activity Index (0-4)	Relative Deprivation[1]			
	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Tau b	Chi-Square p
Total Sample				
Inactive (0)	8%	22%	+.19	$<.001$
Active (1-2)	12%	42%	+.34	$<.001$
Very Active (3-4)	11%	22%	+.15	n.s.
Interracial Neighborhoods Only				
Inactive (0)	6%	39%	+.42	$<.001$
Active (1-2)	9%	43%	+.40	$<.02$
Very Active (3-4)	---[2]	---[2]	----	----
All-White Neighborhoods Only				
Inactive (0)	10%	17%	+.11	$<.20$
Active (1-2)	13%	42%	+.31	$<.002$
Very Active (3-4)	18%	27%	+.11	n.s.

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[1] Relative deprivation is defined differently in each sample as described in Table 7-37.

[2] Insufficient cases for analysis.

interracial neighborhoods (Table 7-42), and political activity mediates it for all-white neighborhoods (Table 7-43). Notice in Table 7-43 that it is the politically active, rather than the inactive or the very active, who show most sharply the relationship between relative deprivation and highly positive parental control attitudes. It may well be that inactives could not benefit from changes in local school governance, while the very active are so closely enmeshed in the existing political system that they could possibly lose influence through any change. At any rate, those who stand to benefit from parental control of public schools, especially parents themselves, are most likely to evince the conversion of sensed relative deprivation into strongly pro-parental control opinions.

A Note of Caution. A similar study of attitudes toward parental control of the public schools in Boston obtained such different results that a note of caution must be sounded at this point. Riley and Cohen (1970) employed the same four-item index as used here on both black and white samples. They also found Negroes somewhat more pro-parental control than whites; yet their chief predictor, ethnicity among whites, did not operate in Cleveland at all. They noted that among whites the groups most removed from local power, the Jews and British, were most favorable. No such trend appears in the Cleveland results, perhaps because of its sharply different political and ethnic structure. At any rate, the Boston investigation failed to find relationships between parental control attitudes and either age or political participation -- two of the major predictors among the whites in these Cleveland data. Such contradictions in findings with the same index suggest that the correlates of parental control attitudes may be highly specific to the particular civic situation. Research in additional cities using the same measure is clearly needed.

Summary. Three significant trends emerged from our analysis of the four-item Parental Control Index in Cleveland:

(1) Negroes are more pro-parental control than the whites sampled, though there is substantial opposition in both racial groups. It should be remembered, however, that our sample of whites are representative of working-class areas of Cleveland, not of whites in Cleveland as a whole; thus, our generalizations from the white data apply only to working-class neighborhoods.

(2) Two rather different types of Negro supporters for parental control emerge. The smaller group includes parental control of schools as part of a larger ideological framework of black power. These advocates are generally radically militant and often anti-integration and anti-white, but they are not low in fate control. The larger group of supporters are neither radically militant nor particularly anti-white and they favor school integration. But they are dissatisfied with public schools and possess a low sense of fate control and political efficacy.

(3) Similarly, two contrasting sources of support for parental control contentions emerge among the white respondents. The larger group agrees with one or two of the parental control items out of largely expressive motivation within a broader framework of political liberalism. These whites are found in greatest numbers among the young, politically active, and ideologically liberal. A smaller group demonstrates its greater enthusiasm about parental control by agreeing with three or all four of the items of the index. These whites are motivated by a strong sense of economic deprivation relative to non-manuals and Negroes and an intense dissatisfaction with their own neighborhood schools; and they are often parents of school-aged children themselves. If the first group is moderately pro-parental control for expressive reasons, then this second group is extremely pro-parental control for instrumental reasons. They want better public schools for their children, and feel they can bring this about themselves better than governmental officials.

These basic conclusions, if we can generalize from Cleveland, lead one to expect that the general issue of parental control of the public schools and the complex issues it raises will continue to grow as a major issue for American education in the 1970's. While support for the idea is not as widespread within either the black or white communities in Cleveland as the mass media sometimes suggest, there is nevertheless a fervent minority in each racial group which advocates the alteration in governance. And these minorities seem to be able, in a central city such as Cleveland, to gain further support among rather different and larger segments of their communities. These data, then, not only delineate the nature and basis of the support for the parental control movement, but suggest that it will not be a passing issue which soon vanishes from the educational scene.

Chapter Eight

Trends in Racial Attitudes in the Urban North[1]

Earlier we considered trends in the racial attitudes of Texans and how they were influenced by dramatic events. Building on the social psychological model of dramatic events we evolved for Texas in Chapter Three and the racial ecology and attitudes of particular northern cities outlined in Chapters Six and Seven, we are now ready to explore the trends in racial attitudes in the urban North and how dramatic events have influenced them.

The Flow of Racial Events Since 1954

The 1954 decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Brown vs. Board of Education and the stream of subsequent integration decisions and events which flowed from it contributed significantly to the increased legitimacy of racial desegregation and to a change in the political climate of the United States (Deutsch and Merritt, 1965). Dramatic events in the formation of public opinion have been an important factor in this process. Beginning with the Supreme Court ruling in 1954, racial change has periodically been accompanied by major crises and dramatic shifts in governmental policies. Historically, the best known events since 1954, Little Rock, New Orleans, Oxford, Birmingham, Selma, have involved violent confrontations between segregationist and integrationist forces within the South followed by governmental intervention (Lewis, 1964). In retrospect, these events represented critical turning points in the Negro's efforts to achieve racial equality. In the aftermath of these crises, discriminatory practices that were the central target of civil rights and governmental activities gradually succumbed to external pressure for change. And the unfolding of these events as presented in the mass media increased the saliency of racial problems as a public issue and helped to form new attitude orientations toward the race issue by Negroes as well as whites.

Parallel to these developments, white attitudes have demonstrated large shifts away from manifest anti-Negro sentiments (Schwartz, 1967; Sheatsley, 1966). Many of the conventional stereotypes concerning the Negro are slowly disappearing. By 1962 only a small minority of white Northerners felt that Negroes were intellectually inferior to whites or that Negroes should not have the same employment opportunities as whites (Schwartz, 1967, pp. 19-22, 73-75, 131, 133; Hyman and Sheatsley, 1964; Sheatsley, 1966). Likewise, strong objections to certain forms of interpersonal contact, for example, Negro neighbors or a few Negroes attending school with white children, have diminished (Schwartz, 1967, pp. 22-28, 53-58).

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[1] This chapter is largely the responsibility of Professor J. Michael Ross, now in the Department of Sociology at the University of California at San Diego, and formerly the associate director of the project.

During the past two decades, Supreme Court decisions and federal actions supporting their implementation have probably been the most important factors in undercutting the normative support for discrimination and intolerance (Pettigrew, 1966). By explicitly re-affirming minority group rights, long disabused in practice, these legal decisions have gradually forced an alteration in segregationist customs. Over an extended period, the daily conformity to formalized patterns of desegregated behavior entailed some modification of attitudes such that certain types of integration were more acceptable. As a result, a large majority of even white Southerners agree that Negroes as citizens must be guaranteed the right to vote, the unrestricted use of public transportation and the opportunity to obtain decent housing (Brink and Harris, 1964, 1967).

Yet despite these trends, white reactions to specific racial events have demonstrated a mixture of positive and negative emotions. On the one hand, unprecedented intervention by the federal government in major crises, like Little Rock and Oxford, have generally been positively endorsed by the majority of white Northerners (Brink and Harris, 1964, 1967). On the other hand, Negro protest activities per se have evoked negative responses. Regardless of the specific tactic employed, massive demonstrations, boycotts, sit-ins, freedom rides, etc., most white Northerners have perceived the civil rights movement as proceeding too rapidly, being more violent than peaceful, and hurting the "Negro cause" (Schwartz, 1967, pp. 89-103; Sheatsley, 1966, pp. 229-232). As long as these reactions did not appear to weaken white Northern support for civil rights legislation, they could be accounted for either as the tensions produced by the pressure for racial change or as residual hostility toward the Negro. Thus, prior to 1965, most social scientists were still convinced that the cumulative impact of these events had made a positive contribution to the changing racial climate in the United States.

However, as riots erupted and the civil rights movement grew more militant, many of the same social scientists perceived an increase in white northern opposition to the principles of racial equality. In the aftermath of congressional antipathy to new civil rights legislation, this reversal in racial sentiment was attributed to such factors as militant Negro protest activities and the persistent federal pressure for racial change. With the growing acceptance of the mass media's "backlash theory," these factors were increasingly viewed as a negative influence on white northern attitudes toward the Negro.

If the nature of white reactions to dramatic events was solely an interesting historical question, the problem would not warrant extensive analysis for this report. However, most investigations of racial change begin with divergent assessments of these reactions and conflicting hypotheses about their long-term trends. Since each explanation in turn is an attempt to account for these reactions and patterns, it is understandable why there is so little agreement about the theoretical implications of resistance to racial change as a complex phenomenon. Accordingly, the analysis of this chapter is directed towards empirical clarification of the relationship between white northern public opinion and activities initiated by Negro protest groups and the federal government. Only when we find a consistent pattern during this period, 1962-1966, can we begin to make more definitive statements about systematic trends and their determinants.

Obviously, we can only make indirect inferences about the intervening cognitive processes underlying aggregate public opinion changes. But the pattern of these responses and its stability over time give us some indirect information relevant to the attitude structure of resistance as well as the role of external factors in modifying those attitudes.

Our analysis in this chapter is divided into three sections, each representing a slightly different perspective to the same problem.

The Effect of Specific Dramatic Events[2]

Despite the controversy about the effects of dramatic events, the few systematic before-after studies paradoxically have found no immediate or direct changes in northern public opinion as a function of specific governmental actions or racial crisis. Based upon extensive secondary analysis of national survey data, Schwartz concluded that neither Supreme Court decisions nor the Little Rock conflict had any unusual effect on white attitudes toward segregated schools (Schwartz, 1967, pp. 32-41).

> . . .over the short run, there was some evidence of responsiveness to immediate events. But the connection between opinions and events was not a close one, and over the long run, it was possible to discern a moderate trend toward increasingly favorable attitudes, regardless of the public issues at the time

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[2] We are defining as dramatic events those racial occurrences which the American mass media considered "significant and important news stories." But we differ from past research on this topic by considering the flow of such newsworthy events, rather than merely discrete events considered singly and in isolation. Examples of this latter type of analysis were provided for Texas in Chapter Three. A "flow analysis" is especially required for American race relations, because Negro Americans, North and South, have traditionally not had access to the normal political mechanisms and channels of communication. To voice their demands, they were forced to adopt a particular form of "demand expression" that bypasses these normal mechanisms and channels, a form that often challenges and disrupts the routine operations of established institutions. Not surprisingly, then, "demand expressions" typically arouse strong counter-reactions and the resulting "crisis" breaks into the news as a significant event. By definition, then, a social movement built on "demand expressions" will generate a series of cumulating events; and such a series requires an analysis of the full flow over a specified period of time.

> when opinions were being measured. (Schwartz, 1967, p. 115)

With shorter time intervals, Sheatsley also found that opinions were not subject to sudden and dramatic shifts even when racial tensions were high (Sheatsley, 1966, pp. 220-221, 233-237).

> The strength of the long-term trend was further attested by its immunity to short-run events. In both 1956 and 1963, it was possible to ask the question on three separate surveys at different times of the year, and it is evident that all three surveys in each year produced essentially identical results. One would not necessarily have expected such short-term stability. (Sheatsley, 1966, p. 220)

In general, the authors of both studies have argued that the cumulative nature of change, mediated by other intervening factors such as education, is more important than short-term shifts produced by dramatic racial events.

But this argument that individuals are largely unresponsive to the external environment is not universally accepted. To begin with, the data from the above studies are not entirely convincing. Within Sheatsley's results we find a four per cent decrease in white southern approval of integrated schools during 1963 (Sheatsley, 1966, p. 219). More detailed presentation of these same N.O.R.C. surveys in Schwartz's work indicates even larger decreases in pro-integration attitudes among both grade school (minus seven per cent) and college-educated (minus fifteen per cent) white Southerners (Schwartz, 1967, p. 131). And we have already noted in detail in Chapter Three significant and meaningful shifts in both white and Negro racial attitudes in Texas following the assassination of Dr. King and the issuance of the Kerner Commission Report. Other studies of prejudice, in this case anti-Jewish sentiments, have revealed significant short-term changes, reflecting psychological reactions to the tensions produced by World War II, superimposed on long-term trends of decreasing levels of anti-Semitism (Stember, 1967).

Furthermore, findings from studies in the area of international affairs are incompatible with the Sheatsley-Schwartz argument. For example, Western European attitudes toward the Soviet Union fluctuated sharply in both directions following the invasion of Hungary and the launching of

Sputnik (Deutsch and Merritt, 1965, pp. 149-151, 174-176). Similarly, a study of public opinion concerning nuclear weapon testing showed both numerous and wide swings in the approval of unilateral suspension of testing (Rosi, 1965). Another investigation revealed significant shifts in American expectation of cooperation with the Soviet Union which corresponded closely with the reported behavior of the U.S.S.R. in the mass media (Caspary, 1967). In recent years approval of the President manifests both sudden up and down movements following dramatic international and national crises.

The Impact of an Event and Its Empirical Measurement. These divergent findings are not very helpful in establishing predictions for white reactions to dramatic events during the period 1962-1966. Yet they do raise questions that direct us towards a more systematic statement of our problem and possible resolution of these conflicting findings. In particular, the empirical problem of isolating the independent impact of an event and the precise definition of an effect are critical, but frequently unrecognized, issues in the study of public opinion change.

The most obvious factor limiting the amount of attitude change is the built-in psychological mechanisms for the maintenance of a stable belief system (Berelson and Steiner, 1964, pp. 664-666). Despite sudden changes in the external environment, one cannot always expect new pieces of information to alter old beliefs and attitudes. Events radically inconsistent with current attitudes can simply be screened out or assimilated and distorted to fit a familiar outlook. Information may have an impact and generate considerable cognitive activity, but the outcome, especially as measured by public opinion surveys, may be minimal.

Likewise, one cannot assume that a person is dependent upon the news media for his information about the outside world. A large part of his everyday knowledge and the normative support for his beliefs emerge from informal contacts. Thus, the account of a particular event may be received third-hand and distorted in the intervening process. Moreover, communication processes within an individual's immediate social network can counteract and reduce the significance of more distant occurrences as communicated by the mass media.

> Here again, the impact of spectacular events and of sustained efforts of governments and media of mass communication can speed the pace of large-scale change, but

> even so, many attitudes and images persist, or return at least part of the way toward their previous state, once the immediate external pressures slacken and so long as the main individual personality structures and supporting social networks have remained intact. (Deutsch and Merritt, 1965, p. 183)

Even if we could somehow control for these factors, we still would face the problem of defining quantitatively the meaning of an effect. In simple terms, any observed change meeting statistical standards of non-randomness might be satisfactory. However, a more adequate definition should include specifications of three other criteria:

(1) the type of effect: long-term versus short-term changes.

(2) the stability of an effect: permanent versus temporary changes.

(3) definition of prior events: single versus multiple sets of group or individual activities.

With these distinctions in mind, it becomes apparent that the divergent findings in the above studies are attributable to implicit variations in each investigator's definition of what constitutes a "meaningful" effect.[3]

Thus, given the social consequences of a particular issue, each investigation has focused on a different type of effect. For example, in studies of racial attitudes, the primary concern generally has been long-term permanent changes produced by a series of racial events. From this "social problem" orientation, temporary or short-term increases in prejudice are not critical as long as the long-term trend toward more tolerant attitudes remains intact. In the area of international affairs, the central focus has been on short-term fluctuations generated by a spectacular occurrence such as the launching of the first Soviet satellite. In studies involving less salient or peripheral public issues, such as nuclear disarmament, long-term permanent changes have been the result mainly of gradual but consistent shifts in governmental policy reinforced by public statements by governmental leaders. However, in comparison with more central beliefs such as minority group prejudices, this type of unstructured attitude is highly susceptible to influence from so-called "opinion elites." Thus, when a peripheral issue suddenly attracts national attention, one can expect large fluctuations.

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[3] An additional distinction can be made concerning direct or indirect effects of dramatic events. For example, most investigators have attributed changes in attitudes toward desegregation of schools to the 1954 Supreme Court decision *per se*. However, other intervening factors, such as the use of federal troops, the closing of schools in Little Rock, the unexpected financial losses following "massive resistance," probably had a greater impact first on the white South's acceptance of the inevitability of desegregation and subsequently on attitudes toward integration.

For our purposes, clarification of these issues helps define the scope and objectives of our inquiry as being limited to the short-term effect of one dramatic event or a related set of events. Any discussion of their permanent effect or their cumulative long-term pattern must be secondary concerns at this point. And we must recognize the limitations of survey data as a tool to measure attitudinal change. Regardless of the length of time between measurements, the survey response represents only the end product of each individual's cognitive processes. The observed change is at best, then, only a gross assessment, subject to numerous intervening contingencies beyond our control.

However, in order to minimize the influence of other intervening factors, such as countervailing forces produced by informal communication processes, our measurement of opinion changes must take place within a relatively narrow time span. If there is a change in attitudes following a particular event, shorter intervals between opinion measurements increase the likelihood that the change is mainly a function of a particular event.

A "Quasi-Experimental" Time-Series Design. As in the dramatic event analyses of Chapter Three, the design used here is roughly analogous to a simple before-after laboratory experiment. Given a prior measurement, the occurrence of a specific event represents in abstract terms the experimental manipulation of variation in the independent variable, though it is obviously not under our control. Any net aggregate change exceeding purely sampling variations is assumed to be a function of the intervening event and an approximate estimate of actual change within individuals although our measurements are based upon samplings of different individuals. As a "control" group, we have adjacent points in time where no major event occurred. With the multiple measurement of opinions, allowing some replication of our findings, this type of treatment of survey data has been labelled a "quasi-experimental" or a "pseudo-panel" time series design (Campbell and Stanley, 1963).

Obviously in comparison with the ideal experimental design, the qualifier "quasi" understates both the many confounding factors involved in this study and the artificiality of this post hoc construction of a time series design. For instance, the experimental assumptions concerning a "neutral" before point are not valid. Not only have events prior to 1962 already produced some changes in public opinion but also each individual's interpretation of recent events is dependent upon his particular reconstruction and evaluation of past history. Similarly, the decision by national polling agencies to include race-oriented items in their questionnaires is not random. Thus, as the saliency of civil rights issues increases, these questions are more likely to be added, thereby distorting the normal levels of positive or negative sentiments. Without minimizing the significance of these problems, an examination of the relationship between dramatic events and public opinion is justified as long as the limitations are recognized.

An unusual opportunity for such an analysis is provided us by Gallup's American Institute of Public Opinion (A.I.P.O.) which asked the same race question eighteen times during the critical five-year period -- more than any other race question was asked by any national survey agency during these years. We seek preliminary answers to the basic questions: Did the major events during 1962-1966 have a short-term effect on attitudes toward the racial initiatives of the two Democratic presidents? And if so, did they tend to increase or decrease support for the government's efforts to integrate? Our analysis is based upon urban northern responses to the question: "Is the Kennedy (Johnson) administration pushing integration too fast or not fast enough?"[4] In the actual interview procedure, the "about right" alternative is read to the respondent after the "too fast" alternative. In our presentation of the findings, the label "too slow" has been substituted for "not fast enough."

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[4] "Urban" is minimally defined in the U. S. Census manner as all communities of at least 2,500 people. "North" is defined essentially as "non-South," that is, it includes all but the eleven ex-Confederate states and the border states.

Basic Empirical Findings. The pattern of responses for both Negroes and whites to the "pushing integration" item over a four year time span is graphically summarized in Figure 8-1.[5] It suggests some general conclusions concerning the reaction of white Northerners to the major racial events in this period. The observed changes between sampling points clearly demonstrate both sharp fluctuations within short time periods and unexpected stability during other intervals. At certain points in time (following Oxford, Birmingham, and Selma), the large changes in the per cent responding "too fast" and "too slow" show the uniform effect of racial crisis and its political aftermath on public opinion. Consistently the direction of these shifts is toward increased resistance to liberal governmental policies. In most cases, the percentage "too fast" increases and the per cent "too slow" decreases at the same time. Yet at other times (e.g., the March on Washington and the Watts "riot"), we fail to find the expected reactions either to organized or unorganized Negro protests. Moreover, careful inspection of white northern responses when the "pushing integration" question is repeated on a monthly basis indicates that both the governmental response to the crisis and the political controversy surrounding civil rights legislation, rather than the events precipitating the crisis, initiated the largest increases in white resistance to racial change.

But this terse summary fails to capture either the actual historical impact of these events or the opinion climate at each point in time. Accordingly, a better understanding of these shifts requires a detailed review of the events prior to each survey and an empirical elaboration of the more important changes. This survey-by-survey historical account can pinpoint what kind of crisis situations and governmental actions were most likely to stimulate resistant reactions. And this provides insight into the intervening factors underlying these trends. In addition, we wish to stress the variations in the per cent of whites responding

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[5] Figure 8-1 shows the trend data for both whites and Negroes in the urban North. This section focuses upon the white results. The Negro data, derived from considerably fewer cases and consequently less stable, will be considered in detail in later sections of this chapter.

Figure 8-1

Negro and White Responses in the Urban North to "Pushing Integration" Question, 1962-1966



"too slow," a figure usually overlooked in analysis of the "pushing integration" question, but equally significant as a possible countervailing force to the dominant swings in the resistant direction.

Historical Review: The Kennedy Years. Our first survey (Table 8-1's A.I.P.O. #658, May 1, 1962) is an important indicator of attitudes toward the Kennedy administration's racial policies prior to its move toward more extensive federal involvement in civil rights issues. Despite the 1960 campaign rhetoric, the first two years of Kennedy's presidency witnessed minimal pursuit of civil rights legislation (Lewis, 1964, pp. 114-120). This relatively low level of federal activity is reflected in white northern responses to the "pushing integration" question in May, 1962.[6] Observe the data provided in Table 8-1. At one extreme only 27.6 per cent expressed the opinion that the pace of racial change was "too fast," and at the other extreme 11.7 per cent responded "too slow." The dominant majority was either satisfied with existing policies (40.3 per cent "about right") or indifferent (20.4 per cent no opinion).

This relatively calm atmosphere was shaken in October,

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[6] One might well doubt the validity of our key "pushing integration" item as a strictly race-related question because of its political party implications. Obviously from 1961 to 1969, party loyalty for Democrats might have acted to inhibit criticism of the President's racial policies, while it might have led Republicans to be more negative than otherwise. And, indeed, Democrats were in our samples the least likely to respond "too fast," Independents were intermediate, and Republicans most likely. Nevertheless, we feel that the "pushing integration" item did measure satisfaction with federal racial policies per se, rather than partisan attitudes on other issues; and we believe the observed party differences largely reflect a meaningful and consistent divergence in opinion by party concerning the proper role of the federal government in resolving racial problems. Hence, if political party loyalty were of overriding importance, we would not expect the Democrats to consistently respond "too slow" more than others -- also a criticism of their party's president (for all surveys combined, white northern urban Democrats answered "too slow" 13.0 per cent of the time, Independents 11.0 per cent, and Republicans 9.6 per cent). Moreover, we find the same party differences on other racial questions which do not have directly political implications.

Table 8-1

White Responses to "Pushing Integration" Question in the Urban North During the Kennedy Years

Response	Gallup A.I.P.O. Survey								
	A658 5/1/62 N=729	A664 10/17/62 N=841	A673 5/21/63 N=823	A674 6/19/63 N=822	A675 7/16/63 N=728	A676 8/13/63 N=775	A677 9/10/63 N=792	A678 10/9/63 N=830	A679 11/8/63 N=792
"Too Fast"	27.6%	36.7%	32.8%	35.8%	48.6%	47.1%	46.1%	46.3%	45.7%
Don't Know	20.4	13.2	14.7	12.7	13.9	12.5	12.5	9.8	9.5
"About Right"	40.3	37.6	34.8	37.2	28.0	30.6	29.4	32.3	34.7
"Too Slow"	11.7	12.5	17.7	14.4	9.5	9.8	12.0	11.7	10.1
Difference (Too Fast - About Right)	-12.7%	-0.9%	-2.0%	-1.4%	+20.6%	+16.5%	+16.7%	+14.0%	+11.0%
Mean Resistance Score[1]	2.64	2.74	2.63	2.70	3.02	2.97	2.93	2.91	2.91

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[1] The "Mean Resistance Score" is constructed by weighting "too fast" responses by four points, "don't know" by three, "about right" by two, and "too slow" by one.

1962, with the violent confrontation between federal and state authority in Oxford, Mississippi.[7] One month after federal intervention had successfully achieved the admission of James Meredith (Table 8-1's A.I.P.O. #664, November 17, 1962), white northern reactions showed a large increase in the per cent "too fast" (9.1). Some of this increment can be attributed to shifts from the "don't know" category. Yet even if only a reaction among the previously disinterested, this significant increment is the first sign that whites in the urban North would respond resistantly even when the government intervention was in the South and for all practical purposes the only available option.

Throughout the spring of 1963, new racial crises developed: the Birmingham crisis, violent sit-ins in Jackson, Governor Wallace's stand in the "schoolhouse doorway," and the Mississippi assassination of Medgar Evers. Yet, as seen in Table 8-1, these dramatic events had only a limited impact on white northern attitudes toward the Kennedy administration's racial policies through mid-June. Notice in particular that the Birmingham episode, complete with fire hoses and "Bull" Connor, failed to spark any strong sentiments for increased federal initiative. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the percentage responding "too slow" did manifest a relatively large increase (6 per cent) from its level one year earlier, creating the high water mark of pro-change sentiment in the 1962-1966 period under study. But the absolute figure of only one in six (17.7 per cent) suggests that the desire for more intensive federal involvement in racial problems was always a minority sentiment in the white urban North at best; and that the impetus for new policies that emerged in the following months was not a function of massive public pressure. At the same time, observe that without direct federal intervention in the Birmingham crisis the level of resistance decreased slightly in comparison with post-Oxford sentiments, although racial tensions were equally high.

During the week prior to the next survey (Table 8-1's A.I.P.O. #674, June 19, 1963), the long latent commitment to new civil rights policies finally materialized beginning with a major presidential speech appealing for racial justice followed one week with an unprecedented legislative program for racial reform. In the midst of this sudden and publicized shift in governmental policy, we find that the state of white northern public opinion had not moved appreciably from its previous level four weeks earlier. Despite the charged political and racial atmosphere, the percentage responding "too fast" was 35.8 per cent -- somewhat below its previous high during the University of Mississippi crisis and only 3.0 per cent higher than its level in May. Similarly, the percentage which responded "too slow" remained relatively high (14.4 per cent).

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[7] The earlier civil rights conflict at Albany, Georgia did not become a state vs. federal confrontation nor did it receive nearly as much mass media attention as the Ole Miss episode at Oxford (Lewis, 1964, pp. 93-100).

As the immediate saliency of the Birmingham crisis receded, we find a very large upward movement in the intensity of white northern resistance only one month later. By the middle of July (Table 8-1's A.I.P.O. #675, July 16, 1963), nearly half of the whites in the urban North (48.6 per cent) thought that Kennedy was pushing integration "too fast," a sharp increase of 12.8 per cent from June. Likewise, the sentiment favoring more federal initiative reached a new low (9.5 per cent), decreasing swiftly from 17.7 per cent two months earlier. A review of the New York Times during this period, mid-June to mid-July, does not reveal any new crisis or unusual governmental action that might easily account for this change. The most prominent news stories were primarily accounts of contrasting positions on the proposed Public Accommodations Bill, including extensive coverage of southern and Republican statements concerning the Bill's alleged "unconstitutionality." It is possible that the interviewing for A.I.P.O. #674, following so closely the formal proposal of this legislation, did not allow sufficient time for the public to realize the full implications of these new governmental initiatives. Yet the prolonged and highly publicized controversy may well be a necessary precondition before general dispositions can solidify into actual judgments about the pace of racial change. During this period, anyone searching for a reason to justify his feeling that things were going "too fast" could easily find a "legitimate" argument presented in the mass media.

Throughout the summer and early fall of 1963 (Table 8-1's A.I.P.O. #676, August 13, 1963 through A.I.P.O. #679, November 8, 1963), the level of resistance remained consistently high and stable with the percentage responding "too fast" dropping only 1.9 per cent. With the Kennedy Administration seeking to achieve a compromise acceptable to both moderate Republicans and civil rights groups campaigning actively for quick enactment, the continuing controversy helped maintain the high saliency of the civil rights issue. Despite the national preoccupation with racial problems, the March on Washington failed to produce any further increases in resistance nor did the Birmingham church bombing revive the diminished pro-change minority. In the fall of 1963, President Kennedy had to admit that the Public Accommodations Bill would have to wait until the next session of Congress. Because of the intervening assassination, we can only speculate on the possible resurgence of similar reactions in the context of an election year and the resultant effect on Congressional decision-making.

Historical Review: The Johnson Years. The first assessment of public reactions to the new President occurred in January, 1964, only two months after the Kennedy assassination (Table 8-2's A.I.P.O. #680, January 28, 1964). The results from the "pushing integration" question, with Johnson's name now substituted for Kennedy's, showed the level of resistance had reverted back to its early 1962 status, with the percentage responding "too fast" lowered from 45.7 per cent to 29.7 per cent. Although Johnson quickly disappointed those who expected a reduction in federal initiative, this drop in resistance could reflect a relatively objective evaluation of the new President's limited opportunity to demonstrate a strong pro-civil rights orientation. But, as noted for Texas in Chapter Three, there is considerable evidence that the emotional reaction to the assassination itself helped dissipate the antagonisms surrounding the controversial Public Accommodation legislation and created more favorable attitudes toward those domestic policies strongly supported by Kennedy. Whatever its cause, this unusual change in public opinion certainly contributed to an atmosphere more conducive to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Skipping the remainder of 1964, the next sampling of white attitudes in the urban North toward the Johnson Administration's racial policies followed within a week of the violent confrontation between civil rights marchers and Alabama state police at the bridge in Selma. Despite this crisis, the survey responses reflect attitudes still supportive of Johnson's pro-change position although the pressure from those desiring more federal involvement once again increased to over 15 per cent. In general, both the low percentage responding "too fast" and the relatively high percentage responding "too slow" were very similar to the public opinion climate during the Birmingham crisis two years earlier. Without a measurement prior to the beginning of the Selma demonstrations, the specific effect of this dramatic event, at least in its first phase, is difficult to determine. Nonetheless, if we assume that the levels of resistance during early February were similar to January, it is apparent that the demonstrations and Johnson's public statements urging the

Table 8-2

White Responses to "Pushing Integration" Question in the Urban North During the Johnson Years

Response	Gallup A.I.P.O. Survey								
	A684 1/28/64 N=809	A708 3/16/65 N=759	A709 3/31/65 N=741	A713 6/22/65 N=629	A714 7/14/65 N=841	A716 8/25/65 N=704	A730 7/1/66 N=815	A734 9/6/66 N=748	A736 10/19/66 N=808
"Too Fast"	29.7%	31.5%	41.8%	35.8%	42.9%	43.2%	42.2%	52.4%	52.2%
Don't Know	15.2	11.6	8.6	8.9	8.2	13.2	12.1	9.5	10.0
"About Right"	42.0	40.7	38.5	43.2	38.9	35.8	38.2	29.4	27.5
"Too Slow"	13.1	16.2	11.1	12.1	10.0	7.8	7.5	8.7	10.3
Difference (Too Fast - About Right)	-12.3%	-9.2%	+3.3%	-7.4%	+4.0%	+7.8%	+4.0%	+23.0%	+24.7%
Mean Resistance Score[1]	2.61	2.58	2.81	2.68	2.84	2.92	2.89	3.06	3.04

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[1] As constructed in Table 8-1.

elimination of voting discrimination produced only a slight increase in resistance. Considering President Kennedy's non-committal stance during the Birmingham crisis, this small negative reaction suggests that white Northerners were adapting to southern racial conflicts necessitating involvement by the chief executive.

Parallel to the post-Birmingham reactions, however, the culmination of the Selma to Montgomery march and the formal proposal of new voting rights legislation evoked comparable increases in resistance to racial change. Thus at the end of March, the percentage responding "too fast" amongst white urban Northerners jumped sharply upwards to 41.5 per cent, an increase of 10.3 per cent in only two weeks (Table 8-2's A.I.P.O. #709, March 31, 1965). Similarly, the percentage "too slow" dropped 5.1 per cent and receded back to its normal range between 9 and 12 per cent. Surprisingly, mass media accounts during this period were not very sensitive to these changing sentiments. From their reports, the entire North in near unanimity supported both the government's action against southern suppression of civil rights demonstrators as well as the legislative proposals for federal regulation of voter registration in the South. But these survey responses to the "pushing integration" question indicate that Johnson, like Kennedy, was not likely to escape rising dissatisfaction with strong executive leadership in civil rights issues.

This intensification of resistance, however, was not immediately forthcoming. As the Voting Rights Bill proceeded through the Senate, opposition was noticeably lacking. With a united Democratic-Republican coalition, the Senate invoked closure even before southern senators attempted their traditional, but in this case obviously futile, filibuster. This lack of highly publicized controversy in conjunction with an unusual reduction in Negro civil rights activity appeared to mellow the mood of whites in the urban North. Rather than the expected continuation of an upward trend initiated by a racial crisis and the proposal of new civil rights legislation, we find by the end of June only 35.8 per cent responding that Johnson was pushing integration "too fast," a 6 per cent decline from its previous level in March.

The lull was short-lived as racial conflict in the South was renewed in the following weeks. Civil rights demonstrations started in Bugolosa, Louisiana, Jackson, Mississippi, and other cities with the characteristic violence and mass arrests. In addition, many northern cities were experiencing serious local political controversies involving the resolution of racial issues. Once again, the level of racial tension increased, and the previous short-term reduction in white northern resistance quickly evaporated. By the middle of July the percentage responding "too fast" was back up to 42.9 per cent (Table 8-2's A.I.P.O. #714, July 14, 1965). And the percentage "too slow" continued to decrease, reaching 10.0 per cent.

As manifest in the Watts riot, August 13th, the inherent tensions bottled up in the northern ghettos could not be restrained or confined within the disciplined strategy of conventional non-violent demonstrations. But following Watts, we do not find any large increase in the level of resistance among white Northerners. In fact, the per cent "too fast" remained unchanged (Table 8-2's A.I.P.O. #716, August 25, 1965). This stability in the percentage "too fast" is consistent with white reactions in similar crisis situations. As a form of unorganized protest activity, the "riot" involved neither direct federal intervention nor presidential support for the goals of the "demonstrators." Without a pattern of similar disorders, there was little justification either to implicate or attribute such an outbreak of violence specifically to previous governmental policies. Nonetheless, the Watts riot appeared to have some impact on certain individuals. Between July and August the number responding "don't know" increased five per cent. Coming at a time when racial problems were a highly salient issue, this unusual change cannot be accounted for in terms of decreasing public interest. Most likely some white Northerners were confused by the sudden turn of events, in particular the emergence of local racial conflicts and the extensive violence occurring in the North.

More significant was the continued reduction in the size of the pro-change minority. While the percentage responding "too slow" went even lower in 1966, the decrease from the Selma high (16.2 per cent) to the post-Watts low (7.8 per cent) is striking given the necessity for new federal programs in the Negro ghettos. Following so closely the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1965 (August 6th), it is possible that some supporters of increased initiative felt that the government had done enough or that further legislation would not be needed once the Negro could participate freely in the democratic processes. On the other hand, during the summer of 1965 disagreements concerning new racial policies and strategies emerged both from within the ranks of white "intellectuals" and between white activists and Negro militants (Rainwater and Yancy, 1967). Whatever the reason, the lack of pressure from this small segment of the northern population cannot be ignored as a contributory factor in the eventual reduction of executive involvement and initiatives.

Relative to the previous three years, the winter and spring of 1966 were unusually calm. Negro civil rights groups focused their efforts on voter registration drives in the South and no dramatic crises developed. Nevertheless, the accumulation of civil rights murders during 1963-1965 was still a pressing issue requiring some type of federal action. Accordingly, late in April President Johnson proposed new legislation directed toward the protection of civil rights workers but also including a provision prohibiting discrimination in the sale or rental of housing. By the middle of June, we might have expected strong public reactions against these new federal initiatives that for the first time extended directly into northern racial problems. Yet responses to the "pushing integration" question do not indicate any shift from their post-Watts level with 42.2 per cent answering "too fast" and 7.5 per cent "too slow" (Table 8-2's A.I.P.O. #730, June 14, 1966). The lack of survey data in the intervening nine months makes it impossible to assess the immediate response of white Northerners to this new civil rights legislation. Small, short-term changes probably did occur. Thus, the level of resistance probably declined during the winter, demonstrated a short-term increase following the proposal of the Civil Rights Act of 1966, declined again without immediate Congressional debate and any new racial crisis, and then started to move up again as James Meredith's Mississippi March brought to the public's attention the first sign of changing Negro militancy.

If the first half of 1966 was deceptively quiet, the last half was exceptionally tumultuous and brought extensive outbreaks of violence in the urban ghettos, widespread criticism of Johnson's racial policies, and a more strident Negro ideology, "Black Power." This discontent is manifest in the survey data early in September (Table 8-2's A.I.P.O. #734, September 6, 1966). For the first time over half of whites in the urban North felt that the Johnson administration was pushing integration "too fast," a striking increase of 10.2 per cent in a two month period. This upward shift occurred after major and publicized riots and during the heated Senate debate on the Fair Housing section of the Civil Rights Act. Like 1963, mass media coverage included considerable coverage not only of widespread opposition but also the Administration's pessimism concerning their chances of stopping a filibuster.

As expected, Democratic attempts to obtain closure failed, but this did not diminish the intensity of racial conflict. As long as political controversy over civil rights issues and racial violence attracted local and national attention, white northern attitudes remained extremely resistant. Hence, in

October of 1966, 52.5 per cent still thought the pace of integration was proceeding too rapidly (Table 8-2's A.I.P.O. #736, October 10, 1966). Any counter move from the former advocates of more extensive federal involvement failed to materialize, although the percentage responding "too slow" inched back up to 10.3 per cent. With congressional election campaigns in full swing, opponents continued to attack the racial policies of the Johnson Administration and most likely the level of resistance remained high throughout the fall.

Summary. The relationship over time between significant changes in public opinion and dramatic racial events has been demonstrated. Our findings suggest that certain types of events had differential effects on white attitudes toward the government's racial policies. First, the positive response of the federal government to racial crisis, whether through intervention by physical force or through moral support of the goals sought by civil rights groups, produced increases in resistance among whites in the urban North. Although these actions were usually directed at the control of southern opposition to desegregation and violence against Negro civil rights groups, the actual intervention was widely perceived in our samples as unwarranted efforts to achieve racial integration. Paradoxically, a large majority of white Northerners supported the elimination of discrimination in those areas that were the central target of Negro protest activities. Over the period 1962 to 1966, there is also some indication that white Northerners became more accustomed to extensive involvement in racial problems.

Second, proposals for new civil rights legislation also generated large increases in resistance to racial change. Efforts by the federal government, oriented toward the more general and permanent solution of racial conflict, appeared to be less acceptable than short-term crisis-mediating actions. From our analysis, it is difficult to separate out the initial response to the proposal itself from the more delayed reactions to the political controversy during Congressional discussions of new civil rights legislations. Accordingly, besides the increments following the formal announcement of the legislation, whenever opposition was present the percentage "too fast" also increased. Under these circumstances, the Administration would attempt through public statements to pressure Congress for quick approval, despite the complex legislative procedures amenable to southern stalling tactics. This pressure only helped reinforce prevailing sentiments that the federal government was moving too rapidly.

Third, Negro protest activities, even unorganized forms such as urban disorders, did not appear to have a direct effect on white attitudes toward the federal government's racial policies as long as they were not followed by an immediate response from the President. At least as measured by the "pushing integration" question, white northern disapproval of militant Negro tactics did not generalize to its evaluation of the President's racial policies. For many we might have expected that these protest activities, by exposing whites to the widespread existence of discrimination, would have triggered demands for more federal involvement in the solution of racial problems. While the percentage responding "too slow" did increase slightly at certain points, northern reactions demonstrated a consistently asymmetrical pattern: strong federal action and shifts in governmental policy producing large increases in resistance, but limited and cautious responses rarely generated changes of equal size in the opposite direction.

Finally, as noted for Texas in Chapter Three, the effect of the Kennedy assassination indicates that a dramatic crisis can quickly transform a political atmosphere highly resistant to racial change into one considerably more receptive. The psychological processes that are responsible for the internalization of a lost leader's goal are extremely complex, and possibly not the only relevant factors. At any rate, the changes associated with the assassination and a new President demonstrates that non-racial events can result in striking alterations in racial attitudes. Thus, the general pattern of action followed by resistance is not a completely closed system. Under certain conditions, whites in the urban North manifest unusual departures from past habits. Yet this was not a lasting conversion, since within a year the former patterns re-emerged.

The evidence suggests that attitudes toward the federal government's role in racial integration is neither a rigid, indiscriminate evaluation of its current policies nor a haphazard, random expression of psychological temperament. The implications and the meaning of dramatic events, as mediated by the mass media, are constantly in the state of active re-appraisal and re-interpretation within a sizable segment of whites in the urban North.

The Intensity of Racial Conflict

The previous analysis, while clearly showing white reactions to specific events, failed to provide any insight into the relationship between the intensity of racial conflict and resistance to racial change. Although we could assume that the development of each crisis situation was symptomatic of basic conflict between the races, a purely historical approach does not facilitate more quantitative measurement of variations in the frequency or intensity of these conflicts. But if one compares the definition of an event as used in a historical review with the way information is actually transmitted to the public via the mass media, alternative methods for determining the intensity of racial conflict suggest themselves.

An event was previously defined in global terms as a combination of separate but interrelated incidents occurring within a relatively short time span. We assumed that information about each episode was conveyed to the public as an immediate and concise message. In addition, we packaged our story neatly by omitting those events that did not have any special significance and focusing on those situations that after the fact appeared to have a major impact on long-term developments. Obviously, only from a historical perspective is such a simple reconstruction possible.

The serial presentation of news via the mass media is, in reality, considerably more complex, diffuse, and disjointed. While we may remember the Birmingham crisis now as consisting of a few dramatic incidents, such as the hosing of Negro demonstrators, that particular event was only one in a long series of similar but less dramatic confrontations between civil rights groups and local southern authorities. Mass media accounts, as viewed by the public on a daily basis, contain factual pieces of information concerning specific actions by individuals or groups and interpretative evaluation of the existing situation by important public figures or the reporter himself. As result, the unfolding of racial conflicts over time reflects a more dynamic flow of ongoing civil rights activities.

From this latter perspective, we can treat the frequency of these external events as indirect indicators of the intensity of racial conflict. The validity of this approach is necessarily dependent upon intervening processes within the mass media. We are assuming that the seriousness of a particular incident or the saliency of racial issues at a particular time is a significant factor influencing daily decisions about the media's selection of certain news stories from a vast corpus of "newsworthy" events.

Consequently, the empirical indicator of the intensity of racial conflict employed here is based upon a simple frequency count of front page news stories as summarized in the New York Times Index under the topic, "Negro." In this measure, one unit count, or event, consists of one headlined news column reporting a specific racial incident, a statement by a government official or civil rights spokesman, a major court decision, or Congressional roll-call outcomes.

This summary measure has several shortcomings as an indicator of racial conflict. For example, at certain times this measure underestimates the intensity of racial conflict since the description of what happened and who said what are often condensed into one report filed by a single correspondent. Yet, typically a major crisis generates several front page stories for several days. Hence, a high frequency count within a specified period, such as a month, could represent a crisis situation either of short duration but intense conflict or of longer duration but milder magnitude. Similarly, basing the method upon the New York Times minimizes the effect of medium-sized racial conflicts occurring in many northern cities. These local crises, often dealing with school integration, made headlines in the affected metropolitan newspapers, but by 1966 were so commonplace to the Times that these incidents appeared only in the back pages.

At other times, this measure overestimates the intensity of racial conflict since many events reported in the Times were not covered in the more popular mass media such as evening newscasts by national broadcasting networks. Furthermore, each event receiving a front page headline is given an equal weight. Thus, a statement by the head of the N.A.A.C.P. is counted the same as a report concerning the outbreak of violence in a northern ghetto. But since the majority of such statements appear in the context of a crisis situation, the total count within a specific period of time still reflects the net intensity of conflict.

We have not attempted to refine this measure by coding the content of the news stories, as has been attempted in similar studies (Gamson and Modigliani, 1965). Although many events could be easily classified according to such types as "Negro protest activities" and "executive responses to crisis situations," examination of the news stories showed many complex combinations of such types, even within one news report, that were not readily amenable to any coding schema. Despite these many limitations, the aggregate accumulation of this frequency count on a monthly basis captures quantitatively both the ongoing nature of civil rights activities and the underlying patterns of racial conflict -- as the following suggestive findings attest.

The validity of this measure can be assessed by examining the monthly frequency counts during the period 1962-1966. In relation to the major racial crises just discussed, we see in Figure 8-2 that the peak periods of external activity stand

Figure 8-2

Frequency of Reported Racial Events by Month, 1962-1966



out sharply and correspond closely to major racial crises or important governmental initiatives. In short, the simple frequency count appears to be an accurate indicator of intense racial conflict. For instance, in September and October of 1962, the high frequency count represents the conflict associated with the admission of James Meredith to the University of Mississippi. Likewise, in the spring of 1963, the Birmingham situation, Governor Wallace's resistance, and the proposed Public Accommodation Law all contributed to sharp increases in the intensity of external racial activity.

The highest count occurs during the summer of 1964 -- unfortunately a period when the "pushing integration" question was not asked. During this period, Congress finally passed the 1964 Civil Rights Act, L. A. Penn and three civil rights workers were murdered in Georgia and Mississippi, the role of civil rights issues in the forthcoming elections was being actively discussed, and riots erupted in several northern cities. In 1965, the periods of highest intensity are also associated with major racial crises: the Selma March and the Watts riots. Once again in 1966, racial disorders in several northern cities are related to high levels of reported racial activity. Thus, there does not appear to be any glaring inconsistencies between our quantification of intensity and our historical description.

How does this pattern of racial conflict correspond to the levels of white northern resistance as measured by the "pushing integration" question?[8] When this frequency is plotted in Figure 8-3 together with the mean resistance score, we see a clear parallel between the fluctuations in external racial activity and changes in racial attitudes. The highest levels of resistance within each year occur very close to the periods of maximum racial conflict, but not exactly within the same month. When we have frequent samplings of opinions, as in 1963, the pattern of racial conflict shows a remarkably close resemblance to changes in the level of resistance. Ignoring individual monthly counts for a moment, survey by survey comparisons show that large increases in the frequency of racial conflict are followed by similar changes in the level of white resistance in the urban North.

While the graphic pattern may be visually convincing, the consistent time lag in the data produces only a weak

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[8] As in Tables 8-1 and 8-2, resistance is measured in these analyses by a mean score which weights "too fast" as four,"don't know"as three, "about right" as two, and "too slow" as one.

Figure 8-3

The Frequency of Racial Events
and the Mean Resistance Score of Whites in the Urban North



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[1] As constructed in Table 8-1.

correlation ($r = +.16$, n.s.). But there is no a priori theoretical reason for simultaneous changes, especially since the survey interviewing actually occurs at different dates within the listed month.

Given this obvious time lag, the inclusion of a delay factor should provide a better statistical fit. A time lag of one month -- that is, the frequency associated with each survey is the count one month prior, improves the relationship; but a two month lag gives the highest correlation ($r = +.70$, $p < .01$).[9] Clearly, such a statistical modification is necessary if we wish to account for the high levels of resistance shown in Figure 8-3 during the summer of 1963 and early fall, 1966. But the theoretical rationale underlying the inclusion of delayed reactions to dramatic events cannot rest merely on the good fit with such highly salient racial crises. Rather this delayed shift in opinion might be expected if information about the changing external situation was gradually received in piecemeal fashion over a long period of time and changing attitudes were a function of a slow assimilation process. But as white reactions to racial events can manifest sizable changes within a short time span (note the shift between A.I.P.O. #708 and #709), this process does not seem too likely.

A more reasonable alternative would stress the cumulative effect of prolonged conflict as a mediating factor in the development of resistance to racial change. Besides the impact of specific events, we might expect that the concentration of many racial crises within a certain time period to affect white attitudes toward the desirability of further attempts to achieve racial equality. Accordingly, for each survey we have computed separately the mean frequency scores for 1, 2, 3, and 4 months prior to each administration of the "pushing integration" question. The cumulative average for the three prior months gives the strongest measure of association ($r = +.645$, $p < .01$).[10] A plot of this relationship in Figure 8-4 shows that this addition of a three month cumulative effect provides a fairly good fit of the empirical data,

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[9] The corresponding coefficients by political party are: Democrats = +.54 ($p < .02$); Independents = +.56 ($p < .01$); and Republicans = +.75 ($p < .001$).

[10] The corresponding coefficients by political party are: Democrats = +.62 (p .01); Independents = +.62 ($p < .01$); and Republicans = +.72 (p .001).

Figure 8-4

Bivariate Distribution of 3-Month Racial Event Frequency and Mean Resistance Score by Gallup Survey



especially for the high and low points during both Democratic administrations.

Examination of the deviations from predicted scores reveals that the survey responses obtained during the Birmingham and Selma crises have lower levels of resistance than would be expected from the three month average conflict measure. If we were to take into consideration the specific type of activity, such as Negro protest activity versus governmental proposal of new civil rights legislation, these deviations would probably be reduced. The two surveys (Figure 8-4's A.I.P.O. #730 and A.I.P.O. #734) with higher levels of resistance than predicted cannot be accounted for so easily. One factor that might have contributed to these unusually high levels is the saliency of the fair housing title in the Civil Rights Act of 1966, which in contrast to previous legislation was opposed by the majority of white Northerners.[11]

The high association between this crude, contentless measure of racial conflict and levels of resistance suggests that the opinion change process is more gradual and continual than is apparent from the observed pattern based upon the eighteen surveys. In contrast to the picture of immediate shifts in attitudes drawn in our historical review, an interpretation incorporating cumulative effects must emphasize this continual flow of new information about dramatic events and the resulting reappraisal of the external situation as a factor in the racial attitude change. The equal weight given to any front page news story is not, from this orientation, a serious measurement error. Statements by public figures frequently provide an individual more information about the meaning of a particular situation than the factual report about what happened. This type of intervening process, where white attitudes are first sensitized by a dramatic announcement by the President and then formulated in the context of evaluative statements, seems to be a more reasonable explanation of the time lag factor than a simple delayed reaction theory.

While not contradicting our earlier findings about the short-term effect of specific events in this chapter and in

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[11] With the exception of the East (40 to 45 per cent), white urban respondents in the Midwest (49 to 39 per cent) and West (65 to 30 per cent) made it clear they wanted Congress to reject the "Open Housing" Title (Gallup, March 1967).

Chapter Three, these results suggest the cumulative nature and the multiple sources of racial conflict is also an important factor in influencing changes in public opinion. Negro pressure for racial change and its expression in dramatic crises sets in motion a complex set of related events involving governmental involvement in civil rights issues and counter-reactions from those opposing change. The inability of these problems to generate quick solutions prolongs the conflict, thereby maintaining over long periods of time high levels of political and social controversy. Up to a point, most white Northerners seem willing to tolerate a certain degree of racial conflict without reacting negatively toward the government as an intermediary force in the resolution of these problems. But once a certain threshold is passed, political authorities rapidly lose the public support necessary for effective policy-making decisions.

The Pattern of Change and the Resistance Process

Taking the beginning (May, 1962) and end (October, 1966) points during this four year period, it is easy to infer a long-term trend toward increasing resistance to racial change. Such a conclusion clearly would be unjustified given the previous findings demonstrating short-term, non-permanent shifts in attitudes toward the government's racial policies. The high level of resistance in late 1966, although higher than the peak period for the Kennedy Administration, is still within the expected range given the degree of racial conflict at that time. Yet this "pushing integration" question is frequently cited as evidence for the so-called "white backlash" (Pettigrew, 1966). For example, using only A.I.P.O. surveys #673, #708, #709, and #716, Mildred Schwartz (1967, p. 103) concluded:

> The growing proportion who felt that things were moving too fast, especially between March and May, 1965, is striking. While detailed information is not yet available, it seems clear that the bulk of the change in opinions took place in the North. During this period, civil rights demonstrations were moving north on a large scale for the first time, and as we know, whites, regardless of region, do not like them. Since then, however, there is some indication that opposition is subsiding slightly in both regions.

Obviously, both A.I.P.O. surveys #673 and #708, obtained at the peak of the Birmingham and Selma confrontations, are not representative of normal white reactions to increasing federal initiatives. Likewise, the large increases in resistance following Kennedy's proposal for a Public Accommodations Bill and its maintenance through the fall of 1963 are missed completely in the Schwartz analysis.

Besides this shortcoming, most studies of changing racial attitudes have focused primarily on linear trends and such demographic causal influences as education. Short-term fluctuations appear in these studies as random or unsystematic. Unfortunately, when one starts with restrictive theoretical assumptions, the empirical findings can be misleading. For example, consider the following empirical strategy:

> The cumulative conception of opinion change underlying the treatment of our data implies that all significant population groups are caught up in the same general move, although not necessarily to the same extent. (Schwartz, 1967, p. 129)

Not surprisingly, the resulting findings produce tenuous conclusions:

> More generally, we should not discount the possibility that major social changes will have an impact on opinions in such a way as to deflect them from their present course. (Schwartz, 1967, pp. 129-130)

Once we reject descriptive statements based upon linear trends or short-term fluctuations superimposed upon a long-term pattern, we are still faced with the problem of proposing an alternative explanation. If we generated a predictive resistance score for each month from the regression equation developed in the previous section, the most distinguishing characteristic of the resulting pattern would be its cyclical property. This suggests that, besides the increases in resistance produced by white reactions to federal pro-change efforts, we must consider the effect of other factors that depress the levels of resistance.

A theoretical model capable of reconstructing this cyclical pattern can be derived from a consideration of feedback mechanisms operating between input demands, policy outcomes, and political support. The probability of positive responses from decision-makers is dependent upon specific inputs into the political system, in particular demands for change and support for the political authorities. Likewise, policy decisions not only produce dissatisfaction and decrease support among one group, but also satisfy or reduce the intensity of input demands from another segment of the population. These effects, by altering the balance of demands for change and levels of political support, in turn influence the likelihood of governmental responses in the future.

We need additional empirical evidence concerning these additional effects, in particular the relationship between Negro attitudes toward more extensive federal involvement in racial problems and the nature of political responses to these inputs. While both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson reacted to specific racial crises originating from organized Negro protest activities, the initiating forces in these situations originated in strategies developed with the leadership of civil rights groups rather than the expressed discontent of the Negro population in general. Although the existence of the long-standing Negro grievances was a necessary precondition for effective protest activities, it is important to know whether the sentiments of the activists were reflected in the attitudes of their more passive supporters.

When we plot Negro responses to the "pushing integration" question in conjunction with northern responses, we see that as the per cent "too fast" increases the per cent responding "too slow" decreases and vice versa during many periods. In terms of our previous findings, this inverse relationship can be attributed to increasing Negro satisfaction with the Administration's racial policies following the proposal of new civil rights legislation, an event likely to produce the precise opposite effect on white Northerners. Applying similar statistical manipulations to levels of Negro insistence for more federal action and the summary measure of racial conflict reveals the sources of these divergent reactions.

In contrast to patterns of white resistance, there is no relationship between the cumulative intensity of racial activity and the per cent Negroes responding "too slow" (Figure 8-1). However, the inclusion of a month delay factor produces a negative relationship. Thus, frequency counts one month before the survey are associated with low levels of Negro insistence. But when we reverse the time sequence -- that is, we examine the intensity of racial activity one month after the survey -- we find a positive correlation.

In other words, Negro impatience with the pace of racial change, as reflected in these survey responses, is manifest after a short time span in heightened civil rights protests and increasing governmental activity. These findings suggest that governmental authorities do respond to Negro input demands and that the intensity of these demands decreases as new civil rights legislation is proposed and enacted. During the intervening period, however, it should be noted that both the "too fast" percentage and the "too slow" percentage tend to increase. As whites react negatively to these proposed federal initiatives, reinforced by Congressional controversy, civil rights groups attempt to mobilize support for quick passage.

We have seen that while political authorities were responding to Negro demands, support for the Administration's racial policies decreased at the same time. In order to complete the links in this theoretical model, we have to include the feedback effect of these attitudes on political decision-making as well. Examining the pattern of white responses to the "pushing integration" question in conjunction with key Congressional action, the high levels of white resistance appear to inhibit federal initiative and governmental activity. For example, passage of both the Public Accommodations Bill in 1963 and the Fair Housing Legislation in 1966 were not forthcoming when the white "too fast" percentage remained at high levels. Similarly, passage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965 occurred in periods when resistance was relatively weak. This is not to imply that there is a direct relationship between public opinion and Congressional voting behavior. But when the President's momentum is blocked by Congress, a period of inaction follows during which new initiatives are not likely. In turn, this decreased pace of federal activity tends to reduce the level of resistance among whites in the urban North, but at the same time slowly re-activates Negro demands for change.

In relation to white responses, the iteration of this cycle over time appears to have a slight dampening effect on the resistant reactions to further governmental intervention vis-a-vis the re-emergence of new racial crises and the need for additional civil rights legislation. As a case in point, when President Johnson sent federal troops to protect the Selma to Montgomery marchers in 1965, there was considerably less public controversy in comparison with the anticipated use of the National Guard in the Birmingham situation two years earlier. Similarly, the proposal for the Voting Rights Bill in 1965 was followed by a smaller increase in the "too fast" percentage than the Public Accommodations Bill in 1963. The significance of this adaptation effect is limited by the changing content of Negro demands and civil rights legislation over time.

We might expect, if only these factors were operative within a closed system, to find smaller cyclic swings and eventual stability as opposing forces were balanced. Neither these ideal conditions nor such rational or goal-directed behavior is manifest as a long-term movement toward racial harmony. The system's inability to achieve balance reflects the time lag and complex processes mediating the conversion of basic Negro demands into actual changes in the racial, social and economic environment. Likewise, the intensity of Negro demands not only peaks prior to the maximum point of white opposition, but also as a minority group they have less influence in determining policy outcomes. Besides the obvious fact that new demands consistently arise before old problems have been solved, other influences exert pressures that reduce the intensity of Negro demands for and white opposition to racial change.

First, Negro demands for change appear to de-escalate systematically at certain points. Consistently, civil rights activity diminished during the winter months. However, this does not imply that common beliefs about the "long hot summers" are valid. In different years, the intensity of civil rights activity peaked at different points. This variation usually reflects the fact that specific racial issues have different critical periods. The most frequent high point usually was the spring, as the specific object of protest efforts conceived during the winter months could muster full organizational mobilization. The winter hibernation also might serve to rejuvenate the motivations of civil rights groups that fade during their exhausting spring to fall activities.

Second, this winter quiescence also tends to reduce the saliency of past governmental actions in the minds of whites in the urban North. Events of the preceding summer and fall are differentially forgotten when the "pushing integration" question is asked in the early spring. How much of the decrease from fall to spring is a function of this memory factor, or how much reflects an objective evaluation of the current low levels of governmental activity, is difficult to determine. It does appear that the winter lull does provide an opportunity for many white Northerners to alter their past evaluations of the government pushing integration "too fast."

Lastly, we cannot forget the implications of sharp decreases in resistance following the assassination of President Kennedy. This emotional atmosphere during that period had a generalized effect on a wide range of issues that Kennedy had advocated. Regrettably, we could not assess how long this willingness to accept a more rapid pace of racial change lasted, especially when the intensity of Negro demands resumed in the spring of 1964. However, it does suggest that the failure of white urban Northerners to respond strongly in a more pro-change direction following frequent outbreaks of southern violence against the Negro did not establish the lower limit of possible change.

Most of the above factors do not reduce resistance directly through their immediate impact on white attitudes toward racial change. Instead, they operate indirectly by altering the external situation to which whites in the urban North react. Satisfying Negro demands not only decreases the intensity of civil rights activity, but it also relieves the pressure on the political authorities for actions that increase white resistance. And the reaction of white Northerners in turn contributes to the inhibition of further actions by the federal government.

These de-escalating factors, however, do not explain why the cyclical pattern is dominant. To describe the process, consider the sequence of events over time as they reflect both upon the conversion process of Negro demands into policy outcomes and the differential effect of the various outputs on Negro demands and white support. In Figure 8-5, we have attempted to represent the cycle pattern as a sequential series of positive or negative effects. For each event, either as a crisis or as a policy output, we have assigned an arbitrary weight that represents its effect on: (1) increases (+) or decreases (-) in resistance to racial change; and (2) increases (+) or decreases (-) in the intensity of Negro demands. The particular choice of a positive or negative effect has been determined by our previous findings. In our hypothetical case, the conversion process is complete in that it is not abnormally terminated before the implementation stage by diminishing demands or lack of support. Furthermore, we have also included the effect of what might be called secondary factors. Thus, for the intensity of Negro demands, we have added organizational fatigue and remobilization effects. For white dispositions to resist racial change, we have incorporated the cumulative effect of prolonged conflict and diminishing saliency.

Starting at "1" in Figure 8-5, prior to the emergence of a racial crisis, the intensity of Negro demands is

Figure 8-5

Input-Output Model of Resistance Process in the Urban North



relatively high, reflecting the reservoir of unfilled needs and the level of resistance among whites is low (such as in pre-Birmingham times). A crisis situation develops as the repressive conditions inhibiting the expression of Negro grievances are overcome. The crisis intensifies Negro demands that the government exert its power to control the situation. At the same time, small sympathy effects decrease white resistance in the urban North slightly. Thus, from a small white minority, we might also find some pressure directed toward the President for some decisive action. At time T2, then, the net balance (demands +11, resistance +1) of inputs into the system is at its most favorable position with strong demands and low resistance. This situation occurred during the Birmingham, Selma, and post-Kennedy assassination episodes.

Beginning with the government's first step towards modifying the situation through the final implementation of a new law, this net balance of demands to resistance becomes increasingly less conducive to the probability of further federal action. The direct intervention of the President decreases the intensity of Negro pressure for change by partially satisfying their demands; but it increases the level of resistance as white Northerners react negatively to these governmental actions. The proposal for new civil rights legislation and the public controversy in Congress preceding its final passage produces similar effects on both the intensity of Negro demands and the level of resistance. Accordingly, at T3, T4, and T5, the ratio of new demands to white resistance decreases 9 to 3, 7 to 6, and 6 to 8 respectively. Recall from Figure 8-1 that at the early stages of the Public Accommodations Bill, when its passage was mistakenly expected, 48.6 per cent of whites said "too fast" while 27.7 per cent of Negroes said "too slow." The inclusion of organizational fatigue effects and cumulative crises effects does not alter the basic trend, but only accelerates the rate of decline. When the final positive policy decision is made, the imbalance in the unfavorable direction is often at its maximum. On the one hand, Negroes expect the new legislation to solve many of their problems, thereby reducing the intensity of their demands upon the political system. On the other hand, the residue of resistance among white Northerners remains strong, although it does not seem to be stimulated further by the final Congressional approval of the legislation.

After this implementation phase, where the unfavorable ratio is diminished somewhat, there is little external pressure for new governmental measures. Furthermore, the erosion of support has reached a dangerous level.

Accordingly, no new actions are forthcoming, but the low intensity of demands does not precipitate any new crisis. The consequence of this situation is to decrease resistance since there are no new events to stimulate it. Also contributing to a decrease in resistance is the diminishing saliency or memory of past government actions. In the meantime, new problems emerge, the ineffectiveness of past civil rights laws becomes more obvious, and the re-organization of the civil rights forces increase the intensity of demands for change. Gradually, (T7, T8, and T9 in Figure 8-5) the ratio of input demands to resistance begins to resemble its original state at T1, and the process starts over again.

Obviously, the model's simplifications and assumptions inject artificial perfections into a complex and ragged process. First, the shifts in the intensity of Negro demands as measured by the percentage responding "too slow" are more volatile than white reactions for several reasons. First, the race issue is obviously more salient for Negroes. And the expression of Negro demands is directly related to the effectiveness and militancy of specific civil rights organizations. Second, there are several factors, internal to the institutional structure of the political system, that influence the progression of Negro demands towards potential policy outcomes besides the two inputs of Negro demands and white northern support. Third, the lengthy time requirements needed to implement any proposal and the internal obstacles involved in processing the demands inserts a period of no action, temporary negative policy decisions, and even apparent failures. Fourth, the assignment of simple weights to each factor, especially the assumption of equivalent effects for demand and support inputs, poses many problems. But any alterations of these weights would only change the characteristics of the upward and downward swings, not the basic cyclical pattern.

To some, these simplifications may eliminate any resemblance to the real process. The ultimate justification of this multi-factor reconstruction rests upon its ability to predict future fluctuations in responses to these questions given the on-going sequence of dramatic events. Survey results for August 1967 and April 1968 (immediately following the King assassination) indicate that white resistance in the North had decreased sharply since November 1966. For white Northerners (urban and non-urban) these findings are: 34 per cent "too fast," 15 per cent"don't know," 27 per cent "about right," and 24 per cent "too slow."

Is this compatible with this reconstruction of the resistance process? According to our model, President

Johnson's failure to press actively for the Fair Housing Law following the 1966 elections, the lack of immediate federal intervention, or the proposal for any new civil rights legislation in the context of the northern race riots, all operated to minimize resistance. Furthermore, white reaction to Dr. King's assassination, as noted for white Texans in Chapter Three, has many similarities to the moral and emotional recommitment to racial equality found following President Kennedy's death. Only in this political atmosphere was the previous opposition to the Fair Housing legislation overcome. Thus, the necessary conditions for low resistance were present. The intensity of Negro demands for government action is more difficult to assess. The survey findings reveal a relatively high percentage responding "too slow" (40-45 per cent). This is consistent with the levels following the Kennedy assassination and during the Birmingham crisis. However, in terms of producing governmental outputs from the President or Congress, these demands have been somewhat deflected by the Vietnam War.

In summarizing our interpretations of resistance to federal action for racial change as a process, the most general finding is that the cyclical pattern can be explained theoretically as a function of the positive and negative effects operating in a definite sequence. The increases in resistance to the federal government's initiative are immediate, short-term responses within a fixed time span. The long-term trend is not the accumulation of these direct reactions to external events. A proper perspective must incorporate a more general conceptualization that represents the social situation in such dynamic terms as our hypothetical conversion process.

The phenomena of resistance as manifest in the reduction in federal initiative or as an unfavorable climate of public opinion does not manifest stable or static properties. At points it reciprocally responds to the internal pressures generated by Negro demands and white support and at other times to external factors operating against change. Any question about trends that implicitly assumes a uni-directional causal factor thereby avoids the critical questions about levels of Negro demands or governmental activity and the developmental stage within the political system. Thus, these qualifying statements about the external situation are essential.

This concludes our analyses of northern race relations. We now turn to a summary chapter that attempts to draw together what we have learned from both the North and South about racial change.

PART III

OVERVIEW

Chapter Nine

Summary and Conclusions

The research presented in this volume focused on a central hypothesis: There are consistent patterns of school desegregation and racial attitudes in the South and urban North which can be empirically-derived and mathematically-described through the simultaneous use of ecological and opinion data. Without attempting to delineate all of these patterns which may exist, we believe the findings presented in the previous seven chapters consistently support this basic hypothesis. In the course of confirming the existence of consistent patterns of racial change, (a) a variety of interesting findings were uncovered; (b) two middle-range theories emerged, one on the attitude effects of dramatic events, the other on the school desegregation process in Texas; (c) new research methods were successfully applied and developed; and (d) several policy implications for public education were suggested. We shall briefly consider in this chapter each of these outcomes of the research in turn.

Interesting Findings

The Public School Desegregation Process in Texas. The work reported in Chapters Two, Four and Five uncovered a number of important and little-known aspects of the pattern and spread of racial desegregation of the public schools across the 187 interracial counties of Texas. First, we found that the date a county initiated the process related only weakly to the extent of desegregation by 1965 -- a Pearsonian correlation of just +.23. Consequently, the two dependent variables -- initiation and extent -- were predicted best by different patterns of census variables. More specifically, the initiation of school desegregation was likely to have occurred earliest in rapidly growing counties with few Negroes -- a pattern most often found in West Texas and least often in East Texas. By contrast, the extent of school desegregation by 1965 was greatest in somewhat urban counties characterized by commercial farming -- a pattern most often found in Central Texas and least often in West Texas.

Second, we successfully employed contrived attitude climates to predict the extent of the process. While these predictions tended not to be as accurate as those made with census variables, attitude climate yielded significant correlations with the extent of desegregation for Texas and each of its regions. Moreover, it worked best in rural counties where Negroes comprise 11 to 30 per cent of the population -- counties most typical of East Texas and least typical of West Texas. These interesting results suggest a middle-range theory to be discussed below.

Finally, path analysis techniques allowed us to offer tentative contextual models for the full state, Central Texas, and East Texas. The variance percentages accounted for in these three regressions, ranging from 38 per cent to 46 per cent, are the highest reported for predictions of racial change in the social science literature. The surprise finding, bearing both theoretical and practical significance, was the special importance in East Texas of attitude climates acting as mediators of residual (unmeasured) factors external to the counties. It appears that such outside pressures as federal court orders and the Health, Education, and Welfare Department's enforcement of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act are singularly crucial for this Black Belt area of Texas.

Attitudes of White and Negro Texans Toward Racial Desegregation. Chapter Three presented a number of interesting findings concerning the opinions of Texans toward racial change in their midst. The seven-year period from 1954 to 1961 witnessed a reduction in resistant responses of whites to school desegregation of roughly a third. The use of federal troops to achieve school desegregation by President Eisenhower in Little Rock in 1957 had a particularly dramatic effect; most white Texans became less resistant, especially high-status Republicans, though low-status East Texans tended to become more resistant.

This pronounced opinion effect of the dramatic events of the Little Rock confrontation led the project to concentrate attention upon the opinion effects of the assassinations of President Kennedy in 1963 and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968. Repeatedly, we found that, despite ceiling effects, the shifts in white desegregation attitudes were greatest for those individuals already most pro-desegregation and those formal contact realms, such as restaurants and hotels, where desegregation was already most widely accepted. However, attitudes toward desegregation of intimate contact realms, such as swimming pools and house parties, tended to become somewhat more favorable some months after the murder of Dr. King. The first of these effects is consistent with social judgment theory in social psychology (Sherif and Hovland, 1961), the second with balance theory (McGuire, 1969). The strength and consistency of these results and their direct translation into general theoretical terms allow us to propose a middle-range theory of the attitude effects of dramatic events, to be discussed below.

A related finding from the King assassination data is also of interest. While attitudes were becoming more favorable toward desegregation in many realms, including schools and teaching staffs, more white Texans thought that the Johnson Administration was "pushing integration too fast" following Dr. King's death and the issuance of the "Kerner Commission Riot Report." Thus, greater acceptance of interracial contact can occur at precisely the same time there is a growing sentiment that there is too much national pressure for racial change.

A check on the attitudes of white Texans toward interracial student bodies and teaching staffs found them to be very similar. Favorable opinions of biracial teaching, the more recent issue, were only slightly less frequent than those favoring biracial students; and the two attitudes correlated highly and possessed nearly identical demographic correlates. These findings were not surprising, since the previous attitude change results had shown both of these sets of attitudes to involve informal contact, neither formal nor intimate; thus, they both combine, in the terms of Triandis and Davis (1965), factors of racial concern and belief similarity.

Turning to the effects of the King murder and the Kerner Commission Report in the Spring of 1968 upon Negro Texans, a number of interesting trends emerged. Consistent with the white results, the changes in Negro attitudes moved further toward those positions which were dominant prior to the dramatic events. Those Negro respondents who were middle-class residents of metropolitan areas reacted with a temporary racial optimism which faded considerably by August of 1968. Militancy shifts, however, were more mixed but longer lasting. Those Negroes least intimidated before the King assassination, the young and the middle-class, became more militant. But those most intimidated, the old and the lower-class, became less militant. And a similar trend arises for preferences for interracial schools when there might be "racial trouble." Middle-class Negroes became more determined and lower-class Negroes less determined to obtain interracial education for their children. In addition, in rural and East Texas counties where "racial trouble" is not uncommon, desire for desegregation among those who had already sent their children to interracial schools sharply increased; presumably this occurred because of the considerable risk and commitment already involved for these Negro parents.

Racial Voting and Attitudes in the Urban North.[1] Extending the analysis to the three northern cities, Boston, Gary, and Cleveland, we investigated in Chapter Six the white voting patterns across precincts for pro-segregationist white candidates for high office and for Negro candidates for high office. Save for differences traceable to contrasting ecological and political structures, the results from the three cities were remarkably similar. And the patterns for Mrs. Hicks and Governor Wallace were largely inversions of those for Councilman Atkins and Mayors Hatcher and Stokes, but they were not precise mirror opposites. The most consistent and important finding involved lower-middle-class white areas characterized by moderately high annual family incomes but restricted educational levels. These precincts in each of the cities studied formed the hard core of white support for Hicks and Wallace and resistance to Atkins, Hatcher, and Stokes.

Chapter Seven pushed this finding further by attempting to establish at the individual level what the fundamental social psychological dynamics were which undergirded this lower-middle-class source of white resistance to racial change in the urban North. Gary survey data provided the first clue. Wallace supporters in Gary in 1968 were often younger workers in highly skilled, blue-collar jobs who were highly identified with "the working class," earned comfortable incomes and boasted some high school training. And they had a stronger sense of relative deprivation than comparable colleagues who did not favor

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[1] Less extensive analyses of racial voting in three southern cities -- Atlanta, Little Rock, and New Orleans -- were also presented in Appendix E. The results strongly suggested that the political coalition of upper-status whites and Negroes which often forms in the urban South is not likely to be a viable and lasting partnership. This is particularly true as two-party politics slowly develops in the South, and economic issues begin to divide the often mislabeled "liberal" coalition.

Wallace. Thus, they were far more likely to agree with the critical statement: "In spite of what some say, the condition of the average man is getting worse, not better."

Intrigued by these findings, the project greatly expanded its indices of relative deprivation for surveys of whites and Negroes in Cleveland. And once again a range of racial attitudes were predicted by the relative deprivation measures. The results were complex; but the economic gains comparisons tended to be most important for males and white-collar workers, the satisfaction comparisons most important for females and for Wallace voting in 1968, and the social comparisons most important for the Negro Threat Scale. In addition, these measures also successfully predicted the Sheatsley Desegregation Scale (Sheatsley, 1966) and a Busing Scale. Comparisons with Negroes proved most important in predicting anti-Negro attitudes, though they lost some of their power when class comparisons were introduced. For blue-collar and unskilled workers, comparisons with white-collar workers were critical; while for white-collar workers, the economic gains of the unskilled appears to be the salient comparison together with those of Negroes.

Finally, in Chapter Eight the trends over a five-year period in one racial question asked in eighteen Gallup surveys were traced for the urban North and West. The question asked: "Is the Kennedy [Johnson] Administration pushing integration too fast or not fast enough?" A number of fascinating findings grew out of this analysis. Thus, white and Negro responses tended to establish a cyclical pattern: When whites predominantly thought the federal push "too fast," Negroes predominantly regarded it "about right"; and when whites predominantly judged it "about right," Negroes predominantly judged it as "too slow." Furthermore, the timing of this pattern appears to link well with the dramatic and publicized racial events of the time. White resistance tended to increase, for example, when widely reported Congressional arguments against pending civil rights legislation legitimated opposition to change. And white resistance tended to peak two months *prior* to intense racial activity as measured by the *New York Times* index, while Negro insistence peaked a month *after such* activity.

Attitudes Toward Parental Control of Public Schools. Both Negro and white respondents in Cleveland were also asked a standard four-item scale measuring their views toward parental control of public schools. Though none of the items received majority backing, the Negro sample was considerably more favorable toward the idea than the white sample. Indeed, the Negro data strongly suggested that the parental control issue has become a part of a larger ideological framework for a small segment of younger and more militant Negroes. At any rate, however, the much larger segment of the Negro respondents who favor parental control are also supporters of school integration and busing as a means to achieve it if necessary. It appears that many Negro parents in Cleveland are highly dissatisfied with their childrens' schools and consequently favor significant change in public education in whatever form it may come, from busing and integration at distant schools to parental control of local schools.

The parental control attitude findings for whites are more complex. Three distinct groups emerge. One group of older respondents evinces both authoritarian personality trends and conservative political views and tends to reject all four parental control items. A second group is characterized by youth, political activism, and generally liberal views; and it usually agrees with one or two of the items for the expressive function of liberal consistency. The third group are the real proponents of parental control in the white community of Cleveland, and tends to accept three or all four of the items for largely instrumental reasons. It is characterized by an extreme sense of economic deprivation relative to various comparison groups, with white-collar workers affording the most predictive comparisons in the all-white neighborhoods and Negroes in the biracial neighborhoods. And these firm adherents of parental control are more likely to be parents and to be highly dissatisfied with their local schools -- results that bolster the interpretation that their views serve a direct, instrumental function.

Two Middle-Range Theories

These findings led to tentative formulations of two middle-range theories. The one on the operation of attitude climates in the desegregation process was explicitly sought; the other on the attitude effects of dramatic events was an unexpected dividend of the project's research approach.

Attitude Climates and Public School Desegregation.

Our proposed theory of the role of attitude climates consists of seven interrelated propositions which receive verification as far as the data of this study can test them:

(1) Decision-makers in a county will reflect to some degree their county's white opinion climates in their attitudes.

(2) Decision-makers will make school desegregation decisions in varying degrees consistent with (a) their own views and (b) their perception of the opinion climate of their county.

(3) Following balance theory, sharp inconsistency between the decision-makers' actions and beliefs leads to intense strains to change their actions, or their beliefs, or simply "to leave the field" by resigning from the school board.

(4) Fear can upset balance theory predictions, causing a relatively pro-change decision-maker in a Black Belt county to resist racial change for fear of local pressure or a relatively anti-change decision-maker to assent to racial change for fear of federal power.

(5) The relationship between decision-makers' actions on educational desegregation and the white attitude climate will be highest for counties (a) close to the traditional racial norms of the Deep South, (b) with a relatively homogeneous white population, and (c) where racial attitudes are particularly salient for both white and Negro citizens.

(6) Extra-county pressures, such as court orders and threatened withdrawal of federal educational aid, is most critical for the traditional counties where they have significant influences on both the attitude climate and the process of public school desegregation. And any lessening of these pressures will lead to the greatest renewal of white resistance in these same traditional, Black Belt counties.

(7) Following the formulation of Aronson and Carlsmith (1963), the amount of outside pressure used to induce the racial desegregation will determine the degree of change in the white attitude climate. The more the force applied over what is minimally required to achieve the change, the less the attitude change; and, conversely, the less the force applied over the minimal requirement, the more the attitude change.

The Influence of Dramatic Events Upon Racial Attitudes. In Chapters Three and Eight, a number of consistent findings were presented which together suggest a tentative middle-range theory of the attitude effects of dramatic racial events. With direct links to two major bodies of social psychological theory on attitude change, three interrelated propositions emerge from the results:

(1) Despite ceiling effects, the most significant initial opinion changes positively toward the object in question will occur for those related attitudes with the most normative acceptance. These are the attitudes, to use social judgment theory terms (Sherif and Hovland, 1961), whose "latitudes of acceptance" most completely include the dramatic event. Likewise, the most significant initial opinion changes negatively away from the object in question will occur for those related attitudes with the least normative acceptance. These, then, are the attitudes whose "latitudes of rejection" most completely include the dramatic event. This relationship appears to be a result of normatively-sanctioned attitudes being: (a) more reliant upon belief similarity than directly racial factors (Triandis and Davis, 1965); (b) governed by more positive social norms; (c) governed by less salient and explicit social norms; and (d) more likely to be supported by public behavioral commitment.

(2) Again despite ceiling effects, the most significant positive opinion changes toward the object will occur among those individuals whose opinions were already most favorable prior to the dramatic event. Likewise, the most significant negative opinion changes away from the object will occur for those individuals whose opinions were already most unfavorable prior to the dramatic event. This effect will be seen clearest for those attitudes which have the least normative acceptance.

(3) Significant changes in attitudes which have the least normative acceptance will not typically manifest themselves, if at all, until some time after the dramatic event. Following from balance theory formulations, this passage of time allows the initial effects to percolate down in a "ripple process" toward greater cognitive consistency with related racial attitudes which have already shifted.

New Research Methods

Race relations research, as mentioned in Chapter One, has been relatively impoverished in its methodological tools. Consequently, the project made a special effort throughout its work to develop and apply new methods to its problems. Indeed, the core of the research concerned with models of the public school desegregation process in Texas depended heavily on the application of the new Pool, Abelson, and Popkin (1965) method of simulating attitude climates for areas smaller than the original sampling frames of the surveys used. In Chapter Four, this new method and our adaptation of it are described in detail. Basically, our adaptation allowed us to use it for county units with 27 demographic types rather than for state units with 480 demographic types. Moreover, we provide the first validity check on the method's basic assumptions in Appendix A.

Another central focus of the project was the establishment of a 200-survey library of race data described in Appendix C and utilized in Chapters Three, Four, and Eight. In order to better exploit this library for meaningful trend analyses of public opinion, a new analytic method was devised for the project by Dr. Donald Olivier and Michael Schwartz (Appendix B). The unweighted means analysis technique offers a valuable way of correcting minor sample biases across opinion surveys conducted at various points of time. Our original hope was that this would allow a meaningful residual analysis of attitude trend data in Texas; but the residual results with these particular data proved uninterpretable (Appendix B). This disappointment was not, however, a function of the Olivier-Schwartz technique; the method itself allows interesting residual analyses which with different data might well prove interesting.

The project also adapted a number of aggregate analysis techniques to study racial voting across urban precincts. These methods are described in detail in Appendix D; and their use is illustrated in analyses of racial voting by whites in Atlanta, Little Rock, and New Orleans in Appendix E.

Finally, two novel uses of established methods were applied in the search for contextual models of school desegregation. First, in the ecological regressions on the initiation and extent of interracial education, a factor analysis of all of the available census variables in 1960 for counties allowed a more effective selection of relevant predictors. And this manner of selection led to the highest percentages of explained variance reported in this particular research literature; and it led, too, to the discovery of a new and amazingly strong predictor of the extent of public school desegregation -- the total number of commercial farms in a given county. This interesting variable is apparently so effective because it is an indicator of a prosperous truck farming area which is influenced by more liberal urban views while not faced with urban patterns of residential segregation by race.

Second, we adapted path analysis to produce tentative contextual models of the process of racial change in the public schools of the entire state of Texas and of Central and East Texas as well. The chief distinction of path analysis, as opposed to routine regression analysis, is that it does not assume that all of the independent variables act directly and simultaneously upon the dependent variable. This feature allowed us to introduce attitude climate as a potential mediator of the effects of the ecological variables upon the extent of public school desegregation. This approach led to the discovery that attitude climate, especially in East Texas, acted as a mediator of critical and unmeasured external factors.

Policy Implications for Public Education

It is always difficult to derive concrete public policy from social science research, especially when the research is largely on a general and basic level. Nonetheless, we shall close this Final Report with a few policy implications for public education which we believe follow from our research findings reported here. Since these findings and the manner in which they were derived have been provided in considerable detail in this volume, the discerning reader will be able to judge for himself the degree to which these policy suggestions are directly supported by the data. The policy implications fall into four interrelated categories: (A) the racial desegregation of student bodies and teaching staffs in the public schools of the South; (B) the basis of white resistance to racial change in public education in the urban North; (C) the rising issue of parental control of public schools; and (D) the translation of survey data into policy-relevant considerations.

(A) The Racial Desegregation of Student Bodies and Teaching Staffs in the Public Schools of the South. Eight policy implications on this subject emerge from our findings:

(1) Since the date when educational desegregation is begun in a county is only weakly related to the extent to which the process spreads over its schools, constant monitoring of each area's progress should be maintained.

(2) Since the correlates and processes of initiating school desegregation are in general different from those of extending the process once begun, the optimal procedures

for encouraging and inducing each of these aspects of racial change may well be quite different.

(3) The desegregation of teachers, in the eyes of most whites in Texas, is basically the same issue as that of desegregating student bodies. Thus, it does not arouse resistance which was not previously in existence against student desegregation. It follows, then, that the implementation of the federal policy of interracial staffs should not concern itself with fears of more widespread white resistance. One additional point is relevant here that derives not from our data but from the interracial contact literature of social psychology in general: namely, the assignment of Negro principals and other high-level administrators is likely to be even more important in its beneficial effects for both white and Negro children than the desegregation of teachers. What students of both races have seldom witnessed in the United States, and particularly in the South, is competent Negroes in significant roles of authority with biracial constituencies.

(4) A wavering official policy on school desegregation will increase general confusion and hostility in the opinions of white Southerners. Worse, it will, according to our contextual model of East Texas, generate greater resistance to racial change in public education in those very areas which were most resistant to begin with. Indeed, this extrapolation from a model based on mid-sixties data seems to have been handsomely verified in the renewed resistance of Black Belt areas in response to the present Administration's equivocal desegregation policy of 1969 and early 1970.

(5) A firm policy requiring full desegregation of public schools is especially necessary, then, for traditional Black Belt areas where the vast majority of rural Negroes live. We have noted that such a policy influences and is mediated by the white attitude climate in the process of achieving change. Note that this is precisely the opposite sequence from what is popularly regarded to be the case in these areas, for it is generally thought that outside pressure generates further white hostility and resistance and makes significant racial change in the public schools less likely.

(6) The key variable that links our general result in Texas and the popular conception is the degree of external pressure that is applied. Generalizing from the critical cognitive dissonance experiment of Aronson and Carlsmith (1963), the policy goal should be to ensure that enough

pressure is brought to bear upon resistant counties in the South to induce the full change necessary but not any excess pressure beyond this point. In short, pressure insufficient to induce the change and pressure far in excess of what is required will both lead to increased white resentment and resistance.

(7) In addition to the usually employed informal methods, the prediction models offered here and elsewhere (Pettigrew and Cramer, 1959) could be utilized to determine approximately how much pressure is required to induce change in a given county or school district.

(8) Another possible practical use of these prediction formulas is administrative. In enforcing federal policy, limited resources must be strategically allocated to maximize the change sought. And any strategic allocation requires a prior assessment of "easy" areas where a minimal effort can achieve maximum effect as well as "difficult" areas where a maximum effort is needed to achieve even a minimal effect. Such an assessment could be obtained from the use of our prediction models.

(B) The Basis of White Resistance to Racial Change in Public Education in the Urban North. Three policy implications on this subject follow from our findings:

(1) Both the ecological and survey evidence of Chapters Six and Seven pinpointed the core of white resistance to racial change in the urban North among younger, lower-middle-class citizens. Moreover, these individuals expressed considerable dissatisfaction with their local schools. Put together, these data suggest that initiatives for racial change in the public school systems of these cities should come as parts of a larger reform package that promises across-the-board improvement for all children in terms these parents can clearly comprehend. The point is simply that such a broad proposal would be more likely to evoke their highest aspirations for their children rather than their lowest racial fears and animosities.

(2) On a range of dependent variables, we noted that the social psychological key to understanding lower-middle-class anxieties over racial change centered upon feelings of severe deprivation relative to professionals and Negroes. While these feelings focused upon economic concerns, there was good reason to believe that social status anxieties were also involved. This suggests that future educational proposals should be sensitive to the status concerns of

these parents.

(3) Both of the above implications are arguments for such sweeping proposals for future urban education as metropolitan educational parks (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1967; Pettigrew, 1970). Such proposals have many other advantages as well. But they will not be implemented unless federal and state governments provide building funds for new schools to combined suburban-central city consortia.[2]

(C) The Rising Issue of Parental Control of Public Schools. We think our intensive analyses of white and Negro opinion in Cleveland of the parental control of public schools are the most extensive to date on this issue. We believe there are four policy implications of these data.

(1) The idea has not achieved a majority following in either racial community. But it is most popular among Negroes, has a solid base among various types of whites, and seems likely to grow as a pressing issue of urban public education during the 1970's.

(2) While some of its most avid advocates in the Negro community are militants with separatist leanings, parental control is basically supported by Negroes who seek swift alteration of their local schools by any intelligent program of reform -- busing, integration, parental control. If some other educational reform were effectively implemented, much of the Negro sentiment for parental control of public schools might well dissolve.

(3) In the white community, support is not only less strong but more complex. Mildly favorable whites have little personal involvement in the issue and appear to back some aspects of the program out of a youthful and politically active and liberal orientation. Other effectively implemented educational reforms in Cleveland's public schools would probably also receive support from these individuals and might blunt their backing of parental control. By contrast, however, there are a critical mass of whites in the working-class areas of Cleveland which we

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[2] Observe that such consortia do not require metropolitan-wide districts -- only metropolitan cooperation. But such desperately needed cross-district cooperation will not come about unless federal and state governments begin to reward it (Pettigrew, 1970).

sampled which provides solid support of parental control for directly personal and instrumental reasons. Directly linked to their keen feelings of relative deprivation, their support of parental control is solid and not likely to wane without such sweeping change as that outlined in the previous section.

(4) A final policy implication concerns the relation of racial desegregation to parental control. The most ardent advocates of parental control in both racial groups tend to see it as a desirable alternative to desegregation. Especially is this true for whites who reside in interracial neighborhoods and who feel economically deprived relative to Negroes. But the vast majority of Negro supporters and mild supporters among whites also favor desegregation and apparently view the two types of reforms as complementary rather than as alternatives. These differences within both racial communities suggest the types of reactions that are likely to arise should parental control actually be implemented in Cleveland's public schools, for they will depend heavily upon whether the change is made together with or in lieu of racial desegregation.

(D) The Translation of Survey Data into Policy-Relevant Considerations. It is, perhaps, appropriate to close the Final Report with some cautions about utilizing survey data to formulate policy. Now that this practice has become popular in higher echelons of government, it should be emphasized that a simple reading of the absolute percentages of a single survey can be both misleading and dangerous. Evidence for this caution abounds in this Report, particularly in Chapters Three, Four, Five, Seven, and Eight. Stated tersely, five principles for translating competently collected survey data into policy considerations are:

(1) Never base final judgments on the absolute percentages of one or two items on a few surveys.

(2) Remember always to interpret survey data within their social contexts.

(3) Recall that even deeply held opinions are subject to change with the occurrence of particular dramatic events.

(4) Some opinions -- such as those measured and studied intensively in Chapter Eight -- are subject to wide, cyclical swings and require repeated surveys over a number of critical years in order to interpret correctly.

(5) Widespread hostility to special change does not necessarily mean that there will be mass resistance to the change once it is introduced. This is especially true when there is a solid minority who favor and press for the change, when the initiator of the change is firm and unwavering, and when there is a widespread belief that the change is inevitable. Once an accomplished fact, the change will generate its own support (Allport, 1964; Deutsch and Collins, 1951; Hyman and Sheatsley, 1956, 1964; Pettigrew, 1961, 1966; Wilner, Walkley and Cook, 1955).

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APPENDIX A

Validation of the Pool-Abelson-Popkin Method for Simulated Opinion Climates

The ingenious method for simulating opinion climates devised by Pool, Abelson, and Popkin (1965) made possible the analyses of the school desegregation process in Texas presented in Chapters Four and Five. The method was described in full in Chapter Four. The reader will recall that basically the method allows a simulation of opinion climates for areas smaller than the original sampling frame. Thus, the originators utilized the method to estimate state climates from national survey data; and we utilized it to estimate county climates from state survey data.

We noted in Chapter Four that the Pool-Abelson-Popkin simulation method rests on an especially crucial assumption: namely, that the individuals comprising a given demographic type hold the same opinions across units (i.e., states or counties). Hence, Pool, *et al.*, had to assume that low-status, Protestant, rural white males in South Carolina were essentially the same as those in Georgia; that is, within regions, the types did not vary significantly in opinions across states. Or in the analyses of Chapters Four and Five, we had to assume that young, college-educated residents of metropolitan areas were essentially the same in Houston and Dallas. Furthermore, the successful use of the method is dependent on the variables actually employed to form the demographic types being significantly related to the opinions and the social process involved.

Are these assumptions justified for our analyses? Only the indirect route of criterion validity has tested them in the social science literature to date; that is, the method has worked successfully to predict political behavior in the presidential elections of 1960 and 1964 (Pool, Abelson, and Popkin, 1965) and in Chapters Four and Five to predict the process of school desegregation in Texas. But no direct test to date has been made of the basic assumption. Because this volume's findings are so heavily dependent upon this new method, this appendix presents data for the first direct check on its validity.

The Validation Method. Ideally, we would have validated the Pool-Abelson-Popkin simulation technique by conducting a massive single survey whose sample size was large enough to allow a split-half approach, with half being employed to calculate the observed opinion climates. At far less cost, we did the next best thing: we included the relevant item on four consecutive surveys of Texas performed by Belden Associates of Dallas in November of 1967 and February, May, and August of 1968 which employed many of the same sampling points. Thus, the validation requires simulated estimates of the white opinion climates on school desegregation of the Texas counties that were sampled in all four surveys; these estimates in turn are compared with actual observations of these climates based on data independent of those employed in obtaining the simulated estimates.

Six Texas counties were used in all four surveys and in addition have sufficient white cases upon which to base our analysis: Bexar (including San Antonio), Dallas, El Paso, Harris (including Houston), Tarrent (including Fort Worth), and Travis (including Austin). The requirement of numerous cases limits our validation to largely metropolitan counties. First, the simulated estimates for each of these six counties were derived with data from one or two surveys in precisely the manner described in full in Chapter Four.[1] To further guarantee the independence of the data used to calculate the estimated and observed opinion climates, the data from each county were systematically omitted from the process of simulation for that particular county.

Second, the simulated estimates had to be corrected for the overall mean change in opinions toward school desegregation[2] which occurred over the momentous nine months in which these surveys were collected, changes which Chapter Three showed with these same four surveys to be unusually large following the assassination of Dr. King in April of 1968. Finally, the simulated estimates of the school desegregation attitudes of whites in these six counties were compared with the observed climates measured by one or two surveys conducted after those used for the estimates.

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[1] The equation for calculating the simulated estimates is:

$A_i = \sum_j^{1,27} P_{ij}T_j$, where A_i is the simulated estimate for county i, P_{ij} is the proportion in county i of demographic type j, T_j is the percentage favorable to school desegregation in type j, and $\sum_j$ is the sum of all 27 $P_{ij}T_j$'s (3 age levels X 3 educational levels X 3 city sizes).

[2] The item measuring attitudes toward school desegregation is the same as listed in Chapter Three for the King-assassination attitude change effects and in Chapter Four for purposes of simulating county opinion climates.

The Results. The results of this analysis are provided in Table A-1. The first comparison at the left of Table A-1 is between the two surveys conducted in November of 1967 and February of 1968. A constant of 3.3 per cent was added to the simulated estimates based on the November data to correct for the overtime mean change between the two surveys. An inspection of the estimated and observed white percentages favoring racial desegregation in the six Texas counties are reasonably close except for the five point spread for Dallas County. Fitting a regression line to the six points indicates that 65 per cent of the variance in the observed percentages is accounted for by the simulated estimates, with a product-moment correlation of +.81.

The second comparison is shown next in Table A-1. It utilizes the May and August of 1968 Texas polls of Belden Associates. The mean correction necessary here was an added 0.3 per cent to the simulated estimates. Again we see that the estimated and observed percentages are reasonably close, with differences ranging from 2.2 per cent in Tarrent County to 0.9 per cent in El Paso County. But when a regression line is fitted to these six points, only 48 per cent of the observed opinion climate variance is accounted for in this comparison by the simulated estimates, with a product-moment correlation of +.69.

Is the random error introduced by the small numbers of cases of just two surveys responsible for these disappointingly low validity relationships? To answer this critical question, we combined the November 1967 with the February 1968 surveys to obtain the simulated estimates and the May and August 1968 surveys to obtain the observed percentages. Again a constant of 4.6 per cent was added to the estimates in order to correct for the sizable shift in means between the pre- and post-King assassination surveys. This resulted in doubling the sample sizes and dramatically altering the findings. Table A-1 shows the results on page A-5. Notice first that the estimated and observed percentage differences range from 2.6 per cent for Dallas to 0.9 per cent in both El Paso and Tarrent. But more important, the best-fitting regression line between the six points indicates that 85 per cent of the variance of the observed opinion climates are accounted for by the simulated estimates, with a product-moment correlation of +.92. This is

Table A-1

Simulated Estimates and Observed Percentages of Whites Favoring School Desegregation in Six Texas Counties[1]

Texas County	November 1967-February 1968 Surveys			May 1968-August 1968 Surveys		
	Simulated[2] Estimates	Observed Estimates	Differences	Simulated Estimates	Observed Estimates	Differences
Bexar (San Antonio)	65.1	67.1	-2.0	68.1	67.0	+1.1
Dallas	55.4	50.4	+5.0	62.0	60.1	+1.9
El Paso	66.1	67.2	-1.1	66.9	66.0	+0.9
Harris (Houston)	59.3	56.9	+2.4	57.6	59.6	-2.0
Tarrent (Fort Worth)	57.6	59.3	-1.7	63.1	60.9	+2.2
Travis (Austin)	63.1	62.1	+1.0	64.1	65.9	-1.8
Best Fitted Regression Line Between Six Points	R^2=	.65			.48	
	R =	+.81			+.69	

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[1] Attitudes toward school desegregation measured by the item described and analyzed in Chapters Three and Four.

[2] Simulated as described in text.

Table A-1 (continued)

Texas County	Simulated Estimates	Observed Estimates	Differences
	Nov.'67+Feb.'68 - May'68+Aug.'68 Surveys		
Bexar (San Antonio)	66.1	66.7	-0.6
Dallas	57.1	59.7	-2.6
El Paso	67.6	66.7	+0.9
Harris (Houston)	62.1	60.2	+1.9
Tarrent (Fort Worth)	59.2	60.1	-0.9
Travis (Austin)	66.6	65.1	+1.5
Best Fitted Regression $R^2=$		.85	
Line Between Six Points $R =$		+.92	

a highly satisfactory validation of the method and its chief assumptions as employed in the analyses of Chapters Four and Five. It also indicates that the less adequate findings of the first two partial comparisons were due in large part to their restricted sample sizes.

Conclusion. We can tentatively conclude, then, that the Pool-Abelson-Popkin method of simulating opinion climates for sub-sets of the sampling frame is a valid approach to the problem. The obtained level of correspondence between the simulated estimates and the observed opinion climates for the six Texas counties when sufficiently large samples were involved makes it an appropriate approach to many of the analytic problems faced in Chapters Four and Five. This first direct validation of the method lends confidence to our earlier analyses that were so heavily dependent upon it.

APPENDIX B

An Unweighted Means Technique for Survey Analysis[1]

One of the major methodological goals of the project was the development of new techniques for the use of survey data in investigating attitude change over time. The problem is that the same individuals are not included in each of our surveys, so there is no way to compare the attitude of a particular individual at time A with his attitude at time B, thus determining changes. As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 4, Pool, Abelson, and Popkin (1965) suggested a solution to this kind of problem which we have adopted with modifications. In essence, this technique consists in breaking each sample up according to important background characteristics and then treating the resulting groups as the units to be compared rather than individuals.

On the basis of their relationships to racial attitudes, we have taken sex, age, city (of residence) size, socio-economic status (SES), and region of the state as the relevant background characteristics according to which groups were formed. We can then refer to the male-old-rural-high SES-western group and ask whether it differs from the female-old-rural-high SES-western group on some dependent variable. Such a comparison would give us one estimate of a sex effect. More important, however, is that this technique enables us to compare the male-old-rural-high SES-western group in 1954 with itself in 1956. What this technique amounts to, then, is treating each group as an individual and considering the different surveys as dealing with the same units at different times.

Methodological Problems

While this technique is conceptually simple, its actual operation is complicated by severe methodological problems. To understand these, it is necessary to give a brief description of the actual data used.

Eight surveys of Texas residents conducted by Joe Belden Associates during the period from November, 1954 to

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[1] Originally devised for the project by Dr. Donald Olivier of Harvard University and Dr. Michael Schwartz of the State University of New York at Stony Brook.

August 1961 were made available to the project by the Roper Public Opinion Research Center of Williamstown, Massachusetts. Each survey contained the following question on racial attitudes:

> As you know, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that all children, no matter what their race, have equal rights to go to the same schools. *Now they have to figure out how to put this new law into effect all over the country.*[2] Suppose you were on the school board here, and they asked you to give your frank opinion. Which one of the four statements on this card comes closest to the way you feel about it?
>
> A. Keep the races separate even if I have to disobey the law.
>
> B. Find a way to keep the races separate by getting around the law.
>
> C. Begin mixing the races gradually, starting where there is *least* opposition.
>
> D. Obey the law even if I have to let all races go to the same schools immediately.

Past experience has shown that even the smallest change in wording of an attitude item can induce changes in response patterns. Furthermore, it is almost impossible to control for change resulting from different wordings, since such changes are virtually indistinguishable from real attitude change. The advantage of the Texas data is that they involve items with the closest to identical wordings over a considerable length of time of any set of race-related polls we have found. A similar series is analyzed in Chapter 8. Our Texas analysis is biased by the wording changes, but, as will be explained below, we can circumscribe the magnitude of their effect considerably.

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[2] The italicized sections indicate those parts of the question which have varied between surveys. The sentence beginning "Now they have to figure. . . ." has had several variations. For instance, in the August 1955 survey it was worded: "Now they're trying to put this new law into effect all over the country." Also, the August, 1961 poll replaced in response alternative C the word "least" with "less."

Each of the eight Belden polls draws a "proportional" cluster sample of about 1,000 Texans. As we shall concentrate here on white "Anglo" attitudes, we eliminate all Negro- and Mexican-Americans before beginning analysis. These groups constitute about one quarter of each sample. In addition, there are a number of respondents in each poll who did not answer the relevant attitude item or for whom we do not have the necessary background data.

The "proportional" sampling technique employed by Belden ensures that his sample will correspond to the universe of Texans on the basis of certain pre-determined characteristics. That is, there will be the same proportion of men in any particular sample as there is in all of Texas; the same proportion of East Texas residents in the sample as there is in all of Texas; etc. The specific variables "controlled" in this fashion, and the number of categories which each variable entails, are:

Geographic district	(7 categories)
City size	(4-10 categories)
Sex	(2 categories)
Age	(3 categories)
Race	(3 categories)
SES	(4 categories)

But Belden Associates do not "control" their sample within categories, only for the total marginals of each variable considered separately. In other words, in drawing their sample, they treat each control variable as if it were independent. Thus, while the sample might contain the proper proportion of big city residents and the correct proportion of West Texas residents, there may not be the correct proportion of West Texans who reside in big cities.

The original outline of the project proposed that each of our background variables, including date, would be dichotomized for the formation of groups. This procedure would yield 2^6 or 64 combinations of categories, each of which would be a group. However, this proved to be empirically unsatisfactory since the resulting groups were far too heterogeneous for statistical purposes. For instance, when we compared time distributions of two groups formed by dichotomizing region from the original seven regional groups, there was as much variance within each of the two groups as there was between the two. The only empirically consistent grouping is that East Texas and Southwest Texas were clearly distinct from the other regions and from each other.[3]

The most natural groupings divide the data into cells of widely varying size, which can be difficult to work with. We could, for example, collapse our two city-size categories "rural" and "2,500 to 10,000" into one category, "under 10,000," which would be reasonably homogeneous; but this would leave us with three city-size categories of such varying size as to be quite difficult to manage:

UNDER 10,000	10,000-50,000	OVER 50,000
36%	19%	45%

In general, then, we had to discard our original hopes for simple dichotomization and develop categories as broad as the data would permit. These worked out to be:

Date of survey	(8 categories)
Region of state	(7 categories)
Sex	(2 categories)
City size	(4 categories)
SES	(4 categories)
Age	(4 categories)

With the exception of age, these categories parallel the sampling categories of the original data. The selection of the 4 category break-down of age is based on the analysis of a series of ways of categorizing age, which is possible since we have the respondents' exact ages available. The cutting points selected (under 30, 31-40, 41-50, and over 50) represented an empirical decision that resulted in a workable distribution and at the same time preserved natural age cohorts.

One obvious result of this categorization policy is that instead of 64 groups of background variables, we now have the massive potential number of 7,168 hypothetical groups, or cells. But the total number of usable respondents is only 5,037, and some cells have more than one person in them. So we end up with 3,939 empty cells. The full distribution is:

---

[3] At a later point in our analysis, we collapsed Belden's seven regional categories into three -- East, Central, and West Texas -- as presented in Chapters 2 through 5.

Number of subjects per cell	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Number of cells	3939	2109	718	244	84	40	21	8	4	0	1

This distribution varies considerably from a random one. That is, there are many more empty cells than we would expect from chance allocation to cells. This in turn implies that there is systematic covariation among the background variables, which introduces problems of confounding effects.

It is necessary to go into the covariation problem in some detail, since its solution is central to the analytic technique we have developed. By covariation, we mean that when a person is in a given category on one background variable, he also tends to be in a certain category on another variable. For example, since Central Texas has more cities than East Texas, a person who lives in Central Texas has a greater probability of being urban than does an East Texas resident. Hence, region and city-size covary.

This covariation can have two sources. First, it can reflect some real-world phenomenon, as the above example does. Second, it can simply be an artifact of the sample drawn by Belden Associates. For example, there were no rural, West Texas subjects in the August, 1960 survey, although West Texas is the most rural region in Texas. We see a covariation between region and city-size, but it does not reflect what we know to be true of the real-world.

Because of the covariation of background variables, empty cells are not distributed randomly throughout the matrix of possible groups, but tend to cluster systematically around the less prevalent categories. Taking the first city size-region covariance example above, we determine that there are 256 Central Texas, big-city cells in our overall matrix as well as 256 East Texas, big-city cells.[4] Since we have more big city respondents from Central Texas than from East

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[4] 256 = 8 dates x 4 ages x 2 sexes x 4 SES categories.

Texas, the Central Texas, big-city cells tend to be more complete. Similarly, since we have more rural people from East Texas than from Central Texas, we get fewer empty cells in the East Texas rural section than in the Central Texas rural.

The object of our analytic technique is basically identical to an ordinary analysis of variance. For each background variable that reduces the amount of unexplained variance, we calculate effect scores. As with all data analysis, it is based on the assumption that the independent variables used are significant in determining response patterns to the dependent variable -- in this case, the desegregation question presented above. To the extent that they do exert a determining influence, our analysis will produce large "effects."

The basic model we use is a six-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with an initial assumption of additivity or linear effects. The assumption of additivity means that it is assumed that each independent variable has an independent effect; and that to predict the score (attitude mean) of a particular group, we simply add together the particular effects of each characteristic which produces the group and add that total effect to the mean for the entire sample. This would, by the usual ANOVA techniques, amount to a relatively simple arithmetic problem. Standard procedure would dictate that we simply divide the sample into the categories of the variable in question, determine the category scores, and subtract the category means from the grand (overall) mean to determine each effect score.[5] For example, the sex effect would be calculated in the following manner:

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[5] Technically, each category or level of a variable yields an effect estimate computed in this manner, but the number of independent effect estimates equals the degrees of freedom for that variable. Thus, city size with 7 levels has 6 independent effects. The constraint that the sum of the $\Sigma \alpha_i = 0$ guarantees this result.

Sex Effect Example

	Male	Female	Overall
Per Cent Resistant to Racial Desegregation of Schools[6]	54.6	45.3	50.0[7]

Category Grand
Score Mean

Male effect = 54.6 - 50.0 = 4.6

Female effect = 45.3 - 50.0 = -4.7

However, the above procedure ignores the fact that sex may covary with one or more of the other independent variables. Hence, what we called a sex effect above may be partially produced by whatever other independent variables covary with sex. Thus, when the effects of these other variables are computed, they will contain elements of a sex effect. And when all the effects are added together to reproduce the data, the redundancies will combine to produce extremely poor predictions.

An example might help make this important point clear. Suppose we have divided our sample into two regions and two city sizes, and of a total of 200 respondents, the distribution is:

		Region		
		East	West	Total
City Size	Rural	N=100	0	100
	Urban	0	100	100
	Total	100	100	200

This non-random distribution of independent variables is somewhat similar to the first example of the covariance between region (Central vs. East Texas) and city size.

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[6] Per cent resistance is the major dependent variable of this analysis. It is formed by dichotomizing responses to the question presented above, where responses A and B were considered resisting desegregation and responses C and D as not resisting.

[7] In all examples, we will assume the overall sample percentage is 50.

Suppose further that 50 per cent of the total sample gave a desegregation resistance response, and the per cent giving a resistance response for each group is:

		Region		
		East	West	Total
	Rural	40%	---	40%
City Size	Urban	---	60%	60%
	Total	40%	60%	50%

If we use the procedure for estimating effects just outlined, we would get:

	Region		
	East	West	Total
Per Cent Resistant	40%	60%	50%

Category Mean   Grand Mean

$\alpha_{east} = 40 - 50 = -10$

$\alpha_{west} = 60 - 50 = +10$

where α_{east} is the east region effect and α_{west} is the west region effect.

and:

	City Size		
	Rural	Urban	Total
Per Cent Resistant	40%	60%	50%

$\beta_{rural} = 40 - 50 = -10$

$\beta_{urban} = 60 - 50 = +10$

where β_{rural} is the rural effect and β_{urban} is the urban effect.

If the additive model is valid, we should be able to reproduce the original data using the above results in the following formula:

$$x_{ij} = \bar{x} + \alpha_i + \beta_j$$

where x_{ij} = per cent resistance for the group in region i and city size j

$\bar{x}$ = the overall mean (in this case assumed to be 50)

α_i = the effect of region i

β_j = the effect of city size j

Using this formula, we get:

$$x_{east \cdot rural} = 50 + (-10) + (-10) = 30\%$$

$$x_{west \cdot urban} = 50 + 10 + 10 = 70\%$$

But our original data gave 40% and 60% as the appropriate percentages, so both estimates are off by 10% -- a considerable error.

The above example is, of course, extreme, but the same problem arises when the association between independent variables is not perfect. Consider another example using the same hypothetical variables, but with a less extreme cell distribution:

		Region		
		1	2	Total
City Size	1	N=900	100	1,000
	2	100	900	1,000
	Total	1,000	1,000	2,000

Suppose we obtain the following actual results for resistant percentage:

		Region		
		1	2	Total
City Size	1	40%	50%	41%
	2	50%	60%	59%
	Total	41%	59%	50%

We would calculate effects as follows:

Region

	1	2	Total
Per Cent Resistant	41%	59%	50%

$$\alpha_1 = 41 - 50 = \underline{-9}$$

$$\alpha_2 = 59 - 50 = \underline{+9}$$

City Size

	1	2	Total
Per Cent Resistant	41%	59%	50%

$$\beta_1 = 41 - 50 = \underline{-9}$$

$$\beta_2 = 59 - 50 = \underline{+9}$$

Using the same formula given above, we produce the following table for resistant percentages:

Region

City Size	1	2
1	32%	50%
2	50%	68%

Once again, we find a large discrepancy between our original data and the estimates of our effects analysis. The problem clearly lies in the unequal sizes of the cells in question, which is precisely the problem we face with the data we are using.

As was discussed above, the covariation of our independent variables produces, in a non-random fashion, large numbers of subjects in some cells and none at all in others. Thus, even if the additive model were appropriate to the data, the analysis would not show it.

The New Technique

Our solution to this problem is the adoption of what is called an "unweighted means" technique. Essentially, this procedure treats the data as though all cell sizes were the same -- in fact, as if all non-empty cells have only one observation. The effect of a particular category of a particular variable is estimated by averaging the scores of each cell within that category, regardless of the number of units per cell. This procedure can be illustrated using the hypothetical data from the previous example.

We begin with the original hypothetical data showing the resistant percentages:

		Region 1	Region 2
City Size	1	40%	50%
	2	50%	60%

To produce regional mean estimates, we average within region, ignoring differences in cell size:

$$\text{Region 1 per cent resistant} = \frac{x_{11} + x_{12}}{2}$$

$$= \frac{40 + 50}{2} = 45\%$$

$$\text{Region 2 per cent resistant} = \frac{x_{21} + x_{22}}{2}$$

$$= \frac{50 + 60}{2} = 55\%$$

Using these regional mean estimates, we estimate region effects in the same manner as earlier, by subtracting the grand mean from the region mean:

$$\alpha_1 = 45 - 50 = \underline{-5}$$

$$\alpha_2 = 55 - 50 = \underline{+5}$$

Using the same procedure to estimate city size means, we find:

City Size 1 per cent resistant = 45%

City Size 2 per cent resistant = 55%

and $$\beta_1 = 45 - 50 = \underline{-5}$$

$$\beta_2 = 55 - 50 = \underline{+5}$$

Using these new effect scores in our estimation formula, we obtain a table identical to the original.

To extend this procedure from a two-way to a six-way analysis requires that we begin by calculating the per cent resistant for each of the 7,168 cells. Then, to obtain first order effects,[8] we find the mean score of all the cells included in the category of the variable in question. Finally, we subtract the mean from the grand mean to estimate the effect.

If all 7,168 cells in our analytic design were populated, this method would suffice to complete our analysis. We would be able to calculate effects scores which would be unaffected by the covariation of independent variables. However, the existence of empty cells reintroduces the problem of covariation bias. Going back to the first example, we used for resistant percentages:

		Region		
		1	2	
City Size	1	40%	---	
	2	---	60%	
				50%

We see that we cannot use empty cells in the same way we use underpopulated cells. In fact, we have no alternative but to ignore the empty cells. In doing so, however, we produce the same effects estimates as an ordinary weighted means analysis; that is,

$$\alpha_1 = \frac{40 + \text{blank}}{1} - 50 = \underline{-10}$$

$$\alpha_2 = \frac{60 + \text{blank}}{1} - 50 = \underline{+10}$$

---

[8] The first order effect of an independent variable is the overall effect of that variable on the dependent variable regardless of how the effect might operate within particular classes created by the addition of another variable.

$$\beta_1 = \frac{\underline{40 + \text{blank}}}{1} - 50 = \underline{-10}$$

$$\beta_2 = \frac{\underline{60 + \text{blank}}}{1} - 50 = \underline{+10}$$

which are the identical effects as produced above and found to yield extremely poor estimates.

Fortunately, there are always a large number of occupied cells within a particular category of a variable whose effect we wish to estimate. Clearly, we must find the average of the non-empty cells. But this does not quite solve the problem. Going back to our second example, let us estimate the effects of region and city size. This time, however, the elements of our analysis are not respondents, but cells formed by the other four variables in our analysis (age, date, sex, SES). For convenience, let us suppose that there are hypothetically 1,000 cells at each combination of region and city size, but we have the following distribution of non-empty cells:

		Region	
		1	2
City Size	1	900/1000 non-empty cells	100/1000 non-empty cells
	2	100/1000 non-empty cells	900/1000 non-empty cells

It is crucial to remember that each cell itself has a score, which is the per cent of respondents in that cell who gave a resistant, pro-segregationist response. However, for each box in our table, we can find the average of the non-empty cells constituting it. Suppose when we found those averages, we arrived at the following table of resistant percentages:

		Region		
		1	2	
City Size	1	40%	50%	
	2	50%	60%	
				50%

Once again, we are faced with the same weighting problem. Using normal procedures, we would get a Region 1 mean of [(40 x 900) + (50 x 100)]/1000 = 41%. The region effect would then be 41 - 50 = -9, which is 4% too high, as we noted previously.

The solution to this problem is to take an unweighted mean of the category means within the category whose effect is being estimated. That is, for the above example:

$$\text{Region 1 per cent resistant} = \frac{\text{City Size 1 mean} + \text{City Size 2 mean}}{2}$$

$$= \frac{40 + 50}{2} = 45\%$$

$$\text{and } \alpha_i = 45 - 50 = \underline{-5}$$

which is the correct effect estimate.

Our general formula for estimating category means and effects contains no provisions for the order of collapsing, but the above example reveals that when empty cells are present, the order of collapsing may be crucial, since it determines whether a cell will be averaged with many or few cells, which in turn determines its influence on the grand mean, which is itself unweighted. This order of collapsing problem can be easily demonstrated. Suppose we have the following table of resistant percentages which treats region as having five categories and city size as a dichotomy:

		Region				
		1	2	3	4	5
City Size	1	75%	25%	25%	25%	25%
	2	---	25%	25%	25%	25%

If we now collapse across region, we get a new table:

	City Size	
	1	2
Per Cent Resistant	35%	25%

which yields an unweighted grand mean of 30%. If, on the other hand, we first collapse across city size, our new table is:

Region

	1	2	3	4	5
Per Cent Resistant	75%	25%	25%	25%	25%

This yields an unweighted grand mean of 35%. In this case, the order of collapsing yields grand means which are different by five percentage points.

This difference results from the confounding (or co-variation) of region and city size -- specifically, within city size 2 there are no respondents who reside in region 1 and all of these cells are presumably empty. Notice that we have no way to select one of the grand mean estimates as the "correct" one; either or neither may be correct. But, according to our ANOVA model, the effects estimate is based on variance about the grand mean. Therefore, the confounding of independent variables due to systematic covariation leads to different estimates of the grand mean (depending on the order of collapse), which in turn produce different estimates of the effect in question. Thus, the order of collapse bears directly on the estimation of effects. Once all empty cells have been eliminated through collapsing, however, the subsequent order of collapsing has no consequence on the final effects estimates.

An exact solution to this problem is not possible, but an approximate solution is arrived at by collapsing in all possible orders and assessing the distribution of estimated effects. If the distribution of estimated effects has a small standard deviation, then the amount of confounding is small, but as the magnitude of the standard deviation increases, the problem of confounded effects becomes more severe.

A Test of the Technique

The data from the eight Belden surveys were analyzed by this unweighted means technique. Between 40 and 60 estimates were obtained for the effect of each variable.[9] Our analysis of the distribution of estimates produced by different collapsing orders suggests that the variability of these estimates are, for the most part, manageable. For example, the estimates for the percentages giving resistant, pro-segregation responses at a given date have the following profile:

---

[9] The variation in the number of estimates results from the fact that depending on which variable effect is being determined, empty cells may be eliminated sooner or later in the process of collapsing.

Category[1]	Median[2]	Mean[3]	S.D.[4]	Range[5]
11/54	56.1	56.2	0.908	3.8
8/55	55.7	55.6	2.108	8.0
5/56	56.8	56.8	0.696	2.8
5/57	56.9	56.6	1.117	4.2
11/57	50.8	50.5	1.042	3.8
11/59	46.7	46.8	1.221	4.7
8/60	41.1	41.5	1.571	6.1
8/61	36.6	35.8	1.050	4.5

---

[1] The variable we are concerned with is date. The categories are the dates of the administration of the surveys.

[2] The medians of the per cent resistant estimated according to different collapsing orders.

[3] The means of the estimates of per cent resistant produced by different collapsing orders.

[4] The standard deviations of the percentage estimates.

[5] The ranges of percentage estimates.

These figures typify the situation for main effects and suggest we would not go too far wrong (two to three per cent) by taking the mean over all orders of collapsings. So, to determine the effect of a particular category i of a particular variable v, calculate the unweighted mean of all nonempty cells which have value i on variable v, using all possible orders of collapsing of the other variables. This gives many estimates; take their mean m_i. Similarly, calculate the grand mean effect by calculating unweighted means over all cells, using all orders of collapsing, and taking the mean m of these estimates. The effect of the category is the difference:

$$a_i = m_i - m$$

Similarly, to get an "interaction" effect estimate for categories i and j of variables u and v, calculate the unweighted mean of all cells within the ij cell, using all orders of collapsing, and find the mean_{ij} of these estimates. The estimated effect is then:

$$a_{ij} = m_{ij} - (m + a_i + a_j)$$
$$= m_{ij} - mi - mj + m$$

Note that the relationship between a's (effects) and m's (means) is the usual one for ANOVA. It is the way of deriving the m's that is unusual.

Ordinarily in ANOVA you use normality assumptions to derive significance levels for each effect estimate (i.e., significance of the difference of the effect estimate from zero). Here, since that procedure gets quite complicated, we take a different approach.

It is fairly clear from inspection of the data that all six main effects are significantly different from zero. Hence, we look at a model which includes the main effects but no interactions (additive model) and see how well it fits the data.

Details of the model: the estimated score for each individual in the ijklmn cell is:

$$e_{ijklmn} = m + a_i + a_j + \dots + a_n$$

(i.e., the sum of the grand mean and all the main effects.) The estimated mean for the ij cell (for example) is the ordinary (weighted) mean of these estimated scores over all individuals in the cell:

$$e_{ij} = \frac{1}{n_{ij}} \sum_{klmn} n_{ijklmn} e_{ijklmn}$$

where n_{ij} is the number of individuals in the ij cell, etc.

If these estimated means coincide with the true cell means (i.e., if $e_{ij} = p_{ij}$), the proportion B+E in the ij cell, then the additive model works perfectly. Large deviations suggest that interaction effects may be present or that something else is wrong.

We can take advantage of the fact that we are dealing with percentage data to get an idea of how large a deviation to consider important. The true cell mean p_{ij} for the ij cell is a mean over all cells within the ij cell:

$$p_{ij} = \frac{1}{n_{ij}} \sum_{klmn} n_{ijklmn} p_{ijklmn}$$

If we assume our estimates e_{ijklmn} for the individual cells are correct (i.e., e_{ijklmn} is the probability that an individual in the ijklmn cell will give a B+E response), and if we assume that all responses are independent, than the variance of the proportion B+E responses for the ijklmn cell will be:

$$\mathrm{var}_{ijklmn} = \frac{e_{ijklmn}\,(1-e_{ijklmn})}{n_{ijklmn}}$$

The variance of the weighted mean p_{ij} of all cells within the ij cell will be:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathrm{var}_{ij} &= \frac{1}{n_{ij}^2} \sum_{klmn} n_{ijklmn}^2 \mathrm{var}_{ijklmn} \\ &= \frac{1}{n_{ij}^2} \sum_{klmn} n_{ijklmn} e_{ijklmn} (1-e_{ijklmn})\end{aligned}$$

If we assume p_{ij} is approximately normally distributed (which will be the case as long as n_{ij} is large and the e_{ijklmn} do not differ too much among themselves), we get a measure of the significance of the deviation $p_{ij} - e_{ij}$ of the true mean in the ij cell from the estimate. The deviation will be approximately normally distributed with mean 0 and s.d.:

$$\mathrm{var}_{ij} = \frac{1}{n_{ij}} \sqrt{\sum_{klmn} n_{ijklmn} e_{ijklmn} (1-e_{ijklmn})}$$

One advantage of this way of doing things is that we can see exactly which of the cells differ from the estimates to an important extent, and try to give substantive interpretations to those differences. One convenient way to summarize the data for two-way interactions (e.g., city size by time) is to plot the deviations of cells from the model (both the raw differences and the differences scaled in s.d. units).

The results indicate that we have very nearly reproduced the data with our additive model. Of 29 first-order estimates (e.g., estimating the percentage of resistants among urban males is a second order estimate), only five were significantly different from the real data at the five per cent level of confidence. These five were: large cities (50,000+), old age (50+ years), the November 1954 and August 1960 dates, and North Texas (the last of these was eliminated through regional collapsing into three categories). Below is a chart of the number of significantly discrepant second-order estimates:

		(2)	(7)	(4)	(4)	(4)
		Sex	Section	Age	City Size	SES
Date of Survey	(8)	2/16	17/56	7/32	7/32	6/32
Sex	(2)		2/14	0/8	1/8	0/8
Section	(7)			4/28	7/28	7/28
Age	(4)				3/16	3/16
City Size	(4)					3/16

Total = 69/338 = 20.4%

Clearly there are many more discrepancies than chance would allow. However, 59 of the 69 discrepancies involve either section or date, while sex is involved in only five. This suggests that most of the discrepancies result from interaction effects involving the two variables, date and section. Further, of the discrepancies for the city size variable (21 in all), twelve involved the 50,000+ category. This indicates the exact location of the estimating errors from the linear effects model. For present purposes, however, the level of accuracy is sufficient.

Use of the Technique

The original purpose for deriving the unweighted means analysis was to probe more deeply into the interactions of background variables as they related to changes in desegregation opinions over time. Put differently, it was designed primarily to uncover subtle differences in the changes of racial views of various types of white Texans during the late 1950's. However, we were not able to achieve meaningful results with it for this purpose. In the end, then, the technique's primary application in this report was to correct for Belden survey sampling errors over time in an array of trend graphs provided in Chapter Three (Figures 3-1 through 3-5).

To appreciate its mixed utility, consider Figures B-1 and B-2. Figure B-1 provides the raw results of resistant percentages for the four city sizes over the eight surveys (city size by date). A glance reveals a rather confused picture, made more so by sampling errors over the eight polls. As previously explained, since different respondents were questioned in each Belden survey and drawn on a stratified quota basis, sampling fluctuations necessarily occurred from one survey to another lending error to the raw findings of Figure B-1. For example, Belden Associates took considerable care to obtain almost precisely the same percentages in each sample of females, of urban residents, of West Texas residents, etc. But the quota sampling assured stability across time only for the total marginals of each variable stratified on. It did not hold constant across surveys more refined types involving two or more background variables considered at once such as urban females in West Texas. And it is these errors for which this technique is well suited to correct.

To see what a vast difference this correction makes, compare the confusing results of Figure B-1 with the same results corrected by the unweighted means technique and shown back in Chapter Three as Figure 3-4. Near-parallel functions back in Figure 3-4 illustrate the technique's corrective power for such sampling errors.

By contrast, Figure B-2 demonstrates our disappointment with the technique's product. We had hoped the residual percentages derived from the expected and the raw results would provide meaningful findings and important clues as to the attitude change processes underway among white Texans from 1954 to 1961. But repeatedly we obtained patterns such as shown in Figure B-2, patterns without apparent meaning or clues. Is this a failure of our technique, the nature of our data, or both? We cannot even hazard a guess at this point. But we hope others engaged in similar survey analyses will employ the technique and give it further testing.

Figure B-1

Raw Percentages of White Texans Who Resist School Desegregation By City Size Over Time



Figure B-2

Residuals Between Expected and Obtained Percentages of Resistant White Texans By City Size Over Time



APPENDIX C

Survey Data Bank

American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup Polls)

The largest segment of the project's Survey Data Bank is a collection of polls conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup Polls). There are 128 surveys in this group, the first conducted in February, 1937 and the last one completed November 14, 1967. Each of these surveys contains a number of demographic items and a number of standard political items, with the bulk comprised of various attitudinal questions related to items of public concern at that point in time. These particular surveys were selected because they contain items dealing with race relations in general and with many specific issue clusters under this broad heading. These items are discussed below.

Each of these surveys contains an adult national probability sample ranging in size from around 1,000 for some of the early polls to around 3,000 for final, pre-election surveys and double surveys conducted to establish sampling errors. The average is around 1,500 respondents. These samples have been laboriously "cleaned" by the project. This process involves the removal of incorrect cards from the original deck and of duplicates inserted for weighting purposes by A.I.P.O. Once this was done, the variables of each poll were ordered and coded in a logically consistent fashion. Wherever possible, combination variables were created, especially in the case of political items with hypothetical national elections. Finally, for each survey an output tape, an I.B.M. 400 foot "mini-reel," was written containing the reordered, recoded final variables in blocked form with standard record lengths.

This output tape first contains a consistent block of demographic items. Following this is a rough grouping of political items, then the group of race-related items, and finally the rest of the items from the survey.

The demographic items are standard, giving the respondent's race, sex, section of the country, state, age, city size, and occupation. This set of items becomes both broader and more standard over time with the increasingly sophisticated development of public opinion theory and research. After the late 1940's, for example, education, religion, and political identification appear regularly in these surveys in addition to such frequently recurring measures as union membership, armed forces experience, type and ownership of residence, number of individuals over and under 21 years of age living in the same residence, marital status, and such socio-economic measures as ownership of cars or telephones.

The political items evolved over time in a similar fashion. The early polls' questions about self-conception as either liberal or conservative developed into broader categories from radical/liberal/conservative through party identification to evaluation of national figures and issues in increasingly broad and varied dimensions. These surveys almost always contain standard items including vote in the latest presidential elections and satisfaction with the President in power, and frequently have items dealing with current choices among prominent candidates and reasons for such choices.

From among this group of surveys, there are 13 which contain items on at least four distinct race-related issue clusters (414, 586, 589, 604, 605, 611, 646, 658, 673, 674, 709, 714, 749). Most of the rest contain one or more direct items dealing with different facets of race relations and, generally, at least one item indirectly connected, e.g., an open-ended question about the most important problem in the country or one area which inevitably turns up responses dealing with race.

Since Gallup Polls are politically oriented, many of the race-related items are focused in that direction. On the most political end of this spectrum, there are items about Strom Thurmond's bid for President as a "Dixiecrat" in 1948 and States' Rights groups in general vis-a-vis integration (422, 433K & T, 436K & T, 454, 456, 508, 510, 586, 604, 605, 673, 678). There are also, of course, items dealing with specific legislative proposals such as Truman's Civil Rights Program (414K & T, 433K & T, 439 K & T) and the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Included at the political end of the race relations issue clusters must also be the items related to George Wallace's candidacy for President in 1968 and its racial implications. Items dealing with Wallace support appear in 745, 746, 754, and 755 in addition to 744, which was a special poll conducted in April of 1967 exclusively on George Wallace: identifying him, rating him and creating a word-picture of him.

Also included at the political end of the spectrum are items dealing with situations of racial crisis such as Little

Rock's problems with school desegregation and attitudes toward Governor Faubus (589, 590, 591, 601, 604). One additional item of interest appears in five surveys from September 1958 to September 1963. It asks: "If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for President and he happened to be a Negro, would you vote for him?" Special attention should perhaps be given this item since a similar question asked about Catholics by A.I.P.O. proved to be an excellent predictor of the religious effect on the 1960 Presidential election (Pool, et al., 1965).

Included in a number of the later surveys are racially relevant measures falling between theoretical loci of political and integrationist attitudes. Nine surveys (658, 664, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679) include the item, "Do you think the Kennedy Administration is pushing racial integration too fast, or not fast enough?" Eight others (684, 709, 714, 716, 734, 736, 748, 749) ask the same question about the Johnson Administration. Other questions tapping this same attitude, such as approval or disapproval of Johnson's handling of civil rights or questions such as, "Do you think the Kennedy-Johnson Administration has gone too far or not far enough to help the Negroes in the past few years?" (699), also appear in a number of surveys throughout the 1960's. These data made it possible to generate the overtime model on northern racial attitudes presented earlier.

There are a large number of questions dealing with anti-Negro stereotypes, discrimination, and prejudice throughout the survey data bank. Although generally speaking these items are not as uniform as the more politically-oriented race items, they do offer a great breadth of analytical possibilities. Typical of these questions is the three-part item first used in 605: "Do you approve or disapprove of marriages between white and colored people?"; "If colored people came to live next door, would you move?"; and "Would you move if colored people came to live in great numbers in your neighborhood?" Questions concerning Negro treatment in the respondent's community, comparisons of Negro treatment in the North and South, advice to Negroes on attaining equal rights, and other measures tap various aspects of anti-Negro behavior through the thirty-year time period from which these surveys were taken.

A number of measures are also included on various aspects of job and employment discrimination (400K & T, 419, 510, and others) and the integration of public accommodations (557, 605, 640, 683, and others).

One of the broadest aspects of this data bank is its group of items dealing with school desegregation. Eight surveys (532, 541, 546, 576, 586, 589, 611, 646) contain items dealing with extent of approval or disapproval of the 1954 Supreme Court decision regarding school desegregation. A number of other polls (532, 563, 590, 604, 614, 642, 662 and others) contain items dealing with other aspects of school desegregation, such as means of enforcing it, whether or not the respondent would object to his child attending schools with different percentages of Negroes, and similar items.

This brief description is not meant to be an exhaustive account of the race-related variables in this segment of the survey data bank. There are hundreds of additional items either directly or tangentially connected to race relations. Among these items is an extensive grouping of questions dealing with race relations in the South. Also, there are miscellaneous items dealing with the Ku Klux Klan, Freedom Riders, and the White Citizens' Councils as well as various questions concerning anti-Semitism, anti-Japanese feelings, and such laws as the Taft, Ellender, Wagner Housing Act dealing with slum clearance and low-rent housing.

Joe Belden & Associates (Texas Polls)

This segment of the survey data bank is a collection of polls conducted only in Texas by Joe Belden & Associates from August, 1954 through September, 1968. There are a total of thirty surveys in this group which are all similar to the Gallup Polls discussed earlier.

Each survey contains a probability sample of the adult population of Texas numbering around a thousand. They contain the same groupings of variables as do the Gallup Polls; first demographic, then political and racial items, and finally the group of attitudinal measures. The main focus of these surveys is like the Gallup Polls, political, but with emphasis upon state instead of national issues and candidates. The processing of these surveys was identical to that of the Gallup Polls except that the various commercial items in the Belden Polls, such as consumer research about oil companies, toothpaste, and face creams, were eliminated.

These surveys were selected primarily because of their items dealing with school desegregation, although a number of them contain other race-related items. The most common wording for this school desegregation item is as follows: "As you know, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that all children, no matter what their race, have equal rights to go to the same schools. Now they're trying to put this new law into effect all over the country. . . .Do you think there would be any real trouble between white and Negro parents if their children were put in the same schools? [If yes] Would you say a great deal, some, or very little trouble?"

All of the surveys contain items about problems facing the state legislature or the country and similar open-ended items which are certain to turn up answers dealing with racial issues.

In addition to the extensive, evolutionary coverage of attitudes toward school desegregation, the final four surveys (Belden 1967, 1968A, 1968B, and 1968C) contain a special group of race-related items dealing with many other aspects of integration. These items were commissioned by the present study of school integration and are identical in all four surveys:

[Asked of whites only]

Please use this plus-and-minus scale to tell me how far in one direction or the other you accept or reject each of the things I am going to read. . . .

a. How about Negroes riding in the same section of trains or busses with you?

b. Eating in the same restaurants with you?

c. Staying in the same hotels with you?

d. Sending your children to the same schools?

e. Attending your church?

f. Using the same public swimming pools with you?

g. Teaching your child in school?

h. Working side by side with you in the same kind of job?

i. Attending the same social gathering outside your home?

j. Attending a social gathering in your home?

k. Living next door to you?

l. Having as a roommate for your son or daughter at college?

Is the Johnson administration pushing integration too fast, too slow, or about right?

[Asked of Negroes only]

We would like to ask you how you feel about a number of things for which there are no right or wrong answers. . . .Please use this plus-and-minus scale to tell me how far in one direction or the other you agree or disagree with each of the things I am going to read. . . .

a. Riots have helped more than hurt the Negro in his struggle for equal rights.

b. White employers underpay and overwork their Negro employees.

c. Very often when you try to get ahead, something or someone gets in your way.

d. The best way for Negroes to gain their rights is to work hard and stay out of "Civil Rights" trouble.

e. If a Negro is wise, he will think twice before he trusts a white man as much as he trusts another Negro.

f. People like you don't have a very good chance to be really successful in life.

g. The best way for Negroes in America to get power is with peaceful non-violent demonstration.

h. Negroes should use all possible means to gain power in America, including violence and rioting if necessary.

i. You would prefer to send your child to a mostly white school instead of an all Negro school.

j. You would prefer to send your child to a mostly white school instead of a Negro one, even if there might be racial trouble.

Have any of your children attended public school with white children?

> Have you ever participated in an organized Civil Rights demonstration?
>
> About how many times have you participated in an organized demonstration?

Louis Harris Pre-1964-Election Surveys

This segment of the survey data bank contains a state-by-state assessment of political and racial attitudes in the South. All these surveys were conducted during the summer of 1964 and contain samples ranging from 298 to 419 respondents per state. These surveys were processed in exactly the same way as the Gallup and Belden surveys just discussed.

Although three slightly different versions of the questionnaire were used, the basic racial items were consistent throughout. They dealt with the respondent's feelings on the country's progress in solving racial problems over the past year, the speed at which this country is progressing toward equality of opportunity, his opinion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and measures on such topics as Federal response to southern schools not integrating and the riots in northern cities.

The questionnaires also contain items tapping other facets of race relations. The form "A" questionnaire pulls out a number of racially-oriented responses to the question, "What do you feel are the two or three biggest problems facing the country today that you would like to see the Federal Government in Washington do something about?" Form "B" questionnaires have the following items, "Some groups of people are superior to other groups of people and always will be. Believe/Not sure/Don't believe;" and "Under Johnson, the Negroes have gotten out of hand" with the same categories. There are also various ratings of Johnson and Goldwater on actual or potential ability to handle racial problems.

Additional Surveys

Also included in the survey data bank are polls conducted by the Field Research Corporation in California and some national samples done by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago. Both of these groups are composed of less than twenty surveys each with varying degrees of relevance.

The California surveys are especially interesting with regard to "Proposition 14" on sale and rental of residential real estate which appeared on the ballot in November of 1964 and political/racial items similar to the items in the other groups of surveys. The N.O.R.C. polls contain the items used to construct the "Sheatsley Pro-Integration Scale," a Guttman scale described in Paul Sheatsley's (1966) article, "White Attitudes toward the Negro," in The Negro American.

Summary

This description of the survey data bank has focused primarily on specific issue clusters and items which might serve as independent race-related variables. Mention should be made in conclusion about some broad dimensions of the entire collection of surveys.

The span of time covered by this collection of surveys is virtually as great as the entire history of modern public opinion research. The A.I.P.O. polls cover thirty years of race-related attitudes with, of course, varying degrees of completeness and continuity. The Beldens cover the last 14 years of this period, from 1954 through September, 1968, on a more theoretically restricted subject, attitudes toward racial desegregation of schools, and for a smaller geographical area, the state of Texas. The other types of surveys assess racial attitudes in the 1960's, the time period when civil rights problems were most frequently in the news. Moreover, the trend of racial attitude coverage quite naturally corresponds with the amount of public concern over these issues in all the surveys. Thus, the early surveys contain few racially-related measures compared to the early 60's, when the Civil Rights Movement was capturing so much public attention. The A.I.P.O.'s early eclectic coverage of the subject matter blossoms around the Little Rock school desegregation crisis and decreases until the early 60's, when its coverage is fortified by the Beldens in Texas, the California polls, the Harris state-by-state surveys in the South, and N.O.R.C.'s national coverage.

The regional coverage of racial attitudes is also broad. The national adult probability samples of A.I.P.O. and N.O.R.C. afford the overview. The Harris surveys then focus on the geographical area most problematic in the 1960's in this realm of public opinion, the southern states. The Belden polls trace the evolution of attitudes toward school desegregation in one of these southern states, Texas.

These major dimensions, historical depth and geographical coverage and specialization, plus the easy physical accessibility of this data provided by the time-consuming "cleaning" and recoding process conducted by this project, make this survey data bank one of the finest which exists in any specialized social science research area.

Recoded Public Opinion Polls as of 9/69

American Institute of Public Opinion Polls (Gallup)

AIPO Number	Date	Number of Subjects Sampled
69	2/15/37	3016
94	8/2/37	2955
127	7/2/38	3104
161A	6/16/39	1523
161B	6/16/39	1531
376K	8/14/46	1116
376T	8/14/46	1201
387K	12/31/46	1467
400K	7/2/47	1479
400T	7/2/47	1516
411K	1/21/48	1560
411T	1/21/48	1601
414K	3/3/48	1510
414T	3/3/48	1529
419	5/26/48	1631
422K	7/28/48	1638
422T	7/28/48	1494
433K	11/26/48	1571
433T	11/26/48	1462
436K	1/20/49	1660
436T	1/20/49	1552
439K	3/17/49	1044
439T	3/17/49	1148
454K	3/24/50	1455
456	6/2/50	1357
508	11/12/52	3011
510	1/9/53	1558
517	7/2/53	1544
528	3/17/54	1561
532	6/10/54	1431
535	8/3/54	1577
537	9/14/54	1464
541	12/29/54	1438
546	4/12/55	1529
550	7/12/55	1397
555	10/25/55	1577
557	12/6/55	1433
561	8/6/56	1959
562	3/27/56	2000
563	4/17/56	2000
564	5/8/56	1934
571	9/18/56	2206
576	12/12/56	1540

AIPO Number	Date	Number of Subjects Sampled
577	1/15/57	1489
582	4/23/57	1620
585	6/25/57	1521
586	7/16/57	1533
588	8/27/57	1528
589	9/17/57	1530
590	10/8/57	1558
591	1/5/57	1458
592	11/23/57	1542
593	12/31/57	1523
594	1/22/58	1540
595	2/12/58	1482
601	7/8/58	1500
603	8/18/58	1525
604	9/8/58	1514
605	9/22/58	1483
606	10/13/58	1553
611	3/2/59	1532
614	5/27/59	1537
616	7/21/59	1498
622	12/8/59	1515
623	1/4/60	641
630	6/28/60	1545
632	7/28/60	1553
634	8/23/60	1638
636	9/26/60	1672
639	12/6/60	1515
640	1/10/61	1503
641	2/8/61	1633
642	3/8/61	1609
643	4/4/61	1584
645	5/15/61	1547
646	5/26/61	1500
647	8/22/61	1628
649	8/22/61	1535
650	9/19/61	1554
654	1/9/62	1616
658	5/1/62	1503
664	1/17/63	1644
674	6/19/63	1606
675	7/16/63	1574
676	8/13/63	1583
677	9/10/63	1548
678	10/9/63	1588
679	11/8/63	1634
680	11/20/63	1590
683	12/31/63	1629

AIPO Number	Date	Number of Subjects Sampled
684	1/28/64	1632
689	4/22/64	1661
695	7/21/64	1631
696	8/4/64	1556
697	8/25/64	2101
699	10/6/64	1570
706	2/17/65	1569
710	4/21/65	1452
712	6/2/65	1638
713	6/22/65	2823
714	7/14/65	1591
716	8/25/65	1586
717	9/14/65	1572
720	11/16/65	2550
721	12/9/65	1566
722	12/29/65	1545
728	5/3/66	1562
729	5/17/66	1522
732	7/27/66	1505
734	9/6/66	1561
736	10/19/66	1609
740	1/24/67	1563
742	3/7/67	1505
744	4/17/67	2005
745	5/9/67	1574
746	5/31/67	2181
748	7/11/67	1518
749	8/1/67	1629
750	8/22/67	1576
754	11/14/67	1582
755	12/5/67	1549

Joe Belden & Associates (Texas Polls)

Poll Number	Date	Number of Subjects Sampled
622	8/54	all samples between 990-1000 respondents (reduced slightly in some surveys by duplicate cards).
639	11/54	
700	5/55	
745	8/55	
779	11/55	
832	5/56	
867	8/56	
891	11/56	
932	5/57	
1013	11/57	
1064	5/58	

Belden Poll Number	Date
1088	8/58
1122	8/58
1178	11/58
1258	5/59
1288	11/59
1327	2/60
1349	8/60
1386	11/60
1466	8/61
1695	8/63
1721	11/63
1766	5/64
1791	8/64
1830	11/64
1966	8/66
1967	12/67
1968A	3/68
1968B	6/68
1968C	9/68

Louis Harris Pre-1964-Election Surveys

Poll Number	Date	Number of Subjects Sampled
1355 (Mississippi)	all surveys conducted during June, July and August, 1964	359
1360 (Virginia)		405
1361 (Texas)		582
1366 (Missouri)		392
1371 (Maryland)		349
1373 (Florida)		419
1374 (Arkansas)		363
1376 (Oklahoma)		416
1380 (District of Columbia)		298
1388 (Georgia)		355
1391 (South Carolina)		338
1393 (Kentucky)		416
1396 (Louisiana)		335
1397 (North Carolina)		415
1402 (Tennessee)		420
1406 (Alabama)		414
1407 (West Virginia)		351

Field Research Corporation (California Polls)

Poll Number	Date
654	
696	3/19/64
697	5/1/64
699	8/31/64
065-02	3/25/65

National Opinion Research Center Surveys

NORC Number	Date
150	4/49
163	1/26/49
166	6/1/49
167	6/30/49
168	8/11/49
225	5/44
241	5/46
282	6/14/50
294	11/8/50
303	6/29/51
341	6/30/53
365	11/26/54
366	1/21/55
382	1/26/56
386	4/20/56
390	6/26/56
393	9/13/56
404	4/26/57
S160	6/63
760N	10/64

APPENDIX D

A New Method for Urban Voting Analyses[1]

A major prerequisite for the study of voting behavior and racial change is accurate and systematic procedures to measure the effects of class, race, and political affiliation. A combination of precinct returns and housing statistics presents excellent materials to study these factors within a city over time. Small aggregate political units, like the precinct, have not been widely used by political scientists due to several problems (Ranney, 1962; Robinson, 1950). However, as this paper will demonstrate, many of these problems can be overcome, making these voting returns valuable in the analysis of racial change. These data can serve as the basis for systematic analysis of racial, social and political cleavages and also as a basis for evaluating the voting system as a method of expressing public opinion as it influences community decision making.

What are the major problems of demographic analysis of voting data? First, there is the lack of correspondence between census units and political units. To interrelate the two sources, most investigators have had to estimate crudely the overlay of census tracts and political units. The second problem is that more general and useful census information is available only for larger census units. Thus, good information is often available only for heterogeneous political units like states or counties. A third problem is the lack of stability of precinct boundaries. Finally, even the political units may be so heterogeneous that the major groups one wishes to study cannot be isolated. Thus, it is difficult to isolate the effects of lower-class-white voting when a minority group, residing in the same area, may have widely divergent political preferences.

The procedures used in this study attempt to overcome these problems. To match precinct boundaries almost perfectly with census units, block data were used. This not only eliminates the problem of overlap (except for the rare case of a block split between two precincts), but also allows some estimate of the homogeneity of the precinct (a necessity in minimizing the statistical problems of ecological fallacies). Valid estimates of socio-economic-status (SES) were determined from the housing statistics concerning house value and rent paid. Finally, to estimate the white vote in racially mixed areas, the predominantly Negro areas were analyzed separately to determine the degree of racial solidarity. On the assumption that Negroes living elsewhere would vote similarly, these estimates were then used to subtract the Negro vote from the predominantly white precincts. In the following sections, considerable evidence will be presented to support this new method.

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[1] This Appendix was chiefly the work of Professor J. Michael Ross, the assistant director of the project at its inception and currently a member of the Department of Sociology at the University of California at San Diego, California.

Measures of SES from Block Data

In substituting block statistics for census tracts, one trades accuracy of traditional indicators of SES for boundary matching. As a substitute measure of SES, a combination of rent and house value is used. To test whether these housing characteristics are related to socio-economic-status, a sample of white Southerners in central cities with over 250,000 population was drawn from the Census sample of 1/1,000 individuals. In Table D-1, the correlations between education, income, a nine-category census classification of SES, and the basic housing variable of block data are presented. For both owners and renters, the corresponding measure of value is associated with all indicators of SES. But indicators of the condition of the house are generally poor correlates of SES. Since a common index of SES was desired, a method was needed to interrelate the two different standards of house value measurement.

To develop a common index for rent paid and house value, an average SES score was obtained for each category used by the Census, representing a range of rents and house values. These averages are summarized in Table D-2. Generally, renters are of lower SES than home owners. This method indicates not only how the median renter differs from the median home owner, but also shows that the very high renter is equivalent in social status to only the high value home owner.

It is then possible to estimate the average SES for each precinct by weighting the per cent renter by the estimated SES for the average rent of the precinct, and the average homeowner by the average SES for that range of house values. For example, a precinct with 20% of its units

Table D-1

Correlations of Housing and Social Indicators of Socio-Economic-Status in Southern Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 1960

Owners (N=1,149)

	Average House Value	±Rooms	Condition	Education	Income
Education	.459	.275	.212	---	---
Income	.338	.315	.133	.384	---
Socio-economic Level	.554	.419	.177	.781	.643

Renters (N=538)

	Average Rental Value	±Rooms	Condition	Education	Income
Education	.465	.124	.251	---	---
Income	.410	.317	.154	.313	---
Socio-economic Level	.545	.259	.277	.763	.615

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Population and Housing, 1960*. *1/1,000, Two National Samples of the Population of the United States*.

Table D-2

Average Census SES Score

Owners and Renters Separately
(1=Lowest SES / 9=Highest SES)

Owners

House Value:	5,000-	3.36	n=50
	5,000-7,400	4.03	n=115
	7,500-9,900	5.34	n=145
	10,000-12,000	6.03	n=183
	12,500-14,900	6.81	n=123
	15,000-19,900	7.24	n=87
	20,000-24,900	7.46	n=47
	25,000-34,000	7.65	n=63
	35,000+	8.18	n=46

Renters

Rental Value:	30-	2.30	n=11
	30-39	2.55	n=13
	40-49	2.79	n=35
	50-59	3.62	n=63
	60-69	4.09	n=76
	70-79	4.51	n=94
	80-89	5.76	n=104
	100-119	6.82	n=31
	120-149	7.70	n=39
	150+	7.77	n=19

renter-occupied at an average rent of $65, and 80% of its units owner-occupied with an average house value of $17,500 would have the following SES score:

$$.20 \times 4.09 + .80 \times 7.24 = 6.61$$

The validity of the rent paid-house value measure was tested separately for three contrasting southern cities -- Atlanta, New Orleans, and Little Rock -- using the census tract as the unit of analysis. For census tracts, the traditional measure of SES is the average of (1) the percentage of persons over 25 with less than an eighth grade education, (2) the percentage of families with incomes less than $5,000 per year, and (3) the percentage of males 14 years and older with unskilled occupations. (This is a standard indicator originally used by Shevsky and Bell [1955] and since employed extensively in the political analysis of voting data.) A major problem of this census tract indicator is its failure to discriminate between middle, upper-middle, and upper class areas. Once the percentage of any of these categories becomes low there is no other indicator, such as per cent professional-managerial versus per cent clerical, to distinguish upper-class from white-collar middle-class areas.

The interrelationship between the rent-house-value indicator and the three traditional components of education, occupation, and income for each of the three cities are presented in Table D-3. Once again the weighted rent-house-value index correlates highly with socio-economic-status. As in the individual data, rent-house-value correlates with education, occupation, and income at levels comparable with how the three components correlate with each other separately.

Finally, since the rent-house-value index is a continuum from high to low SES values, it is more accurate than the measure typically used by political scientists to differentiate extreme SES groupings. The data to support this position are presented in Table D-4. At the extremes of the socio-economic scale, the rent-house-value index tends to correlate more highly with the extreme ranges of high or low education, income, and occupation. While these differences are not large, they can account for different rankings based on census tracts and block statistics.

Table D-3

Correlations Between Education, Income, Occupation and SES Scales by Census Tracts, 1960, for Three Southern Cities[1]

	% 8th Grade or Less	% 5,000 or Less	% Unskilled in Labor Force	Median Edu-cation	Median Family Income	Rent-House-Value SES
% 5,000 or Less	.801 .327 .919					
% Unskilled in Labor Force	.749 .838 .637	.620 .354 .727				
Median Education	-.779 -.776 -.838	-.858 -.368 -.923	-.658 -.842 -.804			
Median Family Income	-.988 -.895 -.992	-.814 -.387 -.903	-.755 -.921 -.639	.826 .844 .855		
Rent-House-Value SES	-.836 -.726 -.994	-.847 -.384 -.935	-.597 -.704 -.593	.842 .822 .905	.837 .823 .950	
Standard SES	.933 .679 .931	.902 .908 .970	.873 .691 .849	-.851 -.651 -.935	-.937 -.713 -.922	-.842 -.620 -.905

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[1] The top coefficient in each cell derives from Atlanta, the middle one from New Orleans, and the final one from Little Rock.

Table D-4a

Correlations Between SES Indicators and Components of SES with Uncollapsed Census Classifications for each Southern City

	Rent-House Value SES			Income % 5,000 or Less			Median Income			% Unskilled Occupation		
	Atl.	N.O.	L.R.	Atl.	N.O.	L.R.	Atl.	N.O.	L.R.	Atl.	N.O.	L.R.
A. EDUCATION												
Grades 1-4	-.714	-.744	-.786	-.798	-.394	-.723	-.661	-.736	-.593	-.615	-.769	-.400
Grades 5-7	-.804	-.597	-.860	-.736	-.269	-.904	-.752	-.736	-.836	-.757	-.789	-.764
Grade 8	-.590	-.468	-.662	-.360	-.143	-.717	-.585	-.523	-.763	-.536	-.568	-.639
H.S. 1-3	-.470	-.101	-.627	-.381	-.026	-.709	-.636	-.290	-.842	-.524	-.318	-.840
H.S. 4	.678	.741	.783	.689	.366	-.822	.482	.682	.645	.586	.721	.518
Coll. 1-3	.805	.756	.917	.740	.338	-.862	.836	.838	.909	.784	.868	.718
Coll. 4	.748	.648	.828	.670	.281	-.841	.866	.814	.927	.697	.833	.802

Table D-4b

Correlations Between SES Indicators and Components of SES with Uncollapsed Census Classifications for each Southern City

	Rent-House Value SES			Income % 5,000 or Less			Median Income			% Unskilled Occupation		
	Atl.	N.O.	L.R.	Atl.	N.O.	L.R.	Atl.	N.O.	L.R.	Atl.	N.O.	L.R.
B. INCOME												
Under 1,000	-.686	-.425	-.519	-.552	-.320	-.592	-.548	-.397	-.544	-.405	-.329	-.734
1,000-2,000	-.780	-.463	-.839	-.646	-.339	-.894	-.657	-.413	-.869	-.441	-.362	-.677
2,000-3,000	-.782	-.355	-.857	-.759	-.311	-.873	-.716	-.768	-.860	-.556	-.369	-.764
3,000-4,000	-.693	-.397	-.878	-.746	-.357	-.793	-.754	-.412	-.780	-.594	-.369	-.322
4,000-5,000	-.226	-.129	-.379	-.320	-.200	-.236	-.352	.229	.286	-.415	-.245	-.317
5,000-6,000	-.063	-.139	-.056	-.046	-.027	-.102	-.053	-.025	.011	.137	.067	.096
6,000-7,000	.397	.238	.547	.226	.131	.606	.216	.144	.551	.047	.118	.132
7,000-8,000	.348	.293	.842	.427	.228	.845	.398	.236	.815	.249	.248	.449
8,000-9,000	.656	.297	.723	.543	.240	.811	.490	.252	.791	.296	.249	.510
9,000-10,000	.711	.344	.906	.696	.296	.822	.672	.309	.813	.526	.299	.509
10,000-15,000	.620	.437	.853	.674	.420	.795	.695	.451	.814	.645	.493	.829
15,000-25,000	.756	.487	.716	.603	.471	.614	.741	.524	.651	.616	.540	.818
25,000+	.562	.460	.687	.515	.512	.549	.580	.591	.607	.448	.596	.564

Table D-4c

Correlations Between SES Indicators and Components of SES with Uncollapsed Census Classifications for each Southern City

	Rent-House Value SES			Income % 5,000 or Less			Median Income			% Unskilled Occupation		
	Atl.	N.O.	L.R.	Atl.	N.O.	L.R.	Atl.	N.O.	L.R.	Atl.	N.O.	L.R.
C. OCCUPATION												
Prof., Tech.	.602	.717	.067	.715	.818	-.082	.616	.924	.063	.578	.296	.295
Mgrs., Prop.	.682	.685	.951	.742	.734	-.893	.800	.798	.916	.753	.330	-.898
Clerical	.216	.429	.366	.313	.301	.518	.050	.365	.478	.252	.253	.370
Sales	.667	.727	.722	.752	.665	.807	.643	.758	.776	.657	.367	.860
Crafts	.125	.102	.005	-.198	-.223	-.051	-.267	-.205	-.012	.028	-.126	-.030
Operatives	-.694	-.676	-.565	-.835	.783	-.587	-.759	-.820	-.571	-.754	-.288	-.691
Private	-.108	-.245	-.086	.021	.202	.076	-.096	-.231	-.069	-.116	-.334	-.226
Service	-.622	-.732	-.687	-.607	.562	.717	-.538	-.671	-.685	-.598	-.315	.770
Laborers	-.439	-.674	-.670	.450	-.613	-.756	.446	.729	-.721	-.518	-.432	-.786

The Homogeneity of Precincts Versus Census Tracts

Since the homogeneity of variance is a major consideration in the use of block data, its accuracy was tested by first grouping the blocks by precincts, and then by tracts, in order to compare the variance within each (Robinson, 1950; Goodman, 1959). These comparisons are presented in Table D-5 for Atlanta and Little Rock. While precincts are smaller, there is no indication that they are more homogeneous, save for the distribution of non-white population. In fact, for average rent and house value, they are slightly less homogeneous.

This finding leads to the next question: Does it make much difference whether one measures SES by overlapping census tracts or by matching blocks exactly to the precinct? For one city, Atlanta, estimates of SES and per cent non-white were made using both the overlapping tract and the block methods. Thus, a direct comparison between the block and tract method was possible. Despite the different estimates (as large as 15% for per cent non-white), the correlations in Table D-6 indicate that both methods give very similar relationships with regard to voting behavior.[2] This is not surprising since the measurements by the different methods are highly correlated. These findings suggest that when the number of precincts is similar to the number of tracts, the two methods will give similar results. In cities unlike Atlanta, where this is not the case, the two methods could diverge sharply.

Controlling for the Negro Vote

The effect of a small heterogeneous population on the analysis of a dominant homogeneous population is a more critical variety of the ecological fallacy. The traditional procedure has been to use partial correlation techniques to control for the per cent Negro. However, this procedure is extremely dangerous if the control variable, the independent variable, or the dependent variable have non-linear relationships with each other. This is a common situation with the Negro vote in southern cities, where the lower-class Negro votes liberal while the lower-class white generally votes conservative on racial issues. Also, party affiliation is considerably less stable for the Negro. If the dominant parties, or the local candidates, switch their racial stance, the Negro is more likely to change his vote, whereas the

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[2] The correlations for the tract method are taken from Jennings and Ziegler (1966).

Table D-5

Differences in Variance Between Precincts and Census Tract as Social Units for Selected Housing Characteristics, 1960

Little Rock			Atlanta	
Tract	Precinct		Tract	Precinct
79.72	52.26	Number people/block	163.18	137.81
$3360.00	$3611.00	Aver. SD House Value	$2688.00	$3182.00
$20.36	$20.66	Average SD Rent	$14.42	$16.20
0.20	0.17	Average % Non-White	0.31	0.26
0.22	0.21	Average SD Non-White	0.19	0.19

Table D-6

Correlations Between Tract and Precinct Measures of SES and Per Cent Non-White with Atlanta Elections[1]

	SES by Tract	Rent-House-Value by Block	% Negro	
			Tract	Block
Partisan Elections				
1956 Cong.-Davis	-.60	-.59	.08	.07
1956 Pres.-Stevenson	-.56	-.56	.02	-.01
1960 Pres.-Kennedy	-.44	-.51	.04	-.01
1962 Cong.-Weltner	-.72	-.73	.55	.51
1964 Cong.-Weltner	-.41	-.33	.74	.82
1964 Pres.-Johnson	-.38	-.30	.68	.78
Non-Partisan Democratic Primaries				
1954 Prim.-Abrams	-.18	-.28	.41	.32
1958 Gov.-Vandiver	.84	.73	-.68	-.63
1962 Gov.-Sanders	.61	.64	-.06	-.01
1962 Cong.-Weltner	.05	.10	.48	.57
1964 Cong.-Weltner	-.09	.03	.58	.63
Local Elections				
1957 Mayor-Hartsfield	.59	.49	-.13	-.01
1961 Mayor-Allen	.49	.46	.07	.10
1962 Bond	.57	.44	-.17	-.01
1963 Bond	.47	.41	.00	.17
1964 Legal Liquor	.43	.48	.02	.12

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[1] The correlations for the tract method are taken from Jennings and Ziegler (1966).

white will tend to conform to his past voting behavior. For any of these reasons, partial correlations confound these patterns.

As an alternative, we propose a two step process to control for the per cent Negro that is necessary before one can assess the effect of socio-economic-status on white voting patterns. First, the dominant Negro precincts are removed and their means analyzed to see if they are following the expected racial solidarity on all elections. For Atlanta this was true for most elections. The next step involves subtracting out the Negro vote for the predominantly white precincts and, if necessary, adjusting for differential turnout. For example, if a precinct has 20% Negro population, and the anti-liberal vote is 60%, and the previous stage indicates that virtually all Negroes are voting for the liberal, the adjusted white vote for that precinct is the actual vote divided by 100 minus 20 giving an estimated vote of 75% of the white population voting against the liberal candidate.

To evaluate how this procedure differs from partial correlation techniques, we compared our results with those presented by Jennings and Ziegler (1966). As Table D-7 shows, the differences in the estimate of the effect of social class, controlling for per cent Negro, is substantial. It should be noted that the reported Jennings and Ziegler (1966) findings controlled for political party. Probably the correlation that best demonstrates how the changing Negro vote affects stability is the comparison of the Democratic index of 1956-1960 with the Democratic index of 1960-1964. Jennings and Ziegler (1966) report a correlation of -.23 between the two indicators and conclude the "party variable has occasionally powerful, but quite flexible explanatory ability. . . .It is difficult to establish a normal Democratic vote for elections." With the adjusted vote method, we find correlations of +.70 between the two indicators for the dominantly white precincts. Obviously the stability of the vote is characteristic of the white vote but not the Negro vote.[3]

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[3] We need to clarify an issue which has confused the demographic analysis of aggregate voting: namely, which is more important, class or party, in predicting voting results? Even for the South, the correlation between the two on the aggregate level is so high that the total unexplained variance is well within the range of pure measurement error or slight curvilinear deviations from the straight line. Thus, any attempt to separate the two into independent factors of party and SES is practically impossible. For Atlanta, the correlation between SES and adjusted Democratic index for 1956-1960 is -.851.

Table D-7

Social Class and Voting Using Adjusted Vote and Partial Correlational Techniques, Atlanta

	SES Vote Adjusted for % Negro	Partialed SES for % Negro[1]	Democratic Index
Partisan Elections			
1956 Cong.-Davis	-.78	-.15	.78
1956 Pres.-Stevenson	-.79	-.76	.76
1960 Pres.-Kennedy	-.73	-.15	.66
1962 Cong.-Weltner	-.74	-.17	.49
1964 Cong.-Weltner	-.08	.34	.02
1964 Pres.-Johnson	.04	.43	-.11
Non-Partisan Democratic Primaries			
1954 Prim.-Abrams	.41	-.11	-.17
1958 Gov.-Vandiver	.60	.50	-.54
1962 Gov.-Sanders	.81	.49	-.58
1962 Cong.-Weltner	.69	.24	-.49
1964 Cong.-Weltner	.34	.50	-.42
Local Elections			
1957 Mayor-Hartsfield	.70	.35	-.71
1961 Mayor-Allen	.69	.35	-.78
1962 Bond	.58	.22	-.66
1963 Bond	.63	.25	-.67
1964 Legal Liquor	.65	.21	-.73

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[1] Taken from Jennings and Ziegler (1966).

At this point, Jennings and Ziegler (1966) do not present the correlation between SES and party. For the 1956-1960 Democratic index adjusted, there is a correlation of -.851; that is, Republicans are high SES and Democrats low SES. Thus, we cannot agree with Jennings and Ziegler (1966) in their conclusion that SES had little explanatory value while political party is very powerful. This illustration points out the danger of making inferences from partial correlations without looking at scatter plots of the mean values. Jennings and Ziegler (1966) report a correlation of +.43 between social class and vote for Johnson, controlling for party and per cent Negro. The adjusted vote method shows a correlation of only +.04. An inspection of tables of mean values clearly indicates that no clear linear trend exists between the Johnson vote and SES.

These results, then, support the methodological contention of this Appendix. Block data, giving a perfect match of census and political units, and a rent-housing-value index of socio-economic-status, present accurate and reliable procedures to study aggregate voting behavior. In the analysis of each of these three southern cities to be presented in Appendix E, voting results will be presented by rent-house-value SES index for social class groupings in relationship to the 1/1,000 nine-category census classification as follows:

1-2 = Lower Class

3 = Upper Lower Class

4 = Lower Middle Class

5 = Middle Class

6 = Upper Middle Class

7-8 = Upper Class

In order to give a better overview of what these eight classifications represent, the distribution of other census characteristics for each classification are summarized in Tables D-8 and D-9 for Atlanta and New Orleans. As the tables indicate, there is a clear progression from lower status occupation, lower income, lower education to higher status occupation, higher income, and higher education as one goes from classification 1 to classification 8.

Table D-8

Selected Census Characteristics by Tract for Rent-House-Value Social Class Groupings, Atlanta, 1960

	Lower SES= 1+2	Upper Lower SES=3	Lower Middle SES=4	Middle SES=5	Upper Middle SES=6	Upper SES= 7+8
% Non-white	38.8	80.3	31.1	20.0	13.0	2.6
% Over 25	57.2	51.9	54.8	57.2	59.4	58.4
Diff House	53.9	45.4	52.7	51.0	50.0	55.1
Diff House, same SMSA	30.8	38.8	35.9	30.1	28.4	28.0
EDUCATION						
No Schooling	2.8	4.7	2.0	1.2	*	0.5
1-4 years	14.5	21.3	11.8	5.8	*	1.3
5-7 years	26.4	28.1	25.1	16.5	*	4.4
8 years	12.7	9.6	11.9	9.7	*	3.6
H.S. 1-3	20.2	20.1	22.4	21.5	*	10.2
H.S. 4	13.0	10.9	17.8	26.2	*	26.5
Coll. 1-3	6.5	2.4	5.7	11.2	*	24.2
Coll. 4	4.0	2.8	3.3	7.9	*	29.3
INCOME						
Less than 1,000	13.6	9.3	6.0	3.2	2.4	2.2
1,000-1,999	25.1	17.7	9.4	5.5	3.0	1.4
2,000-2,999	21.5	23.7	13.8	7.4	4.3	2.3
3,000-3,999	14.6	18.0	15.8	11.3	6.2	2.9
4,000-4,999	5.3	10.3	14.0	12.9	7.1	4.4
5,000-5,999	6.6	8.3	12.2	13.6	8.7	4.9
6,000-6,999	0.9	4.1	9.0	11.9	9.5	5.3
7,000-7,999	3.7	3.4	7.1	9.5	8.1	8.0
8,000-8,999	0.2	1.3	4.4	6.8	7.2	5.4
9,000-9,999	0.2	2.0	2.9	5.4	7.5	7.4
10,000-14,999	8.0	1.7	4.6	9.6	20.8	22.0
15,000-24,999	0.4	0.1	0.7	2.2	10.4	19.0
25,000+	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.6	4.7	14.8
OCCUPATION						
Prof., tech.	5.0	2.3	4.6	13.7	19.1	20.8
Managers	6.1	2.4	5.7	14.9	22.2	36.7
Clerical	4.8	5.2	9.9	16.5	11.6	5.9
Sales	4.6	2.0	5.8	11.3	14.9	20.9
Crafts	11.9	10.3	19.4	19.7	11.5	5.4
Operatives	23.3	26.6	25.4	16.1	8.1	2.2
Service	20.5	21.6	10.5	7.8	4.4	1.6
Laborers	9.5	18.1	8.6	8.6	2.4	1.6

Table D-9

Selected Census Characteristics by Tract for Rent-House-Value Social Class Groupings, New Orleans, 1960

	Lower SES= 1+2	Upper Lower SES=3	Lower Middle SES=4	Middle SES=5	Upper Middle SES=6	Upper SES= 7+8
% Non-white	53.8	65.6	44.8	22.0	4.4	9.1
% Over 25	49.2	57.5	59.0	60.3	56.1	55.4
Diff House	59.0	47.4	45.0	51.8	43.4	59.7
Diff House, same SMSA	47.1	41.1	38.8	37.1	28.8	38.9
EDUCATION						
No Schooling	6.6	4.9	4.0	1.9	0.9	0.6
1-4 years	15.9	18.2	14.6	7.9	4.0	2.2
5-7 years	24.1	26.0	27.5	18.8	11.8	7.1
8 years	17.5	17.3	16.9	15.9	13.0	8.1
H.S. 1-3 years	18.0	16.5	17.4	17.0	17.8	13.4
H.S. 4 years	12.7	12.1	15.2	21.3	28.6	29.2
Coll. 1-3 yrs.	2.7	2.8	4.3	8.5	13.4	17.1
Coll. 4 years	2.6	2.2	4.2	8.7	16.1	22.3
INCOME						
Less than 1,000	14.4	15.6	6.6	4.3	3.5	1.8
1,000-1,999	25.9	28.2	10.8	6.4	3.6	1.8
2,000-2,999	19.5	31.3	14.2	9.5	6.4	2.7
3,000-3,999	15.8	24.5	15.3	11.6	9.3	3.9
4,000-4,999	6.3	18.2	14.7	12.9	12.3	5.1
5,000-5,999	3.2	12.3	12.1	13.0	14.9	8.5
6,000-6,999	3.1	8.6	7.9	9.9	15.7	9.9
7,000-7,999	4.0	4.3	5.6	7.6	14.0	8.9
8,000-8,999	1.5	2.5	3.7	5.7	13.5	7.7
9,000-9,999	0.6	2.0	2.7	4.3	10.5	6.9
10,000-14,999	5.7	2.7	4.8	8.7	23.0	20.2
15,000-24,999	0.1	0.6	1.1	4.0	9.6	13.1
25,000+	0.0	0.1	0.5	2.2	4.7	9.7
OCCUPATION						
Prof., tech.	3.3	3.5	5.9	11.9	20.7	23.2
Managers	7.9	4.8	6.6	13.0	20.0	28.4
Clerical	4.9	6.5	9.4	11.4	12.4	9.7
Sales	2.4	3.8	5.3	8.2	11.5	12.2
Crafts	7.4	11.2	17.0	17.6	14.7	9.2
Operatives	21.5	21.6	20.6	14.9	7.9	4.9
Services	15.0	15.1	11.5	8.0	4.7	2.8
Laborers	25.5	22.9	15.5	7.7	2.9	2.4

APPENDIX E

Racial Change and Urban Politics in the South: An Illustration of the New Voting Methodology[1]

The purpose of this section is two-fold. First, we wish to illustrate the utility of the new techniques for the analysis of urban voting data presented in the previous Appendix. Second, we have a substantive aim that is highly relevant to an understanding of school integration in the urban South. We shall evaluate the view that the South is developing political institutions similar to the rest of the nation, as well as the counter view that segregationist traditions will continue to resist social and political change. A modern city, Atlanta, together with a traditional city, New Orleans, and a smaller, intermediate city, Little Rock, have been chosen as the contrasting areas on which to employ our new techniques. And from these results we will attempt to formulate a theoretical framework for analyzing the effect of racial conflict and a two-party political system on social class polarization and interracial coalitions in the urban South.

Sources of Continuity and Change in the South

Since World War II a wide range of economic, legal, and political changes has created strong pressures to change the basic organization of the South's segregationist society (Sindler, 1963). Not only has this eroded the one-party political system, but it has dissolved the traditional coalition between upper-class conservative business interests and the lower-class anti-Negro leaders. This traditional coalition was able to restrain the political expression of discontent from the disadvantaged sectors of southern society for many years (Key, 1949). However, the development of a modern industrial economy, integrated with the rest of the country, has led to a new business ethic committed to the maintenance of an economic atmosphere conducive to continued economic expansion. There is little doubt that racial violence severely disrupts the local and state economies, and even in the deep South moderation is prevailing over violent resistance. Yet, as noted in Chapter Two, there is still a hard core of resistance based on a dominance of small local industries, strong rural influence, and the potential threat of a large Negro population.

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[1] As with Appendix D, Professor J. Michael Ross, now of the University of California at San Diego, had primary responsibility for this Appendix.

Earlier we noted that another positive factor in mediating the process of desegregation has been the shift in Southerners' evaluation of the Negro as being inherently inferior and their subjective feeling that desegregation is inevitable. By 1963, five out of every six white Southerners thought the day would come when Negroes and whites would go to the same schools, and share the same public accommodations. At the same time, the consensus in the North of the early and mid-sixties over the inequities of segregation initiated and reinforced strong congressional and executive action in the South.

Despite these large changes, survey data indicate several sources of disagreement between southern Negroes and whites. The whites strongly underestimate the desire for integration among Negroes, while the Negroes overestimate the support for their goals among whites (Matthews and Prothro, 1966, Chapter 12). Furthermore, there is a large gap between the races in regard to the optimal pace of desegregation. Negroes anticipate rapid change, whites gradual change. The net effect of this misinterpretation and discrepancy in expectations inevitably leads to intensification of political conflict. Finally, we find that time and increasing education has not diminished the commitment of the new generation of Southerners to segregation. Several sets of data indicate that the 20-30 age group favors segregation more than Southerners aged 30 to 50 (Hyman and Sheatsley, 1964; Sheatsley, 1966; Matthews and Prothro, 1966, p. 319). It appears that the period of "massive resistance" in the late fifties had a greater effect on the younger Southerners in the preliminary stages of their political socialization.

Finally, a major impetus for change is the increasing role and importance of the Negro, both in demanding change and as a voting bloc. Federal voting laws now ensure a sizable Negro vote. This vote has been most influential in determining moderate racial policies in major southern cities such as Atlanta. It is in this situation that the alliance between Negro and white has formed. According to Wilson (1966), upper-status whites are the natural ally of the Negro.

> Whatever the limitations or difficulties, however, there can be little doubt that the natural ally of the Southern Negro, for the foreseeable future, is the cosmopolitan white bourgeoisie. In part, this

> reflects self-interest: race conflict is bad for business, destructive of property and productive of unfavorable national publicity. In part, it reflects an enlarged conception of the common interest: Negroes have a moral right to vote, to be free from arbitrary arrest, and to be protected from official abuse, even if century-old prejudices require that the Negro not live next door to whites. The issues now being pressed by the Negro in the South make the most fundamental claims of elementary justice; when the claims of simple justice are reinforced by self-interest, the potential for effective action is great. But this white ally has little interest in massive redistribution of income, the nationalization of political authority, or the reordering of society. (Wilson, 1966, p. 954)

The necessary conditions for social and racial change in the South are clear; however, the exact pattern of change and the eventual outcome is still undecided. Despite the relative success of such southern cities as Atlanta, we still must ask whether, given the necessary conditions for this interracial coalition, these cities are the exception rather than the rule. The essential conditions seem to be: (1) a group of upper-class or upper-middle-class whites willing to accommodate some Negro demands; (2) an organized and united Negro bloc; and (3) a divided white voting pattern.

The Complexity of Liberalism and Conservatism in the South

The evidence from survey data definitely indicates that the attitudes and beliefs of upper-class, higher-educated white Southerners deviate from traditional southern norms. Better-educated white Southerners, as we have noted in this study, are less likely to see Negroes as being inherently inferior, less likely to favor segregation, and more willing to accept Negro demands for integration in public facilities (Erskine, 1962; Hyman and Sheatsley, 1956, 1964; Pettigrew, 1959; Lustig, 1962; Grunbaum, 1964; Jennings and Ziegler, 1964). On the other hand, these data should not be interpreted to mean that there is a sizable group of educated Southerners committed to integration. As Matthews and Prothro (1966) indicate, only among the college-educated does one find support for "something between segregation and desegregation." And support for integration is substantial only for those with post-graduate training. Furthermore, the southern style of liberalism on racial issues is not closely related to general economic-social liberalism. Thus, the supporters of moderate Negro demands are not likely to favor large-scale structural changes, especially if initiated by the federal government.

The success in Atlanta has been dependent upon a political philosophy best characterized by Agger, Goldrich and Swanson as "community conservatism" (Agger, et al., 1964; Cramer, 1963). Supporters of this view tend to see local government as the most important institution for producing a community of civic pride, with efficient government, good educational facilities and continued expansion of industry. Since taxes are the main source of revenue for the implementation of these goals, this philosophy of "public-regardedness" is kept from wide-spread middle-class support by economic unwillingness to finance these improvements from their own pocket, and by more orthodox conservative philosophies of self-interest. Since this community conservatism has as its goal the improvement of the community as a whole, it has often obtained support from white "liberals" and Negroes when these improvements help them specifically.

As case studies of southern communities indicate, this alliance based on a general progressivism is usually successful, except when it loses too much popular support. In some cases, the elected officials ignore public feelings in the zeal to implement these goals through annexation, urban renewal, school consolidation, and the seeking of federal funds. Frequently, strong resistance to local government grows when specific measures of accommodation on the race issue affects large segments of the white population. At other times, the majority resists attempts to increase taxes to pay for improvements which they mildly support but for which they are unwilling to authorize new bond issues. Finally, the usual consensus between Negroes and upper-income whites dissolves when Negro dissatisfaction with the community conservatives' gradualist policy on race relations leads to a threat of withdrawal of support of civic programs or to the introduction of Negro candidates.

A second factor that confounds this coalition is the influence of national political ideologies on local affairs. Especially in the South, local elections have always been based on specific issues or general policies. The emergence of a local Republican party has the potential of limiting the appeal of these specific issues in favor of traditional voting habits. Even in Atlanta, the emergence of Republican candidates for Congress presented a source of defection from Congressman Weltner among upper-class conservatives who saw the election more in terms of national economic-social issues rather than the issue of moderation or resistance to Negroes on the local level (Jennings and Ziegler, 1964, 1966).

Another factor necessary for an effective coalition is support from the white middle-class. Even in relatively prosperous Atlanta, the Negroes and upper-income whites together do not constitute a majority. During periods of racial crisis, the white middle-class indirectly feels the possibility of economic repercussions if tension continues. Also, they are typically not as committed to the traditional segregationist symbols as the lower-class whites. Thus, their resistance mellows when it comes to closing the public schools, for they could not easily afford to send their children to private schools. Thus, the white middle-class also supports moderation; but they are not generally committed to moderation as a philosophy of continual or gradual accommodation with Negro demands. As crisis recedes, one can expect their defection to anti-coalition candidates.

Finally, the solidarity and high participation of the Negro voting bloc is another factor assumed by the Atlanta model. In fact, this has been the general pattern where Negroes have had unrestricted registration and the white political climate has been divided. However, as is the case between the white middle- and upper-middle-classes, strains exist between militant Negro leaders and traditional Negro leaders who have been responsible for past negotiations with the white "power structure" (Agger, et al., 1964; Matthews and Prothro, 1966). It should be recognized that the maintenance of the status quo also has benefited these traditional Negro leaders during the moderate accommodation of Negro demands. This conflict within Negro leadership intensified throughout the sixties, with older leaders gradually losing their positions of authority (Killian and Grigg, 1964). This means, then, that united Negro participation in southern coalitions is more problematical.

Three Southern Cities

We shall apply our new analysis techniques to this key problem in three contrasting cities -- Atlanta, New Orleans, and Little Rock. The first of these was noted for its peaceful transition into at least token school desegregation; the latter two are known the world over as cities which reacted with sharp violence to the school desegregation process. However, Atlanta has since witnessed a northern-style race riot in its Negro ghetto. Their contrasting social structures are summarized in Table E-1.

The major themes to be followed in each city are: (1) the degree of status polarization in southern urban elections; (2) the effect of racial crisis on status polarization; and (3) the effect of a strong conservative Republican party on the current alliance of moderation.

Table E-1

Economic Characteristics of Each City, 1960

	Atlanta	New Orleans	Little Rock
1. Negro Percentage	.344	.337	.261
2. Education Percentage of Adults			
No Schooling	.022	.031	.012
Elementary 1-4	.107	.110	.063
Elementary 5-7	.199	.212	.119
Elementary 8	.095	.155	.119
High School 1-3	.194	.170	.190
High School 4	.198	.192	.273
College, some	.096	.073	.120
College, graduate	.090	.080	.103
3. Migration Percentages			
Same House	.446	.519	.431
Different House, same SMSA	.333	.377	.321
Outside SMSA	.136	.105	.209
North	.028	.027	.041
South	.108	.078	.168
4. Occupation Percentages			
Professional, technical	.096	.103	.135
Managers, proprietors	.123	.116	.145
Clerical	.096	.098	.084
Sales work	.088	.070	.101
Crafts	.144	.149	.149
Operatives	.189	.164	.146
Private	.008	.002	.003
Service	.114	.096	.089
Laborers	.091	.123	.079
Not represented	.153	.078	.069
5. Housing Data			
Median House Value	11,249	14,615	10,900
Median Rent	58.42	56.53	55.22
Owner Percentage	.42	.41	.49
Renter Percentage	.57	.57	.44
Rent-House-Value SES	4.918	5.012	4.847
Jennings-Ziegler SES	.449	.503	.406

continued next page

Table E-1 continued

	Atlanta	New Orleans	Little Rock
6. Income Percentages			
Less than 1,000	.058	.067	.054
1,000-1,999	.099	.108	.098
2,000-2,999	.127	.132	.126
3,000-3,999	.126	.137	.134
4,000-4,999	.104	.130	.109
5,000-5,999	.100	.119	.104
6,000-6,999	.076	.094	.089
7,000-7,999	.068	.073	.064
8,000-8,999	.044	.057	.055
9,000-9,999	.041	.043	.042
10,000-14,999	.093	.094	.080
15,000-25,000	.040	.038	.034
25,000+	.023	.021	.013

Little Rock

Little Rock was the first southern city to have widespread violence associated with its attempts to integrate its schools (1957-59). While the national government was waging its own war with the then-Governor of Arkansas, Orval Faubus, concerning federal versus state authority in racial matters, the citizens of Little Rock waged an electoral battle between a moderate school board, wishing to accommodate to the legal decrees, and a segregationist opposition, wishing to resist any attempts to desegregate the local schools. Previous research and case analysis have suggested that the upper-class precincts were more favorable to moderation than the lower-class precincts (Alexander, 1960; Silverman, 1959). However, both studies arbitrarily classified precincts into three socio-economic groups and neither looked closely at changes in voting before and after the crisis. The mean vote by socio-economic group for the election period 1954-1959 is presented in Table E-2.

Pre-Crisis Elections. Prior to the crisis in 1957, there is a negative relationship between SES and support for Cherry, Faubus' opponent in the Democratic primary and a fiscal conservative. As a sort of populist from the Ozark Mountains, an area low in Negro population, Faubus was able to attract a sizable Negro vote. And by 1956, even the upper- and middle-classes had reduced their antagonism to the new incumbent governor (Pettigrew and Campbell, 1960). The lack of strong class polarization before the 1957 crisis is also indicated by the vote on several race-related referenda in 1956. But even these votes correspond to the expected upper-class rejection of extreme resistance to desegregation and an acceptance of measures designed to preserve the status quo. Thus, there is a negative relationship between social class and acceptance of doctrines of interposition and state's rights. On the other hand, the upper-class were more likely to support the continuation of the poll tax, an historically popular method of limiting the political power of both Negroes and lower-class whites. The confusion or lack of saliency at the time is suggested by the support given these proposals by the Negro voter.

Two other elections before the crisis are also of interest. First, the 1956 presidential election demonstrates the expected relationship between Republicanism and high social class. The difference between the upper-middle and lower-class is useful as a base line to estimate the amount of class polarization one could expect on the basis of political affiliation alone. The remaining pre-crisis election was the school board election of the spring of 1957.

Table E-2

Adjusted Precinct Votes, Little Rock 1954-1959, by Social Class

	Upper Lower SES=3 N=5	Lower Middle SES=4 N=7	Middle SES=5 N=4	Upper Middle SES=6 N=4	Upper SES=7 N=3	Status Polarization (Upper-Upper Lower)	Negro Precincts N=5
Faubus Elections							
1954 primary	22%	18%	14%	12%	*		28%
1954 run-off	34	27	20	18	*		55
1954 general	52	44	38	30	*		50
1956 general	77	80	75	72	70	- 7	71
1958 general	66	62	55	47	41	-25	25
1956 Elections							
Against abol. poll tax	53	55	54	56	50	- 3	52
Against State's Rights	44	46	48	52	55	-11	60
Against interposition	63	68	72	71	69	- 6	60
For pupil assignment	36	35	36	42	41	- 5	54
1956 Presidential							
Eisenhower	47	51	56	64	67	-20	51

* These precincts were annexed by Little Rock after the 1954 election.
** Third candidates ran, obtaining less than 10% of the vote.

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Table E-2 continued

	Upper Lower SES=3 N=5	Lower Middle SES=4 N=7	Middle SES=5 N=4	Upper Middle SES=6 N=4	Upper SES=7 N=3	Status Polarization (Upper-Upper Lower)	Negro Precincts N=5
1957 School Board							
Rath-moderate	18%	22%	28%	36%	39%	21	39%
Bransman-segregationist	34	29	23	15	12	-22	12
Upton--moderate	19	23	29	36	37	18	3
Brown-segregationist	33	29	21	15	13	-20	13
Average moderates	37	45	57	71	76	39	83
1957 Moderate Candidates: City Council							
Baldwin	24	26	42	50	53**	29	64
Winburn	25	26	47	56	62	37	65
Dixon	27	29	46	56	62	35	72
Blakenship	21	27	43	53	60	39	71
Griffin	20	23	37	51	56	36	69
Knopp	21	24	41	52	56	35	69
Leatherman	19	22	38	47	52**	33	67
1958 Elections							
Against giving power to State to close integrated schools	5	19	29	35	32	23	64
For Milwee	47	67	73	79	36	31	74
Hays (primary)	45	62	66	73	35	32	80
Hays (vs. Alford)	27	42	53	57	33	26	76

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Table E-2 continued

1959 School Board	Upper Lower SES=3 N=5	Lower Middle SES=4 N=7	Middle SES=5 N=4	Upper Middle SES=6 N=4	Upper SES=7 N=3	Status Polarization (Upper-Upper Lower)	Negro Precincts N=5
For removal Milwood-seg.	29%	50%	62%	69%	42%	39	75%
For removal Rowland-seg.	30	51	64	72	44	39	76
For removal Laster-seg.	32	59	73	75	43	37	75
Against removal Lamb-mod.	26	46	61	66	41	38	77
Against removal Matson-mod.	37	48	59	65	39	34	77
Against removal Tucker-mod.	30	51	64	68	40	35	76

In this election moderate, upper-class, "Good-Government" candidates were successful. However, the difference between moderation and resistance was not especially meaningful at this point, since the general southern philosophy had no clear policy implications save to maintain segregated schools.

Crisis Elections. The first local election following the out-break of the crisis was dominated by the racial issue and the Faubus resistance to federal intervention. The candidates, supported by the long-standing "Good-Government Committee," an upper-class organization that had supported the initiation of the "progressive" city manager system, now found an organized slate of opponents supported by "The Independent Citizens Committee." The latter organization was based on strong segregationist and pro-Faubus sentiment; and one of its candidates had been involved in a fire bombing incident. The results show that the upper-middle and upper-class coalition, while not receiving a majority of the white vote, were successful in winning six of the seven council seats.

In 1958 the race issue continued to dominate both state and local elections. The moderate Congressman Brooks Hays, representing the Little Rock area, easily won the Democratic primary, but in the general election, was surprisingly defeated by a strong segregationist write-in candidate. Also, the head of the Citizens Council, Jim Johnson, was successful in his campaign for the elected office of Judge of the State Supreme Court.[2] The defeat of Hays in the write-in election is indicative of what happens when the middle- and upper-middle-class do not return solid majorities of 60-70 per cent for the moderate candidate. The lower-class precincts did not support Hays in either election but the percentage in the upper-class precincts dropped off 16 per cent and the upper-middle precincts dropped 13 per cent from the primary to the election. Also, in 1958, a state referendum was passed by a large majority which permitted the Governor to close integrated schools.

As compliance with the court orders continued to dominate the political scene in Little Rock, a special recall election was initiated by the segregationist opposition. As in the previous local elections, the upper-class was successful in keeping the three moderate candidates on the board while successfully recalling new elections for the three segregationist candidates.

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[2] In 1966, Jim Johnson, running as the Democratic party nominee, lost to Winthrop Rockefeller in the race for state Governor.

In Table E-3, the major cleavages and alliances over time are summarized. This table suggests that the immediate effect of the crisis was depolarization mediated by the traditional southern appeals of resistance, unity, etc. However, when the effects of resistance became clearer, the upper-middle and middle-class moved more in the moderate direction and revealed a greater polarization than that of pre-crisis elections. However, the electoral victory of the moderates in 1959 is due to more than the solidarity of their own voting. A critical factor in the coalition was the partial support of the middle-class. Their increasing moderation was not a change in attitude so much as a reaction to the immediate consequences of continued extreme resistance. When closing of the public schools became the issue, the real cross-pressured middle groups became more influenced by the reality of their needs (public school education) than by the emotional significance of their sacred symbols (their children were not in the affected schools). From 1957 to 1959, the lower-middle-class (SES Group 4) increased their support of moderate local candidates by approximately 7 per cent, while the upper-lower-class maintained their strong resistance.

In summary, the racial crisis in Little Rock exerted differential pressures on different social groups. For the lower-class white, token school desegregation affects his child directly by removing the symbolism of racial superiority while, at the same time, creating conditions for equality in employment. The cross-pressured middle group is not affected directly by the token integration, but is deeply committed to southern tradition. When the issue is closing the schools, however, many defect and support moderate causes. The upper-income groups are concerned with the effect of racial disturbances on the local economy (e.g., Negro boycotts of local business). This coalition has remained stable since 1959. The presence of a strong "civic elite" in Little Rock and the severe and negative economic consequences of the 1957 racial crisis continue to influence the local politics of Little Rock.

Atlanta

The Atlanta coalition between the upper- and upper-middle-classes has been well documented (Jennings and Ziegler, 1964, 1966), and most of the data presented in this section support the previous findings. Nevertheless, more recent elections

Table E-3

Status Polarization and Class Cleavage, Little Rock

Polarization[1]

1956	Presidential	19.6
	Governor	6.9
1957	Pre-crisis School Board	38.7
	City Council	35.0
1958	State and Local	34.8
1959	Local	41.2

Cleavage

	Difference Lower Middle - Lower (4-3)	Difference Middle - Lower Middle (5-4)	Difference Upper Middle - Middle (6-5)	Difference Upper - Upper Middle (7-6)
1956	7.4	2.7	3.4	0.2
1957 (pre-crisis)	7.7	11.9	14.9	4.2
1957 (post-crisis)	3.1	16.4	10.1	5.2
1958	4.2	16.3	7.5	5.8
1959	1.1	22.0	12.8	5.2

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[1] Measured as the percentage difference between the upper-class precinct voting and the upper-lower-class precinct voting.

suggest that Republicanism is having some unexpected results on the moderate Democratic candidates. In Table E-4, the mean vote by social class is summarized for local elections, Democratic primaries, and national elections.

Looking first at the major local election for mayor in 1961, we find a strong class polarization of 47 per cent. But like Little Rock before racial crisis, this polarization was not so prevalent in 1953. At that time, lower-class whites almost gave Hartsfield, Atlanta's moderate mayor from 1947 to 1965, a majority. Furthermore, analysis of Table E-4 shows that the liberal tendency among the upper-class precincts is not as large in the state elections. For example, Lester Maddox, of recent fame, received a majority among the upper-classes in his unsuccessful campaign for Lieutenant Governor in 1961. However, there is a depolarization occurring in partisan elections for Congress and for President. This change warrants special consideration.

The Emergence of Republicanism and Its Effect. Southern commentators have long hoped for the emergence of a two-party system in the South as a prologue to the end of the political preoccupation with race. Since 1962, the Republican party in Atlanta, unlike our other two cities, has entered candidates and had strong organizations in the congressional races. In Atlanta, the victories of Congressman Weltner, one of the few Southerners to support the 1964 Civil Rights Act, have been hailed as proof that a coalition of upper-class whites and Negroes can give a strong base for pro-civil rights candidates. According to an intensive study of Weltner's 1962 campaign by Jennings and Ziegler (1964, 1966), this new-style candidate can utilize upper-class liberal support to defeat the more segregationist candidate in the Democratic primary and then rely on the lower-class white partisan loyalty to transfer allegiance to a more moderate Democrat, despite seeming ideological differences in the civil rights area. This study, we feel, assigns too much importance to the stability of party identification in the face of ideological conflict. Moreover, it fails to look closely at the voting behavior of the cross-pressured lower-class white. The Jennings-Ziegler study found that Weltner had a gain of 18 per cent from the Democratic primary to the election against the Republican, O'Callaghan. While Weltner did make a net gain percentage-wise, he did so mainly because many supporters of Davis, the conservative segregationist, did not vote in the general election. In the two lower-class groups, turnout decreased over 35 per cent, while in the upper-classes, turnout decreased only 12%. The failure of the lower-class whites to vote for the Republican candidate cancelled out the defections from the upper-classes and the Negro precincts.

Table E-4

Adjusted Precinct Votes, Atlanta 1953-1963, by Social Class

	Lower SES=2 N=3	Upper Lower SES=3 N=7	Lower Middle SES=4 N=13	Middle SES=5 N=17	Upper Middle SES=6 N=7	Upper SES=7 N=8	Status Polarization (Upper-Lower)	Negro Precincts N=13
Partisan-% Republican								
1956 Thrower Rep. Cong.	13%	6%	18%	26%	47%	52%	39	84%
1956 Pres.-Eisenhower	12	5	17	23	42	48	36	78
1960 Pres.-Nixon	28	31	36	42	47	55	27	56
1964 Pres.-Goldwater	48	64	55	55	57	57	9	3
1962 O'Callaghan vs. Weltner	29	29	38	38	54	57	28	30
1964 O'Callaghan vs. Weltner	42	69	56	49	63	61	19	41
Non-Partisan % More Moderate								
1954 Abrams vs. Davis	25	22	42	41	45	43	18	84
1958 Vandiver	80	86	85	87	91	93	13	73
1962 Saunders	46	40	59	67	77	81	35	98
1962 Geer vs. Maddox	9	7	23	34	41	45	36	94
1962 Weltner vs. Davis	22	26	40	46	51	52	30	95
1964 Weltner vs. Lowe	50	33	47	55	51	56	6	92

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Table E-4 continued

	Lower SES=2 N=3	Upper Lower SES=3 N=7	Lower Middle SES=4 N=13	Middle SES=5 N=17	Upper Middle SES=6 N=7	Upper SES=7 N=8	Status Polarization (Upper-Lower)	Negro Precincts N=13
Local-% Pro Upper-Income Coalition								
1953 Hartsfield	45%	47%	54%	54%	69%	68%	23	67
1957 Hartsfield vs. Maddox	23	22	30	40	60	71	48	94
1961 Allen vs. Maddox	26	26	30	40	64	73	47	97
1965 Allen vs. Smith & Taylor	29	35	46	42	57	65	36	95
1962 Bond Pro	16	19	25	29	46	53	37	65
1964 Bond Pro	26	32	39	46	60	67	41	88
1964 Mixed Drinks Pro	51	35	49	52	72	76	25	83

Nevertheless, the sign of dissatisfaction with a liberal Democrat among all white voters was clear.

The very low turnout by the lower- and middle-classes in the 1964 Democratic primary was the first sign that the political situation was changing. In this primary, the Negroes and the upper-classes continued to show their support for the liberal, Weltner, against a less-well-known segregationist Democrat, as did the pro-Weltner elements among the middle- and lower-classes. On the other hand, the anti-Weltner forces in the lower- and middle-classes, knowing they could not defeat Weltner in the primary, waited until the general election when they could count on the Republican sentiments to lead to some defections from Weltner. Weltner won in the general election by a very close margin. He received fewer votes than in the 1962 election in every precinct, including the Negro ones. Still the 60 per cent Negro vote was enough. The influence of Goldwater in mobilizing this swing is clear in Table E-5: the largest gains for Goldwater are also the precincts with the largest drop-off in the Weltner vote from 1962 to 1964. This trend suggests another reason why Weltner chose not to run in 1966: he would have lost. Maddox's victory made it obvious that support for moderation in the South was ebbing and the strength of the Republican organization indicated that he could not count on increasing support among the upper-classes. There just were not that many more Negroes registered to make up the difference. In fact, the Republican defeated Weltner's replacement by a large majority. The unusual size of the Republican candidate's margin was only partially attributable to a low turnout in the Negro areas. The lack of choice between a moderate and a segregationist clearly depressed Negro participation for the first time in Atlanta since 1954.

Will this depolarization of the whites generalize to the civic elections and defeat the moderate interracial coalition? The 1965 mayoralty election did indicate a slight drop in the support of the coalition candidate; but it succeeded in both 1965 and 1969 with large Negro turnouts. According to the logic of our analysis, it would not be unexpected for the Republicans, or the Negroes, to enter a candidate splitting the traditional pro-coalition forces severely in the not-too-distant future.

New Orleans

The political history of New Orleans and the state of Louisiana is unusual for the South because of the existence

Table E-5

Status Polarization and Class Cleavage, Atlanta

Polarization[1]

1954	20.5
1956	37.5
1960	40.7
1962	32.5
1964	14.8

Cleavage

	Difference Lower Middle-Upper Lower (4-3)	Difference Middle-Lower Middle (5-4)	Difference Upper Middle-Middle (6-5)	Difference Upper-Upper Middle (7-6)
1954	13.5	-0.5	9.5	-1.5
1956	12.0	7.0	20.0	5.5
1960	5.7	8.7	16.3	9.3
1962	12.0	4.5	12.0	3.8
1964	1.5	1.0	8.0	1.7

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[1] Measured as the percentage difference between the upper-status precinct voting and the lower-class precinct voting.

of a bi-factional political competition based on directly economic issues (Key, 1949, pp. 156-182). Huey Long and his heirs were able to muster an interracial coalition comprised of populist rural sentiment and economic liberalism in the urban areas.

In contrast to Atlanta, racial issues were relatively dormant in Louisiana politics until 1959. The traditional Long coalition, based on lower-class white and Negro support, is indicated in the 1956 governorship race shown in Table E-6. Likewise, the anti-Long, anti-machine sentiments of the urban upper-class is represented by Morrison, Mayor of New Orleans.

In 1959, school desegregation became a dominant issue and the strength of the Long Machine was eroded by the idiosyncratic behavior of Earl Long. The statewide contest soon became a contest between moderates and segregationists to fill the void left by the decaying Long Machine. On the one hand, the moderates, emphasizing basic economic issues, hoped to attract the working class and the Negro vote, while, on the other hand, the segregationists hoped to capitalize on the anti-Negro sentiments in all segments of the white population. In the Democratic primary, the basic divisions within the state were reflected in the New Orleans vote. Willy Rainch, a staunch segregationist and past president of the Citizens Council, fared considerably better statewide (17 per cent) than he did in New Orleans, where his support was distributed equally across all socio-economic groups. Similarly, James Davis, a popular entertainer and Governor from 1944-1948, who represented the traditional, industrial, county seat "elite," and the anti-Long voting bloc, was second in the primary. Morrison, a Roman Catholic with 33 per cent of the vote, did extremely well in the southern Louisiana urban parishes with heavy Roman Catholic populations. Finally, the Long forces, represented by two weak candidates, polled only 10 per cent each of the vote.

The question was: Whom would the Long supporters vote for in the run-off -- the more segregationist candidate, Davis, or the more racially liberal, local candidate, Morrison? In contrast to Atlanta, the more liberal candidate had to compete for the white labor, pro-Long farmers, and the segregationist vote. Morrison's past history of racial tolerance and his Roman Catholicism, together with his failure to gain AFL-CIO endorsement, were insurmountable obstacles. As the vote in the 1960 run-off indicates, Morrison picked up little support from the Long or Rainch supporters both state-wide and in the city of New Orleans. Morrison's defeat in 1964 again reflected his failure to break down the resistance to his candidacy from the anti-Negro and lower classes.

Table E-6

Adjusted Precinct Votes, New Orleans 1956-1964, by Social Class

	Lower SES=2 N=7	Upper Lower SES=3 N=43	Lower Middle SES=4 N=90	Middle SES=5 N=62	Upper Middle SES=6 N=32	Upper SES=7 N=25	Bourbon Aristocrats SES=8 N=7	Status Polarization (Arist.-Lower)	Negro Precincts
1956 Presidential									
Stevenson	65.0%	64.0%	49.8%	37.8%	26.6%	23.5%	23.9%	-41.1	51.1%
Eisenhower	35.8	40.3	49.6	59.0	68.6	70.3	69.5	33.7	46.9
State's Rights 1956	3.4	5.2	5.5	5.1	4.1	3.8	3.7	0.3	2.0
1959 Primary Gov.									
Davis	39.0	32.3	33.1	27.6	23.8	25.3	22.6	-16.4	16.2
Dodd	6.1	8.5	8.2	5.3	5.3	3.4	3.9	- 2.2	3.2
Morrison	29.3	32.5	37.5	47.2	53.8	51.4	61.4	32.1	63.6
Noe	14.1	11.1	7.4	4.8	3.3	3.5	1.5	-12.6	12.5
Rainch	9.2	9.8	12.3	11.6	13.6	12.9	12.4	3.2	2.5
1960 Run-Off Gov.									
Davis	68.0	63.7	57.5	47.1	39.3	38.6	34.6	-33.4	19.0
Morrison	32.0	36.3	42.2	52.9	60.7	61.4	63.4	31.4	81.0
1960 Presidential									
Kennedy	61.9	49.6	46.9	43.4	38.7	38.0	32.3	-29.6	71.0
Nixon	11.4	12.4	20.1	27.7	37.1	40.2	52.3	40.9	22.5

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Table E-6 continued

	Lower SES=2 N=7	Upper Lower SES=3 N=43	Lower Middle SES=4 N=90	Middle SES=5 N=62	Upper Middle SES=6 N=32	Upper SES=7 N=25	Bourbon Aristocrats SES=8 N=7	Status Polarization (Arist.-Lower)	Negro Precincts
State's Rights 1960	26.7%	38.0%	33.4%	28.9%	24.2%	21.7%	15.4%	-11.3	6.5%
School Referenda									
Referendum 1960a	61.3	46.4	37.8	31.6	27.1	23.6	17.5	-43.8	24.8
Referendum 1960b	78.8	61.3	58.1	55.1	55.1	55.2	50.9	-27.9	31.8
Referendum 1960c	76.7	58.1	56.6	55.4	55.6	56.1	53.1	-23.6	30.1
Referendum 1956	81.8	80.7	75.4	70.9	67.0	62.6	67.6	-14.2	53.9
1964 Goldwater	50.8	59.1	50.8	60.3	62.2	66.9	66.9	16.1	13.6
1956 Primary									
Long	68.6	56.1	46.9	31.6	21.4	20.3	22.4	-46.2	56.2
McLemore	6.2	10.9	10.4	10.0	8.6	7.4	7.2	1.0	1.6
Morrison	20.5	25.9	32.1	43.3	49.0	51.1	49.4	28.9	39.2
1964 Primary Gov.									
McKeithen	53.1	57.3	46.1	39.0	33.5	29.3	22.1	-31.0	9.4
Morrison	46.9	42.7	53.8	61.0	66.5	70.7	77.9	31.0	90.6
1964 Lyons Rep.	18.3	18.5	34.0	46.7	56.1	62.9	73.7	55.4	---

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Table E-6 continued

	Lower SES=2 N=7	Upper Lower SES=3 N=43	Lower Middle SES=4 N=90	Middle SES=5 N=62	Upper Middle SES=6 N=32	Upper SES=7 N=25	Bourbon Aristocrats SES=8 N=7	Status Polarization (Arist.-Lower)	Negro Precincts
1956 School Board									
Augustine	4.3%	1.6%	2.3%	2.6%	2.9%	3.3%	3.6%	- 0.7	---
Garvey	19.5	13.4	11.2	11.0	7.3	7.4	10.9	- 8.6	---
Norris	15.4	10.8	8.9	8.2	8.0	6.5	7.8	- 7.6	---
Parun	7.1	6.8	6.3	6.0	5.1	4.8	5.6	- 1.5	---
Riecke	31.4	36.7	39.2	39.5	39.6	40.0	34.3	2.9	---
Rittiner	29.2	35.9	35.1	36.8	37.8	38.1	37.8	8.6	---
1960 School Board									
Singren	41.2	46.6	42.1	37.8	36.1	31.9	27.6	-13.6	---
Sutherland	41.2	32.7	42.1	46.6	54.0	57.2	63.0	21.8	---

However, there is still an indication of a successful coalition between moderates and Negroes in the local elections. In 1956 the election for school board shows little class polarization. But by 1960, New Orleans was the scene of violent resistance to, and white boycotts of, tokenly desegregated schools. Efforts by the segregationists to defeat a moderate, pro-federal compliance candidate, Sutherland, were not successful. During this period also, there were referenda related to creation of private segregated schools and their financial support. In 1956, all social classes, and even the Negro precincts, seemed to favor preservation of the status quo. By 1960, as in Little Rock, the implications of the extreme segregationists changed the situational meaning of resistance. Thus, while there was continued support for the principle of segregated schools, very few whites were willing to grant the state the right to finance private institutions from public taxes.

In national elections, the situation parallels Atlanta. A latent dissatisfaction with the liberal Democratic party was partly expressed in 1960 through support for state's rights electorates, and reaffirmed more extensively in support for Goldwater, although the national Republican vote does not seem to be as general as it was in Atlanta. The lower-class whites did not vote for a Republican candidate for governor, Senate, or the House of Representatives.

In conclusion, New Orleans has not made the progress Atlanta and Little Rock have in developing a strong moderate coalition. For New Orleans the index of status polarization in 1960 is only 22 per cent -- compared to the roughly 40 per cent figure of Little Rock and Atlanta. However, there is evidence to suggest that polarization is increasing. In the 1965 school board election, the moderate candidate received 33 per cent of the vote in the lower-class precincts and 66 per cent of the vote in the upper-class precincts. Furthermore, the New Orleans Negro bloc has not reached its potential either in pure numbers or solidarity. The weakness of the upper-class whites and Negroes to control the local political situation is further indicated by the failure of their candidate to win mayoralty contests since the resignation of Morrison.

Conclusion and Theoretical Speculations

In each of the three southern cities, a coalition of Negroes and upper-income whites has been successful in electing candidates advocating moderation on the race issue. Furthermore, the cleavage between upper- and lower-income whites has increased during periods of racial crisis.

However, the data indicate that this coalition is dominant mostly in local, non-partisan elections.

While this coalition is a feature of some southern cities, it cannot be inferred that this is a necessary or permanent condition of the urban political scene. The analysis of these three southern cities suggests several hypotheses or limiting conditions concerning the development of this coalition of upper-status whites and Negroes.

(1) Because of racial considerations, southern politics is inherently more unstable than stable. The coalition of upper-income whites and Negroes is especially unstable because: (a) it requires an active upper-status "civic elite" as well as support from the white middle-class and united Negroes; and (b) there is a continual tension between local progressivism and economic conservatism.

(2) The coalition of upper-status whites and Negro interests represents a successful strategy of transition from southern segregationist traditions. The middle-class support moderate policies when extreme resistance threatens important economic and educational interests. For the middle-class these interests are more critical than maintaining the symbols of white supremacy.

(3) The disappearance of the symbols of segregation initiates a period of Negro demands for economic and structural changes. Resistance to these new demands for change has a broader based appeal in the urban South, but will deter upper-status white support of the coalition.

(4) Republicanism is an important mediating factor in weakening the traditional identifications with the Democratic party. The emergence of local conservative Republicans allows lower- and middle-class whites to resolve their conflicts between their ideological agreement with the Republicans and past loyalty to the Democratic party. Once the initial resistance to vote Republican is overcome, the traditional reasons for anti-Republicanism (pro-big business, anti-the common man, etc.) are minimized. Thereafter, the latent agreement of conservatism on race and domestic policies is maximized. Some change in the positive evaluation of the Republican party in the South is well documented in Matthews and Prothro (1966). However, they would disagree with the prediction of large changes, because of the fact that strict segregationists favor liberal domestic policies and still feel committed to the Democratic party. To support this, they would point out that even 54 per cent of weak Democrats favoring segregation supported Johnson. In

response, we think Matthews and Prothro failed to look carefully at Goldwater's image in the South. Although race is the only salient factor for many Southerners, Goldwater's economically conservative stance on social security, the TVA, etc., certainly lost him support among the less threatened middle- and upper-class groups in the South, as it did in the North. The local Republican candidates in Atlanta can be successful by accepting present "New Deal" policies while rejecting go-further economic structural changes.

A projection of present trends leads to the prediction of increasing conservatism as a two-party system develops. When partisanship develops, especially in national elections, the divergence between national issues and local issues creates defections from the interracial coalition by the middle- and upper-class whites. Thus, polarization between different SES groups among whites decreases and stability and consensus forms around a conservative orientation on national and racial policies. While this is a progression from traditional segregationist policies, it is also a regression from previous moderate policies. The new consensus among whites creates new conflict and dissatisfaction among Negroes. Their possible reactions, once the value of their vote as the balance of power has been reduced, is hard to predict. One likely choice of action in some areas will be to form a separate political party and enter Negro candidates for local offices. This will at least ensure continued high rates of participation rather than apathy as in the 1966 elections in Atlanta. In turn, the Negro defection would ensure a plurality and victory for the anti-coalition forces.

The overall trend is not, then, toward a political situation more conducive to school integration in the short run. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that the existence of a Negro voting bloc, holding the balance of power, is a political situation generally alien to the southern situation. While the power of the Negro to influence whites via the ballot box is an important tactic, it is certainly not the only one. Other means, such as legal action, protests, etc., have been effective. In pursuing further concessions from whites, the practical implications of our analysis suggest that the maximization of Negro voting power requires the existence of a white community divided on how best to resolve current racial controversy.